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SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Filesystem types
type labeledfs, fs_type;
type pipefs, fs_type;
type sockfs, fs_type;
type rootfs, fs_type;
type proc, fs_type;
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
# Security-sensitive proc nodes that should not be writable to most.
type proc_security, fs_type;
drop_caches label, vold scratch space on expanded. Define an explicit label for /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches and grant to the various people who need it, including vold which uses it when performing storage benchmarks. Also let vold create new directories under it's private storage area where the benchmarks will be carried out. Mirror the definition of the private storage area on expanded media. avc: denied { write } for name="drop_caches" dev="proc" ino=20524 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Bug: 21172095 Change-Id: I300b1cdbd235ff60e64064d3ba6e5ea783baf23f
2015-05-15 05:55:31 +02:00
# Type for /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
type proc_drop_caches, fs_type;
Restrict the ability to set usermodehelpers and proc security settings. Limit the ability to write to the files that configure kernel usermodehelpers and security-sensitive proc settings to the init domain. Permissive domains can also continue to set these values. The current list is not exhaustive, just an initial set. Not all of these files will exist on all kernels/devices. Controlling access to certain kernel usermodehelpers, e.g. cgroup release_agent, will require kernel changes to support and cannot be addressed here. Expected output on e.g. flo after the change: ls -Z /sys/kernel/uevent_helper /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict /proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space /proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 uevent_helper -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 suid_dumpable -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 core_pattern -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 dmesg_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 hotplug -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 kptr_restrict -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 poweroff_cmd -rw-r--r-- root root u:object_r:proc_security:s0 randomize_va_space -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 bset -rw------- root root u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0 inheritable Change-Id: I3f24b4bb90f0916ead863be6afd66d15ac5e8de0 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-12-06 15:31:40 +01:00
# proc, sysfs, or other nodes that permit configuration of kernel usermodehelpers.
type usermodehelper, fs_type, sysfs_type;
Target the denials/policies over qtaguid file and device: 1. Relabel /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl from "qtaguid" to "qtaguid_proc"; 2. Label /dev/xt_qtaguid with "qtaguid_device"; 3. Allow mediaserver read/[write] to qtaguid_proc and qtaguid_device; 4. Allow media apps read/[write] to qtaguid_proc and qtaguid_device; 5. Allow system read/[write] to qtaguid_proc and qtaguid_device. Actually, some of policies related to qtaguid have been there already, but we refind existing ones and add new ones.
2012-07-19 20:07:04 +02:00
type qtaguid_proc, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
Various policy updates. Assortment of policy changes include: * Bluetooth domain to talk to init and procfs. * New device node domains. * Allow zygote to talk to its executable. * Update system domain access to new device node domains. * Create a post-process sepolicy with dontaudits removed. * Allow rild to use the tty device. Change-Id: Ibb96b590d0035b8f6d1606cd5e4393c174d10ffb Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2013-03-27 11:30:25 +01:00
type proc_bluetooth_writable, fs_type;
zygote: allow replacing /proc/cpuinfo Android's native bridge functionality allows an Android native app written on one CPU architecture to run on a different architecture. For example, Android ARM apps may run on an x86 CPU. To support this, the native bridge functionality needs to replace /proc/cpuinfo with the version from /system/lib/<ISA>/cpuinfo using a bind mount. See commit ab0da5a9a6860046619629b8e6b83692d35dff86 in system/core. This change: 1) Creates a new label proc_cpuinfo, and assigns /proc/cpuinfo that label. 2) Grants read-only access to all SELinux domains, to avoid breaking pre-existing apps. 3) Grants zygote mounton capabilities for that file, so zygote can replace the file as necessary. Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { mounton } for path="/proc/cpuinfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532012 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file Bug: 17671501 Change-Id: Ib70624fba2baeccafbc0a41369833f76b976ee20
2014-09-26 19:51:12 +02:00
type proc_cpuinfo, fs_type;
Give /proc/iomem a more specific label. /proc/iomem is currently given the proc label but contains system information which should not be available to all processes. Bug: 22008387 Change-Id: I4f1821f40113a743ad986d13d8d130ed8b8abf2f
2015-07-13 17:39:17 +02:00
type proc_iomem, fs_type;
Create proc_net type for /proc/sys/net entries. /proc/sys/net could use its own type to help distinguish among some of the proc access rules. Fix dhcp and netd because of this. Change-Id: I6e16cba660f07bc25f437bf43e1eba851a88d538 Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2014-01-07 19:46:56 +01:00
type proc_net, fs_type;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
type proc_sysrq, fs_type;
Allow system_server to read/write /proc/uid_cputime/ module Bug:20182139 Change-Id: I1829a83c7d8e2698715e424a688a2753d65de868
2015-05-13 02:14:35 +02:00
type proc_uid_cputime_showstat, fs_type;
type proc_uid_cputime_removeuid, fs_type;
More MLS trusted subject/object annotations. dumpstate and lmkd need to act on apps running at any level. Various file types need to be writable by apps running at any level. Change-Id: Idf574d96ba961cc110a48d0a00d30807df6777ba Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-11 21:51:28 +02:00
type selinuxfs, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type cgroup, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
Add sysfs_type attribute to sysfs, coalesce ueventd rules. As per the discussion in: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/92903/ Add sysfs_type attribute to sysfs type so that it is included in rules on sysfs_type, allow setattr to all sysfs_type for ueventd for chown/chmod, and get rid of redundant rules. Change-Id: I1228385d5703168c3852ec75605ed8da7c99b83d Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-08 19:18:52 +02:00
type sysfs, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type sysfs_writable, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master. Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master. Primarily this consists of changes around the bluetooth subsystem. The zygote also needs further permissions to set up /storage/emulated. adbd service now gets a socket under /dev/socket. keystore uses the binder. Change-Id: I8c5aeb8d100313c75169734a0fa614aa974b3bfc Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2012-11-16 15:06:47 +01:00
type sysfs_bluetooth_writable, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
Integrate nfc_power and rild rules from tuna sepolicy by Bryan Hinton.
2012-03-19 20:56:01 +01:00
type sysfs_nfc_power_writable, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
Introduce controls on wake lock interface Change-Id: Ie0ee266e9e6facb2ab2abd652f68765239a41af1
2013-09-29 00:46:21 +02:00
type sysfs_wake_lock, fs_type, sysfs_type;
Do not allow apps to access network address file Bug: 18068520 Bug: 21852542 Change-Id: I876b37ac31dd44201ea1c1400a7c2c16c6a10049
2015-07-24 22:25:45 +02:00
type sysfs_mac_address, fs_type, sysfs_type;
sysfs_devices_system_cpu should be a sysfs_type Otherwise the following denials occur on mako: <5>[ 2.494246] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:4): avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="time_in_state" dev="sysfs" ino=17444 scontext=u:object_r:sy sfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem <5>[ 2.494735] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:5): avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="total_trans" dev="sysfs" ino=17443 scontext=u:object_r:sysf s_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem <5>[ 2.495162] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:6): avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="stats" dev="sysfs" ino=17442 scontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devi ces_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem <5>[ 2.495620] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:7): avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="scaling_governor" dev="sysfs" ino=17435 scontext=u:object_r :sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem <5>[ 2.496047] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:8): avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="cpuinfo_transition_latency" dev="sysfs" ino=17429 scontext= u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem <5>[ 2.496505] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:9): avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="scaling_available_frequencies" dev="sysfs" ino=17439 sconte xt=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem <5>[ 2.496963] type=1400 audit(1382544550.200:10): avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="scaling_driver" dev="sysfs" ino=17436 scontext=u:object_r: sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem Change-Id: I584a1cf61cb871a38be4d3b308cef03e64cfda8e
2013-10-23 18:08:23 +02:00
# /sys/devices/system/cpu
type sysfs_devices_system_cpu, fs_type, sysfs_type;
initial lmkd policy. * Allow writes to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj * Allow writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/* Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 3.825371] type=1400 audit(9781555.430:5): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.874747] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:16): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="896" dev="proc" ino=9589 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 48.874889] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:17): avc: denied { dac_override } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" capability=1 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 48.874982] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.875075] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:19): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 49.409231] type=1400 audit(9781601.169:20): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.081990] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:24): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1556" dev="proc" ino=10961 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.082240] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.082498] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:26): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.119673] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:27): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1577" dev="proc" ino=12708 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.119937] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:28): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.120105] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:29): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.235597] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:30): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1600" dev="proc" ino=11659 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.235798] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:31): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.236006] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:32): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297283] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:64): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297415] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:65): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355060] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:66): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355236] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:67): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.516920] type=1400 audit(9781766.279:68): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1907" dev="proc" ino=11742 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.678861] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:69): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.678992] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:70): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708284] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:71): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1765" dev="proc" ino=12851 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.708435] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:72): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708648] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:73): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Ie3c1ab8ce9e77742d0cc3c73f40010afd018ccd4
2014-02-13 21:19:50 +01:00
# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller
type sysfs_lowmemorykiller, fs_type, sysfs_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type inotify, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
Add policy for run-as program. Add policy for run-as program and label it in file_contexts. Drop MLS constraints on local socket checks other than create/relabel as this interferes with connections with services, in particular for adb forward. Change-Id: Ib0c4abeb7cbef559e150a620c45a7c31e0531114 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2012-11-13 19:00:05 +01:00
type devpts, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type tmpfs, fs_type;
type shm, fs_type;
type mqueue, fs_type;
Rename sdcard_internal/external types. Rename sdcard_internal/external types to fuse and vfat respectively to make it clear that they are assigned to any fuse or vfat filesystem by default (absent a context= mount option) and do not necessarily represent the SDcard. The sdcard_type attribute is still assigned to both types and can still be used in allow rules to permit access to either the internal or external SDcard. Define type aliases for the old names to preserve compatibility on policy reload and for device-specific policies that may not yet be updated. Change-Id: I8d91a8c4c1342b94e4f1bb62ca7ffd2ca4b06ba1 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-07-08 20:45:09 +02:00
type fuse, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
type vfat, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
typealias fuse alias sdcard_internal;
typealias vfat alias sdcard_external;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type debugfs, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
pstore file system labeling pstore(persistent store) have been applied since kernel 3.5 We need to label the pstore-fs in order to use Android with kernel 3.5 or upper version. My kernel version is 3.10 and I got the below denial log when I ran the "df" command on the adb shell. type=1400 msg=audit(1388540540.220:18): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=7296 comm="df" name="/" dev="pstore" ino=7703 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=filesystem And the below log is also shown during booting type=1400 msg=audit(1388539193.750:4): avc: denied { mount } for pid=2844 comm="mount" name="/" dev="pstore" ino=11393 scontext=u:r:init_shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=filesystem Change-Id: Iaba543d44565c4f20a77a95b9573a628bbd3fd34
2014-04-10 06:32:54 +02:00
type pstorefs, fs_type;
Label /dev/usb-ffs/adb functionfs Newer adbd versions use functionfs instead of a custom adb usb gadget. Make sure the functionfs filesystem is properly labeled, and that adbd has access to the functionfs files. Once labeled, this addresses the following denials: <12>[ 16.127191] type=1400 audit(949060866.189:4): avc: denied { read write } for pid=223 comm="adbd" name="ep0" dev="functionfs" ino=5489 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file <12>[ 16.127406] type=1400 audit(949060866.189:5): avc: denied { open } for pid=223 comm="adbd" path="/dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0" dev="functionfs" ino=5489 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file <12>[ 377.366011] type=1400 audit(949061227.419:16): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=225 comm="adbd" path="/dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep2" dev="functionfs" ino=5564 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Iee8b522e48b4d677fd12f7c83dbc7ffbc9543ad2
2014-04-15 23:53:05 +02:00
type functionfs, fs_type;
Define contextmount_type attribute and add it to oemfs. Several device-specific policy changes with the same Change-Id also add this attribute to device-specific types. Change-Id: I09e13839b1956f61875a38844fe4fc3c911ea60f Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-30 14:49:51 +02:00
type oemfs, fs_type, contextmount_type;
label usbfs Right now usbfs doesn't have any labels, generating the following kernel warnings: <7>[ 3.009582] SELinux: initialized (dev usbfs, type usbfs), not configured for labeling and the occasional SELinux unlabeled auditallow logs: <4>[ 285.579254] type=1400 audit(1402010345.094:16): avc: granted { search } for pid=371 comm="qcks" name="/" dev="usbfs" ino=15794 scontext=u:r:kickstart:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir <4>[ 285.632354] type=1400 audit(1402010345.154:18): avc: granted { search } for pid=371 comm="qcks" name="001" dev="usbfs" ino=15796 scontext=u:r:kickstart:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir Make sure usbfs is assigned via genfscon Change-Id: I7191f2584014ba55a3c3a98e7efd0350dc958782
2014-06-07 16:31:31 +02:00
type usbfs, fs_type;
genfs_contexts: provide a label for binfmt_misc Provide a default label for binfmt_misc. This is not used by the core policy, although it may be used in device specific policy. Bug: 20152930 Change-Id: Id51d69333bfeda40720d0e65e1539fab0b6e1e95
2015-04-11 02:42:49 +02:00
type binfmt_miscfs, fs_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# File types
type unlabeled, file_type;
# Default type for anything under /system.
type system_file, file_type;
Dependencies for new goldfish service domains. In order to support the new goldfish service domains in a change with the same Change-Id for the build project, we need the following changes in external/sepolicy: - /system/bin/logcat needs its own type so that it can be used as an entrypoint for the goldfish-logcat service. A neverallow rule prevents us from allowing entrypoint to any type not in exec_type. - The config. and dalvik. property namespaces need to be labeled with something other than default_prop so that the qemu-props service can set them. A neverallow rule prevents us from allowing qemu-props to set default_prop. We allow rx_file_perms to logcat_exec for any domain that was previously allowed read_logd() as many programs will read the logs by running logcat. We do not do this for all domains as it would violate a neverallow rule on the kernel domain executing any file without transitioning to another domain, and as we ultimately want to apply the same restriction to the init domain (and possibly others). Change-Id: Idce1fb5ed9680af84788ae69a5ace684c6663974 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-04 14:44:49 +02:00
# Type for /system/bin/logcat.
type logcat_exec, exec_type, file_type;
allow coredump functionality (cherrypick of commit d7e004ebf949ae21b299a49cff9917f6560200a3) Change-Id: I7993698ac96f21db0039681275280dbd43ff61ba
2014-10-31 20:40:12 +01:00
# /cores for coredumps on userdebug / eng builds
type coredump_file, file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Default type for anything under /data.
type system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Adding e4crypt support Add selinux rules to allow file level encryption to work Change-Id: I1e4bba23e99cf5b2624a7df843688fba6f3c3209
2015-03-11 23:44:14 +01:00
# Unencrypted data
type unencrypted_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Label /data/.layout_version with its own type. installd creates /data/.layout_version. Introduce a separate type for this file (and any other file created by installd under a directory labeled system_data_file) so that we can allow create/write access by installd without allowing it to any system data files created by other processes. This prevents installd from overwriting other system data files, and ensure that any files it creates will require explicit rules in order to access. Change-Id: Id04e49cd571390d18792949c8b2b13b1ac59c016 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-12 17:18:21 +02:00
# /data/.layout_version or other installd-created files that
# are created in a system_data_file directory.
type install_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Policy changes to support running the latest CTS.
2012-03-07 20:59:01 +01:00
# /data/drm - DRM plugin data
type drm_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Allow adbd to write to /data/adb adbd writes debugging information to /data/adb when persist.adb.trace_mask is set. Allow it. Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=72895 Change-Id: Ia5af09045e9f72a95325b429c30a5ae78e104bdc
2014-10-21 06:56:02 +02:00
# /data/adb - adb debugging files
type adb_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# /data/anr - ANR traces
Allow apps to write to anr_data_file for /data/anr/traces.txt.
2012-04-04 22:00:11 +02:00
type anr_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# /data/tombstones - core dumps
type tombstone_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
# /data/app - user-installed apps
Introduce a separate apk_tmp_file type for the vmdl.*\.tmp files.
2012-03-19 15:24:52 +01:00
type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
type apk_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Add new domains for private apps. /data/app-private is used when making an app purchase or forward locking. Provide a new label for the directory as well as the tmp files that appear under it. Change-Id: I910cd1aa63538253e10a8d80268212ad9fc9fca5 Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2013-04-03 20:21:46 +02:00
# /data/app-private - forward-locked apps
type apk_private_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
type apk_private_tmp_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# /data/dalvik-cache
type dalvikcache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Fix SELinux policies to allow resource overlays. The following commits added support for runtime resource overlays. New command line tool 'idmap' * 65a05fd56dbc9fd9c2511a97f49c445a748fb3c5 Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2 * 48d22323ce39f9aab003dce74456889b6414af55 Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2, test cases * ad6ed950dbfa152c193dd7e49c369d9e831f1591 During SELinux tightening, support for these runtime resource overlays was unknowingly broken. Fix it. This change has been tested by hackbod and she reports that everything is working after this change. I haven't independently verified the functionality. Test cases are available for this by running: * python frameworks/base/core/tests/overlaytests/testrunner.py Change-Id: I1c70484011fd9041bec4ef34f93f7a5509906f40
2014-06-16 23:19:31 +02:00
# /data/resource-cache
type resourcecache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# /data/local - writable by shell
More MLS trusted subject/object annotations. dumpstate and lmkd need to act on apps running at any level. Various file types need to be writable by apps running at any level. Change-Id: Idf574d96ba961cc110a48d0a00d30807df6777ba Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-11 21:51:28 +02:00
type shell_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# /data/gps
type gps_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Protect /data/property. /data/property is only accessible by root and is used by the init property service for storing persistent property values. Create a separate type for it and only allow init to write to the directory and files within it. Ensure that we do not allow access to other domains in future changes or device-specific policy via a neverallow rule. Change-Id: Iff556b9606c5651c0f1bba902e30b59bdd6f063a Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-29 15:22:16 +02:00
# /data/property
type property_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
bootchart: add policy rules for bootchart allow the bootchart to create dir and files at init, also allow user to create the stop and start file under /data/bootchart directory to start and stop bootchart Change-Id: Icfee8dcd17366383eef00fbe3139744bf4427a6b Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org>
2014-12-05 06:40:22 +01:00
# /data/bootchart
type bootchart_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Allow system_server to collect app heapdumps (debug builds only) On debuggable builds, system_server can request app heap dumps by running something similar to the following commands: % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576 % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing which will dump the app's heap to /data/system/heapdump. See framework/base commit b9a5e4ad30c9add140fd13491419ae66e947809d. Allow this behavior. Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { write } for path="/data/system/heapdump/javaheap.bin" dev="dm-0" ino=150747 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Bug: 20073185 Change-Id: I4b925033a5456867caf2697de6c2d683d0743540
2015-04-08 01:40:44 +02:00
# /data/system/heapdump
type heapdump_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Create a new SELinux type for /data/nativetest 1) Don't use the generic "system_data_file" for the files in /data/nativetest. Rather, ensure it has it's own special label. This allows us to distinguish these files from other files in SELinux policy. 2) Allow the shell user to execute files from /data/nativetest, on userdebug or eng builds only. 3) Add a neverallow rule (compile time assertion + CTS test) that nobody is allowed to execute these files on user builds, and only the shell user is allowed to execute these files on userdebug/eng builds. Bug: 25340994 Change-Id: I3e292cdd1908f342699d6c52f8bbbe6065359413
2015-10-29 00:45:58 +01:00
# /data/nativetest
type nativetest_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
alphabetize /data/misc entries. Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories. Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb
2013-12-13 00:23:10 +01:00
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
# Mount locations managed by vold
type mnt_media_rw_file, file_type;
type mnt_user_file, file_type;
Initial policy for expanded storage. Expanded storage supports a subset of the features of the internal data partition. Mirror that policy for consistency. vold is also granted enough permissions to prepare initial directories. avc: denied { write } for name="ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { add_name } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { mounton } for path="/mnt/ext/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=7243 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/ext" dev="tmpfs" ino=3130 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_ext_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=4471 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/expand/57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b/media" dev="dm-0" ino=145153 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { rmdir } for name="57f8f4bc-abf4-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b" dev="tmpfs" ino=6380 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { create } for name="tmp" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 avc: denied { setattr } for name="tmp" dev="dm-0" ino=72578 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1 Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I73c98b36e7c066f21650a9e16ea82c5a0ef3d6c5
2015-04-07 01:21:54 +02:00
type mnt_expand_file, file_type;
Updated policy for external storage. An upcoming platform release is redesigning how external storage works. At a high level, vold is taking on a more active role in managing devices that dynamically appear. This change also creates further restricted domains for tools doing low-level access of external storage devices, including sgdisk and blkid. It also extends sdcardd to be launchable by vold, since launching by init will eventually go away. For compatibility, rules required to keep AOSP builds working are marked with "TODO" to eventually remove. Slightly relax system_server external storage rules to allow calls like statfs(). Still neverallow open file descriptors, since they can cause kernel to kill us. Here are the relevant violations that this CL is designed to allow: avc: denied { search } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user/0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="user" dev="tmpfs" ino=6658 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="10" scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { setattr } for name="10" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=6659 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self" dev="tmpfs" ino=11348 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c522,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6661 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="tmpfs" ino=11979 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.music" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[8297]" dev="sockfs" ino=8297 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=netlink_kobject_uevent_socket avc: denied { read } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { write } for path="pipe:[8298]" dev="pipefs" ino=8298 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { mounton } for path="/storage/emulated" dev="tmpfs" ino=8913 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage" dev="tmpfs" ino=7444 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/storage/self/primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { read } for name="primary" dev="tmpfs" ino=7447 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/user" dev="tmpfs" ino=7441 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { read } for name="disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/disk:179,128" dev="tmpfs" ino=3224 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="/" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { open } for path="/storage/public:81F3-13EC" dev="fuse" ino=0 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { write } for name="data" dev="fuse" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { add_name } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { create } for name="com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox" scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { read } for name="public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/vold/public:179,129" dev="tmpfs" ino=16953 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[3264]" dev="pipefs" ino=3264 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=2494 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4200]" dev="pipefs" ino=4200 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { search } for name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=3131 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=3127 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir avc: denied { getattr } for path="pipe:[3648]" dev="pipefs" ino=3648 scontext=u:r:blkid:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fifo_file avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="/dev/pts/12" dev="devpts" ino=15 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd avc: denied { use } for path="pipe:[4182]" dev="pipefs" ino=4182 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=fd Change-Id: Idf3b8561baecf7faa603fac5ababdcc5708288e1
2015-03-27 19:25:39 +01:00
type storage_file, file_type;
# Label for storage dirs which are just mount stubs
type mnt_media_rw_stub_file, file_type;
type storage_stub_file, file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# /data/misc subdirectories
alphabetize /data/misc entries. Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories. Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb
2013-12-13 00:23:10 +01:00
type adb_keys_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Rename camera_calibration_file and audio_firmware_file. Use more general type names for the contents of /data/misc/camera and /data/misc/audio. These were the names used in our policy until 4.3 was released, at which point we switched to be consistent with AOSP. However, the Galaxy S4 4.2.2 image, Galaxy S4 4.3 image, and Galaxy Note 3 4.3 image all shipped with policies using _data_file names because they were based on our older policy. So we may as well switch AOSP to these names. Not sure if in fact these could be all coalesced to the new media_data_file type for /data/misc/media introduced by Ic374488f8b62bd4f8b3c90f30da0e8d1ed1a7343. Options to fix already existing devices, which would only apply to Nexus devices with 4.3 or 4.4 at this point: 1) Add restorecon_recursive /data/misc/audio /data/misc/camera to either the system/core init.rc or to the device-specific init.*.rc files. -or- 2) Add a typealias declaration in the policy to remap the old type names. to the new ones. Then existing types on persistent storage will be remapped internally to the new ones. -or- 3) Some sort of relabeld. Option #2 is implemented by this change. Change-Id: Id36203f5bb66b5200efc1205630b5b260ef97496 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-11-07 19:42:46 +01:00
type audio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type bluetooth_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Add SELinux settings to support tracing during boot. This CL adds the SELinux settings required to support tracing during boot. https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/157163/ BUG: 21739901 Change-Id: Ib3a7107776141ac8cf4f1ca06674f47a0d4b6ae0
2015-06-24 08:24:17 +02:00
type boottrace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
alphabetize /data/misc entries. Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories. Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb
2013-12-13 00:23:10 +01:00
type camera_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
gatekeeperd: use more specific label for /data file Use a more specific label for /data/misc/gatekeeper Rearrange some other rules. Change-Id: Ib634e52526cf31a8f0a0e6d12bbf0f69dff8f6b5
2015-04-18 02:56:31 +02:00
type gatekeeper_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Pull keychain-data policy out of system-data Migrators should be allowed to write to /data/misc/keychain in order to remove it. Similarly /data/misc/user should be writable by system apps. TODO: Revoke zygote's rights to read from /data/misc/keychain on behalf of some preloaded security classes. Bug: 17811821 Change-Id: I9e9c6883cff1dca3755732225404909c16a0e547
2014-10-13 13:10:08 +02:00
type keychain_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type keystore_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
alphabetize /data/misc entries. Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories. Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb
2013-12-13 00:23:10 +01:00
type media_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
More MLS trusted subject/object annotations. dumpstate and lmkd need to act on apps running at any level. Various file types need to be writable by apps running at any level. Change-Id: Idf574d96ba961cc110a48d0a00d30807df6777ba Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-11 21:51:28 +02:00
type media_rw_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Pull keychain-data policy out of system-data Migrators should be allowed to write to /data/misc/keychain in order to remove it. Similarly /data/misc/user should be writable by system apps. TODO: Revoke zygote's rights to read from /data/misc/keychain on behalf of some preloaded security classes. Bug: 17811821 Change-Id: I9e9c6883cff1dca3755732225404909c16a0e547
2014-10-13 13:10:08 +02:00
type misc_user_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Allow netd to create data files in /data/misc/net/. This will be used to populate rt_tables (a mapping from routing table numbers to table names) that's read by the iproute2 utilities. Change-Id: I69deb1a64d5d6647470823405bf0cc55b24b22de
2014-07-08 07:04:57 +02:00
type net_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
alphabetize /data/misc entries. Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories. Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb
2013-12-13 00:23:10 +01:00
type nfc_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
More MLS trusted subject/object annotations. dumpstate and lmkd need to act on apps running at any level. Various file types need to be writable by apps running at any level. Change-Id: Idf574d96ba961cc110a48d0a00d30807df6777ba Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-11 21:51:28 +02:00
type radio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Define SELinux policy for RELRO sharing support. Define a domain and appropriate access rules for shared RELRO files (used for loading the WebView native library). Any app is permitted to read the files as they are public data, but only the shared_relro process is permitted to create/update them. Bug: 13005501 Change-Id: I9d5ba9e9eedb9b8c80fe6f84a3fc85a68553d52e
2014-05-23 12:01:58 +02:00
type shared_relro_file, file_type, data_file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type systemkeys_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
alphabetize /data/misc entries. Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories. Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb
2013-12-13 00:23:10 +01:00
type vpn_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Label /data/misc/zoneinfo And allow any SELinux domain to read these timezone related files. Addresses the following denial: <5>[ 4.746399] type=1400 audit(3430294.470:7): avc: denied { open } for pid=197 comm="time_daemon" name="tzdata" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=618992 scontext=u:r:time:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Iff32465e62729d7aad8c79607848d89ce0aede86
2013-12-13 00:32:42 +01:00
type zoneinfo_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Directory for vold to store private data. Creates new directory at /data/misc/vold for storing key material on internal storage. Only vold should have access to this label. Change-Id: I7f2d1314ad3b2686e29e2037207ad83d2d3bf465
2015-04-01 00:03:13 +02:00
type vold_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Update sepolicy to add label for /data/misc/perfprofd. Bug: 19483574 (cherry picked from commit 7d66f783c2ddea4dd5f9fcd91b2589ab74e30f8a) Change-Id: If617e29b6fd36c88c157941bc9e11cf41329da48
2015-05-06 00:11:44 +02:00
type perfprofd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Add SElinux rules for /data/misc/trace The directory is to be used in eng/userdebug build to store method traces (previously stored in /data/dalvik-cache/profiles). Bug: 25612377 Change-Id: Ia4365a8d1f13d33ee54115dc5e3bf62786503993
2015-11-10 19:49:57 +01:00
# /data/misc/trace for method traces on userdebug / eng builds
type method_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
alphabetize /data/misc entries. Alphabetize the entries for the /data/misc subdirectories. Change-Id: I3690085cbb99c225545545668dedd66341a14edb
2013-12-13 00:23:10 +01:00
Rename camera_calibration_file and audio_firmware_file. Use more general type names for the contents of /data/misc/camera and /data/misc/audio. These were the names used in our policy until 4.3 was released, at which point we switched to be consistent with AOSP. However, the Galaxy S4 4.2.2 image, Galaxy S4 4.3 image, and Galaxy Note 3 4.3 image all shipped with policies using _data_file names because they were based on our older policy. So we may as well switch AOSP to these names. Not sure if in fact these could be all coalesced to the new media_data_file type for /data/misc/media introduced by Ic374488f8b62bd4f8b3c90f30da0e8d1ed1a7343. Options to fix already existing devices, which would only apply to Nexus devices with 4.3 or 4.4 at this point: 1) Add restorecon_recursive /data/misc/audio /data/misc/camera to either the system/core init.rc or to the device-specific init.*.rc files. -or- 2) Add a typealias declaration in the policy to remap the old type names. to the new ones. Then existing types on persistent storage will be remapped internally to the new ones. -or- 3) Some sort of relabeld. Option #2 is implemented by this change. Change-Id: Id36203f5bb66b5200efc1205630b5b260ef97496 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-11-07 19:42:46 +01:00
# Compatibility with type names used in vanilla Android 4.3 and 4.4.
typealias audio_data_file alias audio_firmware_file;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# /data/data subdirectories - app sandboxes
type app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Add autoplay_app domain Initial check in of empty autoplay_app.te policy file. Create isAutoPlayApp input selector. Give this selector high precedence - only below isSystemServer. Add neverallow rule disallowing an app context with isAutoPlayApp=true from running in a domain other than autoplay_app. Change-Id: I1d06669d2f1acf953e50867dfa2b264ccaee29a4
2015-10-30 20:43:19 +01:00
type autoplay_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Label app data directories for system UID apps with a different type. We were using system_data_file for the /data/data directories of system UID apps to match the DAC ownership of system UID shared with other system files. However, we are seeing cases where files created in these directories must be writable by other apps, and we would like to avoid allowing write to system data files outside of these directories. So introduce a separate system_app_data_file type and assign it. This should also help protect against arbitrary writes by system UID apps to other system data directories. This resolves the following denial when cropping or taking a user photo for secondary users: avc: denied { write } for path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/TakeEditUserPhoto2.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82120 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/CropEditUserPhoto.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=602905 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file Bug: 14604553 Change-Id: Ifa10e3283b07f6bd6ecc16eceeb663edfd756cea Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-05-07 19:10:02 +02:00
# /data/data subdirectory for system UID apps.
fix "Unable to add user's profile photo id." Commit a833763ba04147e840fd054b613f759395bada35 enabled per-user isolation, which requires that any files / processes which cross user boundaries be marked with the mlstrustedsubject attribute. system_app_data_file, used for storing a user's profile photos, is not marked as such. As a result, users are unable to add profile photos. Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { write } for path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/TakeEditUserPhoto2.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82184 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:system_app_data_file:s0 tclass=file Steps to reproduce: 1.Flash & Factory the Deb device with tip-of-tree build 2.Go to 'Settings-Users' 3.Under users&profiles,click on Owner to add profile photo. 4.Select 'Choose photo from Gallery' and select a photo. 5.Then click the 'Done' button. 6.Device showed the message as 'Unable to save the photo edits'. OBSERVED RESULTS: Unable to add user's profile photo id. This issue is coming for all users(Restricted user,second user)also. EXPECTED RESULTS: Device should allow to add profile photo id. Bug: 19170844 Change-Id: If657dc09dd391e63ca85320f9cc1728580e51a15
2015-02-11 02:10:05 +01:00
type system_app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Get rid of separate platform_app_data_file type. The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir> files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and untrusted apps. But we had to allow read/write to support passing of open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well, only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket. So there is no real benefit to keeping it as a separate type. Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility. Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-12 18:31:14 +01:00
# Compatibility with type name used in Android 4.3 and 4.4.
typealias app_data_file alias platform_app_data_file;
Get rid of separate download_file type. This appears to have been created to allow untrusted_app to access DownloadProvider cache files without needing to allow open access to platform_app_data_file. Now that platform_app_data_file is gone, there is no benefit to having this type. Retain a typealias for download_file to app_data_file until restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility. This change depends on: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/87801/ Change-Id: Iab3c99d7d5448bdaa5c1e03a98fb6163804e1ec4 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-12 18:39:38 +01:00
typealias app_data_file alias download_file;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Default type for anything under /cache
type cache_file, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
App data backup security policy. Policy covers: * backup_data_file type for labeling all files/dirs under /data dealing with backup mechanism. * cache_backup_file type for labeling all files/dirs under /cache dealing with backup mechanism. This also covers the the use of LocalTransport for local archive and restore testing. * the use of 'adb shell bmgr' to initiate backup mechanism from shell. * the use of 'adb backup/restore' to archive and restore the device's data. Change-Id: I700a92d8addb9bb91474bc07ca4bb71eb4fc840e Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2012-12-04 14:13:58 +01:00
# Type for /cache/.*\.{data|restore} and default
# type for anything under /cache/backup
type cache_backup_file, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Default type for anything under /efs
type efs_file, file_type;
Introduce a separate wallpaper_file type for the wallpaper file.
2012-03-19 15:29:36 +01:00
# Type for wallpaper file.
Make wallpaper_file a mlstrustedobject to permit writes from any app level.
2012-06-27 14:50:27 +02:00
type wallpaper_file, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Add SELinux policy for asec containers. Creates 2 new types: - asec_apk_file : files found under /mnt/asec when the asec images are mounted - asec_image_file : the actual encrypted apks under /data/app-asec Change-Id: I963472add1980ac068d3a6d36a24f27233022832 Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2012-10-22 19:50:01 +02:00
# /mnt/asec
Mark asec_apk_file as mlstrustedobject. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { write } for pid=1546 comm="Binder_1" name="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=dir This is required to install a forward-locked app. Change-Id: I2b37a56d087bff7baf82c738896d9563f0ab4fc4 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-30 17:12:55 +02:00
type asec_apk_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Introduce asec_public_file type. This new type will allow us to write finer-grained policy concerning asec containers. Some files of these containers need to be world readable. Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2014-02-04 17:36:41 +01:00
# Elements of asec files (/mnt/asec) that are world readable
type asec_public_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Add SELinux policy for asec containers. Creates 2 new types: - asec_apk_file : files found under /mnt/asec when the asec images are mounted - asec_image_file : the actual encrypted apks under /data/app-asec Change-Id: I963472add1980ac068d3a6d36a24f27233022832 Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2012-10-22 19:50:01 +02:00
# /data/app-asec
type asec_image_file, file_type, data_file_type;
App data backup security policy. Policy covers: * backup_data_file type for labeling all files/dirs under /data dealing with backup mechanism. * cache_backup_file type for labeling all files/dirs under /cache dealing with backup mechanism. This also covers the the use of LocalTransport for local archive and restore testing. * the use of 'adb shell bmgr' to initiate backup mechanism from shell. * the use of 'adb backup/restore' to archive and restore the device's data. Change-Id: I700a92d8addb9bb91474bc07ca4bb71eb4fc840e Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
2012-12-04 14:13:58 +01:00
# /data/backup and /data/secure/backup
type backup_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Move policy files Update the file_contexts for the new location of the policy files, as well as update the policy for the management of these types. Change-Id: Idc475901ed437efb325807897e620904f4ff03e9
2013-01-23 23:02:43 +01:00
# For /data/security
type security_file, file_type;
Policy for hci_attach service.
2012-05-31 15:40:12 +02:00
# All devices have bluetooth efs files. But they
# vary per device, so this type is used in per
Correct spelling mistake Change-Id: If4deccfe740c8de6b88929a0d0439667c3ea340d
2012-09-07 03:50:35 +02:00
# device policy
Policy for hci_attach service.
2012-05-31 15:40:12 +02:00
type bluetooth_efs_file, file_type;
Add selinux policy for fingerprintd Change-Id: Ibcb714248c28abf21272986facaade376dcbd7ef
2015-05-13 00:16:06 +02:00
# Type for fingerprint template file.
type fingerprintd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Policy for hci_attach service.
2012-05-31 15:40:12 +02:00
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Socket types
Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master. Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master. Primarily this consists of changes around the bluetooth subsystem. The zygote also needs further permissions to set up /storage/emulated. adbd service now gets a socket under /dev/socket. keystore uses the binder. Change-Id: I8c5aeb8d100313c75169734a0fa614aa974b3bfc Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2012-11-16 15:06:47 +01:00
type adbd_socket, file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type bluetooth_socket, file_type;
type dnsproxyd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
initial dumpstate domain Add the necessary rules to support dumpstate. Start off initially in permissive until it has more testing. Dumpstate is triggered by running "adb bugreport" Change-Id: Ic17a60cca1f6f40daa4f2c51e9ad6009ef36cfbd
2013-12-14 07:19:45 +01:00
type dumpstate_socket, file_type;
Introduce fwmarkd: a service to set the fwmark of sockets. (cherry picked from commit 7d51096d4106a441a15741592d9ccdd0bfaca907) Change-Id: Ib6198e19dbc306521a26fcecfdf6e8424d163fc9
2014-05-01 20:12:10 +02:00
type fwmarkd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type gps_socket, file_type;
type installd_socket, file_type;
Move lmkd into it's own domain. lmkd low memory killer daemon The kernel low memory killer logic has been moved to a new daemon called lmkd. ActivityManager communicates with this daemon over a named socket. This is just a placeholder policy, starting off in unconfined_domain. Change-Id: Ia3f9a18432c2ae37d4f5526850e11432fd633e10
2013-12-06 01:55:34 +01:00
type lmkd_socket, file_type;
More MLS trusted subject/object annotations. dumpstate and lmkd need to act on apps running at any level. Various file types need to be writable by apps running at any level. Change-Id: Idf574d96ba961cc110a48d0a00d30807df6777ba Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-11 21:51:28 +02:00
type logd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Annotate MLS trusted subjects and objects. When using MLS (i.e. enabling levelFrom= in seapp_contexts), certain domains and types must be exempted from the normal constraints defined in the mls file. Beyond the current set, adbd, logd, mdnsd, netd, and servicemanager need to be able to read/write to any level in order to communicate with apps running with any level, and the logdr and logdw sockets need to be writable by apps running with any level. This change has no impact unless levelFrom= is specified in seapp_contexts, so by itself it is a no-op. Change-Id: I36ed382b04a60a472e245a77055db294d3e708c3 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-08 22:06:40 +02:00
type logdr_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
type logdw_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
Label /dev/socket/mdns with its own type. Otherwise it gets left in the general device type, and we get denials such as: type=1400 msg=audit(1379617262.940:102): avc: denied { write } for pid=579 comm="mDnsConnector" name="mdns" dev="tmpfs" ino=3213 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=sock_file This of course only shows up if using a confined system_server. Change-Id: I2456dd7aa4d72e6fd15b55c251245186eb54a80a Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-09-19 21:09:38 +02:00
type mdns_socket, file_type;
More MLS trusted subject/object annotations. dumpstate and lmkd need to act on apps running at any level. Various file types need to be writable by apps running at any level. Change-Id: Idf574d96ba961cc110a48d0a00d30807df6777ba Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-11 21:51:28 +02:00
type mdnsd_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
logd: logpersistd - Enable logpersistd to write to /data/misc/logd - Enable logpersistd to read from pstore to help complete any content lost by reboot disruption - Enable shell readonly ability logpersistd files in /data/misc/logd - Enable logcat -f when placed into logd context to act as a logpersistd (nee logcatd) agent, restrict access to run only in userdebug or eng Bug: 19608716 Change-Id: I3209582bc796a1093c325c90068a48bf268e5ab5
2015-05-27 00:12:45 +02:00
type misc_logd_file, file_type;
Address system_server denials. Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-05 15:50:08 +01:00
type mtpd_socket, file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type netd_socket, file_type;
type property_socket, file_type;
racoon policy. Initial policy for racoon (IKE key management). Signed-off-by: Robert Craig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil> Change-Id: If1e344f39ea914e42afbaa021b272ba1b7113479
2013-01-07 15:21:18 +01:00
type racoon_socket, file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type rild_socket, file_type;
type rild_debug_socket, file_type;
type system_wpa_socket, file_type;
Label and allow access to /data/system/ndebugsocket. Otherwise it defaults to the label of /data/system and cannot be distinguished from any other socket in that directory. Also adds allow rule required for pre-existing wpa_socket transition to function without unconfined_domain. Change-Id: I57179aa18786bd56d247f397347e546cca978e41 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-09-27 16:24:49 +02:00
type system_ndebug_socket, file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
type vold_socket, file_type;
type wpa_socket, file_type;
type zygote_socket, file_type;
Add permission for Bluetooth Sim Access Profile Added permission to SAP socket used to access the the RIL daemon Change-Id: Ifbfb764f0b8731e81fb3157955aa4fda6120d846 Signed-off-by: Casper Bonde <c.bonde@samsung.com>
2015-03-19 10:56:26 +01:00
type sap_uim_socket, file_type;
Corrected denials for LocationManager when accessing gps over uart.
2012-07-10 23:36:22 +02:00
# UART (for GPS) control proc file
type gps_control, file_type;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# Allow files to be created in their appropriate filesystems.
allow fs_type self:filesystem associate;
allow sysfs_type sysfs:filesystem associate;
allow file_type labeledfs:filesystem associate;
allow file_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;
Allow file types to be associated with the rootfs. This is now possible due to the kernel change to support setting security contexts on rootfs inodes. Change-Id: I2a9aac1508eceabb92c3ae8eb5c63a16b28dda6f Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-05-10 17:29:35 +02:00
allow file_type rootfs:filesystem associate;
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
allow dev_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;
Don't allow types which are both file_type and fs_type It's a bug to have a type with both the file_type and fs_type attribute. A type should be declared with either file_type, or fs_type, but not both. Create a neverallow rule which detects this situation. This works because we have the following allow rule: allow fs_type self:filesystem associate; If a type is a file_type and an fs_type, the associate allow rule will conflict with this neverallow rule. Not sure if this is the cleanest way to accomplish this, but it seems to work. Change-Id: Ida387b1df260efca15de38ae7a66ed25e353acaa
2014-06-15 17:41:55 +02:00
# It's a bug to assign the file_type attribute and fs_type attribute
# to any type. Do not allow it.
#
# For example, the following is a bug:
# type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, fs_type;
# Should be:
# type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
Fix neverallow rules to eliminate CTS SELinuxTest warnings. Fix two neverallow rules that yield Invalid SELinux context warnings from the CTS SELinuxTest. For transitions from app domains, we only need to check { domain -appdomain } (i.e. domains other than app domains), not ~appdomain (i.e. all types other than app domains). Otherwise SELinuxTest tries to generate contexts with the r role and non-domain types for testing since the target class is process, and such contexts are invalid. For keeping file_type and fs_type exclusive, we only need to check associate permission, not all filesystem permissions, as only associate takes a file type as the source context. Otherwise SELinuxTest tries to generate contexts with the r role and non-domain types for testing filesystem permissions other than associate, since the source of such checks is normally a process context. Change-Id: I6c2f63f4786d75294a6938613ba14b64212fc802 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-07-29 20:50:30 +02:00
neverallow fs_type file_type:filesystem associate;
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