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SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# phone subsystem
Move domain_deprecated into private policy This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions. Bug: 38316109 Test: build and boot Marlin Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these permissions. Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
2017-05-15 22:19:03 +02:00
type radio, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
Restore app_domain macro and move to private use. app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e6373faa6271d7839d33c5b9e69d998ff020 to enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy. These rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware. Instead of cutting apart the app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app types, move all app_domain calls to private policy. (cherry-pick of commit: 76035ea01971156895cf0d8efc1876bfa2025bd6) Bug: 33428593 Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change. Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665
2016-12-08 20:23:34 +01:00
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
net_domain(radio)
bluetooth_domain(radio)
Address bug report denials. Triggering a bug report via Settings > Developer Options > Take bug report generates a number of denials. Two bugs here: 1) According to the "allowed" list in frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c , media apps, nfc, radio, and apps with system/root UIDs can register as a binder service. However, they were not placed into the binder_service domain. Fix them. 2) The bugreport mechanism queries all the services and java programs and asks them to write to a shell owned file. Grant the corresponding SELinux capability. Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 149.342181] type=1400 audit(1389419775.872:17): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 149.371844] type=1400 audit(1389419775.902:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 149.980161] type=1400 audit(1389419776.512:22): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 150.095066] type=1400 audit(1389419776.622:23): avc: denied { write } for pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 150.096748] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:24): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=3178 comm="Binder_3" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 150.097090] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 154.545583] type=1400 audit(1389419781.072:43): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.000877] type=1400 audit(1389419782.532:44): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.022567] type=1400 audit(1389419782.552:45): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.043463] type=1400 audit(1389419782.572:46): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 156.062550] type=1400 audit(1389419782.592:47): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I365d530c38ce176617e48b620c05c4aae01324d3
2014-01-11 08:05:25 +01:00
binder_service(radio)
SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
Move rild from public to vendor. Also change the neverallow exceptions to be for hal_telephony_server instead of rild. Test: Basic telephony sanity, treehugger Bug: 36427227 Change-Id: If892b28416d98ca1f9c241c5fcec70fbae35c82e
2018-03-08 02:07:37 +01:00
# Talks to hal_telephony_server via the rild socket only for devices without full treble
not_full_treble(`unix_socket_connect(radio, rild, hal_telephony_server)')
Confine all app domains, but make them permissive for now. As has already been done for untrusted_app, isolated_app, and bluetooth, make all the other domains used for app processes confined while making them permissive until sufficient testing has been done. Change-Id: If55fe7af196636c49d10fc18be2f44669e2626c5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-23 19:12:55 +02:00
# Data file accesses.
allow radio radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow radio radio_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow radio alarm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
Allow radio access to netd_pid file. They need to see when it changes so they know when netd bounces. (cherrypicked from commit 71e9a7c4718f786c9d1bc5e6ab62d3f7d46dce66) bug:18069270 Change-Id: I954cf43ff02f1d352015f128ef88b659e6d0f95a
2014-11-03 23:51:34 +01:00
allow radio net_data_file:dir search;
allow radio net_data_file:file r_file_perms;
Confine all app domains, but make them permissive for now. As has already been done for untrusted_app, isolated_app, and bluetooth, make all the other domains used for app processes confined while making them permissive until sufficient testing has been done. Change-Id: If55fe7af196636c49d10fc18be2f44669e2626c5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-23 19:12:55 +02:00
# Property service
Replace unix_socket_connect() and explicit property sets with macro A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of: 1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service 2. Allowing write on the property_socket file 3. Allowing the set on class property_service The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly added. To correct this, we introduce a new macros: set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop) This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3. No difference in sediff is expected. Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
2015-05-05 03:22:45 +02:00
set_prop(radio, radio_prop)
Whitelist exported platform properties This CL lists all the exported platform properties in private/exported_property_contexts. Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is restricted. Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from vendor_init is also specified explicitly. Note that whitelisting would be applied only if PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on. Bug: 38146102 Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
2017-10-19 09:54:49 +02:00
set_prop(radio, exported_radio_prop)
set_prop(radio, exported2_radio_prop)
Replace unix_socket_connect() and explicit property sets with macro A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of: 1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service 2. Allowing write on the property_socket file 3. Allowing the set on class property_service The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly added. To correct this, we introduce a new macros: set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop) This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3. No difference in sediff is expected. Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
2015-05-05 03:22:45 +02:00
set_prop(radio, net_radio_prop)
Confine all app domains, but make them permissive for now. As has already been done for untrusted_app, isolated_app, and bluetooth, make all the other domains used for app processes confined while making them permissive until sufficient testing has been done. Change-Id: If55fe7af196636c49d10fc18be2f44669e2626c5 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-23 19:12:55 +02:00
# ctl interface
Replace unix_socket_connect() and explicit property sets with macro A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of: 1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service 2. Allowing write on the property_socket file 3. Allowing the set on class property_service The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly added. To correct this, we introduce a new macros: set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop) This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3. No difference in sediff is expected. Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
2015-05-05 03:22:45 +02:00
set_prop(radio, ctl_rildaemon_prop)
Add SELinux rules for service_manager. Add a service_mananger class with the verb add. Add a type that groups the services for each of the processes that is allowed to start services in service.te and an attribute for all services controlled by the service manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service name to target label. Bug: 12909011 Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d
2014-06-06 00:52:02 +02:00
te_macros: introduce add_service() macro Introduce the add_service() macro which wraps up add/find permissions for the source domain with a neverallow preventing others from adding it. Only a particular domain should add a particular service. Use the add_service() macro to automatically add a neverallow that prevents other domains from adding the service. mediadrmserver was adding services labeled mediaserver_service. Drop the add permission as it should just need the find permission. Additionally, the macro adds the { add find } permission which causes some existing neverallow's to assert. Adjust those neverallow's so "self" can always find. Test: compile and run on hikey and emulator. No new denials were found, and all services, where applicable, seem to be running OK. Change-Id: Ibbd2a5304edd5f8b877bc86852b0694732be993c Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
2017-01-19 22:23:52 +01:00
add_service(radio, radio_service)
Add rules for running audio services in audioserver audioserver has the same rules as mediaserver so there is no loss of rights or permissions. media.log moves to audioserver. TBD: Pare down permissions. Bug: 24511453 Change-Id: I0fff24c14b712bb3d498f75e8fd66c2eb795171d
2015-09-09 19:48:04 +02:00
allow radio audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow radio to find cameraserver_service for video calls Addresses: avc: denied { find } for service=media.camera pid=1589 uid=1001 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cameraserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager permissive=0 Bug: 29190415 Change-Id: I77c0337500b8ab2f5d7d3d5982c7416fc39b1522
2016-06-09 21:47:05 +02:00
allow radio cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
Allow radio access to drmserver_service. Address the following denial: SELinux E avc: denied { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 which occurs when a non-default SMS app sends an MMS. The message would be stored into system automatically in MMS service (from phone process and phone UID). The storing of the message involves the creation of android.drm.DrmManagerClient instance. Change-Id: Ic4e493f183c9ce7f7ac3f74f6ea062893ea67608
2015-01-31 02:17:04 +01:00
allow radio drmserver_service:service_manager find;
Restrict service_manager find and list access. All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting. Bug: 18106000 Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
2014-12-12 01:01:27 +01:00
allow radio mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow radio to find nfc_service Addresses: avc: denied { find } for service=nfc pid=3355 uid=1001 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager BUG=29339762 Change-Id: I87479ef4607bd3e18a2fecb53909c4878e227e2b
2016-06-14 06:42:10 +02:00
allow radio nfc_service:service_manager find;
Add system_api_service and app_api_service attributes. System services differ in designed access level. Add attributes reflecting this distinction and label services appropriately. Begin moving access to the newly labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly made system_server_service attribute. Reflect the move of system_server_service from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where appropriate. Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b
2015-04-03 01:50:08 +02:00
allow radio app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow radio system_api_service:service_manager find;
SEPolicy changes for radio hal. Test: none Bug: 32020264 Change-Id: If5f22dad672895b3684b8e44209c5a1eae16ba47
2016-12-01 20:36:44 +01:00
SEPolicy changes for BT SAP hal. Test: Verified that WIP telephony and BT SAP CLs work fine with this change https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/q/topic:%22Basic+radio+service+and+client%22+(status:open+OR+status:merged) https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/q/topic:%22SAP+HAL%22+(status:open+OR+status:merged) Bug: 32020264 Change-Id: If15820d43e324d80e35808a292ee811f98d499cc
2016-12-08 02:43:46 +01:00
# Perform HwBinder IPC.
hwbinder_use(radio)
Annotate most remaining HALs with _client/_server This switches most remaining HALs to the _client/_server approach. To unblock efforts blocked on majority of HALs having to use this model, this change does not remove unnecessary rules from clients of these HALs. That work will be performed in follow-up commits. This commit only adds allow rules and thus does not break existing functionality. The HALs not yet on the _client/_server model after this commit are: * Allocator HAL, because it's non-trivial to declare all apps except isolated apps as clients of this HAL, which they are. * Boot HAL, because it's still on the non-attributized model and I'm waiting for update_engine folks to answer a couple of questions which will let me refactor the policy of this HAL. Test: mmm system/sepolicy Test: Device boots, no new denials Test: Device boots in recovery mode, no new denials Bug: 34170079 Change-Id: I03e6bcec2fa02f14bdf17d11f7367b62c68a14b9
2017-03-17 02:48:40 +01:00
hal_client_domain(radio, hal_telephony)
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