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SE Android policy.
2012-01-04 18:33:27 +01:00
# rild - radio interface layer daemon
type rild, domain;
type rild_exec, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(rild)
net_domain(rild)
Clean up socket rules. Replace * or any permission set containing create with create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms. Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te. For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/ nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the underlying kernel state accessed via the socket. See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write. Delete legacy rule for b/12061011. This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate change. Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-02-24 21:06:11 +01:00
allow rild self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
Confine rild, but leave it permissive for now. Change-Id: I6df9981b2af0150c6379a0ebdbe0a8597c994f4a Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-29 19:42:39 +01:00
allow rild kernel:system module_request;
unix_socket_connect(rild, property, init)
allow rild self:capability { setuid net_admin net_raw };
allow rild alarm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow rild cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
allow rild radio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow rild radio_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
allow rild mtd_device:dir search;
allow rild efs_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow rild efs_file:file create_file_perms;
allow rild shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow rild bluetooth_efs_file:file r_file_perms;
allow rild bluetooth_efs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow rild radio_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow rild radio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow rild sdcard_type:dir r_dir_perms;
Remove write access to system_data_file from rild. Anything writable by rild should be in radio_data_file or efs_file. System data should be read-only. Change-Id: I442a253c22f567a147d0591d623e97a6ee8b76e3 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-18 19:01:27 +01:00
allow rild system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow rild system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
Confine rild, but leave it permissive for now. Change-Id: I6df9981b2af0150c6379a0ebdbe0a8597c994f4a Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-29 19:42:39 +01:00
allow rild system_file:file x_file_perms;
# property service
allow rild radio_prop:property_service set;
Align SELinux property policy with init property_perms. Introduce a net_radio_prop type for net. properties that can be set by radio or system. Introduce a system_radio_prop type for sys. properties that can be set by radio or system. Introduce a dhcp_prop type for properties that can be set by dhcp or system. Drop the rild_prop vs radio_prop distinction; this was an early experiment to see if we could separate properties settable by rild versus other radio UID processes but it did not pan out. Remove the ability to set properties from unconfineddomain. Allow init to set any property. Allow recovery to set ctl_default_prop to restart adbd. Change-Id: I5ccafcb31ec4004dfefcec8718907f6b6f3e0dfd Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-06-19 16:27:02 +02:00
allow rild net_radio_prop:property_service set;
allow rild system_radio_prop:property_service set;
auditallow rild net_radio_prop:property_service set;
auditallow rild system_radio_prop:property_service set;
Confine rild, but leave it permissive for now. Change-Id: I6df9981b2af0150c6379a0ebdbe0a8597c994f4a Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2013-10-29 19:42:39 +01:00
# Read/Write to uart driver (for GPS)
allow rild gps_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow rild tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
Clean up socket rules. Replace * or any permission set containing create with create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms. Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te. For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/ nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the underlying kernel state accessed via the socket. See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write. Delete legacy rule for b/12061011. This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate change. Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-02-24 21:06:11 +01:00
# Allow rild to create and use netlink sockets.
allow rild self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
allow rild self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
Introduce controls on wake lock interface Change-Id: Ie0ee266e9e6facb2ab2abd652f68765239a41af1
2013-09-29 00:46:21 +02:00
# Access to wake locks
Introduce wakelock_use() Introduce wakelock_use(). This macro declares that a domain uses wakelocks. Wakelocks require both read-write access to files in /sys/power, and CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND. This macro helps ensure that both capabilities and file access are granted at the same time. Still TODO: fix device specific wakelock use. Change-Id: Ib98ff374a73f89e403acd9f5e024988f59f08115
2014-05-23 22:33:32 +02:00
wakelock_use(rild)
Fix new rild denials. Denials seen on hammerhead but seem appropriate for general policy. <5>[ 8.339347] type=1400 audit(3731546.390:17): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=314 comm="rild" path="socket:[7996]" dev="sockfs" ino=7996 scontext=u:r:rild:s0 tcontext=u:r:rild:s0 tclass=socket <5>[ 8.339065] type=1400 audit(3731546.390:16): avc: denied { create } for pid=314 comm="rild" scontext=u:r:rild:s0 tcontext=u:r:rild:s0 tclass=socket <5>[ 11.232121] type=1400 audit(3731549.289:22): avc: denied { read } for pid=620 comm="rild" scontext=u:r:rild:s0 tcontext=u:r:rild:s0 tclass=socket Change-Id: Ieaca5360afbb44d5da21c7c24bdd5e7c5758f0a2
2013-12-05 23:24:03 +01:00
allow rild self:socket create_socket_perms;
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