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Do not allow init to execute anything without changing domains. Remove the ability of init to execute programs from / or /system without changing domains. This forces all helper programs and services invoked by init to be assigned their own domain. Introduce separate domains for running the helper programs executed from the fs_mgr library by init. This requires a domain for e2fsck (named fsck for generality) and a domain for running mkswap (named toolbox since mkswap is just a symlink to the toolbox binary and the domain transition occurs on executing the binary, not based on the symlink in any way). e2fsck is invoked on any partitions marked with the check mount option in the fstab file, typically userdata and cache but never system. We allow it to read/write the userdata_block_device and cache_block_device types but also allow it to read/write the default block_device type until we can get the more specific types assigned in all of the device-specific policies. mkswap is invoked on any swap partition defined in the fstab file. We introduce a new swap_block_device type for this purpose, to be assigned to any such block devices in the device-specific policies, and only allow it to read/write such block devices. As there seem to be no devices in AOSP with swap partitions in their fstab files, this does not appear to risk any breakage for existing devices. With the introduction of these domains, we can de-privilege init to only having read access to block devices for mounting filesystems; it no longer needs direct write access to such devices AFAICT. To avoid breaking execution of toolbox by system services, apps, or the shell, we allow all domains other than kernel and init the ability to run toolbox in their own domain. This is broader than strictly required; we could alternatively only add it to those domains that already had x_file_perms to system_file but this would require a coordinated change with device-specific policy. Change-Id: Ib05de2d2bc2781dad48b70ba385577cb855708e4 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-23 15:11:30 +02:00
# Any toolbox command run by init.
# At present, the only known usage is for running mkswap via fs_mgr.
# Do NOT use this domain for toolbox when run by any other domain.
type toolbox, domain;
type toolbox_exec, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(toolbox)
# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
# open fd inherited by fsck.
allow toolbox tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
toolbox: android_fork_execvp_ext() requires getattr ioctl Addresses the following denials: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=148 comm="mkswap" path="/dev/pts/0" dev="devpts" ino=3 scontext=u:r:toolbox:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=148 comm="mkswap" path="/dev/pts/0" dev="devpts" ino=3 scontext=u:r:toolbox:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 Change-Id: I88c88493cd5f523b5b26a8028b421b3565aa5751
2014-12-20 01:19:05 +01:00
allow toolbox devpts:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
Do not allow init to execute anything without changing domains. Remove the ability of init to execute programs from / or /system without changing domains. This forces all helper programs and services invoked by init to be assigned their own domain. Introduce separate domains for running the helper programs executed from the fs_mgr library by init. This requires a domain for e2fsck (named fsck for generality) and a domain for running mkswap (named toolbox since mkswap is just a symlink to the toolbox binary and the domain transition occurs on executing the binary, not based on the symlink in any way). e2fsck is invoked on any partitions marked with the check mount option in the fstab file, typically userdata and cache but never system. We allow it to read/write the userdata_block_device and cache_block_device types but also allow it to read/write the default block_device type until we can get the more specific types assigned in all of the device-specific policies. mkswap is invoked on any swap partition defined in the fstab file. We introduce a new swap_block_device type for this purpose, to be assigned to any such block devices in the device-specific policies, and only allow it to read/write such block devices. As there seem to be no devices in AOSP with swap partitions in their fstab files, this does not appear to risk any breakage for existing devices. With the introduction of these domains, we can de-privilege init to only having read access to block devices for mounting filesystems; it no longer needs direct write access to such devices AFAICT. To avoid breaking execution of toolbox by system services, apps, or the shell, we allow all domains other than kernel and init the ability to run toolbox in their own domain. This is broader than strictly required; we could alternatively only add it to those domains that already had x_file_perms to system_file but this would require a coordinated change with device-specific policy. Change-Id: Ib05de2d2bc2781dad48b70ba385577cb855708e4 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-23 15:11:30 +02:00
# mkswap-specific.
# Read/write block devices used for swap partitions.
# Assign swap_block_device type any such partition in your
# device/<vendor>/<product>/sepolicy/file_contexts file.
allow toolbox block_device:dir search needed to get to the swap device. Addresses the following denial: avc: denied { search } for pid=149 comm="mkswap" name="block" dev="tmpfs" ino=9947 scontext=u:r:toolbox:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0 Change-Id: I0c897540f1c7950738622a013121a050a1f32b2f
2014-12-20 02:21:52 +01:00
allow toolbox block_device:dir search;
Do not allow init to execute anything without changing domains. Remove the ability of init to execute programs from / or /system without changing domains. This forces all helper programs and services invoked by init to be assigned their own domain. Introduce separate domains for running the helper programs executed from the fs_mgr library by init. This requires a domain for e2fsck (named fsck for generality) and a domain for running mkswap (named toolbox since mkswap is just a symlink to the toolbox binary and the domain transition occurs on executing the binary, not based on the symlink in any way). e2fsck is invoked on any partitions marked with the check mount option in the fstab file, typically userdata and cache but never system. We allow it to read/write the userdata_block_device and cache_block_device types but also allow it to read/write the default block_device type until we can get the more specific types assigned in all of the device-specific policies. mkswap is invoked on any swap partition defined in the fstab file. We introduce a new swap_block_device type for this purpose, to be assigned to any such block devices in the device-specific policies, and only allow it to read/write such block devices. As there seem to be no devices in AOSP with swap partitions in their fstab files, this does not appear to risk any breakage for existing devices. With the introduction of these domains, we can de-privilege init to only having read access to block devices for mounting filesystems; it no longer needs direct write access to such devices AFAICT. To avoid breaking execution of toolbox by system services, apps, or the shell, we allow all domains other than kernel and init the ability to run toolbox in their own domain. This is broader than strictly required; we could alternatively only add it to those domains that already had x_file_perms to system_file but this would require a coordinated change with device-specific policy. Change-Id: Ib05de2d2bc2781dad48b70ba385577cb855708e4 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-09-23 15:11:30 +02:00
allow toolbox swap_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
# Only allow entry from init via the toolbox binary.
neverallow { domain -init } toolbox:process transition;
neverallow domain toolbox:process dyntransition;
neverallow toolbox { file_type fs_type -toolbox_exec}:file entrypoint;
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