platform_system_sepolicy/vendor/tee.te

##
# trusted execution environment (tee) daemon
#
type tee_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(tee)

allow tee self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override };
allow tee tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow tee tee_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow tee tee_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow tee self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow tee self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow tee ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
r_dir_file(tee, sysfs_type)

allow tee system_data_file:file { getattr read };
allow tee system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
Move TEE rules to vendor image "tee" domain is a vendor domain. Hence its rules should live on the vendor image. What's left as public API is that: 1. tee domain exists and that it is permitted to sys_rawio capability, 2. tee_device type exists and apps are not permitted to access character devices labeled tee_device. If you were relying on system/sepolicy automatically labeling /dev/tf_driver as tee_device or labeling /system/bin/tf_daemon as tee_exec, then you need to add these rules to your device-specific file_contexts. Test: mmm system/sepolicy Test: bullhead, angler, and sailfish boot up without new denials Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36720355 Change-Id: Ie21619ff3c44ef58675c369061b4afdd7e8501c6 2017-04-03 20:05:45 +02:00			`##`
			`# trusted execution environment (tee) daemon`
			`#`
sepolicy: make exec_types in /vendor a subset of vendor_file_type We install all default hal implementations in /vendor/bin/hw along with a few domains that are defined in vendor policy and installed in /vendor. These files MUST be a subset of the global 'vendor_file_type' which is used to address all files installed in /vendor throughout the policy. Bug: 36463595 Test: Boot sailfish without any new denials Change-Id: I3d26778f9a26f9095f49d8ecc12f2ec9d2f4cb41 Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com> 2017-04-10 22:03:28 +02:00			`type tee_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;`
Move TEE rules to vendor image "tee" domain is a vendor domain. Hence its rules should live on the vendor image. What's left as public API is that: 1. tee domain exists and that it is permitted to sys_rawio capability, 2. tee_device type exists and apps are not permitted to access character devices labeled tee_device. If you were relying on system/sepolicy automatically labeling /dev/tf_driver as tee_device or labeling /system/bin/tf_daemon as tee_exec, then you need to add these rules to your device-specific file_contexts. Test: mmm system/sepolicy Test: bullhead, angler, and sailfish boot up without new denials Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36720355 Change-Id: Ie21619ff3c44ef58675c369061b4afdd7e8501c6 2017-04-03 20:05:45 +02:00			`init_daemon_domain(tee)`

sepolicy: Add rules for non-init namespaces In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode. This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels. This is essentially: 1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns, respectively. 2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g 3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g 4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new classes are still appropriate. Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add only cap_userns or cap2_userns; Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel. Bug: crbug.com/754831 Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f 2017-11-09 23:51:26 +01:00			`allow tee self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override };`
Move TEE rules to vendor image "tee" domain is a vendor domain. Hence its rules should live on the vendor image. What's left as public API is that: 1. tee domain exists and that it is permitted to sys_rawio capability, 2. tee_device type exists and apps are not permitted to access character devices labeled tee_device. If you were relying on system/sepolicy automatically labeling /dev/tf_driver as tee_device or labeling /system/bin/tf_daemon as tee_exec, then you need to add these rules to your device-specific file_contexts. Test: mmm system/sepolicy Test: bullhead, angler, and sailfish boot up without new denials Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36714625 Bug: 36720355 Change-Id: Ie21619ff3c44ef58675c369061b4afdd7e8501c6 2017-04-03 20:05:45 +02:00			`allow tee tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;`
			`allow tee tee_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;`
			`allow tee tee_data_file:file create_file_perms;`
			`allow tee self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;`
			`allow tee self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;`
			`allow tee ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;`
			`r_dir_file(tee, sysfs_type)`

			`allow tee system_data_file:file { getattr read };`
Remove unused permissions from tee Only getattr and read are necessary for lnk_file. Open violates a new neverallow for separating system and vendor data. Bug: 34980020 Test: Enroll fingerprint on Taimen Change-Id: I9434afbd5b4ecc1ead9f0ba47c7582fb5a6c6bf0 2017-11-16 05:15:22 +01:00			`allow tee system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read };`