much more finegrained bpf selinux privs for networking mainline
Goal is to gain a better handle on who has access to which maps and to allow (with bpfloader changes to create in one directory and move into the target directory) per-map selection of selinux context, while still having reasonable defaults for stuff pinned directly into the target location. BPFFS (ie. /sys/fs/bpf) labelling is as follows: subdirectory selinux context mainline usecase / usable by / fs_bpf no (*) core operating system (ie. platform) /net_private fs_bpf_net_private yes, T+ network_stack /net_shared fs_bpf_net_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server /netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_readonly yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & r/o to netd /netd_shared fs_bpf_netd_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & netd [**] /tethering fs_bpf_tethering yes, S+ network_stack /vendor fs_bpf_vendor no, T+ vendor * initial support for bpf was added back in P, but things worked differently back then with no bpfloader, and instead netd doing stuff by hand, bpfloader with pinning into /sys/fs/bpf was (I believe) added in Q (and was definitely there in R) ** additionally bpf programs are accesible to netutils_wrapper for use by iptables xt_bpf extensions 'mainline yes' currently means shipped by the com.android.tethering apex, but this is really another case of bad naming, as it's really the 'networking/connectivity/tethering' apex / mainline module. Long term the plan is to merge a few other networking mainline modules into it (and maybe give it a saner name...). The reason for splitting net_private vs tethering is that: S+ must support 4.9+ kernels and S era bpfloader v0.2+ T+ must support 4.14+ kernels and T beta3 era bpfloader v0.13+ The kernel affects the intelligence of the in-kernel bpf verifier and the available bpf helper functions. Older kernels have a tendency to reject programs that newer kernels allow. / && /vendor are not shipped via mainline, so only need to work with the bpfloader that's part of the core os. Ignore-AOSP-First: will be cherrypicked from tm-dev to aosp/master Bug: 218408035 Test: TreeHugger, manually on cuttlefish Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Change-Id: I674866ebe32aca4fc851818c1ffcbec12ac4f7d4
This commit is contained in:
Maciej Żenczykowski
parent
57f48ae1d2
commit
15715aea32
21 changed files with 174 additions and 44 deletions
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@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ typeattribute bpfloader bpfdomain;
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allow bpfloader kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
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# These permissions are required to pin ebpf maps & programs.
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allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir { add_name create search write };
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allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:file { create read setattr };
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allow { fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor } fs_bpf:filesystem associate;
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allow bpfloader bpffs_type:dir { add_name create remove_name search write };
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allow bpfloader bpffs_type:file { create read rename setattr };
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allow { bpffs_type -fs_bpf } fs_bpf:filesystem associate;
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# Allow bpfloader to create bpf maps and programs.
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allow bpfloader self:bpf { map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run };
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@ -26,17 +26,21 @@ allow bpfloader bpfloader_exec:file execute_no_trans;
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###
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# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init; Note: we don't care about getattr/mounton/search
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neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir { open read setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir { add_name create write };
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neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir ~{ add_name create getattr mounton open read search setattr write };
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neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } bpffs_type:dir { open read setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } bpffs_type:dir { add_name create remove_name write };
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neverallow domain bpffs_type:dir ~{ add_name create getattr mounton open read remove_name search setattr write };
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# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:file { map open setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:file create;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -lmkd -mediaprovider_app -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf }:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -lmkd -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf_tethering }:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file write;
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neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file ~{ create map open read setattr write };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } bpffs_type:file { map open setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } bpffs_type:file { create rename };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -lmkd -mediaprovider_app -netd -netutils_wrapper -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_private:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_shared:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_shared:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } { bpffs_type -fs_bpf_vendor }:file write;
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neverallow domain bpffs_type:file ~{ create map open read rename setattr write };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
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@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
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# /proc/config.gz
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type config_gz, fs_type, proc_type;
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# /sys/fs/bpf/<dir> for mainline tethering use
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# TODO: move S+ fs_bpf_tethering here from public/file.te
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type fs_bpf_net_private, fs_type, bpffs_type;
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type fs_bpf_net_shared, fs_type, bpffs_type;
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type fs_bpf_netd_readonly, fs_type, bpffs_type;
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type fs_bpf_netd_shared, fs_type, bpffs_type;
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# /data/misc/storaged
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type storaged_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
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@ -395,5 +395,9 @@ genfscon functionfs / u:object_r:functionfs:s0
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genfscon usbfs / u:object_r:usbfs:s0
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genfscon binfmt_misc / u:object_r:binfmt_miscfs:s0
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genfscon bpf / u:object_r:fs_bpf:s0
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genfscon bpf /net_private u:object_r:fs_bpf_net_private:s0
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genfscon bpf /net_shared u:object_r:fs_bpf_net_shared:s0
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genfscon bpf /netd_readonly u:object_r:fs_bpf_netd_readonly:s0
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genfscon bpf /netd_shared u:object_r:fs_bpf_netd_shared:s0
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genfscon bpf /tethering u:object_r:fs_bpf_tethering:s0
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genfscon bpf /vendor u:object_r:fs_bpf_vendor:s0
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@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ init_daemon_domain(netd)
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# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
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domain_auto_trans(netd, dnsmasq_exec, dnsmasq)
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allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:dir search;
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allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file read;
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allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file write;
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# give netd permission to setup iptables rule with xt_bpf, attach program to cgroup, and read/write
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# the map created by bpfloader
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allow netd bpfloader:bpf { prog_run map_read map_write };
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@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ binder_call(netutils_wrapper, netd);
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# For vendor code that update the iptables rules at runtime. They need to reload
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# the whole chain including the xt_bpf rules. They need to access to the pinned
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# program when reloading the rule.
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allow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf:file { read write };
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allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:dir search;
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allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file read;
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allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf }:file write;
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allow netutils_wrapper bpfloader:bpf prog_run;
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# For /data/misc/net access to ndc and ip
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@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ hal_client_domain(network_stack, hal_tetheroffload)
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allow network_stack self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
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allow network_stack network_stack_service:service_manager find;
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# allow Tethering(network_stack process) to run/update/read the eBPF maps to offload tethering traffic by eBPF.
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allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
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allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
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allow network_stack { fs_bpf_net_private fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
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allow network_stack { fs_bpf_net_private fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
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allow network_stack bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
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# Use XFRM (IPsec) netlink sockets
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@ -71,8 +71,46 @@ allow network_stack self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlms
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allow network_stack tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allowxperm network_stack tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF TUNSETLINK TUNSETCARRIER };
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# Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_tethering' programs/maps.
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############### NEVER ALLOW RULES
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# This place is as good as any for these rules,
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# and it is probably the most appropriate because
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# network_stack itself is entirely mainline code.
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#
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# Unfortunately init/vendor_init have all sorts of extra privs
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# T+: Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_net_private' programs/maps.
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_private:dir ~getattr;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_private:file *;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_net_private:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_net_private:file ~{ map open read setattr };
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# T+: Only the bpfloader, network_stack and system_server should ever touch 'fs_bpf_net_shared' programs/maps.
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_shared:dir ~getattr;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_shared:file *;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_net_shared:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_net_shared:file ~{ map open read setattr };
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# T+: Only the bpfloader, netd, network_stack and system_server should ever touch 'fs_bpf_netd_readonly' programs/maps.
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# netd's access should be readonly
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:dir ~getattr;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file *;
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neverallow netd fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file write;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file ~{ map open read setattr };
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# T+: Only the bpfloader, netd, netutils_wrapper, network_stack and system_server should ever touch 'fs_bpf_netd_shared' programs/maps.
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# netutils_wrapper requires access to be able to run iptables and only needs readonly access
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_shared:dir ~getattr;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_shared:file *;
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neverallow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf_netd_shared:file write;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_shared:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_shared:file ~{ map open read setattr };
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# S+: Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_tethering' programs/maps.
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~getattr;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:file *;
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@ -1154,7 +1154,8 @@ with_asan(`
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# allow system_server to read the eBPF maps that stores the traffic stats information and update
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# the map after snapshot is recorded, and to read, update and run the maps and programs used for
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# time in state accounting
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allow system_server fs_bpf:file { read write };
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allow system_server { fs_bpf fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:dir search;
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allow system_server { fs_bpf fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file { read write };
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allow system_server bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
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# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
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allow system_server self:key_socket create;
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@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ attribute dev_type;
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# TODO(b/202520796) Remove this attribute once the sc-dev branch stops using it.
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attribute bdev_type;
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# Attribute for all bpf filesystem subtypes.
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attribute bpffs_type;
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# All types used for processes.
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attribute domain;
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@ -129,9 +129,10 @@ type sysfs_vendor_sched, sysfs_type, fs_type;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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typeattribute sysfs_vendor_sched mlstrustedobject;
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')
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type fs_bpf, fs_type;
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type fs_bpf_tethering, fs_type;
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type fs_bpf_vendor, fs_type;
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type fs_bpf, fs_type, bpffs_type;
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# TODO: S+ fs_bpf_tethering (used by mainline) should be private
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type fs_bpf_tethering, fs_type, bpffs_type;
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type fs_bpf_vendor, fs_type, bpffs_type;
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type configfs, fs_type;
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# /sys/devices/cs_etm
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type sysfs_devices_cs_etm, fs_type, sysfs_type;
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@ -64,8 +64,6 @@ allow netd sysfs_usb:file write;
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r_dir_file(netd, cgroup_v2)
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allow netd fs_bpf:file { read write };
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# TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related
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# work. However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them.
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# Why?
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@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ typeattribute bpfloader bpfdomain;
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allow bpfloader kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
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# These permissions are required to pin ebpf maps & programs.
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allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir { add_name create search write };
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allow bpfloader { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:file { create read setattr };
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allow { fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor } fs_bpf:filesystem associate;
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allow bpfloader bpffs_type:dir { add_name create remove_name search write };
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allow bpfloader bpffs_type:file { create read rename setattr };
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allow { bpffs_type -fs_bpf } fs_bpf:filesystem associate;
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# Allow bpfloader to create bpf maps and programs.
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allow bpfloader self:bpf { map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run };
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@ -26,17 +26,21 @@ allow bpfloader bpfloader_exec:file execute_no_trans;
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###
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# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init; Note: we don't care about getattr/mounton/search
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neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir { open read setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir { add_name create write };
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neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:dir ~{ add_name create getattr mounton open read search setattr write };
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neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } bpffs_type:dir { open read setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } bpffs_type:dir { add_name create remove_name write };
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neverallow domain bpffs_type:dir ~{ add_name create getattr mounton open read remove_name search setattr write };
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# TODO: get rid of init & vendor_init
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:file { map open setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering fs_bpf_vendor }:file create;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -lmkd -mediaprovider_app -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf }:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -lmkd -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } { fs_bpf_tethering }:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file write;
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neverallow domain { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file ~{ create map open read setattr write };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -vendor_init } bpffs_type:file { map open setattr };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } bpffs_type:file { create rename };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -init -lmkd -mediaprovider_app -netd -netutils_wrapper -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_private:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_shared:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_shared:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:file read;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } { bpffs_type -fs_bpf_vendor }:file write;
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neverallow domain bpffs_type:file ~{ create map open read rename setattr write };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
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@ -1,6 +1,13 @@
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# /proc/config.gz
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type config_gz, fs_type, proc_type;
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# /sys/fs/bpf/<dir> for mainline tethering use
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# TODO: move S+ fs_bpf_tethering here from public/file.te
|
||||
type fs_bpf_net_private, fs_type, bpffs_type;
|
||||
type fs_bpf_net_shared, fs_type, bpffs_type;
|
||||
type fs_bpf_netd_readonly, fs_type, bpffs_type;
|
||||
type fs_bpf_netd_shared, fs_type, bpffs_type;
|
||||
|
||||
# /data/misc/storaged
|
||||
type storaged_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -395,5 +395,9 @@ genfscon functionfs / u:object_r:functionfs:s0
|
|||
genfscon usbfs / u:object_r:usbfs:s0
|
||||
genfscon binfmt_misc / u:object_r:binfmt_miscfs:s0
|
||||
genfscon bpf / u:object_r:fs_bpf:s0
|
||||
genfscon bpf /net_private u:object_r:fs_bpf_net_private:s0
|
||||
genfscon bpf /net_shared u:object_r:fs_bpf_net_shared:s0
|
||||
genfscon bpf /netd_readonly u:object_r:fs_bpf_netd_readonly:s0
|
||||
genfscon bpf /netd_shared u:object_r:fs_bpf_netd_shared:s0
|
||||
genfscon bpf /tethering u:object_r:fs_bpf_tethering:s0
|
||||
genfscon bpf /vendor u:object_r:fs_bpf_vendor:s0
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ init_daemon_domain(netd)
|
|||
# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(netd, dnsmasq_exec, dnsmasq)
|
||||
|
||||
allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:dir search;
|
||||
allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file read;
|
||||
allow netd { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# give netd permission to setup iptables rule with xt_bpf, attach program to cgroup, and read/write
|
||||
# the map created by bpfloader
|
||||
allow netd bpfloader:bpf { prog_run map_read map_write };
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ binder_call(netutils_wrapper, netd);
|
|||
# For vendor code that update the iptables rules at runtime. They need to reload
|
||||
# the whole chain including the xt_bpf rules. They need to access to the pinned
|
||||
# program when reloading the rule.
|
||||
allow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf:file { read write };
|
||||
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:dir search;
|
||||
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file read;
|
||||
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf }:file write;
|
||||
allow netutils_wrapper bpfloader:bpf prog_run;
|
||||
|
||||
# For /data/misc/net access to ndc and ip
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ hal_client_domain(network_stack, hal_tetheroffload)
|
|||
allow network_stack self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
|
||||
allow network_stack network_stack_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
# allow Tethering(network_stack process) to run/update/read the eBPF maps to offload tethering traffic by eBPF.
|
||||
allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
|
||||
allow network_stack { fs_bpf fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
|
||||
allow network_stack { fs_bpf_net_private fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared fs_bpf_tethering }:dir search;
|
||||
allow network_stack { fs_bpf_net_private fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared fs_bpf_tethering }:file { read write };
|
||||
allow network_stack bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
|
||||
|
||||
# Use XFRM (IPsec) netlink sockets
|
||||
|
|
@ -71,8 +71,46 @@ allow network_stack self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlms
|
|||
allow network_stack tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allowxperm network_stack tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF TUNSETLINK TUNSETCARRIER };
|
||||
|
||||
# Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_tethering' programs/maps.
|
||||
############### NEVER ALLOW RULES
|
||||
# This place is as good as any for these rules,
|
||||
# and it is probably the most appropriate because
|
||||
# network_stack itself is entirely mainline code.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Unfortunately init/vendor_init have all sorts of extra privs
|
||||
|
||||
# T+: Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_net_private' programs/maps.
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_private:dir ~getattr;
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_private:file *;
|
||||
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_net_private:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack } fs_bpf_net_private:file ~{ map open read setattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# T+: Only the bpfloader, network_stack and system_server should ever touch 'fs_bpf_net_shared' programs/maps.
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_shared:dir ~getattr;
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_net_shared:file *;
|
||||
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_net_shared:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_net_shared:file ~{ map open read setattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# T+: Only the bpfloader, netd, network_stack and system_server should ever touch 'fs_bpf_netd_readonly' programs/maps.
|
||||
# netd's access should be readonly
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:dir ~getattr;
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file *;
|
||||
neverallow netd fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file write;
|
||||
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file ~{ map open read setattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# T+: Only the bpfloader, netd, netutils_wrapper, network_stack and system_server should ever touch 'fs_bpf_netd_shared' programs/maps.
|
||||
# netutils_wrapper requires access to be able to run iptables and only needs readonly access
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_shared:dir ~getattr;
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -vendor_init } fs_bpf_netd_shared:file *;
|
||||
neverallow netutils_wrapper fs_bpf_netd_shared:file write;
|
||||
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_shared:dir ~{ getattr open read search setattr };
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_shared:file ~{ map open read setattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# S+: Only the bpfloader and the network_stack should ever touch 'fs_bpf_tethering' programs/maps.
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:dir ~getattr;
|
||||
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init -network_stack -vendor_init } fs_bpf_tethering:file *;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1154,7 +1154,8 @@ with_asan(`
|
|||
# allow system_server to read the eBPF maps that stores the traffic stats information and update
|
||||
# the map after snapshot is recorded, and to read, update and run the maps and programs used for
|
||||
# time in state accounting
|
||||
allow system_server fs_bpf:file { read write };
|
||||
allow system_server { fs_bpf fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:dir search;
|
||||
allow system_server { fs_bpf fs_bpf_net_shared fs_bpf_netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file { read write };
|
||||
allow system_server bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
|
||||
# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
|
||||
allow system_server self:key_socket create;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ attribute dev_type;
|
|||
# TODO(b/202520796) Remove this attribute once the sc-dev branch stops using it.
|
||||
attribute bdev_type;
|
||||
|
||||
# Attribute for all bpf filesystem subtypes.
|
||||
attribute bpffs_type;
|
||||
|
||||
# All types used for processes.
|
||||
attribute domain;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -129,9 +129,10 @@ type sysfs_vendor_sched, sysfs_type, fs_type;
|
|||
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
||||
typeattribute sysfs_vendor_sched mlstrustedobject;
|
||||
')
|
||||
type fs_bpf, fs_type;
|
||||
type fs_bpf_tethering, fs_type;
|
||||
type fs_bpf_vendor, fs_type;
|
||||
type fs_bpf, fs_type, bpffs_type;
|
||||
# TODO: S+ fs_bpf_tethering (used by mainline) should be private
|
||||
type fs_bpf_tethering, fs_type, bpffs_type;
|
||||
type fs_bpf_vendor, fs_type, bpffs_type;
|
||||
type configfs, fs_type;
|
||||
# /sys/devices/cs_etm
|
||||
type sysfs_devices_cs_etm, fs_type, sysfs_type;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -64,8 +64,6 @@ allow netd sysfs_usb:file write;
|
|||
|
||||
r_dir_file(netd, cgroup_v2)
|
||||
|
||||
allow netd fs_bpf:file { read write };
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related
|
||||
# work. However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them.
|
||||
# Why?
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ def TestSystemTypeViolations(pol):
|
|||
|
||||
return pol.AssertPathTypesHaveAttr(partitions, exceptions, "system_file_type")
|
||||
|
||||
def TestBpffsTypeViolations(pol):
|
||||
return pol.AssertGenfsFilesystemTypesHaveAttr("bpf", "bpffs_type")
|
||||
|
||||
def TestProcTypeViolations(pol):
|
||||
return pol.AssertGenfsFilesystemTypesHaveAttr("proc", "proc_type")
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -128,6 +131,7 @@ class MultipleOption(Option):
|
|||
Option.take_action(self, action, dest, opt, value, values, parser)
|
||||
|
||||
Tests = [
|
||||
"TestBpffsTypeViolations",
|
||||
"TestDataTypeViolators",
|
||||
"TestProcTypeViolations",
|
||||
"TestSysfsTypeViolations",
|
||||
|
|
@ -175,6 +179,8 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
|
|||
|
||||
results = ""
|
||||
# If an individual test is not specified, run all tests.
|
||||
if options.test is None or "TestBpffsTypeViolations" in options.test:
|
||||
results += TestBpffsTypeViolations(pol)
|
||||
if options.test is None or "TestDataTypeViolations" in options.test:
|
||||
results += TestDataTypeViolations(pol)
|
||||
if options.test is None or "TestProcTypeViolations" in options.test:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue