Move allow rules from public/app.te to private/app.te
Allow rules in public/*.te can only reference types defined in public/*.te files. This can be quite cumbersome in cases a rule needs to be updated to reference a type that is only defined in private/*.te. This change moves all the allow rules from public/app.te to private/app.te to make it possible to reference private types in the allow rules. Bug: 211761016 Test: m Test: presubmit Change-Id: I0c4a3f1ef568bbfdfb2176869fcd92ee648617fa Merged-In: I0c4a3f1ef568bbfdfb2176869fcd92ee648617fa
This commit is contained in:
Nikita Ioffe
parent
70cd2da646
commit
269e7cfc51
2 changed files with 369 additions and 369 deletions
369
private/app.te
369
private/app.te
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@ -87,6 +87,375 @@ allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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allow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file { getattr read };
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neverallow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
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# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
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allow appdomain self:process execmem;
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allow appdomain { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from app zygote.
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allow appdomain app_zygote:fd use;
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
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# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
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allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Notify zygote of death;
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allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
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# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
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allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
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allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
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')
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# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
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allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
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allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
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# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
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allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
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allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
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allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
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# For AppFuse.
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allow appdomain vold:fd use;
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# Communication with other apps via fifos
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allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
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allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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# App sandbox file accesses.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
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# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
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# Traverse into expanded storage
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allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
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r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# TextClassifier
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
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# Access to OEM provided data and apps
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allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
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# Execute the shell or other system executables.
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;
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not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
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# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
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allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
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# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
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not_full_treble(`
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allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
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')
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full_treble_only(`
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# For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
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')
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
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# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app }, vendor_app_file)
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allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
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r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
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# for vendor provided libraries.
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r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
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# Allow apps read / execute access to vendor public libraries.
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allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:file { execute read open getattr map };
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# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write map };
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# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
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allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write map };
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# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
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allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read map };
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# Read icon file (opened by system).
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allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read map };
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# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
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#
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# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
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# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
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# and the rules below.
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
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# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
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# domain socket.
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#
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# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
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# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
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# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
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# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
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# creation).
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unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
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allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
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allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file append;
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# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
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allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
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allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
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allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
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# Allow apps to send dump information to incidentd
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allow appdomain incidentd:fd use;
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allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file { write getattr };
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# Allow apps to send information to statsd socket.
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unix_socket_send(appdomain, statsdw, statsd)
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# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
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allow appdomain user_profile_root_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
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allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
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# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
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# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
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# debuggable builds only.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
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')
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# /proc/net access.
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# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
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# proc_net access for the negated domains below is granted (or not) in their
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# individual .te files.
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r_dir_file({
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appdomain
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-ephemeral_app
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-isolated_app
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-platform_app
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-priv_app
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-shell
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-system_app
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-untrusted_app_all
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}, proc_net_type)
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# audit access for all these non-core app domains.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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auditallow {
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appdomain
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-ephemeral_app
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-isolated_app
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-platform_app
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-priv_app
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-shell
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-su
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-system_app
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-untrusted_app_all
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} proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
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')
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# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
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# They need that to render the standard UI.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Use the Binder.
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binder_use(appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
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binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
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# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
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binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, gpuservice)
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# Talk with graphics composer fences
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allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
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# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
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# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
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# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
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# are examined.
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allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
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# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
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# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
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allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr map };
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allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
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# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
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allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
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# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
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# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
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# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read/write visible storage
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
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# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
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# accesses to the underlying FS.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
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# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
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#
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# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
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# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
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# For art.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
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allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain apk_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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# /data/resource-cache
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# logd access
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read_logd(appdomain)
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control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app })
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# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
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allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
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use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
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use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
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allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
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# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
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allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
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ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
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# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
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# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
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allow {appdomain -isolated_app} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
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# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
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# TODO: switch to meminfo service
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allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
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# For app fuse.
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allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
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# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
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pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
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###
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### CTS-specific rules
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###
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# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
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# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
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allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
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# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
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# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
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# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
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allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
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# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
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# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
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allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
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allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
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# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
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with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
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# Read access to FDs from the DropboxManagerService.
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allow appdomain dropbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
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# Read tmpfs types from these processes.
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allow appdomain audioserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
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allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
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allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
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# Sensitive app domains are not allowed to execute from /data
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# to prevent persistence attacks and ensure all code is executed
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# from read-only locations.
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369
public/app.te
369
public/app.te
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@ -8,375 +8,6 @@
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###
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type appdomain_tmpfs, file_type;
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# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
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allow appdomain self:process execmem;
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allow appdomain { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
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allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
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# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from app zygote.
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allow appdomain app_zygote:fd use;
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
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||||
# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
|
||||
allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Notify zygote of death;
|
||||
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
|
||||
|
||||
# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
|
||||
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
|
||||
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
|
||||
allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
|
||||
allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
|
||||
|
||||
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
||||
# Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
|
||||
allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
|
||||
allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
|
||||
allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
|
||||
|
||||
# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
|
||||
allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
|
||||
|
||||
# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
|
||||
allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
|
||||
allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
|
||||
allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
|
||||
|
||||
# For AppFuse.
|
||||
allow appdomain vold:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Communication with other apps via fifos
|
||||
allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
|
||||
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
|
||||
|
||||
# App sandbox file accesses.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
|
||||
|
||||
# Traverse into expanded storage
|
||||
allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
|
||||
r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
|
||||
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# TextClassifier
|
||||
r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
|
||||
|
||||
# Access to OEM provided data and apps
|
||||
allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute the shell or other system executables.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;
|
||||
not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
|
||||
|
||||
# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
|
||||
allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
|
||||
# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
|
||||
not_full_treble(`
|
||||
allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
full_treble_only(`
|
||||
# For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
|
||||
# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
|
||||
r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app }, vendor_app_file)
|
||||
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
|
||||
r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
|
||||
# for vendor provided libraries.
|
||||
r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps read / execute access to vendor public libraries.
|
||||
allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:file { execute read open getattr map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
|
||||
allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
|
||||
allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
|
||||
allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read icon file (opened by system).
|
||||
allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
|
||||
# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
|
||||
# and the rules below.
|
||||
allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
|
||||
allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
|
||||
|
||||
# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
|
||||
# domain socket.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
|
||||
# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
|
||||
# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
|
||||
# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
|
||||
# creation).
|
||||
unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
|
||||
allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
|
||||
allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
|
||||
allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file append;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
|
||||
allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
|
||||
allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
|
||||
allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
|
||||
allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps to send dump information to incidentd
|
||||
allow appdomain incidentd:fd use;
|
||||
allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file { write getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps to send information to statsd socket.
|
||||
unix_socket_send(appdomain, statsdw, statsd)
|
||||
|
||||
# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
|
||||
allow appdomain user_profile_root_file:dir search;
|
||||
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
|
||||
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
|
||||
# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
|
||||
# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
|
||||
# debuggable builds only.
|
||||
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
||||
allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# /proc/net access.
|
||||
# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
|
||||
# proc_net access for the negated domains below is granted (or not) in their
|
||||
# individual .te files.
|
||||
r_dir_file({
|
||||
appdomain
|
||||
-ephemeral_app
|
||||
-isolated_app
|
||||
-platform_app
|
||||
-priv_app
|
||||
-shell
|
||||
-system_app
|
||||
-untrusted_app_all
|
||||
}, proc_net_type)
|
||||
# audit access for all these non-core app domains.
|
||||
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
||||
auditallow {
|
||||
appdomain
|
||||
-ephemeral_app
|
||||
-isolated_app
|
||||
-platform_app
|
||||
-priv_app
|
||||
-shell
|
||||
-su
|
||||
-system_app
|
||||
-untrusted_app_all
|
||||
} proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
|
||||
# They need that to render the standard UI.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Use the Binder.
|
||||
binder_use(appdomain)
|
||||
# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
|
||||
binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
|
||||
# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
|
||||
binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
|
||||
# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
|
||||
binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
|
||||
# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
|
||||
binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, gpuservice)
|
||||
|
||||
# Talk with graphics composer fences
|
||||
allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
|
||||
# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
|
||||
# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
|
||||
# are examined.
|
||||
allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
|
||||
|
||||
# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
|
||||
# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
|
||||
allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
|
||||
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr map };
|
||||
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
|
||||
# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
|
||||
allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
|
||||
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Read/write visible storage
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
|
||||
# accesses to the underlying FS.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
|
||||
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
|
||||
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# For art.
|
||||
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
|
||||
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
|
||||
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
|
||||
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
|
||||
allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain apk_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# /data/resource-cache
|
||||
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# logd access
|
||||
read_logd(appdomain)
|
||||
control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app })
|
||||
# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
|
||||
allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
|
||||
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
|
||||
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
|
||||
|
||||
use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
|
||||
|
||||
use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
|
||||
|
||||
allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
|
||||
|
||||
# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
|
||||
allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
|
||||
ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
|
||||
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
|
||||
allow {appdomain -isolated_app} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
|
||||
|
||||
# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
|
||||
allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO: switch to meminfo service
|
||||
allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# For app fuse.
|
||||
allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };
|
||||
|
||||
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
|
||||
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
|
||||
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
|
||||
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
|
||||
# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
|
||||
pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
|
||||
|
||||
###
|
||||
### CTS-specific rules
|
||||
###
|
||||
|
||||
# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
|
||||
# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
|
||||
allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
|
||||
# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
|
||||
|
||||
# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
|
||||
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
|
||||
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
|
||||
allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
|
||||
|
||||
# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
|
||||
# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
|
||||
allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
|
||||
allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
|
||||
|
||||
allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
|
||||
with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
|
||||
|
||||
# Read access to FDs from the DropboxManagerService.
|
||||
allow appdomain dropbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read tmpfs types from these processes.
|
||||
allow appdomain audioserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
|
||||
allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
|
||||
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
|
||||
|
||||
###
|
||||
### Neverallow rules
|
||||
###
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue