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sepolicy: add version_policy tool and version non-platform policy.

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In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317
This commit is contained in:
dcashman 2016-10-12 14:58:09 -07:00
parent fed665edca
commit 2e00e6373f
57 changed files with 549 additions and 150 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

184
Android.mk
View file

@ -38,14 +38,13 @@ endif
# in this policy to ensure that policy targeting attributes from public
# policy from an older platform version continues to work.
# TODO - build process for device:
# build process for device:
# 1) convert policies to CIL:
# - private + public platform policy to CIL
# - mapping file to CIL (should already be in CIL form)
# - non-platform public policy to CIL
# - non-platform public + private policy to CIL
# 2) attributize policy
# - TODO: do this for platform policy?
# - run script which takes non-platform public and non-platform combined
# private + public policy and produces attributized and versioned
# non-platform policy
@ -55,6 +54,27 @@ endif
PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY := $(LOCAL_PATH)/public
PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY := $(LOCAL_PATH)/private
REQD_MASK_POLICY := $(LOCAL_PATH)/reqd_mask
# TODO: move to README when doing the README update and finalizing versioning.
# BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS should contain the platform version identifier
# corresponding to the platform on which the non-platform policy is to be
# based. If unspecified, this will build against the current public platform
# policy in tree.
# BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR should contain the public platform policy which
# is associated with the given BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS. The policy therein will be
# versioned according to the BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS identifier and included as
# part of the non-platform policy to ensure removal of access in future
# platform policy does not break non-platform policy.
ifndef BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS
$(warning BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS not specified, assuming current platform version)
BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS := current
BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR := $(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY)
else
ifndef BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR
$(error BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR not specified for versioned sepolicy.)
endif
endif
###########################################################
# Compute policy files to be used in policy build.
@ -83,6 +103,7 @@ sepolicy_build_files := security_classes \
global_macros \
neverallow_macros \
mls_macros \
mls_decl \
mls \
policy_capabilities \
te_macros \
@ -90,6 +111,7 @@ sepolicy_build_files := security_classes \
ioctl_defines \
ioctl_macros \
*.te \
roles_decl \
roles \
users \
initial_sid_contexts \
@ -128,11 +150,64 @@ endif
include $(BUILD_SYSTEM)/base_rules.mk
platform_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/plat_policy.conf
$(platform_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
$(platform_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
$(platform_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
$(platform_policy.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
# reqd_policy_mask - a policy.conf file which contains only the bare minimum
# policy necessary to use checkpolicy. This bare-minimum policy needs to be
# present in all policy.conf files, but should not necessarily be exported as
# part of the public policy. The rules generated by reqd_policy_mask will allow
# the compilation of public policy and subsequent removal of CIL policy that
# should not be exported.
reqd_policy_mask.conf := $(intermediates)/reqd_policy_mask.conf
$(reqd_policy_mask.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
$(reqd_policy_mask.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
$(reqd_policy_mask.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
$(reqd_policy_mask.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
-D target_build_variant=$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT) \
-s $^ > $@
reqd_policy_mask.cil := $(intermediates)/reqd_policy_mask.cil
$(reqd_policy_mask.cil): $(reqd_policy_mask.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
# plat_pub_policy - policy that will be exported to be a part of non-platform
# policy corresponding to this platform version. This is a limited subset of
# policy that would not compile in checkpolicy on its own. To get around this
# limitation, add only the required files from private policy, which will
# generate CIL policy that will then be filtered out by the reqd_policy_mask.
plat_pub_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/plat_pub_policy.conf
$(plat_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
$(plat_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
$(plat_pub_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
$(plat_pub_policy.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY))
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
-D target_build_variant=$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT) \
-s $^ > $@
plat_pub_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/plat_pub_policy.cil
$(plat_pub_policy.cil): $(plat_pub_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
pruned_plat_pub_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/pruned_plat_pub_policy.cil
$(pruned_plat_pub_policy.cil): $(reqd_policy_mask.cil) $(plat_pub_policy.cil)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) grep -Fxv -f $^ > $@
# plat_policy.conf - A combination of the private and public platform policy
# which will ship with the device. The platform will always reflect the most
# recent platform version and is not currently being attributized.
plat_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/plat_policy.conf
$(plat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
$(plat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
$(plat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
$(plat_policy.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
$(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
@ -144,15 +219,23 @@ $(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
-s $^ > $@
$(hide) sed '/dontaudit/d' $@ > $@.dontaudit
# TODO: add steps for non-platform public and combined files with checkpolicy
# support. b/31932523
plat_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/plat_policy.cil
$(plat_policy.cil): $(plat_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $<
$(hide) grep -v neverallow $@.tmp > $@
sepolicy_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/policy.conf
$(sepolicy_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
$(sepolicy_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
$(sepolicy_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
$(sepolicy_policy.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
$(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
# nonplat_policy.conf - A combination of the non-platform private and the
# exported platform policy associated with the version the non-platform policy
# targets. This needs attributization and to be combined with the
# platform-provided policy. Like plat_pub_policy.conf, this needs to make use
# of the reqd_policy_mask files from private policy in order to use checkpolicy.
nonplat_policy.conf := $(intermediates)/nonplat_policy.conf
$(nonplat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_SENS := $(MLS_SENS)
$(nonplat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_MLS_CATS := $(MLS_CATS)
$(nonplat_policy.conf): PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS := $(LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS)
$(nonplat_policy.conf): $(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_files), \
$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS_DIR) $(REQD_MASK_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) m4 $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) \
-D mls_num_sens=$(PRIVATE_MLS_SENS) -D mls_num_cats=$(PRIVATE_MLS_CATS) \
@ -164,10 +247,47 @@ $(PLAT_PUBLIC_POLICY) $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY) $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
-s $^ > $@
$(hide) sed '/dontaudit/d' $@ > $@.dontaudit
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(sepolicy_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze
nonplat_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/nonplat_policy.cil
$(nonplat_policy.cil): $(nonplat_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $< > /dev/null
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $(dir $<)/$(notdir $@).dontaudit $<.dontaudit > /dev/null
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
pruned_nonplat_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/pruned_nonplat_policy.cil
$(pruned_nonplat_policy.cil): $(reqd_policy_mask.cil) $(nonplat_policy.cil)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) grep -Fxv -f $^ | grep -v neverallow > $@
vers_nonplat_policy.cil := $(intermediates)/vers_nonplat_policy.cil
$(vers_nonplat_policy.cil) : PRIVATE_VERS := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS)
$(vers_nonplat_policy.cil) : PRIVATE_TGT_POL := $(pruned_nonplat_policy.cil)
$(vers_nonplat_policy.cil) : $(pruned_plat_pub_policy.cil) $(pruned_nonplat_policy.cil) \
$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy -b $< -t $(PRIVATE_TGT_POL) -n $(PRIVATE_VERS) -o $@
# auto-generate the mapping file for current platform policy, since it needs to
# track platform policy development
current_mapping.cil := $(intermediates)/mapping/current.cil
$(current_mapping.cil) : PRIVATE_VERS := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS)
$(current_mapping.cil) : $(pruned_plat_pub_policy.cil) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/version_policy -b $< -m -n $(PRIVATE_VERS) -o $@
ifeq ($(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS), current)
mapping.cil := $(current_mapping.cil)
else
mapping.cil := $(addsuffix /$(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS).cil, $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)/mapping)
endif
all_cil_files := \
$(plat_policy.cil) \
$(vers_nonplat_policy.cil) \
$(mapping.cil)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_CIL_FILES := $(all_cil_files)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze $(all_cil_files)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $< -M true -c $(POLICYVERS) $(PRIVATE_CIL_FILES) -o $@.tmp
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze $@.tmp permissive > $@.permissivedomains
$(hide) if [ "$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT)" = "user" -a -s $@.permissivedomains ]; then \
echo "==========" 1>&2; \
@ -179,6 +299,20 @@ $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(sepolicy_policy.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpoli
$(hide) mv $@.tmp $@
built_sepolicy := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
reqd_policy_mask.conf :=
reqd_policy_mask.cil :=
plat_pub_policy.conf :=
plat_pub_policy.cil :=
pruned_plat_pub_policy.cil :=
plat_policy.conf :=
plat_policy.cil :=
nonplat_policy.conf :=
nonplat_policy.cil :=
pruned_nonplat_policy.cil :=
vers_nonplat_policy.cil :=
current_mapping.cil :=
mapping.cil :=
all_cil_files :=
sepolicy_policy.conf :=
##################################
@ -311,7 +445,7 @@ file_contexts.device.sorted.tmp := $(intermediates)/file_contexts.device.sorted.
$(file_contexts.device.sorted.tmp): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
$(file_contexts.device.sorted.tmp): $(file_contexts.device.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/fc_sort $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -e $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $<
# TODO: fix with attributized types $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -e $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $<
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/fc_sort $< $@
file_contexts.concat.tmp := $(intermediates)/file_contexts.concat.tmp
@ -322,7 +456,7 @@ $(file_contexts.concat.tmp): $(file_contexts.local.tmp) $(file_contexts.device.s
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(file_contexts.concat.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sefcontext_compile $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $<
# TODO: fix with attributized types $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $<
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sefcontext_compile -o $@ $<
built_fc := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
@ -352,7 +486,7 @@ $(general_file_contexts.tmp): $(addprefix $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)/, file_contexts
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_general_sepolicy)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(general_file_contexts.tmp) $(built_general_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sefcontext_compile $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $<
# TODO: fix with attributized types $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $<
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sefcontext_compile -o $@ $<
general_file_contexts.tmp :=
@ -433,7 +567,7 @@ $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(property_contexts.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $< > $@
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -p $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
# TODO: fix with attributized types $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -p $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
built_pc := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
all_pc_files :=
@ -458,7 +592,7 @@ $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_general_sepolicy)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(general_property_contexts.tmp) $(built_general_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(ACP)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
$(hide) sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $< > $@
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -p $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
# TODO: fix with attributized types $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -p $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
general_property_contexts.tmp :=
@ -486,7 +620,7 @@ $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_sepolicy)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(service_contexts.tmp) $(built_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(ACP)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $< > $@
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -s $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
# TODO: fix with attributized types$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -s $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
built_svc := $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE)
all_svc_files :=
@ -511,7 +645,7 @@ $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_SEPOLICY := $(built_general_sepolicy)
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(general_service_contexts.tmp) $(built_general_sepolicy) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc $(ACP)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
sed -e 's/#.*$$//' -e '/^$$/d' $< > $@
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -s $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
# TODO: fix with attributized types $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkfc -s $(PRIVATE_SEPOLICY) $@
general_service_contexts.tmp :=

3
private/app.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
# Read system properties managed by zygote.
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;

5
private/bluetooth.te
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@ -2,3 +2,8 @@
# public, but conceptually should go with this
# Socket creation under /data/misc/bluedroid.
type_transition bluetooth bluetooth_data_file:sock_file bluetooth_socket;
# app_domain macro fallout
tmpfs_domain(bluetooth)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow bluetooth bluetooth_tmpfs:file execute;

10
private/domain.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
-debuggerd
-vold
-dumpstate
-system_server
userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
} self:capability sys_ptrace;

2
private/drmserver.te
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@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
# public, but conceptually should go with this
init_daemon_domain(drmserver)
type_transition drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file drmserver_socket;

9
private/dumpstate.te
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@ -4,3 +4,12 @@ init_daemon_domain(dumpstate)
# Execute and transition to the vdc domain
domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, vdc_exec, vdc)
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
allow dumpstate dumpstate_tmpfs:file execute;
# systrace support - allow atrace to run
allow dumpstate debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
allow dumpstate debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow dumpstate debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
allow dumpstate atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;

6
private/ephemeral_app.te
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@ -3,3 +3,9 @@
# Define and allow access to our own type for ashmem regions.
# Label ashmem objects with our own unique type.
tmpfs_domain(ephemeral_app)
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_tmpfs:file execute;
# Read system properties managed by zygote.
allow ephemeral_app zygote_tmpfs:file read;

4
private/file.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# Compatibility with type names used in vanilla Android 4.3 and 4.4.
typealias audio_data_file alias audio_firmware_file;
typealias app_data_file alias platform_app_data_file;
typealias app_data_file alias download_file;

3
private/installd.te
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@ -10,3 +10,6 @@ domain_auto_trans(installd, profman_exec, profman)
# Run idmap in its own sandbox.
domain_auto_trans(installd, idmap_exec, idmap)
# Create /data/.layout_version.* file
type_transition installd system_data_file:file install_data_file;

7
private/isolated_app.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(isolated_app)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow isolated_app isolated_app_tmpfs:file execute;
# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;

5
private/logd.te
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@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
# public, but conceptually should go with this
init_daemon_domain(logd)
# logd is not allowed to write anywhere other than /data/misc/logd, and then
# only on userdebug or eng builds
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
neverallow logd { file_type -logd_tmpfs userdebug_or_eng(` -misc_logd_file -coredump_file ') }:file { create write append };

12
private/mls
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@ -1,15 +1,3 @@
#########################################
# MLS declarations
#
# Generate the desired number of sensitivities and categories.
gen_sens(mls_num_sens)
gen_cats(mls_num_cats)
# Generate level definitions for each sensitivity and category.
gen_levels(mls_num_sens,mls_num_cats)
#################################################
# MLS policy constraints
#

10
private/mls_decl Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#########################################
# MLS declarations
#
# Generate the desired number of sensitivities and categories.
gen_sens(mls_num_sens)
gen_cats(mls_num_cats)
# Generate level definitions for each sensitivity and category.
gen_levels(mls_num_sens,mls_num_cats)

4
private/nfc.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# app_domain_fallout
tmpfs_domain(nfc)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow nfc nfc_tmpfs:file execute;

4
private/platform_app.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(platform_app)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow platform_app platform_app_tmpfs:file execute;

8
private/priv_app.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(priv_app)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow priv_app priv_app_tmpfs:file execute;
# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(priv_app)

4
private/radio.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(radio)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow radio radio_tmpfs:file execute;

4
private/recovery_persist.te
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@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
# public, but conceptually should go with this
init_daemon_domain(recovery_persist)
# recovery_persist is not allowed to write anywhere other than recovery_data_file
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
neverallow recovery_persist { file_type -recovery_data_file -recovery_persist_tmpfs userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file') }:file write;

4
private/recovery_refresh.te
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@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
# public, but conceptually should go with this
init_daemon_domain(recovery_refresh)
# recovery_refresh is not allowed to write anywhere
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
neverallow recovery_refresh { file_type -recovery_refresh_tmpfs userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file') }:file write;

1
private/roles_decl Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
role r;

4
private/shared_relro.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(shared_relro)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow shared_relro shared_relro_tmpfs:file execute;

10
private/shell.te Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# systrace support - allow atrace to run
allow shell debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow shell debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
allow shell atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(shell)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow shell shell_tmpfs:file execute;

48
private/su.te
View file

@ -1,13 +1,5 @@
# File types must be defined for file_contexts.
type su_exec, exec_type, file_type;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Domain used for su processes, as well as for adbd and adb shell
# after performing an adb root command. The domain definition is
# wrapped to ensure that it does not exist at all on -user builds.
type su, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
domain_auto_trans(shell, su_exec, su)
# Allow dumpstate to call su on userdebug / eng builds to collect
# additional information.
domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, su_exec, su)
@ -16,41 +8,11 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
# from the "init" domain.
domain_auto_trans(su, dumpstate_exec, dumpstate)
# su is also permissive to permit setenforce.
# su is also permissive to permit setenforce.
permissive su;
# Add su to various domains
net_domain(su)
app_domain(su)
dontaudit su self:capability_class_set *;
dontaudit su kernel:security *;
dontaudit su kernel:system *;
dontaudit su self:memprotect *;
dontaudit su domain:process *;
dontaudit su domain:fd *;
dontaudit su domain:dir *;
dontaudit su domain:lnk_file *;
dontaudit su domain:{ fifo_file file } *;
dontaudit su domain:socket_class_set *;
dontaudit su domain:ipc_class_set *;
dontaudit su domain:key *;
dontaudit su fs_type:filesystem *;
dontaudit su {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set *;
dontaudit su node_type:node *;
dontaudit su node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
dontaudit su netif_type:netif *;
dontaudit su port_type:socket_class_set *;
dontaudit su port_type:{ tcp_socket dccp_socket } *;
dontaudit su domain:peer *;
dontaudit su domain:binder *;
dontaudit su property_type:property_service *;
dontaudit su property_type:file *;
dontaudit su service_manager_type:service_manager *;
dontaudit su servicemanager:service_manager list;
dontaudit su keystore:keystore_key *;
dontaudit su domain:debuggerd *;
dontaudit su domain:drmservice *;
dontaudit su unlabeled:filesystem *;
dontaudit su postinstall_file:filesystem *;
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(su)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow su su_tmpfs:file execute;
')

4
private/system_app.te Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(system_app)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow system_app system_app_tmpfs:file execute;

9
private/system_server.te
View file

@ -4,3 +4,12 @@
tmpfs_domain(system_server)
# Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
# Create a socket for receiving info from wpa.
type_transition system_server wifi_data_file:sock_file system_wpa_socket;
type_transition system_server wpa_socket:sock_file system_wpa_socket;
# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
neverallow system_server system_server_tmpfs:file execute;

8
private/untrusted_app.te Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# app_domain fallout
tmpfs_domain(untrusted_app)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow untrusted_app untrusted_app_tmpfs:file execute;
# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(untrusted_app)

3
public/app.te
View file

@ -22,9 +22,6 @@ allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Read system properties managed by zygote.
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;
# Notify zygote of death;
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;

17
public/domain.te
View file

@ -192,17 +192,6 @@ neverallowxperm * devpts:chr_file ioctl TIOCSTI;
# Do not allow any domain other than init or recovery to create unlabeled files.
neverallow { domain -init -recovery } unlabeled:dir_file_class_set create;
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
-debuggerd
-vold
-dumpstate
-system_server
userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
} self:capability sys_ptrace;
# Limit device node creation to these whitelisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
@ -506,7 +495,7 @@ neverallow { domain -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;
# written on domain are applied to all processes.
# This is achieved by ensuring that it is impossible to transition
# from a domain to a non-domain type and vice versa.
neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };
# TODO - rework this: neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };
neverallow ~domain domain:process { transition dyntransition };
#
@ -617,10 +606,10 @@ neverallow {
neverallow * ~servicemanager:service_manager list;
# only service_manager_types can be added to service_manager
neverallow * ~service_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
# TODO - rework this: neverallow * ~service_manager_type:service_manager { add find };
# Prevent assigning non property types to properties
neverallow * ~property_type:property_service set;
# TODO - rework this: neverallow * ~property_type:property_service set;
# Domain types should never be assigned to any files other
# than the /proc/pid files associated with a process. The

1
public/drmserver.te
View file

@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ type drmserver_socket, file_type;
# /data/app/tlcd_sock socket file.
# Clearly, /data/app is the most logical place to create a socket. Not.
allow drmserver apk_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
type_transition drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file drmserver_socket;
allow drmserver drmserver_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
allow drmserver tee:unix_stream_socket connectto;
# Delete old socket file if present.

7
public/dumpstate.te
View file

@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ allow dumpstate shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow dumpstate zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Dalvik Compiler JIT.
allow dumpstate ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
allow dumpstate dumpstate_tmpfs:file execute;
allow dumpstate self:process execmem;
# For art.
allow dumpstate libart_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
@ -187,12 +186,6 @@ set_prop(dumpstate, dumpstate_prop)
# dumpstate_options_prop is used to pass extra command-line args.
set_prop(dumpstate, dumpstate_options_prop)
# systrace support - allow atrace to run
allow dumpstate debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
allow dumpstate debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow dumpstate debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
allow dumpstate atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Access to /data/media.
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.

6
public/ephemeral_app.te
View file

@ -16,12 +16,6 @@ net_domain(ephemeral_app)
allow ephemeral_app self:process execmem;
allow ephemeral_app ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_tmpfs:file execute;
# Read system properties managed by zygote.
allow ephemeral_app zygote_tmpfs:file read;
# Send logcat messages to logd.
write_logd(ephemeral_app)

4
public/file.te
View file

@ -172,16 +172,12 @@ type perfprofd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
# /data/misc/trace for method traces on userdebug / eng builds
type method_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
# Compatibility with type names used in vanilla Android 4.3 and 4.4.
typealias audio_data_file alias audio_firmware_file;
# /data/data subdirectories - app sandboxes
type app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
type ephemeral_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
# /data/data subdirectory for system UID apps.
type system_app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
# Compatibility with type name used in Android 4.3 and 4.4.
typealias app_data_file alias platform_app_data_file;
typealias app_data_file alias download_file;
# Default type for anything under /cache
type cache_file, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
# Type for /cache/backup_stage/* (fd interchange with apps)

1
public/installd.te
View file

@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ allow installd keychain_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow installd keychain_data_file:file {r_file_perms unlink};
# Create /data/.layout_version.* file
type_transition installd system_data_file:file install_data_file;
allow installd install_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Create files under /data/dalvik-cache.

2
public/isolated_app.te
View file

@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ auditallow isolated_app sdcard_type:file { write append };
# webview_zygote process. These rules are specialized copies of the ones in app.te.
# Inherit FDs from the webview_zygote.
allow isolated_app webview_zygote:fd use;
# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
# Notify webview_zygote of child death.
allow isolated_app webview_zygote:process sigchld;
# Inherit logd write socket.

4
public/logd.te
View file

@ -57,10 +57,6 @@ neverallow logd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
neverallow logd { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
# logd is not allowed to write anywhere other than /data/misc/logd, and then
# only on userdebug or eng builds
neverallow logd { file_type -logd_tmpfs userdebug_or_eng(` -misc_logd_file -coredump_file ') }:file { create write append };
# logpersist is only allowed on userdebug/eng builds
neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-logd -shell -dumpstate') } misc_logd_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-logd') } misc_logd_file:dir { add_name link relabelfrom remove_name rename reparent rmdir write };

4
public/priv_app.te
View file

@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ auditallow priv_app app_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(priv_app)
allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;

2
public/recovery_persist.te
View file

@ -25,5 +25,3 @@ neverallow recovery_persist system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
# Write to files in /data/data
neverallow recovery_persist { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
# recovery_persist is not allowed to write anywhere other than recovery_data_file
neverallow recovery_persist { file_type -recovery_data_file -recovery_persist_tmpfs userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file') }:file write;

3
public/recovery_refresh.te
View file

@ -22,6 +22,3 @@ neverallow recovery_refresh system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
neverallow recovery_refresh { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;
# recovery_refresh is not allowed to write anywhere
neverallow recovery_refresh { file_type -recovery_refresh_tmpfs userdebug_or_eng(`-coredump_file') }:file write;

1
private/roles → public/roles
View file

@ -1,2 +1 @@
role r;
role r types domain;

6
public/shell.te
View file

@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ set_prop(shell, wifi_log_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)')
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
# systrace support - allow atrace to run
allow shell debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow shell debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
allow shell atrace_exec:file rx_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run
allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;

44
public/su.te Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
# File types must be defined for file_contexts.
type su_exec, exec_type, file_type;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Domain used for su processes, as well as for adbd and adb shell
# after performing an adb root command. The domain definition is
# wrapped to ensure that it does not exist at all on -user builds.
type su, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
# Add su to various domains
net_domain(su)
app_domain(su)
dontaudit su self:capability_class_set *;
dontaudit su kernel:security *;
dontaudit su kernel:system *;
dontaudit su self:memprotect *;
dontaudit su domain:process *;
dontaudit su domain:fd *;
dontaudit su domain:dir *;
dontaudit su domain:lnk_file *;
dontaudit su domain:{ fifo_file file } *;
dontaudit su domain:socket_class_set *;
dontaudit su domain:ipc_class_set *;
dontaudit su domain:key *;
dontaudit su fs_type:filesystem *;
dontaudit su {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set *;
dontaudit su node_type:node *;
dontaudit su node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
dontaudit su netif_type:netif *;
dontaudit su port_type:socket_class_set *;
dontaudit su port_type:{ tcp_socket dccp_socket } *;
dontaudit su domain:peer *;
dontaudit su domain:binder *;
dontaudit su property_type:property_service *;
dontaudit su property_type:file *;
dontaudit su service_manager_type:service_manager *;
dontaudit su servicemanager:service_manager list;
dontaudit su keystore:keystore_key *;
dontaudit su domain:debuggerd *;
dontaudit su domain:drmservice *;
dontaudit su unlabeled:filesystem *;
dontaudit su postinstall_file:filesystem *;
')

4
public/system_server.te
View file

@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ allow system_server self:process ptrace;
# Child of the zygote.
allow system_server zygote:fd use;
allow system_server zygote:process sigchld;
allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
# May kill zygote on crashes.
allow system_server zygote:process sigkill;
@ -381,8 +380,6 @@ set_prop(system_server, ctl_bugreport_prop)
set_prop(system_server, cppreopt_prop)
# Create a socket for receiving info from wpa.
type_transition system_server wifi_data_file:sock_file system_wpa_socket;
type_transition system_server wpa_socket:sock_file system_wpa_socket;
allow system_server wpa_socket:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_wpa_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
@ -626,4 +623,3 @@ neverallow system_server { dev_type -frp_block_device }:blk_file no_rw_file_perm
# system_server should never use JIT functionality
neverallow system_server self:process execmem;
neverallow system_server ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
neverallow system_server system_server_tmpfs:file execute;

4
public/te_macros
View file

@ -95,10 +95,6 @@ tmpfs_domain($1)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for all apps.
define(`app_domain', `
typeattribute $1 appdomain;
# Label ashmem objects with our own unique type.
tmpfs_domain($1)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file execute;
')
#####################################

4
public/untrusted_app.te
View file

@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Execute libs in asec containers.
allow untrusted_app asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(untrusted_app)
# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
# running "adb install foo.apk".
# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.

1
reqd_mask/access_vectors Symbolic link
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
../private/access_vectors

1
reqd_mask/initial_sid_contexts Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
sid reqd_mask u:r:reqd_mask_type:s0

3
reqd_mask/initial_sids Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
sid reqd_mask
# FLASK

1
reqd_mask/mls Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
mlsconstrain binder { set_context_mgr } (l1 eq l2);

1
reqd_mask/mls_decl Symbolic link
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
../private/mls_decl

1
reqd_mask/mls_macros Symbolic link
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
../private/mls_macros

1
reqd_mask/reqd_mask.te Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
type reqd_mask_type;

1
reqd_mask/roles Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
role r types reqd_mask_type;

1
reqd_mask/roles_decl Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
role r;

1
reqd_mask/security_classes Symbolic link
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
../private/security_classes

1
reqd_mask/users Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1 @@
user u roles { r } level s0 range s0 - mls_systemhigh;

13
tools/Android.mk
View file

@ -46,4 +46,17 @@ LOCAL_CXX_STL := none
include $(BUILD_HOST_EXECUTABLE)
###################################
include $(CLEAR_VARS)
LOCAL_MODULE := version_policy
LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
LOCAL_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror
LOCAL_SRC_FILES := version_policy.c
LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libsepol
LOCAL_CXX_STL := none
include $(BUILD_HOST_EXECUTABLE)
include $(call all-makefiles-under,$(LOCAL_PATH))

184
tools/version_policy.c Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
/*
* version_policy.c - Takes the given public platform policy, a private policy
* and a version number to produced a combined "versioned" policy file.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <cil/android.h>
#include <cil/cil.h>
#include <cil/cil_write_ast.h>
void __attribute__ ((noreturn)) static usage(char *prog) {
printf("Usage: %s [OPTION]...\n", prog);
printf("\n");
printf("Options:\n");
printf(" -b, --base=<file> (req'd) base policy for versioning.\n");
printf(" -m, --mapping generate cil version mapping from base policy\n");
printf(" -n, --number (req'd) version number to use.\n");
printf(" -o, --output=<file> write cil policy to <file>\n");
printf(" -t, --tgt_policy policy to be versioned according to base policy\n");
printf(" -h, --help display usage information\n");
exit(1);
}
/*
* read_cil_file - Initialize db and parse CIL input file.
*/
static int read_cil_file(struct cil_db **db, char *path) {
int rc = SEPOL_ERR;
FILE *file;
struct stat filedata;
uint32_t file_size;
char *buff = NULL;
cil_db_init(db);
file = fopen(path, "re");
if (!file) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open file: %s\n", path);
goto file_err;
}
rc = stat(path, &filedata);
if (rc == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not stat file: %s - %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
file_size = filedata.st_size;
buff = malloc(file_size);
if (buff == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "OOM!\n");
rc = SEPOL_ERR;
goto err;
}
rc = fread(buff, file_size, 1, file);
if (rc != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failure reading file: %s\n", path);
rc = SEPOL_ERR;
goto err;
}
fclose(file);
file = NULL;
/* creates parse_tree */
rc = cil_add_file(*db, path, buff, file_size);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failure adding %s to parse tree\n", path);
goto err;
}
free(buff);
return SEPOL_OK;
err:
free(buff);
fclose(file);
file_err:
cil_db_destroy(db);
return rc;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int opt_char;
int opt_index = 0;
int rc = SEPOL_ERR;
bool mapping = false;
char *base = NULL;
char *tgt_policy = NULL;
char *num = NULL;
char *output = NULL;
struct cil_db *base_db = NULL;
struct cil_db *out_db = NULL;
static struct option long_opts[] = {
{"help", no_argument, 0, 'h'},
{"base", required_argument, 0, 'b'},
{"mapping", no_argument, 0, 'm'},
{"number", required_argument, 0, 'n'},
{"output", required_argument, 0, 'o'},
{"tgt_policy", required_argument, 0, 't'},
{0, 0, 0, 0}
};
while (1) {
opt_char = getopt_long(argc, argv, "b:mn:o:t:h", long_opts, &opt_index);
if (opt_char == -1) {
break;
}
switch (opt_char) {
case 'b':
base = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'm':
mapping = true;
break;
case 'n':
num = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'o':
output = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 't':
tgt_policy = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'h':
usage(argv[0]);
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported option: %s\n", optarg);
usage(argv[0]);
}
}
if (optind < argc) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown arguments supplied\n");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (num == NULL || base == NULL || (mapping == false && tgt_policy == NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Please specify required arguments\n");
usage(argv[0]);
}
if (mapping && tgt_policy) {
fprintf(stderr, "Please select only one mode between --mapping and --tgt_policy\n");
usage(argv[0]);
}
/* gimme all the details */
cil_set_log_level(CIL_INFO);
/* read platform policy */
rc = read_cil_file(&base_db, base);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK) {
goto exit;
}
if (mapping) {
rc = cil_android_attrib_mapping(&out_db, base_db, num);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK)
goto exit;
} else {
/* read target policy, ready for manipulation */
rc = read_cil_file(&out_db, tgt_policy);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK) {
goto exit;
}
/* attributize the target policy */
rc = cil_android_attributize(out_db, base_db, num);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK) {
goto exit;
}
}
rc = cil_write_ast(out_db, output);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK) {
goto exit;
}
exit:
free(base);
free(tgt_policy);
free(num);
free(output);
cil_db_destroy(&base_db);
cil_db_destroy(&out_db);
return rc;
}