selinux - netd - tighten down bpf policy
bpf programs/maps are now loaded by the bpfloader, not netd Test: built/installed on crosshatch which uses eBPF - no avc denials Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Change-Id: I1ebd82e6730d62d1966da3c4634ecd78ce703543
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2 changed files with 4 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ allow bpfloader self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf prog_load;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper} *:bpf prog_run;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper } *:bpf prog_run;
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neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
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neverallow bpfloader domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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# only system_server, netd and bpfloader can read/write the bpf maps
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@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ allow netd sysfs_usb:file write;
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r_dir_file(netd, cgroup_bpf)
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allow netd fs_bpf:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow netd fs_bpf:file create_file_perms;
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allow netd fs_bpf:dir search;
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allow netd fs_bpf:file { read write setattr };
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# TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related
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# work. However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them.
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@ -151,9 +151,6 @@ neverallow {
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-netutils_wrapper
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} dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
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# only netd can create the bpf maps
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neverallow { domain -netd } netd:bpf { map_create };
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# apps may not interact with netd over binder.
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neverallow { appdomain -network_stack } netd:binder call;
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neverallow netd { appdomain -network_stack userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call;
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