Update SELinux policy for Pre-reboot Dexopt.

- Add pm.dexopt.* properties.
- Add rules for running artd in chroot.

Bug: 311377497
Test: manual - Run Pre-reboot Dexopt and see no denial.
Change-Id: If5ff9b23e99be033f19ab257c90e0f52bf250ccf
This commit is contained in:
Jiakai Zhang 2024-03-20 11:24:54 +00:00
parent 88e37d37f1
commit 4acd07323e
14 changed files with 256 additions and 28 deletions

View file

@ -1296,3 +1296,5 @@
/data/misc/uprobestats-configs/test uprobestats_configs_data_file
/tmp shell_data_file
/mnt/pre_reboot_dexopt pre_reboot_dexopt_file

View file

@ -189,8 +189,10 @@ neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_info_file:file no_w_file_perms;
# A note on otapreopt_chroot. It used to mount APEXes during postainstall stage of A/B OTAs,
# but starting from S it just calls into apexd to prepare /apex for otapreoprt. Once the sepolicies
# around otapreopt_chroot are cleaned up we should be able to remove it from the lists below.
# dexopt_chroot_setup calls apexd to prepare /apex for Pre-reboot Dexopt, but it
# needs to mount a tmpfs on /apex for apexd to work on.
neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:dir { mounton };
neverallow { domain -apexd -dexopt_chroot_setup -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
# Allow for use in postinstall
allow apexd otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
@ -199,6 +201,9 @@ allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file create;
allow apexd proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
# Allow for use in Pre-reboot Dexopt.
allow apexd dexopt_chroot_setup:fd use;
# Allow calling derive_classpath to gather BCP information for staged sessions
domain_auto_trans(apexd, derive_classpath_exec, apexd_derive_classpath);

22
private/art_exec.te Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
# A wrapper program that configures the process and executes a command.
type art_exec, domain, coredomain;
type art_exec_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
# Usually, this program is executed in the caller's domain. For example, it is
# executed in the `artd` domain when artd calls it. Domain transition will take
# place as soon as it executes other programs.
# The only exception is when called by init. In this case, it's executed in its
# own domain because init should never execute a program without changing to
# another domain.
init_daemon_domain(art_exec)
# init calls this program to execute artd in a chroot environment for Pre-reboot
# Dexopt.
domain_auto_trans(art_exec, artd_exec, artd)
# "sys_chroot" is for chroot'ing into the chroot environment, created by
# dexopt_chroot_setup.
allow art_exec self:global_capability_class_set sys_chroot;
# Allow finding artd in the chroot dir for Pre-reboot Dexopt.
allow art_exec pre_reboot_dexopt_file:dir search;

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@ -121,10 +121,9 @@ allow artd system_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# /mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
allow artd system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Never allow running other binaries without a domain transition.
# The only exception is art_exec. It is allowed to use the artd domain because
# it is a thin wrapper that executes other binaries on behalf of artd.
neverallow artd ~{art_exec_exec}:file execute_no_trans;
# Allow art_exec_exec to use the artd domain because it is a thin wrapper that
# executes other binaries on behalf of artd. Domain transition will take place
# as soon as art_exec_exec executes other binaries.
allow artd art_exec_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Allow running other binaries in their own domains.
@ -143,3 +142,43 @@ r_dir_file(artd, dex2oat);
# artd needs to reopen a memfd with readonly in order to pass it to subprocesses
# that don't have write permissions on memfds.
allow artd artd_tmpfs:file open;
# For Pre-reboot Dexopt.
# Allow init to execute artd through art_exec.
allow artd art_exec:fd use;
# During Pre-reboot Dexopt, artd needs one more capability:
# - "sys_admin" is for bind-mounting temp dirs at
# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art and /data/misc/odrefresh, to run
# odrefresh innocuously (in a way that doesn't affect the real boot images,
# metrics, etc.).
allow artd self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
# Allow running other binaries in their own domains.
domain_auto_trans(artd, derive_classpath_exec, derive_classpath)
domain_auto_trans(artd, odrefresh_exec, odrefresh)
# Allow accessing Pre-reboot Dexopt files.
allow artd pre_reboot_dexopt_file:dir { getattr search };
# Allow reading /init.environ.rc in chroot, to extract env vars from it.
allow artd rootfs:file { read open getattr };
# Allow managing Pre-reboot Dexopt temp files.
# The root of the temp dir that artd uses during Pre-reboot Dexopt is labeled
# pre_reboot_dexopt_artd_file. Inside the temp dir, we create files and dirs and
# relabel them after creation, so we need relabelfrom.
allow artd pre_reboot_dexopt_artd_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
allow artd pre_reboot_dexopt_artd_file:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
# Allow bind-mounting at /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art and
# /data/misc/odrefresh and restorecon, to run odrefresh innocuously.
allow artd { apex_art_data_file odrefresh_data_file }:dir relabelto;
allow artd { apex_art_data_file odrefresh_data_file pre_reboot_dexopt_artd_file }:dir mounton;
# Neverallow rules.
# Never allow running other binaries without a domain transition.
# The exception for art_exec_exec is explained above.
neverallow artd ~{art_exec_exec}:file execute_no_trans;

View file

@ -24,3 +24,9 @@ allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:fd use;
allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:file read;
allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:lnk_file read;
allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt_tmpfs:file rw_file_perms;
# Allow to be called by artd in Pre-reboot Dexopt.
allow derive_classpath artd:fd use;
# Allow writing to Pre-reboot Dexopt temp files.
allow derive_classpath pre_reboot_dexopt_artd_file:file { open read write };

View file

@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
# A service that sets up the chroot environment for Pre-reboot Dexopt.
type dexopt_chroot_setup, domain, coredomain;
type dexopt_chroot_setup_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
type dexopt_chroot_setup_tmpfs, file_type;
@ -10,10 +11,10 @@ allow dexopt_chroot_setup dumpstate:fd use;
init_daemon_domain(dexopt_chroot_setup)
# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by dexopt_chroot_setup their
# own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by dexopt_chroot_setup vs other
# processes.
# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by dexopt_chroot_setup
# their own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by dexopt_chroot_setup vs
# other processes.
tmpfs_domain(dexopt_chroot_setup)
# libart (mark_compact.cc) has some intialization code that touches the cache
@ -21,3 +22,118 @@ tmpfs_domain(dexopt_chroot_setup)
allow dexopt_chroot_setup apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
r_dir_file(dexopt_chroot_setup, apex_art_data_file)
userfaultfd_use(dexopt_chroot_setup)
# Allow getting root capabilities to bypass permission checks.
# - "sys_admin" is for performing mount and umount.
# - "sys_chroot" is for performing chroot.
allow dexopt_chroot_setup self:global_capability_class_set { sys_admin sys_chroot };
# Allow managing its own files.
# The root of the temp dir that dexopt_chroot_setup uses is labeled
# pre_reboot_dexopt_file.
allow dexopt_chroot_setup pre_reboot_dexopt_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow dexopt_chroot_setup pre_reboot_dexopt_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow accessing /proc/filesystems.
allow dexopt_chroot_setup proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
# Allow accessing block devices (/dev/block/...).
allow dexopt_chroot_setup block_device:dir { getattr search };
# Allow mounting file systems, to create a chroot environment.
allow dexopt_chroot_setup {
apex_mnt_dir
binderfs
cgroup
cgroup_v2
debugfs_tracing_debug
device
devpts
fs_bpf
fusectlfs
linkerconfig_file
metadata_file
mnt_expand_file
pre_reboot_dexopt_file
proc
pstorefs
rootfs
selinuxfs
sysfs
system_data_file
system_data_root_file
system_file
tmpfs
vendor_file
}:dir mounton;
allow dexopt_chroot_setup { tmpfs labeledfs }:filesystem mount;
allow dexopt_chroot_setup {
binderfs
cgroup
cgroup_v2
debugfs_tracing_debug
devpts
fs_bpf
fusectlfs
labeledfs
proc
pstorefs
selinuxfs
sysfs
tmpfs
}:filesystem unmount;
# Allow reading /apex in chroot.
r_dir_file(dexopt_chroot_setup, apex_mnt_dir)
allow dexopt_chroot_setup apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow writing an empty linker config in chroot to suppress linker warnings.
# The empty linker config is used until linkerconfig has run.
# In chroot, we're reusing the type outside the chroot, to reuse all the rules
# for it for other domains, even though we're not changing the real linker
# config outside the chroot.
allow dexopt_chroot_setup linkerconfig_file:dir { write add_name };
allow dexopt_chroot_setup linkerconfig_file:file { create write };
# Allow using the `rootcontext=` option when mounting tmpfs, so we can give the
# right labels to /apex, /linkerconfig, /mnt/artd_tmp in chroot.
# Combined with `allow file_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;`, this allows
# giving any labels to any tmpfs filesystems as soon as they are mounted.
# Note that those tmpfs filesystems are known to be empty at the time where the
# labels are given, and this rule doesn't allow relabeling any existing tmpfs.
allow dexopt_chroot_setup tmpfs:filesystem relabelfrom;
# Allow executing art_exec_exec without a domain transition because it is a thin
# wrapper that executes other binaries on behalf of dexopt_chroot_setup. Domain
# transition will take place as soon as art_exec_exec executes other binaries.
allow dexopt_chroot_setup art_exec_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Allow running other binaries in their own domains.
domain_auto_trans(dexopt_chroot_setup, apexd_exec, apexd)
domain_auto_trans(dexopt_chroot_setup, linkerconfig_exec, linkerconfig)
# Allow running snapshotctl through init, to map and unmap block devices.
set_prop(dexopt_chroot_setup, snapshotctl_prop)
# Neverallow rules.
# Never allow running other binaries without a domain transition.
# The exception for art_exec_exec is explained above.
neverallow dexopt_chroot_setup ~{art_exec_exec}:file execute_no_trans;
# Given how powerful this domain is, it shouldn't be used for other purposes.
neverallow { domain -init } dexopt_chroot_setup:process transition;
neverallow * dexopt_chroot_setup:process dyntransition;
# Never allow other processes to access the temp dirs for Pre-reboot Dexopt.
neverallow {
domain
-art_exec
-artd
-dexopt_chroot_setup
-init
-system_server
-vendor_init
} pre_reboot_dexopt_file:dir *;

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@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ allow {
-webview_zygote
-system_server
-artd
-dexopt_chroot_setup
-audioserver
-cameraserver
-mediadrmserver
@ -526,6 +527,7 @@ neverallow ~{
neverallow {
domain
-apexd
-dexopt_chroot_setup
recovery_only(`-fastbootd')
-init
-kernel
@ -676,7 +678,7 @@ neverallow domain mlsvendorcompat:process fork;
# Only init and otapreopt_chroot should be mounting filesystems on locations
# labeled system or vendor (/product and /vendor respectively).
neverallow { domain -init -otapreopt_chroot } { system_file_type vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;
neverallow { domain -dexopt_chroot_setup -init -otapreopt_chroot } { system_file_type vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;
# Only allow init and vendor_init to read/write mm_events properties
# NOTE: dumpstate is allowed to read any system property
@ -829,3 +831,5 @@ neverallow { domain -gmscore_app -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } checkin_data_file
neverallow { domain -init -aconfigd -system_server } aconfig_storage_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
neverallow { domain -init -aconfigd -system_server } aconfig_storage_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
neverallow { domain -dexopt_chroot_setup -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;
neverallow { domain -dexopt_chroot_setup -init -zygote } proc_type:{ file dir } mounton;

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@ -132,11 +132,6 @@ type compos_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
# /apex/com.android.compos/bin/compos_key_helper
type compos_key_helper_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
# /apex/com.android.art/bin/art_exec
# This executable does not have its own domain because it is executed in the caller's domain. For
# example, it is executed in the `artd` domain when artd calls it.
type art_exec_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
# Filesystem entry for for PRNG seeder socket. Processes require
# write permission on this to connect, and needs to be mlstrustedobject
# in to satisfy MLS constraints for trusted domains.
@ -163,3 +158,10 @@ type vendor_aconfig_storage_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
# /data/misc/connectivityblobdb
type connectivityblob_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# Type for /mnt/pre_reboot_dexopt
type pre_reboot_dexopt_file, file_type;
# Type for /mnt/artd_tmp in the Pre-reboot Dexopt chroot
# This type is set on the directory through the `rootcontext=` mount option.
type pre_reboot_dexopt_artd_file, file_type;

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@ -902,3 +902,12 @@
/(system|product)/bin/check_dynamic_partitions u:object_r:postinstall_exec:s0
/(system|product)/bin/otapreopt_script u:object_r:postinstall_exec:s0
/(system|product)/bin/otapreopt u:object_r:postinstall_dexopt_exec:s0
#############################
# For Pre-reboot Dexopt (see art/dexopt_chroot_setup/README.md)
# Managed by dexopt_chroot_setup.
# Note that pre_reboot_dexopt_file also applies to any tmpfs mounted by
# dexopt_chroot_setup inside chroot, in addition to the files and directories
# matching the pattern below.
/mnt/pre_reboot_dexopt(/.*)? u:object_r:pre_reboot_dexopt_file:s0

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@ -27,4 +27,13 @@ allow linkerconfig otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
allow linkerconfig postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
allow linkerconfig postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:file r_file_perms;
neverallow { domain -init -linkerconfig -otapreopt_chroot } linkerconfig_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
# Allow for use in Pre-reboot Dexopt.
allow linkerconfig dexopt_chroot_setup:fd use;
neverallow {
domain
-dexopt_chroot_setup
-init
-linkerconfig
-otapreopt_chroot
} linkerconfig_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

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@ -51,17 +51,28 @@ dontaudit odrefresh { adbd shell }:fd use;
dontaudit odrefresh devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
dontaudit odrefresh adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
# No other processes should be creating files in the staging area.
neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -compos_fd_server } apex_art_staging_data_file:file open;
# No processes other than init, odrefresh and system_server access
# odrefresh_data_files.
neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -system_server } odrefresh_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -system_server } odrefresh_data_file:file *;
# Read access to SELinux context files, for restorecon.
allow odrefresh file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
allow odrefresh seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
# Check validity of SELinux context, for restorecon.
selinux_check_context(odrefresh)
# odrefresh iterates over all properties to find the ones that it's interested
# in. It's okay to ignore denials on other properties.
dontaudit odrefresh property_type:file r_file_perms;
# Allow to be called by artd in Pre-reboot Dexopt.
allow odrefresh artd:fd use;
# Neverallow rules.
# No other processes should be creating files in the staging area.
neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -compos_fd_server } apex_art_staging_data_file:file open;
# No processes other than init, odrefresh, system_server, and artd access
# odrefresh_data_files.
# Among those, artd only needs to bind-mount /data/misc/odrefresh, but doesn't
# need to access the files.
neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -system_server -artd } odrefresh_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -init -odrefresh -system_server } odrefresh_data_file:file *;

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@ -675,9 +675,11 @@ pm.dexopt.boot-after-ota u:object_r:exported_pm_p
pm.dexopt.boot-after-ota.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
pm.dexopt.boot-after-mainline-update u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.boot-after-mainline-update.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
pm.dexopt.post-boot u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.post-boot.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
pm.dexopt.ab-ota u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.ab-ota.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
pm.dexopt.cmdline u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.inactive u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
pm.dexopt.install u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string

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@ -1618,3 +1618,7 @@ get_prop(system_server, pm_archiving_enabled_prop)
# Do not allow any domain other than init or system server to get or set the property
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } crashrecovery_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -init -dumpstate -system_server } crashrecovery_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
# Allow accessing /mnt/pre_reboot_dexopt/chroot, to load the new service-art.jar
# in Pre-reboot Dexopt.
allow system_server pre_reboot_dexopt_file:dir { getattr search };

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@ -1069,9 +1069,6 @@ neverallow * self:process { execstack execheap };
# and modification of executable pages are unsafe.
neverallow { domain -untrusted_app_25 -untrusted_app_27 } file_type:file execmod;
neverallow { domain -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;
neverallow { domain -init -zygote } proc_type:{ file dir } mounton;
# Ensure that all types assigned to processes are included
# in the domain attribute, so that all allow and neverallow rules
# written on domain are applied to all processes.