Merge "Minimize public policy" into main

private/adbd.te

@@ -230,6 +230,11 @@ allow adbd apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow adbd tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow adbd tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Access /data/local/tests.
+allow adbd shell_test_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd shell_test_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow adbd shell_test_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
@@ -239,3 +244,7 @@ allow adbd tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 # never want to see a transition from adbd to su (aka "adb root")
 neverallow adbd { domain -crash_dump -shell }:process transition;
 neverallow adbd { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') recovery_only(`-shell') }:process dyntransition;
+
+# Only init is allowed to enter the adbd domain via exec()
+neverallow { domain -init } adbd:process transition;
+neverallow * adbd:process dyntransition;

private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te

@@ -2,4 +2,9 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
   typeattribute aidl_lazy_test_server coredomain;
 
   init_daemon_domain(aidl_lazy_test_server)
+
+  binder_use(aidl_lazy_test_server)
+  binder_call(aidl_lazy_test_server, binderservicedomain)
+
+  add_service(aidl_lazy_test_server, aidl_lazy_test_service)
 ')

private/apexd.te

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ typeattribute apexd coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(apexd)
 
+binder_use(apexd)
+add_service(apexd, apex_service)
+
 # Allow creating, reading and writing of APEX files/dirs in the APEX data dir
 allow apexd apex_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow apexd apex_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -166,33 +169,7 @@ get_prop(apexd, apexd_select_prop)
 # Allow apexd to read apexd_payload_metadata_prop
 get_prop(apexd, apexd_payload_metadata_prop)
 
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
-neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
-
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
-
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
-
-# only apexd can set apexd sysprop
 set_prop(apexd, apexd_prop)
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apexd_prop:property_service set;
-
-# only apexd can write apex-info-list.xml
-neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_info_file:file no_w_file_perms;
-
-# Only apexd and init should be allowed to manage /apex mounts
-# A note on otapreopt_chroot. It used to mount APEXes during postainstall stage of A/B OTAs,
-# but starting from S it just calls into apexd to prepare /apex for otapreoprt. Once the sepolicies
-# around otapreopt_chroot are cleaned up we should be able to remove it from the lists below.
-# dexopt_chroot_setup calls apexd to prepare /apex for Pre-reboot Dexopt, but it
-# needs to mount a tmpfs on /apex for apexd to work on.
-neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
-neverallow { domain -apexd -dexopt_chroot_setup -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
 
 # Allow for use in postinstall
 allow apexd otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
@@ -212,3 +189,39 @@ set_prop(apexd, apex_ready_prop)
 
 # Allow apexd to write to statsd.
 unix_socket_send(apexd, statsdw, statsd)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# only apexd can set apexd sysprop
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apexd_prop:property_service set;
+
+# only apexd can write apex-info-list.xml
+neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_info_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only apexd and init should be allowed to manage /apex mounts
+# A note on otapreopt_chroot. It used to mount APEXes during postainstall stage of A/B OTAs,
+# but starting from S it just calls into apexd to prepare /apex for otapreoprt. Once the sepolicies
+# around otapreopt_chroot are cleaned up we should be able to remove it from the lists below.
+# dexopt_chroot_setup calls apexd to prepare /apex for Pre-reboot Dexopt, but it
+# needs to mount a tmpfs on /apex for apexd to work on.
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
+neverallow { domain -apexd -dexopt_chroot_setup -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
+
+neverallow { domain -init -apexd -system_server -update_engine } apex_service:service_manager find;
+neverallow { domain -init -apexd -system_server -servicemanager -update_engine } apexd:binder call;
+
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump') } apexd:process ptrace;

private/app.te

@@ -84,28 +84,6 @@ allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
 allow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
         connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
 
-neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
-        accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
-        relabelfrom relabelto setattr shutdown };
-
-# Transition to a non-app domain.
-# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
-# Exception for crash_dump to allow for app crash reporting.
-# Exception for renderscript binaries (/system/bin/bcc, /system/bin/ld.mc)
-# to allow renderscript to create privileged executable files.
-# Exception for virtualizationmanager to allow running VMs as child processes.
-neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
-    { domain -appdomain -crash_dump -rs -virtualizationmanager }:process { transition };
-neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
-    { domain -appdomain }:process { dyntransition };
-
-# Don't allow regular apps access to storage configuration properties.
-neverallow { appdomain -mediaprovider_app } storage_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
-# Don't allow apps reading /system/etc/font_fallback.xml
-dontaudit appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
-neverallow appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
 # Allow to read sendbug.preferred.domain
 get_prop(appdomain, sendbug_config_prop)
 
@@ -134,7 +112,6 @@ allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
 # Allow access to tombstones if an fd to one is given to you.
 # An app cannot open the tombstone itself because it lacks `open`.
 allow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file { getattr read };
-neverallow { appdomain -shell } tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.
 allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
@@ -505,6 +482,223 @@ allow appdomain audioserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
 allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
 allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
 
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
+###
+
+# Superuser capabilities.
+# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm. network stack app requires net_admin.
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -network_stack } self:capability_class_set *;
+
+# Block device access.
+neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
+
+# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
+neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
+    { read write };
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
+    { read write };
+neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
+neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
+    domain:{
+        netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+        netlink_nflog_socket
+        netlink_xfrm_socket
+        netlink_audit_socket
+        netlink_dnrt_socket
+    } *;
+
+# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
+# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
+# of rooting vulns in the past.
+neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
+    domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
+
+# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
+neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
+
+# Unix domain sockets.
+neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
+
+# ptrace access to non-app domains.
+neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
+
+# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
+# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
+# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
+# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
+# produce stack traces.  llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
+# inspect stack traces for live lock conditions.
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -crash_dump
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
+} appdomain:process ptrace;
+
+# Read or write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
+# A different form of hidepid=2 like protections
+neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# signal access to non-app domains.
+# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
+# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
+# All others prohibited.
+# -perfetto is to allow shell (which is an appdomain) to kill perfetto
+# (see private/shell.te).
+neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain -perfetto }:process
+    { sigkill sigstop signal };
+
+# Write to rootfs.
+neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to /system.
+neverallow appdomain system_file_type:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to entrypoint executables.
+neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
+# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
+# specified in file_contexts.  Define a different type for portions
+# that should be writable by apps.
+neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# Write to various other parts of /data.
+neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -shell }
+    shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
+    bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow { domain -credstore -init } credstore_data_file:dir_file_class_set *;
+neverallow appdomain
+    keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow appdomain
+    systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow appdomain
+    wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+neverallow appdomain
+    dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+# access tmp apk files
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+    apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
+    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_all -platform_app -priv_app -isolated_app_all }
+    { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all isolated_app_all } { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ devfile_class_set dir fifo_file lnk_file sock_file } *;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all isolated_app_all } { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+# Access to factory files.
+neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
+
+# Write to various pseudo file systems.
+neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
+    sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
+neverallow appdomain
+    proc:dir_file_class_set write;
+
+# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
+neverallow appdomain kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
+
+# SELinux is not an API for apps to use
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:security { compute_av check_context };
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:netlink_selinux_socket *;
+
+# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
+# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
+neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
+
+# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
+neverallow appdomain {
+  apk_data_file
+  cache_file
+  cache_recovery_file
+  dev_type
+  rootfs
+  system_file
+  tmpfs
+}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Applications should use the activity model for receiving events
+neverallow {
+  appdomain
+  -shell # bugreport
+} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;
+
+# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few allowed domains.
+# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
+neverallow {
+  appdomain
+  -bluetooth
+  -system_app
+} { bluetooth_audio_hal_prop bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop bluetooth_prop exported_bluetooth_prop }:file create_file_perms;
+
+# allow system_app to access Nfc-related system properties.
+set_prop(system_app, nfc_prop)
+
+# allow system_app to access radio_config system properties.
+set_prop(system_app, radio_control_prop)
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_time_in_state
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_time_in_state:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access proc_uid_cpupower
+neverallow appdomain proc_uid_cpupower:file *;
+
+# Apps may not read /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6}. These files leak information across the
+# application boundary. VPN apps may use the ConnectivityManager.getConnectionOwnerUid() API to
+# perform UID lookups.
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } proc_net_tcp_udp:file *;
+
+# Apps cannot access bootstrap files. The bootstrap files are only for
+# extremely early processes (like init, etc.) which are started before
+# the runtime APEX is activated and Bionic libs are provided from there.
+# If app process accesses (or even load/execute) the bootstrap files,
+# it might cause problems such as ODR violation, etc.
+neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:file
+    { open read write append execute execute_no_trans map };
+neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir
+    { open read getattr search };
+
 # Sensitive app domains are not allowed to execute from /data
 # to prevent persistence attacks and ensure all code is executed
 # from read-only locations.
@@ -559,3 +753,27 @@ neverallow {
   -untrusted_app_30
   -untrusted_app_32
 } apk_data_file:file { watch watch_reads };
+
+neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
+        accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
+        relabelfrom relabelto setattr shutdown };
+
+# Transition to a non-app domain.
+# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
+# Exception for crash_dump to allow for app crash reporting.
+# Exception for renderscript binaries (/system/bin/bcc, /system/bin/ld.mc)
+# to allow renderscript to create privileged executable files.
+# Exception for virtualizationmanager to allow running VMs as child processes.
+neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
+    { domain -appdomain -crash_dump -rs -virtualizationmanager }:process { transition };
+neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
+    { domain -appdomain }:process { dyntransition };
+
+# Don't allow regular apps access to storage configuration properties.
+neverallow { appdomain -mediaprovider_app } storage_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Don't allow apps reading /system/etc/font_fallback.xml
+dontaudit appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { appdomain -shell } tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };

private/asan_extract.te

@@ -8,4 +8,28 @@ with_asan(`
 
   # We need to signal a reboot when done.
   set_prop(asan_extract, powerctl_prop)
+
+  # Allow asan_extract to execute itself using #!/system/bin/sh
+  allow asan_extract shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+  # We execute log, rm, gzip and tar.
+  allow asan_extract toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+
+  # asan_extract deletes old /data/lib.
+  allow asan_extract system_file:dir { open read remove_name rmdir write };
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file unlink;
+
+  # asan_extract untars ASAN libraries into /data.
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms ;
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms ;
+
+  # Relabel the libraries with restorecon.
+  allow asan_extract file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:{ dir file } relabelfrom;
+  allow asan_extract system_file:dir { relabelto setattr };
+  allow asan_extract system_file:file relabelto;
+
+  # Restorecon will actually already try to run with sanitized libraries (libpackagelistparser).
+  allow asan_extract system_data_file:file execute;
 ')

private/audioserver.te

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 # audioserver - audio services daemon
-
+type audioserver_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
 typeattribute audioserver coredomain;
 
-type audioserver_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(audioserver)
 tmpfs_domain(audioserver)
 
@@ -79,6 +78,20 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
 # Allow write access to log tag property
 set_prop(audioserver, log_tag_prop);
 
+# Allow audioserver to signal audio HAL processes and dump their stacks.
+allow audioserver hal_audio_server:process signal;
+
+# Allow audioserver to access sensorservice.
+allow audioserver sensorservice_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# Allow using wake locks
+wakelock_use(audioserver)
+
+# Allow reading audio config props, e.g. af.fast_track_multiplier
+get_prop(audioserver, audio_config_prop)
+get_prop(audioserver, system_audio_config_prop)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
@@ -99,10 +112,3 @@ neverallow audioserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
 # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
 neverallow audioserver domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
 neverallow audioserver { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
-
-# Allow using wake locks
-wakelock_use(audioserver)
-
-# Allow reading audio config props, e.g. af.fast_track_multiplier
-get_prop(audioserver, audio_config_prop)
-get_prop(audioserver, system_audio_config_prop)

private/bootanim.te

@@ -21,3 +21,46 @@ r_dir_file(bootanim, bootanim_data_file)
 
 # Allow accessing vendor apex for EGL/GLES
 allow bootanim vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+hal_client_domain(bootanim, hal_configstore)
+hal_client_domain(bootanim, hal_graphics_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(bootanim, hal_graphics_composer)
+
+binder_use(bootanim)
+binder_call(bootanim, surfaceflinger)
+binder_call(bootanim, audioserver)
+
+hwbinder_use(bootanim)
+
+allow bootanim gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow bootanim gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow bootanim sysfs_gpu:file r_file_perms;
+
+# /oem access
+allow bootanim oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+# boot animations on oem are stored with specific label
+allow bootanim bootanim_oem_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow bootanim audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow bootanim audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow bootanim audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bootanim surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow bootanim surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# Allow access to ion memory allocation device
+allow bootanim ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to DMA-BUF system heap
+allow bootanim dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+allow bootanim hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Fences
+allow bootanim hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
+allow bootanim proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# System file accesses.
+allow bootanim system_file:dir r_dir_perms;

private/bootstat.te

@@ -10,6 +10,39 @@ set_prop(bootstat, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
 set_prop(bootstat, system_boot_reason_prop)
 set_prop(bootstat, last_boot_reason_prop)
 
+read_runtime_log_tags(bootstat)
+
+# Allow persistent storage in /data/misc/bootstat.
+allow bootstat bootstat_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow bootstat bootstat_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow bootstat metadata_file:dir search;
+allow bootstat metadata_bootstat_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow bootstat metadata_bootstat_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# ToDo: TBI move access for the following to a system health HAL
+
+# Allow access to /sys/fs/pstore/ and syslog
+allow bootstat pstorefs:dir search;
+allow bootstat pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+allow bootstat kernel:system syslog_read;
+
+# Allow access to reading the logs to read aspects of system health
+read_logd(bootstat)
+
+# Allow bootstat write to statsd.
+unix_socket_send(bootstat, statsdw, statsd)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -bootstat
+  -init
+} system_boot_reason_prop:property_service set;
+
 neverallow {
   domain
   -bootanim

private/bufferhubd.te

@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
 typeattribute bufferhubd coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(bufferhubd)
+
+hal_client_domain(bufferhubd, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+# TODO(b/112338294): remove these after migrate to Binder
+pdx_server(bufferhubd, bufferhub_client)
+pdx_client(bufferhubd, performance_client)
+
+# Access the GPU.
+allow bufferhubd gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access /dev/ion
+allow bufferhubd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Receive sync fence FDs from hal_omx_server. Note that hal_omx_server never directly
+# connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge between
+# those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd via PDX.
+# Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
+allow bufferhubd hal_omx_server:fd use;
+
+# Codec2 is similar to OMX
+allow bufferhubd hal_codec2_server:fd use;

private/cameraserver.te

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
-typeattribute cameraserver coredomain;
-
 typeattribute cameraserver camera_service_server;
+typeattribute cameraserver coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(cameraserver)
 tmpfs_domain(cameraserver)
@@ -8,3 +7,86 @@ tmpfs_domain(cameraserver)
 allow cameraserver gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow cameraserver gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow cameraserver virtual_camera:binder call;
+
+binder_use(cameraserver)
+binder_call(cameraserver, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(cameraserver, appdomain)
+binder_service(cameraserver)
+
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_camera)
+
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+allow cameraserver ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow cameraserver dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow cameraserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+add_service(cameraserver, cameraserver_service)
+add_service(cameraserver, fwk_camera_service)
+add_hwservice(cameraserver, fwk_camera_hwservice)
+
+allow cameraserver activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver appops_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver cameraproxy_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver package_native_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver sensor_privacy_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow cameraserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow cameraserver hal_camera_service:service_manager find;
+allow cameraserver virtual_camera_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow to talk with surfaceflinger through unix stream socket
+allow cameraserver surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
+allow cameraserver adbd:fd use;
+allow cameraserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow cameraserver shell:fd use;
+allow cameraserver shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow cameraserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# allow self to set SCHED_FIFO
+allow cameraserver self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+# Allow to talk with media codec
+allow cameraserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_codec2)
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_omx)
+hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_allocator)
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow cameraserver su:fd use;
+  allow cameraserver su:fifo_file { read write };
+  allow cameraserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+')
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# cameraserver should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow cameraserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow cameraserver domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow cameraserver { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;

private/charger.te

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 typeattribute charger coredomain;
 
+# The system charger is a client of HIDL health HAL.
+hal_client_domain(charger, hal_health)
+
 # charger needs to tell init to continue the boot
 # process when running in charger mode.
 # The system charger needs to be allowed to set these properties on legacy devices.

private/charger_type.te

@@ -6,6 +6,44 @@ get_prop(charger_type, charger_config_prop)
 # get minui properties
 get_prop(charger_type, recovery_config_prop)
 
+# Write to /dev/kmsg
+allow charger_type kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
+r_dir_file(charger_type, rootfs)
+r_dir_file(charger_type, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(charger_type, cgroup_v2)
+
+# Allow to read /sys/class/power_supply directory
+allow charger_type sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow charger_type self:global_capability_class_set {
+    sys_boot
+    sys_tty_config
+};
+
+wakelock_use(charger_type)
+
+allow charger_type self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Read/write to /sys/power/state
+allow charger_type sysfs_power:file rw_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(charger_type, sysfs_batteryinfo)
+
+# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
+# Don't worry about overly broad permissions for now, as there's
+# only one file in /sys/fs/pstore
+allow charger_type pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow charger_type pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow charger_type graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow charger_type graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow charger_type input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow charger_type input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow charger_type tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow charger_type proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;
+
 ### Neverallow rules for charger properties
 
 # charger_config_prop: Only init and vendor_init is allowed to set it

private/charger_vendor.te

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+hal_server_domain(charger_vendor, hal_health)
+
+typeattribute charger_vendor bpfdomain;

private/crash_dump.te

@@ -39,10 +39,84 @@ allow crash_dump system_bootstrap_lib_file:file r_file_perms;
 # Read Vendor APEX directories
 allow crash_dump vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir { getattr search };
 
+# crash_dump might inherit CAP_SYS_PTRACE from a privileged process,
+# which will result in an audit log even when it's allowed to trace.
+dontaudit crash_dump self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace };
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow crash_dump logd:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+
+  # Let crash_dump write to /dev/kmsg_debug crashes that happen before logd comes up.
+  allow crash_dump kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { open append };
+')
+
+# Use inherited file descriptors
+allow crash_dump domain:fd use;
+
+# Read/write IPC pipes inherited from crashing processes.
+allow crash_dump domain:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Append to pipes given to us by processes requesting dumps (e.g. dumpstate)
+allow crash_dump domain:fifo_file { append };
+
+# Read information from /proc/$PID.
+allow crash_dump domain:process getattr;
+
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, domain)
+allow crash_dump exec_type:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow crash_dump dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow crash_dump dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read APEX data directories.
+allow crash_dump apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+# Read uptime
+allow crash_dump proc_uptime:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read APK files.
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, apk_data_file);
+
+# Read all /vendor
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, { vendor_file same_process_hal_file })
+
+# Read all /data/local/tests
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, shell_test_data_file)
+
+# Talk to tombstoned
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, tombstoned_crash, tombstoned)
+
+# Talk to ActivityManager.
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, system_ndebug, system_server)
+
+# Append to ANR files.
+allow crash_dump anr_data_file:file { append getattr };
+
+# Append to tombstone files.
+allow crash_dump tombstone_data_file:file { append getattr };
+
+# crash_dump writes out logcat logs at the bottom of tombstones,
+# which is super useful in some cases.
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, logdr, logd)
+
+# Crash dump is not intended to access the following files. Since these
+# are WAI, suppress the denials to clean up the logs.
+dontaudit crash_dump {
+  core_data_file_type
+  vendor_file_type
+}:dir search;
+dontaudit crash_dump system_data_file:{ lnk_file file } read;
+dontaudit crash_dump property_type:file read;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow assertions
 ###
 
+# A domain transition must occur for crash_dump to get the privileges needed to trace the process.
+# Do not allow the execution of crash_dump without a domain transition.
+neverallow domain crash_dump_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
 # sigchld not explicitly forbidden since it's part of the
 # domain-transition-on-exec macros, and is by itself not sensitive
 neverallow crash_dump {

private/credstore.te

@@ -11,3 +11,19 @@ hal_client_domain(credstore, hal_keymint)
 # credstore needs to get keys from the RKPD
 get_prop(credstore, remote_prov_prop)
 allow credstore remote_provisioning_service:service_manager find;
+
+binder_use(credstore)
+binder_service(credstore)
+binder_call(credstore, system_server)
+
+allow credstore credstore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow credstore credstore_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+add_service(credstore, credstore_service)
+allow credstore sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:service_manager find;
+allow credstore dropbox_service:service_manager find;
+allow credstore authorization_service:service_manager find;
+allow credstore keystore:keystore2 get_auth_token;
+
+r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup_v2)

private/dhcp.te

@@ -5,3 +5,29 @@ type_transition dhcp system_data_file:{ dir file } dhcp_data_file;
 
 set_prop(dhcp, dhcp_prop)
 set_prop(dhcp, pan_result_prop)
+
+net_domain(dhcp)
+
+allow dhcp cgroup:dir { create write add_name };
+allow dhcp cgroup_v2:dir { create write add_name };
+allow dhcp self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
+allow dhcp self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow dhcp self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow dhcp shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow dhcp system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow dhcp vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# dhcpcd runs dhcpcd-hooks/*, which runs getprop / setprop (toolbox_exec)
+allow dhcp toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# For /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/promote_secondaries
+allow dhcp proc_net_type:file write;
+
+allow dhcp dhcp_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow dhcp dhcp_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# PAN connections
+allow dhcp netd:fd use;
+allow dhcp netd:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+allow dhcp netd:{ dgram_socket_class_set unix_stream_socket } { read write };
+allow dhcp netd:{ netlink_kobject_uevent_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_nflog_socket } { read write };

private/dnsmasq.te

@@ -1 +1,23 @@
 typeattribute dnsmasq coredomain;
+
+net_domain(dnsmasq)
+allowxperm dnsmasq self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+# TODO:  Run with dhcp group to avoid need for dac_override.
+allow dnsmasq self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
+
+allow dnsmasq self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw net_bind_service setgid setuid };
+
+allow dnsmasq dhcp_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow dnsmasq dhcp_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Inherit and use open files from netd.
+allow dnsmasq netd:fd use;
+allow dnsmasq netd:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+# TODO: Investigate whether these inherited sockets should be closed on exec.
+allow dnsmasq netd:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:netlink_nflog_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:netlink_route_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
+allow dnsmasq netd:udp_socket { read write };

private/drmserver.te

@@ -7,3 +7,63 @@ type_transition drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file drmserver_socket;
 typeattribute drmserver_socket coredomain_socket;
 
 get_prop(drmserver, drm_service_config_prop)
+
+typeattribute drmserver mlstrustedsubject;
+
+net_domain(drmserver)
+
+# Perform Binder IPC to system server.
+binder_use(drmserver)
+binder_call(drmserver, system_server)
+binder_call(drmserver, appdomain)
+binder_call(drmserver, mediametrics)
+binder_service(drmserver)
+# Inherit or receive open files from system_server.
+allow drmserver system_server:fd use;
+
+# Perform Binder IPC to mediaserver
+binder_call(drmserver, mediaserver)
+
+allow drmserver { sdcard_type fuse }:dir search;
+allow drmserver drm_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow drmserver drm_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow drmserver { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { read write getattr map };
+allow drmserver { sdcard_type fuse }:file { read write getattr map };
+r_dir_file(drmserver, efs_file)
+
+# /data/app/tlcd_sock socket file.
+# Clearly, /data/app is the most logical place to create a socket.  Not.
+allow drmserver apk_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+auditallow drmserver apk_data_file:dir { add_name write };
+allow drmserver drmserver_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+auditallow drmserver drmserver_socket:sock_file create;
+# Delete old socket file if present.
+allow drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file unlink;
+
+# After taking a video, drmserver looks at the video file.
+r_dir_file(drmserver, media_rw_data_file)
+
+# Read resources from open apk files passed over Binder.
+allow drmserver apk_data_file:file { read getattr map };
+allow drmserver asec_apk_file:file { read getattr map };
+allow drmserver ringtone_file:file { read getattr map };
+
+# Read /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
+allow drmserver radio_data_file:file { read getattr map };
+
+# /oem access
+allow drmserver oemfs:dir search;
+allow drmserver oemfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# overlay package access
+allow drmserver vendor_overlay_file:file { read map };
+
+add_service(drmserver, drmserver_service)
+allow drmserver permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow drmserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+
+selinux_check_access(drmserver)
+
+r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup_v2)
+r_dir_file(drmserver, system_file)

private/dumpstate.te

@@ -151,3 +151,407 @@ allow dumpstate system_dlkm_file:dir getattr;
 
 # Allow dumpstate to execute derive_sdk in its own domain
 domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, derive_sdk_exec, derive_sdk)
+
+net_domain(dumpstate)
+binder_use(dumpstate)
+wakelock_use(dumpstate)
+
+# Allow setting process priority, protect from OOM killer, and dropping
+# privileges by switching UID / GID
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid sys_resource };
+
+# Allow dumpstate to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, domain)
+
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set {
+    # Send signals to processes
+    kill
+    # Run iptables
+    net_raw
+    net_admin
+};
+
+# Allow executing files on system, such as:
+#   /system/bin/toolbox
+#   /system/bin/logcat
+#   /system/bin/dumpsys
+allow dumpstate system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+not_full_treble(`allow dumpstate vendor_file:file execute_no_trans;')
+allow dumpstate toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# hidl searches for files in /system/lib(64)/hw/
+allow dumpstate system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Create and write into /data/anr/
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search chown fowner fsetid };
+allow dumpstate anr_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reading /data/system/uiderrors.txt
+# TODO: scope this down.
+allow dumpstate system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to append into apps' private files.
+allow dumpstate { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file append;
+
+# Read dmesg
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
+allow dumpstate kernel:system syslog_read;
+
+# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
+allow dumpstate pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Get process attributes
+allow dumpstate domain:process getattr;
+
+# Signal java processes to dump their stack
+allow dumpstate { appdomain system_server zygote app_zygote }:process signal;
+
+# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
+allow dumpstate {
+  # This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.c
+  audioserver
+  cameraserver
+  drmserver
+  inputflinger
+  mediadrmserver
+  mediaextractor
+  mediametrics
+  mediaserver
+  mediaswcodec
+  sdcardd
+  surfaceflinger
+  vold
+
+  # This list comes from hal_interfaces_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.c
+  evsmanagerd
+  hal_audio_server
+  hal_audiocontrol_server
+  hal_bluetooth_server
+  hal_broadcastradio_server
+  hal_camera_server
+  hal_codec2_server
+  hal_drm_server
+  hal_evs_server
+  hal_face_server
+  hal_fingerprint_server
+  hal_graphics_allocator_server
+  hal_graphics_composer_server
+  hal_health_server
+  hal_input_processor_server
+  hal_neuralnetworks_server
+  hal_omx_server
+  hal_power_server
+  hal_power_stats_server
+  hal_sensors_server
+  hal_thermal_server
+  hal_vehicle_server
+  hal_vr_server
+  system_suspend_server
+}:process signal;
+
+# Connect to tombstoned to intercept dumps.
+unix_socket_connect(dumpstate, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
+
+# Access to /sys
+allow dumpstate sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate {
+  sysfs_devices_block
+  sysfs_dm
+  sysfs_loop
+  sysfs_usb
+  sysfs_zram
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Ignore other file access under /sys.
+dontaudit dumpstate sysfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Other random bits of data we want to collect
+no_debugfs_restriction(`
+  allow dumpstate debugfs:file r_file_perms;
+  auditallow dumpstate debugfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+  allow dumpstate debugfs_mmc:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# df for
+allow dumpstate {
+  block_device
+  cache_file
+  metadata_file
+  rootfs
+  selinuxfs
+  storage_file
+  tmpfs
+}:dir { search getattr };
+allow dumpstate fuse_device:chr_file getattr;
+allow dumpstate { dm_device cache_block_device }:blk_file getattr;
+allow dumpstate { cache_file rootfs }:lnk_file { getattr read };
+
+# Read /dev/cpuctl and /dev/cpuset
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup_v2)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to any binder service
+binder_call(dumpstate, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(dumpstate, { appdomain artd netd wificond })
+
+# Allow dumpstate to call dump() on specific hals.
+dump_hal(hal_audio)
+dump_hal(hal_audiocontrol)
+dump_hal(hal_authgraph)
+dump_hal(hal_authsecret)
+dump_hal(hal_bluetooth)
+dump_hal(hal_broadcastradio)
+dump_hal(hal_camera)
+dump_hal(hal_codec2)
+dump_hal(hal_contexthub)
+dump_hal(hal_drm)
+dump_hal(hal_dumpstate)
+dump_hal(hal_evs)
+dump_hal(hal_face)
+dump_hal(hal_fingerprint)
+dump_hal(hal_gnss)
+dump_hal(hal_graphics_allocator)
+dump_hal(hal_graphics_composer)
+dump_hal(hal_health)
+dump_hal(hal_identity)
+dump_hal(hal_input_processor)
+dump_hal(hal_keymint)
+dump_hal(hal_light)
+dump_hal(hal_memtrack)
+dump_hal(hal_neuralnetworks)
+dump_hal(hal_nfc)
+dump_hal(hal_oemlock)
+dump_hal(hal_power)
+dump_hal(hal_power_stats)
+dump_hal(hal_rebootescrow)
+dump_hal(hal_secretkeeper)
+dump_hal(hal_sensors)
+dump_hal(hal_thermal)
+dump_hal(hal_vehicle)
+dump_hal(hal_weaver)
+dump_hal(hal_wifi)
+
+# Vibrate the device after we are done collecting the bugreport
+hal_client_domain(dumpstate, hal_vibrator)
+
+# Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+
+# Allow the bugreport service to create a file in
+# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport
+allow dumpstate shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Run a shell.
+allow dumpstate shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# For running am and similar framework commands.
+# Run /system/bin/app_process.
+allow dumpstate zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# For Bluetooth
+allow dumpstate bluetooth_data_file:dir search;
+allow dumpstate bluetooth_logs_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate bluetooth_logs_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For Nfc
+allow dumpstate nfc_logs_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate nfc_logs_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Dumpstate calls screencap, which grabs a screenshot. Needs gpu access
+allow dumpstate gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# logd access
+read_logd(dumpstate)
+control_logd(dumpstate)
+read_runtime_log_tags(dumpstate)
+
+# Read files in /proc
+allow dumpstate {
+  proc_bootconfig
+  proc_buddyinfo
+  proc_cmdline
+  proc_meminfo
+  proc_modules
+  proc_net_type
+  proc_pipe_conf
+  proc_pagetypeinfo
+  proc_qtaguid_ctrl
+  proc_qtaguid_stat
+  proc_slabinfo
+  proc_version
+  proc_vmallocinfo
+  proc_vmstat
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read network state info files.
+allow dumpstate net_data_file:dir search;
+allow dumpstate net_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# List sockets via ss.
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read };
+
+# Access /data/tombstones.
+allow dumpstate tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /cache/recovery
+allow dumpstate cache_recovery_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate cache_recovery_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/misc/recovery
+allow dumpstate recovery_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate recovery_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/misc/update_engine & /data/misc/update_engine_log
+allow dumpstate { update_engine_data_file update_engine_log_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate { update_engine_data_file update_engine_log_data_file }:file r_file_perms;
+# Access /data/misc/snapuserd_log
+allow dumpstate snapuserd_log_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate snapuserd_log_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/misc/profiles/{cur,ref}/
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate { user_profile_root_file user_profile_data_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow dumpstate user_profile_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Access /data/misc/logd
+allow dumpstate misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate misc_logd_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access /data/misc/prereboot
+allow dumpstate prereboot_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate prereboot_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate app_fuse_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate overlayfs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate {
+  service_manager_type
+  -apex_service
+  -dumpstate_service
+  -gatekeeper_service
+  -hal_service_type
+  -virtual_touchpad_service
+  -vold_service
+  -default_android_service
+}:service_manager find;
+# suppress denials for services dumpstate should not be accessing.
+dontaudit dumpstate {
+  apex_service
+  dumpstate_service
+  gatekeeper_service
+  hal_service_type
+  virtual_touchpad_service
+  vold_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Most of these are neverallowed.
+dontaudit dumpstate hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager find;
+
+allow dumpstate servicemanager:service_manager list;
+allow dumpstate hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+
+allow dumpstate devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Read any system properties
+get_prop(dumpstate, property_type)
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow dumpstate media_rw_data_file:dir getattr;
+allow dumpstate proc_interrupts:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate proc_zoneinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Create a service for talking back to system_server
+add_service(dumpstate, dumpstate_service)
+
+# use /dev/ion for screen capture
+allow dumpstate ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run top
+allow dumpstate proc_stat:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow dumpstate proc_pressure_cpu:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate proc_pressure_mem:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate proc_pressure_io:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run ps
+allow dumpstate proc_pid_max:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to installd over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, installd);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run ip xfrm policy
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read };
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run iotop
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+# newer kernels (e.g. 4.4) have a new class for sockets
+allow dumpstate self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to run ss
+allow dumpstate { domain pdx_channel_socket_type pdx_endpoint_socket_type }:socket_class_set getattr;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to read linkerconfig directory
+allow dumpstate linkerconfig_file:dir { read open };
+
+# For when dumpstate runs df
+dontaudit dumpstate {
+  mnt_vendor_file
+  mirror_data_file
+  mnt_user_file
+  mnt_product_file
+}:dir search;
+dontaudit dumpstate {
+  apex_mnt_dir
+  linkerconfig_file
+  mirror_data_file
+  mnt_user_file
+}:dir getattr;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to bufferhubd over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, bufferhubd);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to mediaswcodec over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, mediaswcodec);
+
+#Access /data/misc/snapshotctl_log
+allow dumpstate snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate snapshotctl_log_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+#Allow access to /dev/binderfs/binder_logs
+allow dumpstate binderfs_logs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate binderfs_logs:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate binderfs_logs_proc:file r_file_perms;
+allow dumpstate binderfs_logs_stats:file r_file_perms;
+
+use_apex_info(dumpstate)
+
+# Allow reading files under /data/system/shutdown-checkpoints/
+allow dumpstate shutdown_checkpoints_system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate shutdown_checkpoints_system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# dumpstate has capability sys_ptrace, but should only use that capability for
+# accessing sensitive /proc/PID files, never for using ptrace attach.
+neverallow dumpstate *:process ptrace;
+
+# only system_server, dumpstate, traceur_app and shell can find the dumpstate service
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -system_server
+  -shell
+  -traceur_app
+  -dumpstate
+} dumpstate_service:service_manager find;

private/e2fs.te

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+allow e2fs devpts:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+
+allow e2fs dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+allow e2fs block_device:dir search;
+allow e2fs userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow e2fs metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow e2fs dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow e2fs zoned_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+# Vold needs to capture mkfs.ext4's output
+allow e2fs vold:fd use;
+# Need to be able to format a partition
+allow e2fs sysfs_dm:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow e2fs sysfs_dm:file r_file_perms;
+
+allowxperm e2fs { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device dm_device zoned_block_device }:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD BLKPBSZGET BLKDISCARDZEROES BLKROGET BLKREPORTZONE BLKRESETZONE
+};
+
+allow e2fs {
+  proc_filesystems
+  proc_mounts
+  proc_swaps
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# access /sys/fs/ext4/features
+allow e2fs sysfs_fs_ext4_features:dir search;
+allow e2fs sysfs_fs_ext4_features:file r_file_perms;
+
+# access SELinux context files
+allow e2fs file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;

private/extra_free_kbytes.te

@@ -4,3 +4,13 @@ init_daemon_domain(extra_free_kbytes)
 
 # Only extra_free_kbytes script is allowed to store these properties
 set_prop(extra_free_kbytes, init_storage_prop)
+
+# required permissions to run the script from init
+allow extra_free_kbytes shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow extra_free_kbytes system_file:file x_file_perms;
+allow extra_free_kbytes toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# files used by the script
+allow extra_free_kbytes proc_extra_free_kbytes:file rw_file_perms;
+allow extra_free_kbytes proc_watermark_scale_factor:file rw_file_perms;
+allow extra_free_kbytes proc_zoneinfo:file r_file_perms;

private/fastbootd.te

@@ -49,9 +49,129 @@ recovery_only(`
   # Let this domain use the hal fastboot service
   binder_use(fastbootd)
   hal_client_domain(fastbootd, hal_fastboot)
+
+  # fastbootd can only use HALs in passthrough mode
+  passthrough_hal_client_domain(fastbootd, hal_bootctl)
+
+  # fastbootd can use AIDL HALs in binder mode
+  binder_use(fastbootd)
+  hal_client_domain(fastbootd, hal_health)
+  hal_client_domain(fastbootd, hal_fastboot)
+
+  # Access /dev/usb-ffs/fastbootd/ep0
+  allow fastbootd functionfs:dir search;
+  allow fastbootd functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+
+  allowxperm fastbootd functionfs:file ioctl { FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC };
+  # Log to serial
+  allow fastbootd kmsg_device:chr_file { open getattr write };
+
+  # battery info
+  allow fastbootd sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+  allow fastbootd device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # For dev/block/by-name dir
+  allow fastbootd block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Needed for DM_DEV_CREATE ioctl call
+  allow fastbootd self:capability sys_admin;
+
+  unix_socket_connect(fastbootd, recovery, recovery)
+
+  # Required for flashing
+  allow fastbootd dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+  allow fastbootd cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd super_block_device_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd {
+    boot_block_device
+    metadata_block_device
+    system_block_device
+    userdata_block_device
+  }:blk_file { w_file_perms getattr ioctl };
+
+  # For disabling/wiping GSI, and for modifying/deleting files created via
+  # libfiemap.
+  allow fastbootd metadata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd {rootfs tmpfs}:dir mounton;
+  allow fastbootd metadata_file:dir { search getattr mounton };
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file_type:file create_file_perms;
+
+  allowxperm fastbootd super_block_device_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKIOMIN BLKALIGNOFF };
+
+  allowxperm fastbootd {
+    metadata_block_device
+    userdata_block_device
+    dm_device
+    cache_block_device
+  }:blk_file ioctl { BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD };
+
+  allow fastbootd misc_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+  allow fastbootd proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Needed to read fstab node from device tree.
+  allow fastbootd sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Needed because libdm reads sysfs to validate when a dm path is ready.
+  r_dir_file(fastbootd, sysfs_dm)
+
+  # Needed for realpath() call to resolve symlinks.
+  allow fastbootd block_device:dir getattr;
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    # Refined manipulation of /mnt/scratch, without these perms resorts
+    # to deleting scratch partition when partition(s) are flashed.
+    allow fastbootd self:process setfscreate;
+    allow fastbootd cache_file:dir search;
+    allow fastbootd proc_filesystems:file { getattr open read };
+    allow fastbootd self:capability sys_rawio;
+    allowxperm fastbootd dev_type:blk_file ioctl BLKROSET;
+    allow fastbootd overlayfs_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+    allow fastbootd {
+      system_file_type
+      unlabeled
+      vendor_file_type
+    }:dir { remove_name rmdir search write };
+    allow fastbootd {
+      overlayfs_file
+      system_file_type
+      unlabeled
+      vendor_file_type
+    }:{ file lnk_file } unlink;
+    allow fastbootd tmpfs:dir rw_dir_perms;
+    # Fetch vendor_boot partition
+    allow fastbootd boot_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+    # popen(/system/bin/dmesg) and associated permissions. We only allow this
+    # on unlocked devices running userdebug builds.
+    allow fastbootd rootfs:file execute_no_trans;
+    allow fastbootd system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+    allow fastbootd kmsg_device:chr_file read;
+    allow fastbootd kernel:system syslog_read;
+  ')
+
+  # Allow using libfiemap/gsid directly (no binder in recovery).
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file_type:dir search;
+  allow fastbootd ota_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow fastbootd ota_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
 ')
 
 # This capability allows fastbootd to circumvent memlock rlimits while using
 # io_uring. An Alternative would be to up the memlock rlimit for the fastbootd service.
 allow fastbootd self:capability ipc_lock;
 io_uring_use(fastbootd)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Write permission is required to wipe userdata
+# until recovery supports vold.
+neverallow fastbootd {
+   data_file_type
+}:file { no_x_file_perms };

private/file.te

@@ -165,3 +165,27 @@ type pre_reboot_dexopt_file, file_type;
 # Type for /mnt/artd_tmp in the Pre-reboot Dexopt chroot
 # This type is set on the directory through the `rootcontext=` mount option.
 type pre_reboot_dexopt_artd_file, file_type;
+
+# Allow files to be created in their appropriate filesystems.
+allow fs_type self:filesystem associate;
+allow cgroup tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow cgroup_v2 tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow cgroup_rc_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow sysfs_type sysfs:filesystem associate;
+allow debugfs_type { debugfs debugfs_tracing debugfs_tracing_debug }:filesystem associate;
+allow file_type labeledfs:filesystem associate;
+allow file_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow file_type rootfs:filesystem associate;
+allow dev_type tmpfs:filesystem associate;
+allow app_fuse_file app_fusefs:filesystem associate;
+allow postinstall_file self:filesystem associate;
+allow proc_net proc:filesystem associate;
+
+# It's a bug to assign the file_type attribute and fs_type attribute
+# to any type. Do not allow it.
+#
+# For example, the following is a bug:
+#   type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, fs_type;
+# Should be:
+#   type apk_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+neverallow fs_type file_type:filesystem associate;

private/fingerprintd.te

@@ -1,3 +1,27 @@
 typeattribute fingerprintd coredomain;
 
 init_daemon_domain(fingerprintd)
+
+binder_use(fingerprintd)
+
+# Scan through /system/lib64/hw looking for installed HALs
+allow fingerprintd system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# need to find KeyStore and add self
+add_service(fingerprintd, fingerprintd_service)
+
+# allow HAL module to read dir contents
+allow fingerprintd fingerprintd_data_file:file { create_file_perms };
+
+# allow HAL module to read/write/unlink contents of this dir
+allow fingerprintd fingerprintd_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Need to add auth tokens to KeyStore
+use_keystore(fingerprintd)
+allow fingerprintd keystore:keystore2 { add_auth };
+
+# For permissions checking
+binder_call(fingerprintd, system_server);
+allow fingerprintd permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow fingerprintd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

private/flags_health_check.te

@@ -36,6 +36,18 @@ set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_camera_native_prop)
 set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_tethering_u_or_later_native_prop)
 set_prop(flags_health_check, next_boot_prop)
 
+allow flags_health_check server_configurable_flags_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow flags_health_check server_configurable_flags_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# server_configurable_flags_data_file is used for storing whether server configurable flags which
+# have been reset during current booting. Mistakenly modified by unrelated components can
+# cause bad server configurable flags synced back to device.
+neverallow { domain -init -flags_health_check } server_configurable_flags_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
 # system property device_config_boot_count_prop is used for deciding when to perform server
 # configurable flags related disaster recovery. Mistakenly set up by unrelated components can, at a
 # wrong timing, trigger server configurable flag related disaster recovery, which will override

private/fsck.te

@@ -3,3 +3,77 @@ typeattribute fsck coredomain;
 init_daemon_domain(fsck)
 
 allow fsck metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
+# open fd inherited by fsck.
+allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };
+
+# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
+allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow fsck vold:fd use;
+allow fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Run fsck on certain block devices
+allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fsck zoned_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+allow fsck system_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+# e2fsck performs a comprehensive search of /proc/mounts to check whether the
+# checked filesystem is currently mounted.
+allow fsck metadata_file:dir getattr;
+allow fsck block_device:dir search;
+allow fsck mirror_data_file:dir search;
+
+# For the block devices where we have ioctl access,
+# allow at a minimum the following common fsck ioctls.
+allowxperm fsck dev_type:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKDISCARDZEROES
+  BLKROGET
+  BLKREPORTZONE
+};
+
+# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
+# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
+# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
+# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
+# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
+# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
+# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
+# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
+# major/minor values.
+allow fsck dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+
+allow fsck {
+  proc_mounts
+  proc_swaps
+  sysfs_dm
+}:file r_file_perms;
+allow fsck rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow fsck sysfs_dm:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# fsck should never be run on these block devices
+neverallow fsck {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-system_block_device')
+  vold_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from init or vold via fsck binaries
+neverallow { domain -init -vold } fsck:process transition;
+neverallow * fsck:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;

private/fsck_untrusted.te

@@ -1 +1,66 @@
 typeattribute fsck_untrusted coredomain;
+
+# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
+allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
+allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Run fsck on vold block devices
+allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
+allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow fsck_untrusted proc_mounts:file r_file_perms;
+
+# To determine if it is safe to run fsck on a filesystem, e2fsck
+# must first determine if the filesystem is mounted. To do that,
+# e2fsck scans through /proc/mounts and collects all the mounted
+# block devices. With that information, it runs stat() on each block
+# device, comparing the major and minor numbers to the filesystem
+# passed in on the command line. If there is a match, then the filesystem
+# is currently mounted and running fsck is dangerous.
+# Allow stat access to all block devices so that fsck can compare
+# major/minor values.
+allow fsck_untrusted dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
+neverallow fsck_untrusted {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  metadata_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdata_block_device
+  cache_block_device
+  dm_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
+neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
+neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
+
+# fsck_untrusted should never have sys_admin permissions. If it requires sys_admin
+# permissions, that is a code mistake that needs to be fixed, not a permission that
+# should be granted. Same with setgid and setuid.
+neverallow fsck_untrusted self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid sys_admin };
+
+###
+### dontaudit rules
+###
+
+# Ignores attempts to access sysfs. fsck binaries seem to like trying to go
+# here, but nothing bad happens if they can't, and they shouldn't be allowed.
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:file rw_file_perms;
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Ignore attempts to access tmpfs. fsck don't need to do this.
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted tmpfs:lnk_file read;

private/gatekeeperd.te

@@ -4,3 +4,42 @@ init_daemon_domain(gatekeeperd)
 
 # For checking whether GSI is running
 get_prop(gatekeeperd, gsid_prop)
+
+# gatekeeperd
+binder_service(gatekeeperd)
+binder_use(gatekeeperd)
+
+### Rules needed when Gatekeeper HAL runs inside gatekeeperd process.
+### These rules should eventually be granted only when needed.
+allow gatekeeperd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+# Load HAL implementation
+allow gatekeeperd system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+###
+
+### Rules needed when Gatekeeper HAL runs outside of gatekeeperd process.
+### These rules should eventually be granted only when needed.
+hal_client_domain(gatekeeperd, hal_gatekeeper)
+###
+
+# need to find KeyStore and add self
+add_service(gatekeeperd, gatekeeper_service)
+
+# Need to add auth tokens to KeyStore
+use_keystore(gatekeeperd)
+allow gatekeeperd keystore:keystore2 { add_auth };
+allow gatekeeperd authorization_service:service_manager find;
+
+
+# For permissions checking
+allow gatekeeperd system_server:binder call;
+allow gatekeeperd permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# for SID file access
+allow gatekeeperd gatekeeper_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow gatekeeperd gatekeeper_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# For hardware properties retrieval
+allow gatekeeperd hardware_properties_service:service_manager find;
+
+r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup_v2)

private/hal_graphics_composer.te

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_client, hal_graphics_composer_server)
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_server, hal_graphics_composer_client)
+allow hal_graphics_composer_client hal_graphics_composer_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow hal_graphics_composer_server hal_graphics_composer_client_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_graphics_composer, hal_graphics_composer_hwservice)
+
+# Coordinate with hal_graphics_mapper
+allow hal_graphics_composer_server hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# GPU device access
+allow hal_graphics_composer gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_composer gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_composer ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_composer dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow hal_graphics_composer hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Access /dev/graphics/fb0.
+allow hal_graphics_composer graphics_device:dir search;
+allow hal_graphics_composer graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Fences
+allow hal_graphics_composer system_server:fd use;
+allow hal_graphics_composer bootanim:fd use;
+allow hal_graphics_composer appdomain:fd use;
+
+# allow self to set SCHED_FIFO
+allow hal_graphics_composer self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+# allow surfaceflinger to use a pipe for dumpsys output
+allow hal_graphics_composer_server hal_graphics_composer_client:fifo_file write;
+
+
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_client, servicemanager)
+binder_call(hal_graphics_composer_server, servicemanager)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_graphics_composer, hal_graphics_composer_service)