Separate fsck domains to protect userdata.
Create new vold_fsck domain that only has access to vold_block devices to prevent any access to internal userdata. Change-Id: I25ddcd16cbf83d7a25b70bc64d95f5345d0d5731
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parent
5895ffe1f7
commit
5a5b364c54
3 changed files with 40 additions and 9 deletions
12
fsck.te
12
fsck.te
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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# Any fsck program run by init or vold
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# Any fsck program run by init
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type fsck, domain;
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type fsck_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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@ -15,11 +15,6 @@ allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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allow fsck block_device:dir search;
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allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow fsck vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow fsck vold:fd use;
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allow fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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###
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### neverallow rules
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@ -34,9 +29,10 @@ neverallow fsck {
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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vold_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from init or vold via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -init -vold } fsck:process transition;
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# Only allow entry from init via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -init } fsck:process transition;
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neverallow domain fsck:process dyntransition;
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neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
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2
vold.te
2
vold.te
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(vold)
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domain_auto_trans(vold, sgdisk_exec, sgdisk);
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domain_auto_trans(vold, blkid_exec, blkid);
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domain_auto_trans(vold, sdcardd_exec, sdcardd);
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domain_auto_trans(vold, fsck_exec, fsck);
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domain_auto_trans(vold, fsck_exec, vold_fsck);
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typeattribute vold mlstrustedsubject;
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allow vold self:process setfscreate;
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35
vold_fsck.te
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35
vold_fsck.te
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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# Any fsck program run by vold
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type vold_fsck, domain;
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# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
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allow vold_fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
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# Run fsck on certain block devices
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allow vold_fsck block_device:dir search;
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allow vold_fsck vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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# Allow stdin/out back to vold
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allow vold_fsck vold:fd use;
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allow vold_fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# fsck should never be run on these block devices
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neverallow vold_fsck {
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boot_block_device
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frp_block_device
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metadata_block_device
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recovery_block_device
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root_block_device
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swap_block_device
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system_block_device
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userdata_block_device
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cache_block_device
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}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
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neverallow { domain -vold } vold_fsck:process transition;
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neverallow domain vold_fsck:process dyntransition;
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neverallow vold_fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
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