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Protect apps from ptrace by other system components

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The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
produce stack traces.

Bug: 111317528
Test: code compiles
Change-Id: I883df49d3e9bca62952c3b33d1c691786dd7df4d
This commit is contained in:
Nick Kralevich 2018-07-25 23:48:14 -07:00
parent 719fa6db00
commit 84a42eadb2
2 changed files with 14 additions and 0 deletions
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8
public/app.te
View file

@ -405,6 +405,14 @@ neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;
# ptrace access to non-app domains.
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
# produce stack traces.
neverallow { domain -appdomain -crash_dump } appdomain:process ptrace;
# Read or write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
# A different form of hidepid=2 like protections
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file no_w_file_perms;

6
public/te_macros
View file

@ -178,6 +178,12 @@ tmpfs_domain($1)
allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file execute;
neverallow { $1 -shell } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow { appdomain -shell -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
# produce stack traces.
neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump } $1:process ptrace;
')
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