Revert "Allow kernel domain, not init domain, to set SELinux enforcing mode."

The build is broken. Reverting temporarily to fix breakage.

libsepol.check_assertion_helper: neverallow on line 4758 violated by allow init kernel:security { setenforce };
Error while expanding policy
make: *** [out/target/product/mako/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy] Error 1
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....


This reverts commit bf12e22514.

Change-Id: I78a05756d8ce3c7d06e1d9d27e6135f4b352bb85
This commit is contained in:
Nick Kralevich 2013-12-06 16:52:30 +00:00
parent bf12e22514
commit 9e8b8d9fdf
3 changed files with 2 additions and 15 deletions

View file

@ -130,17 +130,8 @@ neverallow { domain -relabeltodomain } *:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
### neverallow rules
###
# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies.
# The first load technically occurs while still in the kernel domain,
# but this does not trigger a denial since there is no policy yet.
# Policy reload requires allowing this to the init domain.
neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security load_policy;
# Only init prior to switching context should be able to set enforcing mode.
# init starts in kernel domain and switches to init domain via setcon in
# the init.rc, so the setenforce occurs while still in kernel. After
# switching domains, there is never any need to setenforce again by init.
neverallow { domain -kernel } kernel:security setenforce;
# Only init should be able to load SELinux policies and set enforcing mode.
neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security { load_policy setenforce };
# Only init, ueventd and system_server should be able to access HW RNG
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -ueventd -unconfineddomain } hw_random_device:chr_file *;

View file

@ -11,4 +11,3 @@ allow init {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
allow init kernel:security { load_policy setenforce };
allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
allow init kernel:security load_policy;

View file

@ -6,6 +6,3 @@ relabelto_domain(kernel)
allow kernel {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
allow kernel unlabeled:filesystem mount;
# Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain.
allow kernel self:security setenforce;