tequilaOS/platform_system_sepolicy
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Remove legacy execmod access.

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am: 0f11ffccf9

Change-Id: I0f85ecb4a1dc6464becce64fb8539cd2f8e1a779
This commit is contained in:
Alan Stokes 2018-08-02 06:59:12 -07:00 committed by android-build-merger
commit a8898820d6
2 changed files with 5 additions and 24 deletions
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11
private/untrusted_app_all.te
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@ -21,18 +21,15 @@
### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also
### added to untrusted_v2_app.te and ephemeral_app.te.
# Legacy text relocations
allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod;
# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms };
# ASEC
allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Execute libs in asec containers.
allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute };
# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
# running "adb install foo.apk".
@ -151,10 +148,6 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
}:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')
# Temporary auditing to get data on what apps use execmod.
# TODO(b/111544476) Remove this and deny the permission if feasible.
auditallow untrusted_app_all { apk_data_file app_data_file asec_public_file }:file execmod;
# Attempts to write to system_data_file is generally a sign
# that apps are attempting to access encrypted storage before
# the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered. Suppress this

18
public/domain.te
View file

@ -1113,26 +1113,14 @@ neverallow * { file_type fs_type dev_type }:{ lnk_file fifo_file sock_file } mou
# su itself execute su.
neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-dumpstate -shell -su') } su_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
# Do not allow the introduction of new execmod rules. Text relocations
# and modification of executable pages are unsafe.
# The only exceptions are for NDK text relocations associated with
# https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=23203
# which, long term, need to go away.
neverallow * {
file_type
-apk_data_file
-app_data_file
-asec_public_file
}:file execmod;
# Do not allow making the stack or heap executable.
# We would also like to minimize execmem but it seems to be
# required by some device-specific service domains.
neverallow * self:process { execstack execheap };
# prohibit non-zygote spawned processes from using shared libraries
# with text relocations. b/20013628 .
neverallow { domain -untrusted_app_all } file_type:file execmod;
# Do not allow the introduction of execmod rules. Text relocations
# and modification of executable pages are unsafe.
neverallow * file_type:file execmod;
neverallow { domain -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;