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Merge "Properly define hal_codec2 and related policies" into qt-dev am: cf48bfd082

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am: 789db9aeca

Change-Id: I33110eae784e8a6b891343143dc018f4ced9bcc6
This commit is contained in:
Pawin Vongmasa 2019-05-24 00:34:00 -07:00 committed by android-build-merger
commit aacbaf7685
34 changed files with 146 additions and 102 deletions
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3
prebuilts/api/29.0/private/app_neverallows.te
View file

@ -311,9 +311,10 @@ full_treble_only(`
neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
halserverdomain
-coredomain
-hal_cas_server
-hal_codec2_server
-hal_configstore_server
-hal_graphics_allocator_server
-hal_cas_server
-hal_neuralnetworks_server
-hal_omx_server
-binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone

1
prebuilts/api/29.0/private/incidentd.te
View file

@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ allow incidentd {
hal_audio_server
hal_bluetooth_server
hal_camera_server
hal_codec2_server
hal_graphics_allocator_server
hal_graphics_composer_server
hal_health_server

2
prebuilts/api/29.0/private/mediaserver.te
View file

@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ tmpfs_domain(mediaserver)
# allocate and use graphic buffers
hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_codec2)

1
prebuilts/api/29.0/private/surfaceflinger.te
View file

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ read_runtime_log_tags(surfaceflinger)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_allocator)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_composer)
typeattribute surfaceflinger_tmpfs hal_graphics_composer_client_tmpfs;
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_configstore)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_power)

3
prebuilts/api/29.0/private/system_server.te
View file

@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ allow system_server appdomain:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server audioserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_audio:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_bluetooth:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_codec2_server:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_omx_server:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server mediaswcodec:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server cameraserver:process { getsched setsched };
@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ binder_service(system_server)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_authsecret)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_broadcastradio)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_configstore)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_contexthub)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_face)
@ -275,6 +277,7 @@ allow system_server {
hal_audio_server
hal_bluetooth_server
hal_camera_server
hal_codec2_server
hal_graphics_allocator_server
hal_graphics_composer_server
hal_health_server

4
prebuilts/api/29.0/private/technical_debt.cil
View file

@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Codec2-related services
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Configstore HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_client;

2
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/attributes
View file

@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ hal_attribute(bufferhub);
hal_attribute(broadcastradio);
hal_attribute(camera);
hal_attribute(cas);
hal_attribute(codec2);
hal_attribute(configstore);
hal_attribute(confirmationui);
hal_attribute(contexthub);
@ -305,7 +306,6 @@ hal_attribute(wifi_supplicant);
attribute camera_service_server;
attribute display_service_server;
attribute mediaswcodec_server;
attribute scheduler_service_server;
attribute sensor_service_server;
attribute stats_service_server;

4
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/bufferhubd.te
View file

@ -19,3 +19,7 @@ allow bufferhubd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd via PDX.
# Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
allow bufferhubd hal_omx_server:fd use;
# Codec2 is similar to OMX
allow bufferhubd hal_codec2_server:fd use;

1
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/cameraserver.te
View file

@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ allow cameraserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
# Allow to talk with media codec
allow cameraserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_allocator)

4
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/domain.te
View file

@ -1063,8 +1063,8 @@ neverallow {
-system_server
# Processes that can't exec crash_dump
-hal_codec2_server
-hal_omx_server
-mediaswcodec_server
-mediaextractor
} tombstoned_crash_socket:unix_stream_socket connectto;
@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ full_treble_only(`
neverallow {
domain
-mediaswcodec_server
-hal_codec2_server
-hal_omx_server
} hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;

1
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/dumpstate.te
View file

@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ allow dumpstate {
hal_audio_server
hal_bluetooth_server
hal_camera_server
hal_codec2_server
hal_drm_server
hal_graphics_allocator_server
hal_graphics_composer_server

22
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/hal_codec2.te Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
binder_call(hal_codec2_client, hal_codec2_server)
binder_call(hal_codec2_server, hal_codec2_client)
hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_codec2, hal_codec2_hwservice)
# The following permissions are added to hal_codec2_server because vendor and
# vndk libraries provided for Codec2 implementation need them.
# Allow server access to composer sync fences
allow hal_codec2_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
# Allow both server and client access to ion
allow hal_codec2_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# Allow server access to camera HAL's fences
allow hal_codec2_server hal_camera:fd use;
# Receive gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd.
allow hal_codec2_server bufferhubd:fd use;
allow hal_codec2_client ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

4
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/hal_omx.te
View file

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
# since OMX must always be in its own process.
binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })
@ -21,9 +20,6 @@ allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;
hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice)
allow hal_omx_client hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow hal_omx_server hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };
allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)

2
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/mediaserver.te
View file

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ allow mediaserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
# for ModDrm/MediaPlayer
allow mediaserver mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
# For interfacing with OMX HAL
# For hybrid interfaces
allow mediaserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
# /oem access

21
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/mediaswcodec.te
View file

@ -1,10 +1,27 @@
type mediaswcodec, domain;
type mediaswcodec_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
typeattribute mediaswcodec halserverdomain;
typeattribute mediaswcodec mediaswcodec_server;
hal_server_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_codec2)
# mediaswcodec may use an input surface from a different Codec2 service or an
# OMX service
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_graphics_allocator)
get_prop(mediaswcodec, device_config_media_native_prop)
crash_dump_fallback(mediaswcodec)
# mediaswcodec_server should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow mediaswcodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow mediaswcodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;

40
prebuilts/api/29.0/public/swcodec_service_server.te
View file

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
# Add hal_codec2_hwservice to mediaswcodec_server
allow mediaswcodec_server hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };
allow mediaswcodec_server hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
# Allow mediaswcodec_server access to composer sync fences
allow mediaswcodec_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
allow mediaswcodec_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow mediaswcodec_server hal_camera:fd use;
crash_dump_fallback(mediaswcodec_server)
# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that mediaswcodec_server never
# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
allow mediaswcodec_server bufferhubd:fd use;
binder_call(mediaswcodec_server, hal_omx_client)
binder_call(hal_omx_client, mediaswcodec_server)
###
### neverallow rules
###
# mediaswcodec_server should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow mediaswcodec_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# The goal of the mediaserver/codec split is to place media processing code into
# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
# hardware/content. Etc.
#
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow mediaswcodec_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;

3
private/app_neverallows.te
View file

@ -260,9 +260,10 @@ full_treble_only(`
neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
halserverdomain
-coredomain
-hal_cas_server
-hal_codec2_server
-hal_configstore_server
-hal_graphics_allocator_server
-hal_cas_server
-hal_neuralnetworks_server
-hal_omx_server
-binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone

1
private/incidentd.te
View file

@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ allow incidentd {
hal_audio_server
hal_bluetooth_server
hal_camera_server
hal_codec2_server
hal_graphics_allocator_server
hal_graphics_composer_server
hal_health_server

2
private/mediaserver.te
View file

@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ tmpfs_domain(mediaserver)
# allocate and use graphic buffers
hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(mediaserver, hal_codec2)

1
private/surfaceflinger.te
View file

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ read_runtime_log_tags(surfaceflinger)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_allocator)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_composer)
typeattribute surfaceflinger_tmpfs hal_graphics_composer_client_tmpfs;
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_configstore)
hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_power)

3
private/system_server.te
View file

@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ allow system_server appdomain:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server audioserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_audio:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_bluetooth:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_codec2_server:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_omx_server:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server mediaswcodec:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server cameraserver:process { getsched setsched };
@ -207,6 +208,7 @@ binder_service(system_server)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_authsecret)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_broadcastradio)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_configstore)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_contexthub)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_face)
@ -276,6 +278,7 @@ allow system_server {
hal_audio_server
hal_bluetooth_server
hal_camera_server
hal_codec2_server
hal_graphics_allocator_server
hal_graphics_composer_server
hal_health_server

4
private/technical_debt.cil
View file

@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Codec2-related services
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Configstore HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_client;

2
public/attributes
View file

@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ hal_attribute(bufferhub);
hal_attribute(broadcastradio);
hal_attribute(camera);
hal_attribute(cas);
hal_attribute(codec2);
hal_attribute(configstore);
hal_attribute(confirmationui);
hal_attribute(contexthub);
@ -305,7 +306,6 @@ hal_attribute(wifi_supplicant);
attribute camera_service_server;
attribute display_service_server;
attribute mediaswcodec_server;
attribute scheduler_service_server;
attribute sensor_service_server;
attribute stats_service_server;

4
public/bufferhubd.te
View file

@ -19,3 +19,7 @@ allow bufferhubd ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd via PDX.
# Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
allow bufferhubd hal_omx_server:fd use;
# Codec2 is similar to OMX
allow bufferhubd hal_codec2_server:fd use;

1
public/cameraserver.te
View file

@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ allow cameraserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
# Allow to talk with media codec
allow cameraserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_allocator)

4
public/domain.te
View file

@ -1054,8 +1054,8 @@ neverallow {
-system_server
# Processes that can't exec crash_dump
-hal_codec2_server
-hal_omx_server
-mediaswcodec_server
-mediaextractor
} tombstoned_crash_socket:unix_stream_socket connectto;
@ -1385,7 +1385,7 @@ full_treble_only(`
neverallow {
domain
-mediaswcodec_server
-hal_codec2_server
-hal_omx_server
} hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;

1
public/dumpstate.te
View file

@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ allow dumpstate {
hal_audio_server
hal_bluetooth_server
hal_camera_server
hal_codec2_server
hal_drm_server
hal_graphics_allocator_server
hal_graphics_composer_server

22
public/hal_codec2.te Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
binder_call(hal_codec2_client, hal_codec2_server)
binder_call(hal_codec2_server, hal_codec2_client)
hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_codec2, hal_codec2_hwservice)
# The following permissions are added to hal_codec2_server because vendor and
# vndk libraries provided for Codec2 implementation need them.
# Allow server access to composer sync fences
allow hal_codec2_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
# Allow both server and client access to ion
allow hal_codec2_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# Allow server access to camera HAL's fences
allow hal_codec2_server hal_camera:fd use;
# Receive gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd.
allow hal_codec2_server bufferhubd:fd use;
allow hal_codec2_client ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

4
public/hal_omx.te
View file

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
# since OMX must always be in its own process.
binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })
@ -21,9 +20,6 @@ allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;
hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice)
allow hal_omx_client hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow hal_omx_server hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };
allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)

2
public/mediaserver.te
View file

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ allow mediaserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
# for ModDrm/MediaPlayer
allow mediaserver mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
# For interfacing with OMX HAL
# For hybrid interfaces
allow mediaserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
# /oem access

21
public/mediaswcodec.te
View file

@ -1,10 +1,27 @@
type mediaswcodec, domain;
type mediaswcodec_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
typeattribute mediaswcodec halserverdomain;
typeattribute mediaswcodec mediaswcodec_server;
hal_server_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_codec2)
# mediaswcodec may use an input surface from a different Codec2 service or an
# OMX service
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(mediaswcodec, hal_graphics_allocator)
get_prop(mediaswcodec, device_config_media_native_prop)
crash_dump_fallback(mediaswcodec)
# mediaswcodec_server should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow mediaswcodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow mediaswcodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;

40
public/swcodec_service_server.te
View file

@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
# Add hal_codec2_hwservice to mediaswcodec_server
allow mediaswcodec_server hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };
allow mediaswcodec_server hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
# Allow mediaswcodec_server access to composer sync fences
allow mediaswcodec_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
allow mediaswcodec_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow mediaswcodec_server hal_camera:fd use;
crash_dump_fallback(mediaswcodec_server)
# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that mediaswcodec_server never
# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
allow mediaswcodec_server bufferhubd:fd use;
binder_call(mediaswcodec_server, hal_omx_client)
binder_call(hal_omx_client, mediaswcodec_server)
###
### neverallow rules
###
# mediaswcodec_server should never execute any executable without a
# domain transition
neverallow mediaswcodec_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# The goal of the mediaserver/codec split is to place media processing code into
# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
# hardware/content. Etc.
#
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow mediaswcodec_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;

1
vendor/hal_drm_default.te vendored
View file

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ hal_server_domain(hal_drm_default, hal_drm)
type hal_drm_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(hal_drm_default)
allow hal_drm_default hal_codec2_server:fd use;
allow hal_drm_default hal_omx_server:fd use;
allow hal_drm_default { appdomain -isolated_app }:fd use;

17
vendor/mediacodec.te vendored
View file

@ -15,12 +15,29 @@ not_full_treble(`
# can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder
vndbinder_use(mediacodec)
hal_server_domain(mediacodec, hal_codec2)
hal_server_domain(mediacodec, hal_omx)
# mediacodec may use an input surface from a different Codec2 or OMX service
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_graphics_allocator)
allow mediacodec gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow mediacodec ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow mediacodec video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow mediacodec video_device:dir search;
crash_dump_fallback(mediacodec)
# mediacodec should never execute any executable without a domain transition
neverallow mediacodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
# Lengthier explanation here:
# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
neverallow mediacodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;