Merge changes from topic "iso_compute"
* changes: Add isolated_compute_app domain Share isolated properties across islolated apps
This commit is contained in:
Charles Chen
Gerrit Code Review
commit
b36ecf6caa
10 changed files with 250 additions and 173 deletions
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
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r_dir_file({
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appdomain
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-ephemeral_app
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-isolated_app
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-isolated_app_all
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-platform_app
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-priv_app
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-shell
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
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auditallow {
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appdomain
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-ephemeral_app
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-isolated_app
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-isolated_app_all
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-platform_app
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-priv_app
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-shell
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@ -149,53 +149,53 @@ binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox)
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# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
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# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Read/write visible storage
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
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# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
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# accesses to the underlying FS.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
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# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
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#
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# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
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# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
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#logd access
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control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
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# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
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use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
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use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
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use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
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use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
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# For app fuse.
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_client)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_manager)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_vsync)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, performance_client)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_client)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_manager)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_vsync)
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pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, performance_client)
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# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
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pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, bufferhub_client)
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pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, bufferhub_client)
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# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
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# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
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allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
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allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
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# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
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@ -221,8 +221,8 @@ allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
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allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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@ -259,11 +259,11 @@ allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
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# App sandbox file accesses.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
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# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
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# Traverse into expanded storage
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allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# TextClassifier
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
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r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, textclassifier_data_file)
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# Access to OEM provided data and apps
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allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ not_full_treble(`
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full_treble_only(`
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# For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } vendor_file:dir { open read };
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')
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# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
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@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
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# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
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# They need that to render the standard UI.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } sysfs_gpu:file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } sysfs_gpu:file r_file_perms;
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# Use the Binder.
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@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
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# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
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binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
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# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
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binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, gpuservice)
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binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, gpuservice)
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# Talk with graphics composer fences
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allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
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@ -403,10 +403,10 @@ allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
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# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
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# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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# For art.
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allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
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@ -435,21 +435,21 @@ allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
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allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
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ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_audio:fd use;
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# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_camera:fd use;
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# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
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allow {appdomain -isolated_app} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
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allow {appdomain -isolated_app_all} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
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# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
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# TODO: switch to meminfo service
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@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
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# from read-only locations.
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neverallow {
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bluetooth
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isolated_app
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isolated_app_all
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nfc
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radio
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shared_relro
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@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
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define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{
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ephemeral_app
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isolated_app
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isolated_app_all
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isolated_compute_app
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mediaprovider
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mediaprovider_app
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untrusted_app
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@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
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hal_wifi_service
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healthconnect_service
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hypervisor_restricted_prop
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isolated_compute_app
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keystore_config_prop
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ntfs
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permissive_mte_prop
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@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ get_prop(domain, socket_hook_prop)
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get_prop(domain, surfaceflinger_prop)
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get_prop(domain, telephony_status_prop)
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get_prop(domain, timezone_prop)
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get_prop({domain -untrusted_app_all -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, userdebug_or_eng_prop)
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get_prop({domain -untrusted_app_all -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app }, userdebug_or_eng_prop)
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get_prop(domain, vendor_socket_hook_prop)
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get_prop(domain, vndk_prop)
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get_prop(domain, vold_status_prop)
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@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ neverallow {
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# traced_probes.te.
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} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
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neverallow {
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isolated_app
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isolated_app_all
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ephemeral_app
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priv_app
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sdk_sandbox
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@ -1,36 +1,24 @@
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###
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### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
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### isolated_apps.
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###
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### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
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### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
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### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
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### This file defines the rules for isolated apps that does not wish to use
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### service managers and does not require extra computational resources.
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###
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typeattribute isolated_app coredomain;
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app_domain(isolated_app)
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isolated_app_domain(isolated_app)
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# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
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allow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file { append read write getattr lock map };
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allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow access to network sockets received over IPC. New socket creation is not
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# permitted.
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allow isolated_app { ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl };
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allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
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allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
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allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
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# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
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# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
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# tool is broken.
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# b/20150694
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# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
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allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
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# b/32896414: Allow accessing sdcard file descriptors passed to isolated_apps
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# by other processes. Open should never be allowed, and is blocked by
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# neverallow rules below.
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# neverallow rules in isolated_app_all attribute.
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# media_rw_data_file is included for sdcardfs, and can be removed if sdcardfs
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# is modified to change the secontext when accessing the lower filesystem.
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allow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse media_rw_data_file }:file { read write append getattr lock map };
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@ -47,17 +35,6 @@ allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
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allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
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# Inherit FDs from the app_zygote.
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allow isolated_app app_zygote:fd use;
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# Notify app_zygote of child death.
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allow isolated_app app_zygote:process sigchld;
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# Inherit logd write socket.
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allow isolated_app app_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
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# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
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# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
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dontaudit isolated_app shell_data_file:dir search;
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# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
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# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
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perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
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@ -66,88 +43,3 @@ perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
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# debuggable.
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can_profile_heap(isolated_app)
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can_profile_perf(isolated_app)
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#####
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##### Neverallow
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#####
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||||
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# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
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||||
neverallow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file open;
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# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
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# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
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# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
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neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
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||||
neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
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||||
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||||
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
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||||
neverallow isolated_app hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app *:hwservice_manager *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
|
||||
# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
|
||||
|
||||
# b/17487348
|
||||
# Isolated apps can only access three services,
|
||||
# activity_service, display_service, webviewupdate_service.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app {
|
||||
service_manager_type
|
||||
-activity_service
|
||||
-display_service
|
||||
-webviewupdate_service
|
||||
}:service_manager find;
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow isolated_app to access external storage, except for files passed
|
||||
# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type fuse }:dir ~getattr;
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse }:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse }:file ~{ read write append getattr lock map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow USB access
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app webview_zygote:sock_file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app can access. This is important
|
||||
# for controlling isolated_app attack surface.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app {
|
||||
sysfs_type
|
||||
-sysfs_devices_system_cpu
|
||||
-sysfs_transparent_hugepage
|
||||
-sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_app (b/28417852)
|
||||
-sysfs_fs_incfs_features
|
||||
}:file no_rw_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# No creation of sockets families other than AF_UNIX sockets.
|
||||
# List taken from system/sepolicy/public/global_macros - socket_class_set
|
||||
# excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
|
||||
# Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
|
||||
# be compiled into the Android kernel.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
|
||||
socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
|
||||
key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
|
||||
netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
|
||||
netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_dnrt_socket
|
||||
netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
|
||||
netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
|
||||
netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket
|
||||
netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket
|
||||
netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket
|
||||
rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
|
||||
bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket
|
||||
ieee802154_socket caif_socket alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket
|
||||
qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
|
||||
} create;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
120
private/isolated_app_all.te
Normal file
120
private/isolated_app_all.te
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
|
|||
###
|
||||
### isolated_app_all.
|
||||
###
|
||||
### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
|
||||
###
|
||||
### This file defines the rules shared by all isolated apps. An "isolated
|
||||
### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
|
||||
### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
|
||||
###
|
||||
|
||||
# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
|
||||
allow isolated_app_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file { append read write getattr lock map };
|
||||
|
||||
allow isolated_app_all activity_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow isolated_app_all display_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
|
||||
# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
|
||||
# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
|
||||
# tool is broken.
|
||||
# b/20150694
|
||||
# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
|
||||
allow isolated_app_all self:process ptrace;
|
||||
|
||||
# Inherit FDs from the app_zygote.
|
||||
allow isolated_app_all app_zygote:fd use;
|
||||
# Notify app_zygote of child death.
|
||||
allow isolated_app_all app_zygote:process sigchld;
|
||||
# Inherit logd write socket.
|
||||
allow isolated_app_all app_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
|
||||
# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
|
||||
dontaudit isolated_app_all shell_data_file:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
#####
|
||||
##### Neverallow
|
||||
#####
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file open;
|
||||
|
||||
# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
|
||||
# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
|
||||
# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all anr_data_file:dir ~search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
|
||||
neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
|
||||
neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } *:hwservice_manager *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
|
||||
# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
|
||||
neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } *:service_manager ~find;
|
||||
|
||||
# b/17487348
|
||||
# Isolated apps can only access three services,
|
||||
# activity_service, display_service, webviewupdate_service.
|
||||
neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } {
|
||||
service_manager_type
|
||||
-activity_service
|
||||
-display_service
|
||||
-webviewupdate_service
|
||||
}:service_manager find;
|
||||
|
||||
# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow isolated_apps access to /cache
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow isolated_app_all to access external storage, except for files passed
|
||||
# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type fuse }:dir ~getattr;
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all { sdcard_type fuse }:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all { sdcard_type fuse }:file ~{ read write append getattr lock map };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow USB access
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all webview_zygote:sock_file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app_all can access. This is important
|
||||
# for controlling isolated_app_all attack surface.
|
||||
# TODO (b/266555480): The permission should be guarded by compliance test.
|
||||
# Remove the negation for member domains when refactorization is done.
|
||||
neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } {
|
||||
sysfs_type
|
||||
-sysfs_devices_system_cpu
|
||||
-sysfs_transparent_hugepage
|
||||
-sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_apps (b/28417852)
|
||||
-sysfs_fs_incfs_features
|
||||
}:file no_rw_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# No creation of sockets families other than AF_UNIX sockets.
|
||||
# List taken from system/sepolicy/public/global_macros - socket_class_set
|
||||
# excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
|
||||
# Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
|
||||
# be compiled into the Android kernel.
|
||||
neverallow isolated_app_all { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
|
||||
socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
|
||||
key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
|
||||
netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
|
||||
netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_dnrt_socket
|
||||
netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
|
||||
netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
|
||||
netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket
|
||||
netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket
|
||||
netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket
|
||||
rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
|
||||
bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket
|
||||
ieee802154_socket caif_socket alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket
|
||||
qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
|
||||
} create;
|
||||
52
private/isolated_compute_app.te
Normal file
52
private/isolated_compute_app.te
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
|||
###
|
||||
### isolated_compute_apps.
|
||||
###
|
||||
### This file defines the rules for isolated apps that requires the permission
|
||||
### to gather data with service manager and require computational resources to
|
||||
### improve the performance to process data under a sandbox. This
|
||||
### isolated_compute_app restricts data egress to protect the privacy.
|
||||
###
|
||||
### TODO(b/266923392): Clean rules for isolated_compute_app characteristics
|
||||
###
|
||||
type isolated_compute_app, domain;
|
||||
|
||||
typeattribute isolated_compute_app coredomain;
|
||||
|
||||
app_domain(isolated_compute_app)
|
||||
isolated_app_domain(isolated_compute_app)
|
||||
|
||||
allow isolated_compute_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow isolated_compute_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow isolated_compute_app content_capture_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow isolated_compute_app device_state_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow isolated_compute_app speech_recognition_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable access to hardware services for camera functionalilites
|
||||
hal_client_domain(isolated_compute_app, hal_allocator)
|
||||
hwbinder_use(isolated_compute_app)
|
||||
|
||||
# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
|
||||
# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
|
||||
perfetto_producer(isolated_compute_app)
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
|
||||
# debuggable.
|
||||
can_profile_heap(isolated_compute_app)
|
||||
can_profile_perf(isolated_compute_app)
|
||||
|
||||
#####
|
||||
##### Neverallow
|
||||
#####
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow isolated_compute_app to access hardware service except for the
|
||||
# ones necessary for camera service.
|
||||
# TODO (b/266555480): The permission should be guarded by compliance test.
|
||||
# Remove the negation for member domains when refactorization is done.
|
||||
# neverallow isolated_compute_app {
|
||||
# hwservice_manager_type
|
||||
# -hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice
|
||||
# -hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice
|
||||
# -hidl_allocator_hwservice
|
||||
# -hidl_manager_hwservice
|
||||
# -hidl_memory_hwservice
|
||||
# }:hwservice_manager *;
|
||||
|
|
@ -7,27 +7,27 @@
|
|||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Allocator HAL
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_allocator_client;
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_allocator_client;
|
||||
; typeattribute hal_allocator_client halclientdomain;
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
|
||||
(typeattributeset halclientdomain (hal_allocator_client))
|
||||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of OMX-related services
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
|
||||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Codec2-related services
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
|
||||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps and SDK sandboxes, are clients of Drm-related services
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_drm_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (or (isolated_app) (sdk_sandbox)))))))
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_drm_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (or (isolated_app_all) (sdk_sandbox)))))))
|
||||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Configstore HAL
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_client;
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_configstore_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_configstore_client;
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_configstore_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
|
||||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Graphics Allocator HAL
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
|
|
@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
|
|||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Cas HAL
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_cas_client;
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_cas_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_cas_client;
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_cas_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
|
||||
|
||||
; Domains hosting Camera HAL implementations are clients of Allocator HAL
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
|
|
@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
|
|||
|
||||
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Neuralnetworks HAL
|
||||
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_neuralnetworks_client;
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_neuralnetworks_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
|
||||
; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_neuralnetworks_client;
|
||||
(typeattributeset hal_neuralnetworks_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
|
||||
|
||||
; TODO(b/112056006): move these to mapping files when/if we implement 'versioned' attributes.
|
||||
; Rename untrusted_app_visible_* to untrusted_app_visible_*_violators.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ attribute appdomain;
|
|||
# All third party apps (except isolated_app and ephemeral_app)
|
||||
attribute untrusted_app_all;
|
||||
|
||||
# All apps with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
|
||||
attribute isolated_app_all;
|
||||
|
||||
# All domains used for apps with network access.
|
||||
attribute netdomain;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -232,6 +232,13 @@ define(`untrusted_app_domain', `
|
|||
typeattribute $1 untrusted_app_all;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
#####################################
|
||||
# isolated_app_domain(domain)
|
||||
# Allow a base set of permissions required for all isolated apps.
|
||||
define(`isolated_app_domain', `
|
||||
typeattribute $1 isolated_app_all;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
#####################################
|
||||
# net_domain(domain)
|
||||
# Allow a base set of permissions required for network access.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue