sepolicy: rules for uid/pid cgroups v2 hierarchy am: aa4ce95c6f am: 9afaef844b

Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/sepolicy/+/1585406

MUST ONLY BE SUBMITTED BY AUTOMERGER

Change-Id: I1e9d42b8f13f4c60e4f46119adc4dc69ecd1c7f0

private/app_neverallows.te

@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ neverallow all_untrusted_apps proc_tty_drivers:file ~r_file_perms;
 
 # Untrusted apps are not allowed to use cgroups.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup:file *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup_v2:file *;
 
 # /mnt/sdcard symlink was supposed to have been removed in Gingerbread. Apps
 # must not use it.

private/domain.te

@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ allow domain cgroup:dir search;
 allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
 allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;
 
+allow domain cgroup_v2:dir search;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
 allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
 allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;

private/logpersist.te

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ typeattribute logpersist coredomain;
 userdebug_or_eng(`
 
   r_dir_file(logpersist, cgroup)
+  r_dir_file(logpersist, cgroup_v2)
 
   allow logpersist misc_logd_file:file create_file_perms;
   allow logpersist misc_logd_file:dir rw_dir_perms;

private/priv_app.te

@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };
 
 # Do not allow priv_app access to cgroups.
 neverallow priv_app cgroup:file *;
+neverallow priv_app cgroup_v2:file *;
 
 # Do not allow loading executable code from non-privileged
 # application home directories. Code loading across a security boundary

private/surfaceflinger.te

@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ allow surfaceflinger inputflinger_service:service_manager find;
 allow surfaceflinger self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
 allow surfaceflinger proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(surfaceflinger, system_file)
 allow surfaceflinger tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow surfaceflinger system_server:fd use;

private/system_app.te

@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ allow system_app {
 
 # Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks.
 allow system_app cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+allow system_app cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
 
 control_logd(system_app)
 read_runtime_log_tags(system_app)

private/system_server.te

@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ allowxperm system_server frp_block_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISC
 
 # Clean up old cgroups
 allow system_server cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+allow system_server cgroup_v2:dir { remove_name rmdir };
 
 # /oem access
 r_dir_file(system_server, oemfs)
@@ -975,9 +976,8 @@ allow system_server preloads_media_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
 allow system_server preloads_media_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
 
 r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup_v2)
 allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow system_server cgroup_v2:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow system_server cgroup_v2:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Access to /dev/dma_heap/system
 allow system_server dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

private/zygote.te

@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ r_dir_file(zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
 # Control cgroups.
 allow zygote cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow zygote cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow zygote cgroup_v2:{ file lnk_file } { r_file_perms setattr };
 allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
 
 # Allow zygote to stat the files that it opens. The zygote must
@@ -190,7 +192,10 @@ get_prop(zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
 get_prop(zygote, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
 
 # ingore spurious denials
-dontaudit zygote self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+# fsetid can be checked as a consequence of chmod when using cgroup v2 uid/pid hierarchy. This is
+# done to determine if the file should inherit setgid. In this case, setgid on the file is
+# undesirable, so suppress the denial.
+dontaudit zygote self:global_capability_class_set { sys_resource fsetid };
 
 # Ignore spurious denials calling access() on fuse
 # TODO(b/151316657): avoid the denials

public/charger.te

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ allow charger kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
 r_dir_file(charger, rootfs)
 r_dir_file(charger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(charger, cgroup_v2)
 
 # Allow to read /sys/class/power_supply directory
 allow charger sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;

public/credstore.te

@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ allow credstore sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:service_manager find;
 allow credstore dropbox_service:service_manager find;
 
 r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(credstore, cgroup_v2)

public/dhcp.te

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ type dhcp_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
 net_domain(dhcp)
 
 allow dhcp cgroup:dir { create write add_name };
+allow dhcp cgroup_v2:dir { create write add_name };
 allow dhcp self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
 allow dhcp self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow dhcp self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;

public/domain.te

@@ -1322,10 +1322,12 @@ neverallow domain {
 
 # cgroupfs directories can be created, but not files within them.
 neverallow domain cgroup:file create;
+neverallow domain cgroup_v2:file create;
 
 dontaudit domain proc_type:dir write;
 dontaudit domain sysfs_type:dir write;
 dontaudit domain cgroup:file create;
+dontaudit domain cgroup_v2:file create;
 
 # These are only needed in permissive mode - in enforcing mode the
 # directory write check fails and so these are never attempted.

public/drmserver.te

@@ -61,4 +61,5 @@ allow drmserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
 selinux_check_access(drmserver)
 
 r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(drmserver, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(drmserver, system_file)

public/dumpstate.te

@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ allow dumpstate { cache_file rootfs }:lnk_file { getattr read };
 
 # Read /dev/cpuctl and /dev/cpuset
 r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, cgroup_v2)
 
 # Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to any binder service
 binder_call(dumpstate, binderservicedomain)

public/gatekeeperd.te

@@ -39,3 +39,4 @@ allow gatekeeperd gatekeeper_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow gatekeeperd hardware_properties_service:service_manager find;
 
 r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(gatekeeperd, cgroup_v2)

public/hal_cas.te

@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ r_dir_file(hal_cas, cgroup)
 allow hal_cas cgroup:dir { search write };
 allow hal_cas cgroup:file w_file_perms;
 
+r_dir_file(hal_cas, cgroup_v2)
+allow hal_cas cgroup_v2:dir { search write };
+allow hal_cas cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
 # Allow access to ion memory allocation device
 allow hal_cas ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_cas hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;

public/hal_drm.te

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ r_dir_file(hal_drm, cgroup)
 allow hal_drm cgroup:dir { search write };
 allow hal_drm cgroup:file w_file_perms;
 
+r_dir_file(hal_drm, cgroup_v2)
+allow hal_drm cgroup_v2:dir { search write };
+allow hal_drm cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
 # Allow access to ion memory allocation device
 allow hal_drm ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_drm hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;

public/hal_fingerprint.te

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ allow hal_fingerprint fingerprint_vendor_data_file:file { create_file_perms };
 allow hal_fingerprint fingerprint_vendor_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 
 r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(hal_fingerprint, sysfs)
 
 

public/hal_telephony.te

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ allow hal_telephony_server kernel:system module_request;
 allow hal_telephony_server self:global_capability_class_set { setpcap setgid setuid net_admin net_raw };
 allow hal_telephony_server cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_telephony_server cgroup_v2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server radio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server radio_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
 allow hal_telephony_server efs_file:dir create_dir_perms;

public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ r_dir_file(hal_wifi_supplicant, proc_net_type)
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant kernel:system module_request;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:global_capability_class_set { setuid net_admin setgid net_raw };
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

public/healthd.te

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ allow healthd sysfs_type:dir search;
 allow healthd sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 r_dir_file(healthd, rootfs)
 r_dir_file(healthd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(healthd, cgroup_v2)
 
 allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_tty_config };
 allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;

public/init.te

@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ allow init {
     postinstall_mnt_dir
     mirror_data_file
 }:dir mounton;
-allow init cgroup_v2:dir { mounton create_dir_perms };
 
 # Mount bpf fs on sys/fs/bpf
 allow init fs_bpf:dir mounton;
@@ -132,6 +131,8 @@ allow init cgroup_rc_file:file rw_file_perms;
 allow init cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow init cgroup_desc_api_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow init vendor_cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow init cgroup_v2:dir { mounton create_dir_perms};
+allow init cgroup_v2:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # /config
 allow init configfs:dir mounton;

public/inputflinger.te

@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ allow inputflinger input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow inputflinger input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 r_dir_file(inputflinger, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(inputflinger, cgroup_v2)

public/installd.te

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ allow installd apk_tmp_file:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
 allow installd oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow installd oemfs:file r_file_perms;
 allow installd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow installd cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow installd mnt_expand_file:dir { search getattr };
 # Check validity of SELinux context before use.
 selinux_check_context(installd)

public/keystore.te

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ add_service(keystore, authorization_service)
 selinux_check_access(keystore)
 
 r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(keystore, cgroup_v2)
 
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules

public/lmkd.te

@@ -26,9 +26,11 @@ allow lmkd kernel:process { setsched };
 
 # Clean up old cgroups
 allow lmkd cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
+allow lmkd cgroup_v2:dir { remove_name rmdir };
 
 # Allow to read memcg stats
 allow lmkd cgroup:file r_file_perms;
+allow lmkd cgroup_v2:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Set self to SCHED_FIFO
 allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;

public/logd.te

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ type logd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
 
 # Read access to pseudo filesystems.
 r_dir_file(logd, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(logd, cgroup_v2)
 r_dir_file(logd, proc_kmsg)
 r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
 

public/mediaextractor.te

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ hal_client_domain(mediaextractor, hal_cas)
 hal_client_domain(mediaextractor, hal_allocator)
 
 r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediaextractor, cgroup_v2)
 allow mediaextractor proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
 crash_dump_fallback(mediaextractor)

public/mediametrics.te

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ add_service(mediametrics, mediametrics_service)
 allow mediametrics system_server:fd use;
 
 r_dir_file(mediametrics, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediametrics, cgroup_v2)
 allow mediametrics proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 
 # allows interactions with dumpsys to GMScore

public/mediaserver.te

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ net_domain(mediaserver)
 
 r_dir_file(mediaserver, sdcard_type)
 r_dir_file(mediaserver, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(mediaserver, cgroup_v2)
 
 # stat /proc/self
 allow mediaserver proc:lnk_file getattr;

public/performanced.te

@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
 
 # Access /dev/cpuset/cpuset.cpus
 r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup)
+r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup_v2)

public/racoon.te

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ binder_use(racoon)
 allow racoon tun_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 allowxperm racoon tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNSETIFF;
 allow racoon cgroup:dir { add_name create };
+allow racoon cgroup_v2:dir { add_name create };
 allow racoon kernel:system module_request;
 
 allow racoon self:key_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

public/sdcardd.te

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ type sdcardd, domain;
 type sdcardd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
 
 allow sdcardd cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdcardd cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow sdcardd fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow sdcardd rootfs:dir mounton;  # TODO: deprecated in M
 allow sdcardd sdcardfs:filesystem remount;

public/shell.te

@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ r_dir_file(shell, cgroup)
 allow shell cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow shell cgroup_desc_api_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow shell vendor_cgroup_desc_file:file r_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(shell, cgroup_v2)
 allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
 allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
 

public/vendor_init.te

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ allow vendor_init rootfs:lnk_file { create unlink };
 # Create cgroups mount points in tmpfs and mount cgroups on them.
 allow vendor_init cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow vendor_init cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+allow vendor_init cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow vendor_init cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
 
 # /config
 allow vendor_init configfs:dir mounton;