Move sdk_sandbox sepolicy to AOSP.

Bug: 224796470
Bug: 203670791
Bug: 204989872
Bug: 211761016
Bug: 217543371
Bug: 217559719
Bug: 215105355
Bug: 220320098
Test: make, ensure device boots

Change-Id: Ia96ae5407f5a83390ce1b610da0d49264e90d7e2
Merged-In: Ib085c49f29dab47268e479fe5266490a66adaa87
Merged-In: I2215ffe74e0fa19ff936e90c08c4ebfd177e5258
Merged-In: I478c9a16032dc1f1286f5295fc080cbe574f09c9
Merged-In: Ibf478466e5d6ab0ee08fca4da3b4bae974a82db0
Merged-In: I5d519605d9fbe80c7b4c9fb6572bc72425f6e90a
Merged-In: I05d2071e023d0de8a93dcd111674f8d8102a21ce
Merged-In: I6572a7a5c46c52c9421d0e9c9fc653ddbd6de145
Merged-In: I1b6d1a778cb658bdfd930b684e4ba0640031b226
Merged-In: I9fb98e0caee75bdaaa35d11d174004505f236799

mac_permissions.mk

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ $(plat_mac_perms_keys.tmp): $(all_plat_mac_perms_keys) $(M4)
 	$(hide) $(M4) --fatal-warnings -s $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_M4DEFS) $(PRIVATE_KEYS) > $@
 
 # Should be synced with keys.conf.
-all_plat_keys := platform media networkstack shared testkey
+all_plat_keys := platform media networkstack sdk_sandbox shared testkey
 all_plat_keys := $(all_plat_keys:%=$(dir $(DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE))/%.x509.pem)
 
 $(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): PRIVATE_MAC_PERMS_FILES := $(all_plat_mac_perms_files)

private/app.te

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ dontaudit appdomain system_data_file:dir write;
 dontaudit appdomain vendor_default_prop:file read;
 
 # Access to /mnt/media_rw/<vol> (limited by DAC to apps with external_storage gid)
-allow appdomain mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
 
 neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
         accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
@@ -111,11 +111,11 @@ allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
 allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
 # Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
-allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
 allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
@@ -149,11 +149,11 @@ allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
 allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
 
 # App sandbox file accesses.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
 
 # Traverse into expanded storage
 allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.
-allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;
-not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
+not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
 
 # Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
 allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -192,8 +192,11 @@ full_treble_only(`
 
 # Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
 # apps which cannot be in /vendor.
-r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app }, vendor_app_file)
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, vendor_app_file)
-allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+
+# Perform binder IPC to sdk sandbox.
+binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox)
 
 # Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
 r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
@@ -275,6 +278,7 @@ r_dir_file({
   -isolated_app
   -platform_app
   -priv_app
+  -sdk_sandbox
   -shell
   -system_app
   -untrusted_app_all
@@ -287,6 +291,7 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
     -isolated_app
     -platform_app
     -priv_app
+    -sdk_sandbox
     -shell
     -su
     -system_app
@@ -328,33 +333,33 @@ allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
 
 # Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
 
 # Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
 
 # Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
 # and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read/write visible storage
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
 # This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
 # accesses to the underlying FS.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
 # http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
 #
 # USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
 # and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
 
 # For art.
 allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
@@ -374,19 +379,19 @@ allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # logd access
 read_logd(appdomain)
-control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app })
+control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
 # application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
 allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
 
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
 
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
 
-use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
+use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
 
-use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
+use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
 
 allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
 
@@ -417,12 +422,12 @@ allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
 # For app fuse.
 allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };
 
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_client)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_manager)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_vsync)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, performance_client)
 # Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
-pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
+pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, bufferhub_client)
 
 ###
 ### CTS-specific rules
@@ -435,8 +440,8 @@ allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
 
 # Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
 # device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
-allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
+allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
 
 # Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
 # This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
@@ -465,6 +470,7 @@ neverallow {
   isolated_app
   nfc
   radio
+  sdk_sandbox
   shared_relro
   system_app
 } {

private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
     proc_watermark_scale_factor
     untrusted_app_30
     proc_vendor_sched
+    sdk_sandbox_service
     sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf
     sysfs_vendor_sched
     tv_iapp_service

private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil

@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@
     remotelyprovisionedkeypool_service
     resources_manager_service
     rootdisk_sysdev
+    sdk_sandbox_service
     selection_toolbar_service
     snapuserd_proxy_socket
-    supplemental_process_service
     sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf
     system_dlkm_file
     tare_service

private/domain.te

@@ -612,3 +612,22 @@ neverallow {
   userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationservice')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-crosvm')
 } shell_data_file:file open;
+
+# respect system_app sandboxes
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
+  -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
+  -installd # creation of app sandbox
+  -iorap_inode2filename
+  -traced_probes # resolve inodes for i/o tracing.
+                 # only needs open and read, the rest is neverallow in
+                 # traced_probes.te.
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+neverallow {
+  isolated_app
+  untrusted_app_all # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
+  ephemeral_app
+  priv_app
+  sdk_sandbox
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };

private/file.te

@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ type perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_f
 # /data/misc/perfetto-configs for perfetto configs
 type perfetto_configs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 
+# /data/misc_{ce/de}/<user>/sdksandbox/<app-name>/* subdirectory for sdk sandbox processes
+type sdk_sandbox_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type;
+
 # /sys/kernel/debug/kcov for coverage guided kernel fuzzing in userdebug builds.
 type debugfs_kcov, fs_type, debugfs_type;
 

private/isolated_app.te

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ neverallow isolated_app {
 # excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
 # Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
 # be compiled into the Android kernel.
-neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{
+neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
   socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
   key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
   netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket

private/keys.conf

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 [@PLATFORM]
 ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/platform.x509.pem
 
+[@SDK_SANDBOX]
+ALL : $MAINLINE_SEPOLICY_DEV_CERTIFICATES/sdk_sandbox.x509.pem
+
 [@MEDIA]
 ALL : $DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE/media.x509.pem
 

private/mac_permissions.xml

@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@
       <seinfo value="platform" />
     </signer>
 
+    <!-- Sdk Sandbox key -->
+    <signer signature="@SDK_SANDBOX" >
+      <seinfo value="sdk_sandbox" />
+    </signer>
+
     <!-- Media key in AOSP -->
     <signer signature="@MEDIA" >
       <seinfo value="media" />

private/net.te

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Bind to ports.
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} node_type:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } node_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
+allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
+
+# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
+# untrusted_apps.
+# b/171572148 gate RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} with a new permission nlmsg_getneigh and block access from
+# untrusted_apps. Some untrusted apps (e.g. untrusted_app_25-30) are granted access elsewhere
+# to avoid app-compat breakage.
+allow {
+  netdomain
+  -ephemeral_app
+  -mediaprovider
+  -sdk_sandbox
+  -untrusted_app_all
+} self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv nlmsg_getneigh };

private/sdk_sandbox.te

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes.
+
+type sdk_sandbox, domain;
+
+typeattribute sdk_sandbox coredomain;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox)
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox activity_task_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find;
+# Audit the access to signal that we are still investigating whether sdk_sandbox
+# should have access to audio_service
+# TODO(b/211632068): remove this line
+auditallow sdk_sandbox audio_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox hint_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox trust_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox uimode_service:service_manager find;
+allow sdk_sandbox webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(sdk_sandbox)
+
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
+can_profile_heap(sdk_sandbox)
+can_profile_perf(sdk_sandbox)
+
+# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow sdk_sandbox system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+# allow access to sdksandbox data directory
+allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow sdk_sandbox sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow sdk_sandbox domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox debugfs:file read;
+
+# execute gpu_device
+neverallow sdk_sandbox gpu_device:chr_file execute;
+
+# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
+neverallow sdk_sandbox sysfs:file *;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow sdk_sandbox proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Directly access external storage
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
+
+# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
+# ongoing connections.
+neverallow sdk_sandbox proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# SDK sandbox processes don't  have any access to external storage
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow sdk_sandbox { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms;

private/seapp_contexts

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 # isEphemeralApp=true will match apps marked by PackageManager as Ephemeral
 # user=_app will match any regular app process.
 # user=_isolated will match any isolated service process.
+# user=_sdksandbox will match sdk sandbox process for an app.
 # Other values of user are matched against the name associated with the process
 # UID.
 # seinfo= matches aginst the seinfo tag for the app, determined from
@@ -137,6 +138,9 @@ neverallow isEphemeralApp=true domain=((?!ephemeral_app).)*
 
 isSystemServer=true domain=system_server_startup
 
+# sdksandbox must run in the sdksandbox domain
+neverallow name=com.android.sdksandbox domain=((?!sdk_sandbox).)*
+
 user=_app seinfo=platform name=com.android.traceur domain=traceur_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.remoteprovisioner domain=remote_prov_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=system seinfo=platform domain=system_app type=system_app_data_file
@@ -149,6 +153,7 @@ user=shared_relro domain=shared_relro levelFrom=all
 user=shell seinfo=platform domain=shell name=com.android.shell type=shell_data_file
 user=webview_zygote seinfo=webview_zygote domain=webview_zygote
 user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
+user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user

private/service_contexts

@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ runtime                                   u:object_r:runtime_service:s0
 safety_center                             u:object_r:safety_center_service:s0
 samplingprofiler                          u:object_r:samplingprofiler_service:s0
 scheduling_policy                         u:object_r:scheduling_policy_service:s0
+sdk_sandbox                               u:object_r:sdk_sandbox_service:s0
 search                                    u:object_r:search_service:s0
 search_ui                                 u:object_r:search_ui_service:s0
 secure_element                            u:object_r:secure_element_service:s0

private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
     fingerprint_vendor_data_file
     iris_vendor_data_file
     rollback_data_file
+    sdk_sandbox_data_file
     storaged_data_file
     system_data_file
     vold_data_file
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
     fingerprint_vendor_data_file
     iris_vendor_data_file
     rollback_data_file
+    sdk_sandbox_data_file
     storaged_data_file
     system_data_file
     vold_data_file

public/domain.te

@@ -1131,24 +1131,6 @@ neverallow {
 # to installd
 neverallow installd system_data_file:file ~{ r_file_perms relabelfrom unlink };
 
-# respect system_app sandboxes
-neverallow {
-  domain
-  -appdomain # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
-  -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
-  -installd # creation of app sandbox
-  -iorap_inode2filename
-  -traced_probes # resolve inodes for i/o tracing.
-                 # only needs open and read, the rest is neverallow in
-                 # traced_probes.te.
-} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
-neverallow {
-  isolated_app
-  untrusted_app_all # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
-  ephemeral_app
-  priv_app
-} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
-
 #
 # Only these domains should transition to shell domain. This domain is
 # permissible for the "shell user". If you need a process to exec a shell

public/net.te

@@ -13,23 +13,8 @@ allow netdomain self:{ icmp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } create_socket_perms
 
 # Connect to ports.
 allow netdomain port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-# Bind to ports.
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} node_type:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } node_bind;
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
-allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
 # See changes to the routing table.
 allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read };
-# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
-# untrusted_apps.
-# b/171572148 gate RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} with a new permission nlmsg_getneigh and block access from
-# untrusted_apps. Some untrusted apps (e.g. untrusted_app_25-30) are granted access elsewhere
-# to avoid app-compat breakage.
-allow {
-  netdomain
-  -ephemeral_app
-  -mediaprovider
-  -untrusted_app_all
-} self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv nlmsg_getneigh };
 
 # Talks to netd via dnsproxyd socket.
 unix_socket_connect(netdomain, dnsproxyd, netd)

public/service.te

@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ type runtime_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type rttmanager_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type samplingprofiler_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type scheduling_policy_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type sdk_sandbox_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type search_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type search_ui_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;