Merge "Vendor API level 202404 is now frozen" into main

prebuilts/api/202404/Android.bp

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// Automatically generated file, do not edit!
+se_policy_conf {
+    name: "202404_plat_pub_policy.conf",
+    defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
+    srcs: [
+        ":se_build_files{.plat_public_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.reqd_mask}",
+    ],
+    installable: false,
+    build_variant: "user",
+}
+
+se_policy_cil {
+    name: "202404_plat_pub_policy.cil",
+    src: ":202404_plat_pub_policy.conf",
+    filter_out: [":reqd_policy_mask.cil"],
+    secilc_check: false,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_conf {
+    name: "202404_product_pub_policy.conf",
+    defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
+    srcs: [
+        ":se_build_files{.plat_public_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.system_ext_public_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.product_public_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.reqd_mask}",
+    ],
+    installable: false,
+    build_variant: "user",
+}
+
+se_policy_cil {
+    name: "202404_product_pub_policy.cil",
+    src: ":202404_product_pub_policy.conf",
+    filter_out: [":reqd_policy_mask.cil"],
+    secilc_check: false,
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_conf {
+    name: "202404_plat_policy.conf",
+    defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
+    srcs: [
+        ":se_build_files{.plat_public_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.plat_private_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.system_ext_public_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.system_ext_private_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.product_public_202404}",
+        ":se_build_files{.product_private_202404}",
+    ],
+    installable: false,
+    build_variant: "user",
+}
+
+se_policy_cil {
+    name: "202404_plat_policy.cil",
+    src: ":202404_plat_policy.conf",
+    additional_cil_files: [":sepolicy_technical_debt{.plat_private_202404}"],
+    installable: false,
+}
+
+se_policy_binary {
+    name: "202404_plat_policy",
+    srcs: [":202404_plat_policy.cil"],
+    installable: false,
+    dist: {
+        targets: ["base-sepolicy-files-for-mapping"],
+    },
+}

prebuilts/api/202404/private/access_vectors

@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
+#
+# Define common prefixes for access vectors
+#
+# common common_name { permission_name ... }
+
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for file access vectors.
+#
+
+common file
+{
+	ioctl
+	read
+	write
+	create
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	lock
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	append
+	map
+	unlink
+	link
+	rename
+	execute
+	quotaon
+	mounton
+	audit_access
+	open
+	execmod
+	watch
+	watch_mount
+	watch_sb
+	watch_with_perm
+	watch_reads
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for socket access vectors.
+#
+
+common socket
+{
+# inherited from file
+	ioctl
+	read
+	write
+	create
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	lock
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	append
+	map
+# socket-specific
+	bind
+	connect
+	listen
+	accept
+	getopt
+	setopt
+	shutdown
+	recvfrom
+	sendto
+	name_bind
+}
+
+#
+# Define a common prefix for ipc access vectors.
+#
+
+common ipc
+{
+	create
+	destroy
+	getattr
+	setattr
+	read
+	write
+	associate
+	unix_read
+	unix_write
+}
+
+#
+# Define a common for capability access vectors.
+#
+common cap
+{
+	# The capabilities are defined in include/linux/capability.h
+	# Capabilities >= 32 are defined in the cap2 common.
+	# Care should be taken to ensure that these are consistent with
+	# those definitions. (Order matters)
+
+	chown
+	dac_override
+	dac_read_search
+	fowner
+	fsetid
+	kill
+	setgid
+	setuid
+	setpcap
+	linux_immutable
+	net_bind_service
+	net_broadcast
+	net_admin
+	net_raw
+	ipc_lock
+	ipc_owner
+	sys_module
+	sys_rawio
+	sys_chroot
+	sys_ptrace
+	sys_pacct
+	sys_admin
+	sys_boot
+	sys_nice
+	sys_resource
+	sys_time
+	sys_tty_config
+	mknod
+	lease
+	audit_write
+	audit_control
+	setfcap
+}
+
+common cap2
+{
+	mac_override	# unused by SELinux
+	mac_admin
+	syslog
+	wake_alarm
+	block_suspend
+	audit_read
+	perfmon
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vectors.
+#
+# class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for file-related objects.
+#
+
+class filesystem
+{
+	mount
+	remount
+	unmount
+	getattr
+	relabelfrom
+	relabelto
+	associate
+	quotamod
+	quotaget
+	watch
+}
+
+class dir
+inherits file
+{
+	add_name
+	remove_name
+	reparent
+	search
+	rmdir
+}
+
+class file
+inherits file
+{
+	execute_no_trans
+	entrypoint
+}
+
+class anon_inode
+inherits file
+
+class lnk_file
+inherits file
+
+class chr_file
+inherits file
+{
+	execute_no_trans
+	entrypoint
+}
+
+class blk_file
+inherits file
+
+class sock_file
+inherits file
+
+class fifo_file
+inherits file
+
+class fd
+{
+	use
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for network-related objects.
+#
+
+class socket
+inherits socket
+
+class tcp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+}
+
+class udp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+class rawip_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+class node
+{
+	recvfrom
+	sendto
+}
+
+class netif
+{
+	ingress
+	egress
+}
+
+class netlink_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class packet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class key_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class unix_stream_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	connectto
+}
+
+class unix_dgram_socket
+inherits socket
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for process-related objects
+#
+
+class process
+{
+	fork
+	transition
+	sigchld # commonly granted from child to parent
+	sigkill # cannot be caught or ignored
+	sigstop # cannot be caught or ignored
+	signull # for kill(pid, 0)
+	signal  # all other signals
+	ptrace
+	getsched
+	setsched
+	getsession
+	getpgid
+	setpgid
+	getcap
+	setcap
+	share
+	getattr
+	setexec
+	setfscreate
+	noatsecure
+	siginh
+	setrlimit
+	rlimitinh
+	dyntransition
+	setcurrent
+	execmem
+	execstack
+	execheap
+	setkeycreate
+	setsockcreate
+	getrlimit
+}
+
+class process2
+{
+	nnp_transition
+	nosuid_transition
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for ipc-related objects
+#
+
+class ipc
+inherits ipc
+
+class sem
+inherits ipc
+
+class msgq
+inherits ipc
+{
+	enqueue
+}
+
+class msg
+{
+	send
+	receive
+}
+
+class shm
+inherits ipc
+{
+	lock
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for the security server.
+#
+
+class security
+{
+	compute_av
+	compute_create
+	compute_member
+	check_context
+	load_policy
+	compute_relabel
+	compute_user
+	setenforce     # was avc_toggle in system class
+	setbool
+	setsecparam
+	setcheckreqprot
+	read_policy
+	validate_trans
+}
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for system operations.
+#
+
+class system
+{
+	ipc_info
+	syslog_read
+	syslog_mod
+	syslog_console
+	module_request
+	module_load
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
+#
+
+class capability
+inherits cap
+
+class capability2
+inherits cap2
+
+#
+# Extended Netlink classes
+#
+class netlink_route_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+	nlmsg_readpriv
+	nlmsg_getneigh
+}
+
+class netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+}
+
+class netlink_nflog_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_xfrm_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+}
+
+class netlink_selinux_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_audit_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	nlmsg_read
+	nlmsg_write
+	nlmsg_relay
+	nlmsg_readpriv
+	nlmsg_tty_audit
+}
+
+class netlink_dnrt_socket
+inherits socket
+
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
+# access to IPSec network data by association
+#
+class association
+{
+	sendto
+	recvfrom
+	setcontext
+	polmatch
+}
+
+# Updated Netlink class for KOBJECT_UEVENT family.
+class netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class appletalk_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class packet
+{
+	send
+	recv
+	relabelto
+	forward_in
+	forward_out
+}
+
+class key
+{
+	view
+	read
+	write
+	search
+	link
+	setattr
+	create
+}
+
+class dccp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+}
+
+class memprotect
+{
+	mmap_zero
+}
+
+# network peer labels
+class peer
+{
+	recv
+}
+
+class kernel_service
+{
+	use_as_override
+	create_files_as
+}
+
+class tun_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	attach_queue
+}
+
+class binder
+{
+	impersonate
+	call
+	set_context_mgr
+	transfer
+}
+
+class netlink_iscsi_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_fib_lookup_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_connector_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_netfilter_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_generic_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_scsitransport_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_rdma_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netlink_crypto_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class infiniband_pkey
+{
+	access
+}
+
+class infiniband_endport
+{
+	manage_subnet
+}
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling capabilities
+# in user namespaces
+#
+
+class cap_userns
+inherits cap
+
+class cap2_userns
+inherits cap2
+
+
+#
+# Define the access vector interpretation for the new socket classes
+# enabled by the extended_socket_class policy capability.
+#
+
+#
+# The next two classes were previously mapped to rawip_socket and therefore
+# have the same definition as rawip_socket (until further permissions
+# are defined).
+#
+class sctp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+	name_connect
+	association
+}
+
+class icmp_socket
+inherits socket
+{
+	node_bind
+}
+
+#
+# The remaining network socket classes were previously
+# mapped to the socket class and therefore have the
+# same definition as socket.
+#
+
+class ax25_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class ipx_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class netrom_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class atmpvc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class x25_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rose_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class decnet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class atmsvc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rds_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class irda_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class pppox_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class llc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class can_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class tipc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class bluetooth_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class iucv_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class rxrpc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class isdn_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class phonet_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class ieee802154_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class caif_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class alg_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class nfc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class vsock_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class kcm_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class qipcrtr_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class smc_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class bpf
+{
+	map_create
+	map_read
+	map_write
+	prog_load
+	prog_run
+}
+
+class property_service
+{
+	set
+}
+
+class service_manager
+{
+	add
+	find
+	list
+}
+
+class hwservice_manager
+{
+	add
+	find
+	list
+}
+
+class keystore_key
+{
+	get_state
+	get
+	insert
+	delete
+	exist
+	list
+	reset
+	password
+	lock
+	unlock
+	is_empty
+	sign
+	verify
+	grant
+	duplicate
+	clear_uid
+	add_auth
+	user_changed
+	gen_unique_id
+}
+
+class keystore2
+{
+	add_auth
+	change_password
+	change_user
+	clear_ns
+	clear_uid
+	delete_all_keys
+	early_boot_ended
+	get_attestation_key
+	get_auth_token
+	get_last_auth_time
+	get_state
+	list
+	lock
+	pull_metrics
+	report_off_body
+	reset
+	unlock
+}
+
+class keystore2_key
+{
+	convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral
+	delete
+	gen_unique_id
+	get_info
+	grant
+	manage_blob
+	rebind
+	req_forced_op
+	update
+	use
+	use_dev_id
+}
+
+class diced
+{
+	demote
+	demote_self
+	derive
+	get_attestation_chain
+	use_seal
+	use_sign
+}
+
+class drmservice {
+	consumeRights
+	setPlaybackStatus
+	openDecryptSession
+	closeDecryptSession
+	initializeDecryptUnit
+	decrypt
+	finalizeDecryptUnit
+	pread
+}
+
+class xdp_socket
+inherits socket
+
+class perf_event
+{
+	open
+	cpu
+	kernel
+	tracepoint
+	read
+	write
+}
+
+class lockdown
+{
+	integrity
+	confidentiality
+}
+
+class io_uring
+{
+	override_creds
+	sqpoll
+	cmd
+}

prebuilts/api/202404/private/adbd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+### ADB daemon
+
+typeattribute adbd coredomain;
+typeattribute adbd mlstrustedsubject;
+
+init_daemon_domain(adbd)
+
+domain_auto_trans(adbd, shell_exec, shell)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow adbd self:process setcurrent;
+  allow adbd su:process dyntransition;
+')
+
+# When 'adb shell' is executed in recovery mode, adbd explicitly
+# switches into shell domain using setcon() because the shell executable
+# is not labeled as shell but as rootfs.
+recovery_only(`
+  domain_trans(adbd, rootfs, shell)
+  allow adbd shell:process dyntransition;
+
+  # Allows reboot fastboot to enter fastboot directly
+  unix_socket_connect(adbd, recovery, recovery)
+')
+
+# Control Perfetto traced and obtain traces from it.
+# Needed to allow port forwarding directly to traced.
+unix_socket_connect(adbd, traced_consumer, traced)
+
+# Do not sanitize the environment or open fds of the shell. Allow signaling
+# created processes.
+allow adbd shell:process { noatsecure signal };
+
+# Set UID and GID to shell.  Set supplementary groups.
+allow adbd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid };
+
+# Drop capabilities from bounding set on user builds.
+allow adbd self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
+
+# ignore spurious denials for adbd when disk space is low.
+dontaudit adbd self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+# adbd probes for vsock support. Do not generate denials when
+# this occurs. (b/123569840)
+dontaudit adbd self:{ socket vsock_socket } create;
+
+# Allow adbd inside vm to forward vm's vsock.
+allow adbd self:vsock_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl listen accept };
+
+# Create and use network sockets.
+net_domain(adbd)
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(adbd, mdnsd, mdnsd)
+
+# Access /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0
+allow adbd functionfs:dir search;
+allow adbd functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm adbd functionfs:file ioctl {
+  FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC
+  FUNCTIONFS_CLEAR_HALT
+};
+
+# Use a pseudo tty.
+allow adbd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# adb push/pull /data/local/tmp.
+allow adbd shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /data/local/traces/*
+allow adbd trace_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd trace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /data/misc/profman.
+allow adbd profman_dump_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd profman_dump_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# adb push/pull sdcard.
+allow adbd tmpfs:dir search;
+allow adbd rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;  # /sdcard symlink
+allow adbd tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;   # /mnt/sdcard symlink
+allow adbd { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /data/anr/traces.txt
+allow adbd anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# adb pull /vendor/framework/*
+allow adbd vendor_framework_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd vendor_framework_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Set service.adb.*, sys.powerctl, and sys.usb.ffs.ready properties.
+set_prop(adbd, shell_prop)
+set_prop(adbd, powerctl_prop)
+get_prop(adbd, ffs_config_prop)
+set_prop(adbd, ffs_control_prop)
+
+# Set service.adb.tcp.port, service.adb.tls.port, persist.adb.wifi.* properties
+set_prop(adbd, adbd_prop)
+set_prop(adbd, adbd_config_prop)
+
+# Allow adbd start/stop mdnsd via ctl.start
+set_prop(adbd, ctl_mdnsd_prop)
+
+# Access device logging gating property
+get_prop(adbd, device_logging_prop)
+
+# Read device's serial number from system properties
+get_prop(adbd, serialno_prop)
+
+# Read whether or not Test Harness Mode is enabled
+get_prop(adbd, test_harness_prop)
+
+# Read persist.adb.tls_server.enable property
+get_prop(adbd, system_adbd_prop)
+
+# Read device's overlayfs related properties and files
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  get_prop(adbd, persistent_properties_ready_prop)
+  r_dir_file(adbd, sysfs_dt_firmware_android)
+')
+
+# Run /system/bin/bu
+allow adbd system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Perform binder IPC to surfaceflinger (screencap)
+# XXX Run screencap in a separate domain?
+binder_use(adbd)
+binder_call(adbd, surfaceflinger)
+binder_call(adbd, gpuservice)
+# b/13188914
+allow adbd gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow adbd gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+r_dir_file(adbd, system_file)
+
+# Needed for various screenshots
+hal_client_domain(adbd, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+# Read /data/misc/adb/adb_keys.
+allow adbd adb_keys_file:dir search;
+allow adbd adb_keys_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Write debugging information to /data/adb
+  # when persist.adb.trace_mask is set
+  # https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=72895
+  allow adbd adb_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow adbd adb_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
+
+# ndk-gdb invokes adb forward to forward the gdbserver socket.
+allow adbd app_data_file:dir search;
+allow adbd app_data_file:sock_file write;
+allow adbd appdomain:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# ndk-gdb invokes adb pull of app_process, linker, and libc.so.
+allow adbd zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd system_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
+allow adbd selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd kernel:security read_policy;
+allow adbd service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow pulling config.gz for CTS purposes
+allow adbd config_gz:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For CTS listening ports test.
+allow adbd proc_net_tcp_udp:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow adbd gpu_service:service_manager find;
+allow adbd surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+allow adbd bootchart_data_file:dir search;
+allow adbd bootchart_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
+# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
+allow adbd storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow adbd mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow adbd media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow adbd media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+r_dir_file(adbd, apk_data_file)
+
+allow adbd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow killing child "perfetto" binary processes, which auto-transition to
+# their own domain. Allows propagating termination of "adb shell perfetto ..."
+# invocations.
+allow adbd perfetto:process signal;
+
+# Allow to pull Perfetto traces.
+allow adbd perfetto_traces_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow adbd perfetto_traces_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow to push and manage configs in /data/misc/perfetto-configs.
+allow adbd perfetto_configs_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow adbd perfetto_configs_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Connect to shell and use a socket transferred from it.
+# Used for e.g. abb.
+allow adbd shell:unix_stream_socket { read write shutdown };
+allow adbd shell:fd use;
+
+# Allow pull /vendor/apex files for CTS tests
+allow adbd vendor_apex_file:dir search;
+allow adbd vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow adb pull of updated apex files in /data/apex/active.
+allow adbd apex_data_file:dir search;
+allow adbd staging_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow adbd to pull /apex/apex-info-list.xml for CTS tests.
+allow adbd apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# No transitions from adbd to non-shell, non-crash_dump domains. adbd only ever
+# transitions to the shell domain (except when it crashes). In particular, we
+# never want to see a transition from adbd to su (aka "adb root")
+neverallow adbd { domain -crash_dump -shell }:process transition;
+neverallow adbd { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') recovery_only(`-shell') }:process dyntransition;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  typeattribute aidl_lazy_test_server coredomain;
+
+  init_daemon_domain(aidl_lazy_test_server)
+')

prebuilts/api/202404/private/apex_test_prepostinstall.te

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# APEX pre- & post-install test.
+#
+# Allow to run pre- and post-install hooks for APEX test modules
+# in debuggable builds.
+
+type apex_test_prepostinstall, domain, coredomain;
+type apex_test_prepostinstall_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # /dev/zero
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall apexd:fd use;
+  # Logwrapper.
+  create_pty(apex_test_prepostinstall)
+  # Logwrapper executing sh.
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+  # Logwrapper exec.
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall system_file:file execute_no_trans;
+  # Ls.
+  allow apex_test_prepostinstall toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+')

prebuilts/api/202404/private/apexd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+typeattribute apexd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(apexd)
+
+# Allow creating, reading and writing of APEX files/dirs in the APEX data dir
+allow apexd apex_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+# Allow relabeling file created in /data/apex/decompressed
+allow apexd apex_data_file:file relabelfrom;
+
+# Allow creating, reading and writing of APEX files/dirs in the APEX metadata dir
+allow apexd metadata_file:dir search;
+allow apexd apex_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reserving space on /data/apex/ota_reserved for apex decompression
+allow apexd apex_ota_reserved_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_ota_reserved_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to create files and directories for snapshots of apex data
+allow apexd apex_data_file_type:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_data_file_type:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_module_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow apexd apex_module_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
+allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to read /data/misc_de and the directories under it, in order to
+# snapshot and restore apex data for all users.
+allow apexd {
+    system_userdir_file
+    system_data_file
+}:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# allow apexd to create loop devices with /dev/loop-control
+allow apexd loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+# allow apexd to access loop devices
+allow apexd loop_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm apexd loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  LOOP_GET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_FD
+  LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE
+  LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO
+  LOOP_CLR_FD
+  BLKFLSBUF
+  LOOP_CONFIGURE
+};
+# Allow apexd to access /dev/block
+allow apexd dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+
+#allow apexd to access virtual disks
+allow apexd vd_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow apexd to access /dev/block/dm-* (device-mapper entries)
+allow apexd dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow apexd dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# sys_admin is required to access the device-mapper and mount
+# dac_override, chown, and fowner are needed for snapshot and restore
+allow apexd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_admin chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
+
+# Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
+# triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
+# than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if
+# the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid
+# bit was even set.  We do not appear to truly need this capability
+# for apexd to operate.
+dontaudit apexd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
+
+# allow apexd to create a mount point in /apex
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:dir create_dir_perms;
+# allow apexd to mount in /apex
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
+# allow apexd to create symlinks in /apex
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+# allow apexd to create /apex/apex-info-list.xml and relabel to apex_info_file
+allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom mounton };
+allow apexd apex_info_file:file relabelto;
+# apexd needs to update /apex/apex-info-list.xml after non-staged APEX update.
+allow apexd apex_info_file:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# allow apexd to unlink apex files in /data/apex/active
+# note that apexd won't be able to unlink files in /data/app-staging/session_XXXX,
+# because it doesn't have write permission for staging_data_file object.
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file unlink;
+
+# allow apexd to read files from /data/app-staging and hardlink them to /data/apex.
+allow apexd staging_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file { r_file_perms link };
+# # Allow relabeling file created in /data/apex/decompressed
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file relabelto;
+
+# allow apexd to read files from /vendor/apex
+r_dir_file(apexd, vendor_apex_file)
+r_dir_file(apexd, vendor_apex_metadata_file)
+
+# Unmount and mount filesystems
+allow apexd labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+
+# /sys directory tree traversal
+allow apexd sysfs_type:dir search;
+# Access to /sys/class/block
+allow apexd sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd sysfs_type:file r_file_perms;
+# Configure read-ahead of dm-verity and loop devices
+# for dm-X
+allow apexd sysfs_dm:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd sysfs_dm:file rw_file_perms;
+# for loopX
+allow apexd sysfs_loop:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow apexd sysfs_loop:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to log to the kernel.
+allow apexd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to reboot device. Required for rollbacks of apexes that are
+# not covered by rollback manager.
+set_prop(apexd, powerctl_prop)
+
+# Allow apexd to stop itself
+set_prop(apexd, ctl_apexd_prop)
+
+# Allow apexd to send control messages to load/unload apex from init
+set_prop(apexd, ctl_apex_load_prop)
+
+# Find the vold service, and call into vold to manage FS checkpoints
+allow apexd vold_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(apexd, vold)
+
+# apexd is using bootstrap bionic
+use_bootstrap_libs(apexd)
+
+# Allow apexd to be invoked with logwrapper from init during userspace reboot.
+allow apexd devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Allow apexd to create pts files via logwrap_fork_exec for its own use, to pass to
+# other processes
+create_pty(apexd)
+
+# Allow apexd to read file contexts when performing restorecon of snapshots.
+allow apexd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to execute toybox for snapshot & restore
+allow apexd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to release compressed blocks in case /data is f2fs-compressed fs.
+allowxperm apexd staging_data_file:file ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+  F2FS_IOC_RELEASE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS
+};
+
+# Allow apexd to read ro.cold_boot_done prop.
+# apexd uses it to decide whether it needs to keep retrying polling for loop device.
+get_prop(apexd, cold_boot_done_prop)
+
+# Allow apexd to read per-device configuration properties.
+get_prop(apexd, apexd_config_prop)
+
+# Allow apexd to read apex selection properties.
+# These are used to choose between multi-installed APEXes at activation time.
+get_prop(apexd, apexd_select_prop)
+#
+# Allow apexd to read apexd_payload_metadata_prop
+get_prop(apexd, apexd_payload_metadata_prop)
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_metadata_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_module_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } apex_rollback_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# only apexd can set apexd sysprop
+set_prop(apexd, apexd_prop)
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apexd_prop:property_service set;
+
+# only apexd can write apex-info-list.xml
+neverallow { domain -apexd } apex_info_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only apexd and init should be allowed to manage /apex mounts
+# A note on otapreopt_chroot. It used to mount APEXes during postainstall stage of A/B OTAs,
+# but starting from S it just calls into apexd to prepare /apex for otapreoprt. Once the sepolicies
+# around otapreopt_chroot are cleaned up we should be able to remove it from the lists below.
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:filesystem { mount unmount };
+neverallow { domain -apexd -init -otapreopt_chroot } apex_mnt_dir:dir { mounton };
+
+# Allow for use in postinstall
+allow apexd otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
+allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
+allow apexd postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file create;
+allow apexd proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow calling derive_classpath to gather BCP information for staged sessions
+domain_auto_trans(apexd, derive_classpath_exec, apexd_derive_classpath);
+
+# Allow set apex ready property
+set_prop(apexd, apex_ready_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/apexd_derive_classpath.te

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Exclusive domain for apexd calling into derive_classpath binary
+type apexd_derive_classpath, domain, coredomain;
+
+# Allow the binary to write into output file at location /apex/derive_classpath_temp
+allow apexd_derive_classpath apexd:fd use;
+allow apexd_derive_classpath apex_mnt_dir:file { write open };
+# Allow the binary to log using logwrap
+allow apexd_derive_classpath apexd_devpts:chr_file { read write };
+

prebuilts/api/202404/private/app.te

@@ -0,0 +1,558 @@
+# /proc/net access.
+# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
+# proc_net access for the negated domains below is granted (or not) in their
+# individual .te files.
+r_dir_file({
+  appdomain
+  -ephemeral_app
+  -isolated_app_all
+  -platform_app
+  -priv_app
+  -shell
+  -sdk_sandbox_all
+  -system_app
+  -untrusted_app_all
+}, proc_net_type)
+# audit access for all these non-core app domains.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  auditallow {
+    appdomain
+    -ephemeral_app
+    -isolated_app_all
+    -platform_app
+    -priv_app
+    -shell
+    -su
+    -sdk_sandbox_all
+    -system_app
+    -untrusted_app_all
+  } proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
+')
+
+# Allow apps to read the Test Harness Mode property. This property is used in
+# the implementation of ActivityManager.isDeviceInTestHarnessMode()
+get_prop(appdomain, test_harness_prop)
+
+get_prop(appdomain, boot_status_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, dalvik_config_prop_type)
+get_prop(appdomain, media_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, packagemanager_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, radio_control_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, systemsound_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, telephony_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, vold_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, adbd_config_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, dck_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, persist_wm_debug_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, persist_sysui_builder_extras_prop)
+get_prop(appdomain, persist_sysui_ranking_update_prop)
+
+# Allow the heap dump ART plugin to the count of sessions waiting for OOME
+get_prop(appdomain, traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)
+
+# Allow to read ro.vendor.camera.extensions.enabled
+get_prop(appdomain, camera2_extensions_prop)
+
+# Allow to ro.camerax.extensions.enabled
+get_prop(appdomain, camerax_extensions_prop)
+
+# Prevent apps from causing presubmit failures.
+# Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
+# and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
+# not the cause of the failure, but just a symptom that
+# storage isn't ready. Many apps handle the failure appropriately.
+#
+# Apps cannot access external storage before it becomes available.
+dontaudit appdomain storage_stub_file:dir getattr;
+# Attempts to write to system_data_file is generally a sign
+# that apps are attempting to access encrypted storage before
+# the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered. Apps are not
+# allowed to write to CE storage before it's available.
+# Attempting to do so will be blocked by both selinux and unix
+# permissions.
+dontaudit appdomain system_data_file:dir write;
+# Apps should not be reading vendor-defined properties.
+dontaudit appdomain vendor_default_prop:file read;
+
+# Access to /mnt/media_rw/<vol> (limited by DAC to apps with external_storage gid)
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+
+# allow apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
+        accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
+        relabelfrom relabelto setattr shutdown };
+
+# Transition to a non-app domain.
+# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
+# Exception for crash_dump to allow for app crash reporting.
+# Exception for renderscript binaries (/system/bin/bcc, /system/bin/ld.mc)
+# to allow renderscript to create privileged executable files.
+# Exception for virtualizationmanager to allow running VMs as child processes.
+neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
+    { domain -appdomain -crash_dump -rs -virtualizationmanager }:process { transition };
+neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
+    { domain -appdomain }:process { dyntransition };
+
+# Don't allow regular apps access to storage configuration properties.
+neverallow { appdomain -mediaprovider_app } storage_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Don't allow apps reading /system/etc/font_fallback.xml
+dontaudit appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow to read sendbug.preferred.domain
+get_prop(appdomain, sendbug_config_prop)
+
+# Allow to read graphics related properties.
+get_prop(appdomain, graphics_config_prop)
+
+# Allow to read persist.config.calibration_fac
+get_prop(appdomain, camera_calibration_prop)
+
+# Allow to read db.log.detailed, db.log.slow_query_threshold*
+get_prop(appdomain, sqlite_log_prop)
+
+# Allow to read system_user_mode_emulation_prop, which is used by UserManager.java
+userdebug_or_eng(`get_prop(appdomain, system_user_mode_emulation_prop)')
+
+# Allow font file read by apps.
+allow appdomain font_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow appdomain font_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Enter /data/misc/apexdata/
+allow appdomain apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+# Read /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art, execute signed AOT artifacts.
+allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow access to tombstones if an fd to one is given to you.
+# This is restricted by unix permissions, so an app must go through system_server to get one.
+allow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file { getattr read };
+neverallow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+# Execute the shell or other system executables.
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
+# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, vendor_app_file)
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } vendor_app_file:file execute;
+
+# Allow apps to read microdroid related files in vendor partition for CTS purpose.
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, vendor_microdroid_file)
+
+# Perform binder IPC to sdk sandbox.
+binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox_all)
+
+# Allow apps to communicate via binder with virtual camera service.
+binder_call(appdomain, virtual_camera)
+
+# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
+# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read/write visible storage
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
+# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
+# accesses to the underlying FS.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
+# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
+#
+# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
+# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
+
+#logd access
+control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })
+
+# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
+
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+
+use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })
+
+use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })
+
+# For app fuse.
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_manager)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_vsync)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, performance_client)
+# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
+pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, bufferhub_client)
+
+# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
+# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
+allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
+
+
+# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
+allow appdomain self:process execmem;
+
+allow appdomain { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;
+
+# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
+allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
+
+# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from app zygote.
+allow appdomain app_zygote:fd use;
+
+# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
+# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
+allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Notify zygote of death;
+allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
+allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
+allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
+  allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+  allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
+')
+
+# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
+allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
+allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
+
+# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
+allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
+
+# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
+allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
+allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
+allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
+
+# For AppFuse.
+allow appdomain vold:fd use;
+
+# Communication with other apps via fifos
+allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
+allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
+
+# App sandbox file accesses.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
+allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file ioctl FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY;
+
+# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
+
+# Access open fds from SDK sandbox
+allow appdomain sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# Traverse into expanded storage
+allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
+r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
+allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# TextClassifier
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, textclassifier_data_file)
+
+# Access to OEM provided data and apps
+allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
+
+allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;
+
+# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
+allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
+not_full_treble(`
+    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
+    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
+    allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } vendor_file:dir { open read };
+')
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
+
+# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
+# for vendor provided libraries.
+r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
+
+# Allow apps read / execute access to vendor public libraries.
+allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
+allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write map };
+
+# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
+allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write map };
+
+# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
+allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Read icon file (opened by system).
+allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
+#
+# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
+# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
+# and the rules below.
+allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
+allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
+
+# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
+# domain socket.
+#
+# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
+# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
+# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
+# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
+# creation).
+unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
+allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
+allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
+allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file append;
+
+# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
+allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
+allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
+allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
+allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
+
+# Allow apps to send dump information to incidentd
+allow appdomain incidentd:fd use;
+allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file { write getattr };
+
+# Allow apps to send information to statsd socket.
+unix_socket_send(appdomain, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
+allow appdomain user_profile_root_file:dir search;
+allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow writing performance tracing data into the perfetto traced daemon.
+# Needed for java heap graph ART plugin (perfetto_hprof).
+# The perfetto profiling daemon will check for the specific application's
+# opt-in/opt-out.
+perfetto_producer(appdomain)
+
+# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
+# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
+# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
+# debuggable builds only.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
+')
+
+# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
+# They need that to render the standard UI.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } sysfs_gpu:file r_file_perms;
+
+
+# Use the Binder.
+binder_use(appdomain)
+# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
+binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
+# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
+binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
+# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
+binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
+# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
+binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, gpuservice)
+
+# Talk with graphics composer fences
+allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
+# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
+# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
+# are examined.
+allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
+
+# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
+# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
+allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
+allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr map };
+allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
+# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
+allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
+
+# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
+
+# For art.
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
+allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
+allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
+allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
+allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir { open getattr read search ioctl lock };
+allow appdomain apk_data_file:file { getattr open read ioctl lock map x_file_perms };
+
+# /data/resource-cache
+allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# logd access
+read_logd(appdomain)
+
+allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
+
+allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
+allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
+  ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
+
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_audio:fd use;
+
+# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_camera:fd use;
+
+# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
+allow {appdomain -isolated_app_all} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
+
+# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
+
+# TODO: switch to meminfo service
+allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For app fuse.
+allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };
+
+###
+### CTS-specific rules
+###
+
+# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
+# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
+allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
+# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
+
+# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
+# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
+allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
+allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
+
+allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
+with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# Read access to FDs from the DropboxManagerService.
+allow appdomain dropbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
+# Read tmpfs types from these processes.
+allow appdomain audioserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
+allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
+
+# Sensitive app domains are not allowed to execute from /data
+# to prevent persistence attacks and ensure all code is executed
+# from read-only locations.
+neverallow {
+  bluetooth
+  isolated_app_all
+  nfc
+  radio
+  shared_relro
+  sdk_sandbox_all
+  system_app
+} {
+  data_file_type
+  -apex_art_data_file
+  -dalvikcache_data_file
+  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
+  -apk_data_file
+}:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Don't allow apps access to any of the following character devices.
+neverallow appdomain {
+    audio_device
+    camera_device
+    dm_device
+    radio_device
+    rpmsg_device
+}:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Block video device access for all apps except the DeviceAsWebcam Service which
+# needs access to /dev/video* for interfacing with the host
+neverallow {
+    appdomain
+    -device_as_webcam
+} video_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Prevent calling inotify on APKs. This can be used as a side channel
+# to observer app launches, so it must be disallowed. b/231587164
+# Gate by targetSdkVersion to avoid breaking existing apps.
+neverallow {
+  appdomain
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -untrusted_app_29
+  -untrusted_app_30
+  -untrusted_app_32
+} apk_data_file:dir { watch watch_reads };
+neverallow {
+  appdomain
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -untrusted_app_29
+  -untrusted_app_30
+  -untrusted_app_32
+} apk_data_file:file { watch watch_reads };

prebuilts/api/202404/private/app_neverallows.te

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+###
+### neverallow rules for untrusted app domains
+###
+
+define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{
+  ephemeral_app
+  isolated_app
+  isolated_app_all
+  isolated_compute_app
+  mediaprovider
+  mediaprovider_app
+  untrusted_app
+  untrusted_app_25
+  untrusted_app_27
+  untrusted_app_29
+  untrusted_app_30
+  untrusted_app_all
+}')
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Read or write kernel printk buffer
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps kmsg_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps { debugfs_type -debugfs_kcov }:file read;
+neverallow {all_untrusted_apps userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')} debugfs_type:{ file lnk_file } read;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
+# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
+# services.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps service_manager_type:service_manager add;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to use VendorBinder
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
+# or set properties. b/10243159
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_type:property_service set;
+
+# net.dns properties are not a public API. Disallow untrusted apps from reading this property.
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps } net_dns_prop:file read;
+
+# radio_cdma_ecm_prop properties are not a public API. Disallow untrusted apps from reading this property.
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps } radio_cdma_ecm_prop:file read;
+
+# Shared libraries created by trusted components within an app home
+# directory can be dlopen()ed. To maintain the W^X property, these files
+# must never be writable to the app.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps app_exec_data_file:file
+  { append create link relabelfrom relabelto rename setattr write };
+
+# Block calling execve() on files in an apps home directory.
+# This is a W^X violation (loading executable code from a writable
+# home directory). For compatibility, allow for targetApi <= 28.
+# b/112357170
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -runas_app
+} { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to invoke dex2oat. This was historically required
+# by ART for compiling secondary dex files but has been removed in Q.
+# Exempt legacy apps (targetApi<=28) for compatibility.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+} dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
+# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
+# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
+# constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
+# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
+# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
+# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
+# and an untrusted app is allowed fork permission to itself.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to hard link to any files.
+# In particular, if an untrusted app links to other app data
+# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
+# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
+# bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted apps never have this
+# capability.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps file_type:file link;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to access network MAC address file
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_net:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow any write access to files in /sys
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_type:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Apps may never access the default sysfs label.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
+# ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
+neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps domain:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{
+  socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
+  netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
+  netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
+  netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
+  netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
+  netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
+  netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket
+  ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket
+  atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
+  bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
+  alg_socket nfc_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
+} *;
+
+# Apps can read/write an already open vsock (e.g. created by
+# virtualizationservice) but nothing more than that (e.g. creating a
+# new vsock, etc.)
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:vsock_socket ~{ getattr getopt read write };
+
+# Disallow sending RTM_GETLINK messages on netlink sockets.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
+neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
+
+# Disallow sending RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} messages on netlink sockets.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -untrusted_app_29
+  -untrusted_app_30
+} domain:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
+# internal storage or sdcard.
+# World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
+# with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
+# application un-installation.
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } {
+  fs_type
+  -sdcard_type
+  -fuse
+  file_type
+  -app_data_file            # The apps sandbox itself
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -app_exec_data_file       # stored within the app sandbox directory
+  -media_rw_data_file       # Internal storage. Known that apps can
+                            # leave artfacts here after uninstall.
+  -user_profile_data_file   # Access to profile files
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    -method_trace_data_file # only on ro.debuggable=1
+    -coredump_file          # userdebug/eng only
+  ')
+}:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+# No untrusted component except mediaprovider_app should be touching /dev/fuse
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider_app } fuse_device:chr_file *;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open the tun_device
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file open;
+# The tun_device ioctls below are not allowed, to prove equivalence
+# to the kernel patch at
+# https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/11cee2be0c2062ba88f04eb51196506f870a3b5d%5E%21
+neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file ioctl ~{ FIOCLEX FIONCLEX TUNGETIFF };
+
+# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:dir ~search;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+  proc
+  proc_asound
+  proc_kmsg
+  proc_loadavg
+  proc_mounts
+  proc_pagetypeinfo
+  proc_slabinfo
+  proc_stat
+  proc_swaps
+  proc_uptime
+  proc_version
+  proc_vmallocinfo
+  proc_vmstat
+}:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# /proc/filesystems is accessible to mediaprovider_app only since it handles
+# external storage
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps - mediaprovider_app } proc_filesystems:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Avoid all access to kernel configuration
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps config_gz:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps access to preloads data files
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps preloads_data_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Locking of files on /system could lead to denial of service attacks
+# against privileged system components
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps system_file:file lock;
+
+# Do not permit untrusted apps to perform actions on HwBinder service_manager
+# other than find actions for services listed below
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:hwservice_manager ~find;
+
+# Do not permit access from apps which host arbitrary code to the protected services
+# The two main reasons for this are:
+# 1. Protected HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because
+#    vendor code does not have a way to understand apps or their relation to
+#    caller UID information and, even if it did, those services either operate
+#    at a level below that of apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity
+#    for authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption for all added
+#    vendor services is that they treat all their clients as equally authorized
+#    to perform operations offered by the service.
+# 2. HAL servers contain code with higher incidence rate of security issues
+#    than system/core components and have access to lower layes of the stack
+#    (all the way down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing
+#    the Android security model.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_service:service_manager find;
+
+# SELinux is not an API for untrusted apps to use
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps selinuxfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
+# are running in an emulated environment.
+# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
+# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
+# This will go away in a future Android release
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -untrusted_app_25 } proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps proc_tty_drivers:file ~r_file_perms;
+
+# Untrusted apps are not allowed to use cgroups.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup:file *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup_v2:file *;
+
+# /mnt/sdcard symlink was supposed to have been removed in Gingerbread. Apps
+# must not use it.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+} mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file *;
+
+# Only privileged apps may find the incident service
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps incident_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Only privileged apps may find stats service
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps stats_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted app to read hidden system proprerties.
+# We do not include in the exclusions other normally untrusted applications such as mediaprovider
+#  due to the specific logging use cases.
+# Context: b/193912100
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -mediaprovider
+  -mediaprovider_app
+} { userdebug_or_eng_prop }:file read;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted app to access /dev/socket/mdnsd since U. The socket is
+# used to communicate to the mdnsd responder. The mdnsd responder will be
+# replaced by a java implementation which is integrated into the system server.
+# For untrusted apps running with API level 33-, they still have access to
+# /dev/socket/mdnsd for backward compatibility.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -untrusted_app_29
+  -untrusted_app_30
+  -untrusted_app_32
+} mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -untrusted_app_29
+  -untrusted_app_30
+  -untrusted_app_32
+} mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to use anonymous inodes. At the moment,
+# type transitions are the only way to distinguish between different
+# anon_inode usages like userfaultfd and io_uring. This prevents us from
+# creating a more fine-grained neverallow policy for each anon_inode usage.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:anon_inode *;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted app access to hidraw devices.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps hidraw_device:chr_file *;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/app_zygote.te

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+typeattribute app_zygote coredomain;
+
+######
+###### Policy below is different from regular zygote-spawned apps
+######
+
+# Allow access to temporary files, which is normally permitted through
+# a domain macro.
+tmpfs_domain(app_zygote);
+
+# Set the UID/GID of the process.
+# This will be further limited to a range of isolated UIDs with seccomp.
+allow app_zygote self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid };
+# Drop capabilities from bounding set.
+allow app_zygote self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
+# Switch SELinux context to isolated app domain.
+allow app_zygote self:process setcurrent;
+allow app_zygote isolated_app:process dyntransition;
+
+# For JIT
+allow app_zygote self:process execmem;
+
+# Allow exec mapping from tmpfs (memfds) for binary translation
+allow app_zygote app_zygote_tmpfs:file execute;
+
+# Allow app_zygote to stat the files that it opens. It must
+# be able to inspect them so that it can reopen them on fork
+# if necessary: b/30963384.
+allow app_zygote debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+
+# get system_server process group
+allow app_zygote system_server:process getpgid;
+
+# Interaction between the app_zygote and its children.
+allow app_zygote isolated_app:process setpgid;
+
+# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
+dontaudit app_zygote mnt_expand_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Get seapp_contexts
+allow app_zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
+selinux_check_context(app_zygote)
+# Check SELinux permissions.
+selinux_check_access(app_zygote)
+
+# Read and inspect temporary files managed by zygote.
+allow app_zygote zygote_tmpfs:file { read getattr };
+
+######
+###### Policy below is shared with regular zygote-spawned apps
+######
+
+# Child of zygote.
+allow app_zygote zygote:fd use;
+allow app_zygote zygote:process sigchld;
+
+# For ART (read /data/dalvik-cache).
+r_dir_file(app_zygote, dalvikcache_data_file);
+allow app_zygote dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
+
+# For ART (allow userfaultfd and related ioctls)
+userfaultfd_use(app_zygote)
+
+# Read /data/misc/apexdata/ to (get to com.android.art/dalvik-cache).
+allow app_zygote apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+# For ART APEX (read /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/dalvik-cache).
+r_dir_file(app_zygote, apex_art_data_file)
+
+# Allow reading/executing installed binaries to enable preloading
+# application data
+allow app_zygote apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow app_zygote apk_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# /oem accesses.
+allow app_zygote oemfs:dir search;
+
+# Allow app_zygote access to /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(app_zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
+# Allow app_zygote to read vendor_overlay_file from vendor apex as well
+allow app_zygote vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+allow app_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow app_zygote system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
+
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(app_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
+# Allow the app_zygote to access the runtime feature flag properties.
+get_prop(app_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(app_zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# Allow app_zygote to access odsign verification status
+get_prop(app_zygote, odsign_prop)
+
+#####
+##### Neverallow
+#####
+
+# Only permit transition to isolated_app.
+neverallow app_zygote { domain -isolated_app }:process dyntransition;
+
+# Only setcon() transitions, no exec() based transitions, except for crash_dump.
+neverallow app_zygote { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
+
+# Must not exec() a program without changing domains.
+# Having said that, exec() above is not allowed.
+neverallow app_zygote *:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The only way to enter this domain is for the zygote to fork a new
+# app_zygote child.
+neverallow { domain -zygote } app_zygote:process dyntransition;
+
+# Disallow write access to properties.
+neverallow app_zygote property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow app_zygote property_type:property_service set;
+
+# Should not have any access to data files.
+neverallow app_zygote app_data_file_type:file { rwx_file_perms };
+
+neverallow app_zygote {
+    service_manager_type
+    -activity_service
+    -webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Isolated apps should not be able to access the driver directly.
+neverallow app_zygote gpu_device:chr_file { rwx_file_perms };
+
+# Do not allow app_zygote access to /cache.
+neverallow app_zygote cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow app_zygote cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
+
+# Do not allow most socket access. This is socket_class_set, excluding unix_dgram_socket,
+# unix_stream_socket, and netlink_selinux_socket.
+neverallow app_zygote domain:{
+  socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket
+  appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket
+  netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
+  netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
+  netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
+  netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
+  sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket
+  x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket
+  pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket bluetooth_socket iucv_socket
+  rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
+  alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket
+} *;
+
+# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and su on eng/userdebug.
+# This is because cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in
+# SCM_CREDENTIALS. Think twice before changing.
+neverallow app_zygote {
+  domain
+  -app_zygote
+  -logd
+  -system_server
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:unix_dgram_socket *;
+
+neverallow app_zygote {
+  domain
+  -app_zygote
+  -prng_seeder
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:unix_stream_socket *;
+
+# Never allow ptrace
+neverallow app_zygote *:process ptrace;
+
+# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties.
+# neverallow rules for Bluetooth-related data files are listed above.
+neverallow app_zygote {
+  bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop
+  bluetooth_audio_hal_prop
+  bluetooth_prop
+  exported_bluetooth_prop
+}:file create_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/art_boot.te

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# ART boot oneshot service
+type art_boot, domain, coredomain;
+type art_boot_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(art_boot)
+
+# Allow query of device config properties, typically experiment flags.
+get_prop(art_boot, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+get_prop(art_boot, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+
+# Allow ART to set its config properties at boot, mainly to be able to propagate
+# experiment flags to properties that only may change at boot.
+set_prop(art_boot, dalvik_config_prop_type)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/artd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+# ART service daemon.
+typeattribute artd coredomain;
+typeattribute artd mlstrustedsubject;
+type artd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type artd_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Allow artd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+binder_use(artd)
+add_service(artd, artd_service)
+add_service(artd, artd_pre_reboot_service)
+allow artd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write };
+allow artd dumpstate:fd use;
+
+init_daemon_domain(artd)
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(artd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# Access to "odsign.verification.success" for deciding whether to deny files in
+# the ART APEX data directory.
+get_prop(artd, odsign_prop)
+
+# Reading an APK opens a ZipArchive, which unpack to tmpfs.
+# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by artd their
+# own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
+# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by artd vs other
+# processes.
+tmpfs_domain(artd)
+
+# Allow testing userfaultfd support.
+userfaultfd_use(artd)
+
+# Read access to primary dex'es on writable partitions
+# ({/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/app/...).
+# Also allow creating the "oat" directory before restorecon.
+allow artd mnt_expand_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow artd apk_data_file:dir { rw_dir_perms create setattr relabelfrom };
+allow artd apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read access to vendor APKs ({/vendor,/odm}/{app,priv-app}/...).
+r_dir_file(artd, vendor_app_file)
+
+# Read access to vendor overlay APKs ({/vendor,/odm,/oem,/apex/*}/overlay/...).
+allow artd oemfs:dir { getattr search };
+r_dir_file(artd, vendor_overlay_file)
+# Vendor overlay can be found in vendor apex
+allow artd vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+# Read access to vendor shared libraries ({/vendor,/odm}/framework/...).
+r_dir_file(artd, vendor_framework_file)
+
+# Read/write access to all compilation artifacts generated on device for apps'
+# primary dex'es. (/data/dalvik-cache/..., /data/app/.../oat/..., etc.)
+allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+
+# Read access to the ART APEX data directory.
+# Needed for reading the boot image generated on device.
+allow artd apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+r_dir_file(artd, apex_art_data_file)
+
+# Read access to /apex/apex-info-list.xml
+# Needed for getting APEX versions.
+allow artd apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow getting root capabilities to bypass permission checks.
+# - "dac_override" and "dac_read_search" are for
+#   - reading secondary dex'es in app data directories (reading primary dex'es
+#     doesn't need root capabilities)
+#   - managing (CRUD) compilation artifacts in both APK directories for primary
+#     dex'es and in app data directories for secondary dex'es
+#   - managing (CRUD) profile files for both primary dex'es and secondary dex'es
+# - "fowner" is for adjusting the file permissions of compilation artifacts and
+#   profile files based on whether they include user data or not.
+# - "chown" is for transferring the ownership of compilation artifacts and
+#   profile files to the system or apps.
+allow artd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search fowner chown };
+
+# Read/write access to profiles (/data/misc/profiles/{ref,cur}/...). Also allow
+# scanning /data/misc/profiles/cur, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
+allow artd user_profile_root_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow artd user_profile_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow artd user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Read/write access to secondary dex files, their profiles, and their
+# compilation artifacts
+# ({/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/{user,user_de}/<user-id>/<package-name>/...).
+allow artd app_data_file_type:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
+allow artd app_data_file_type:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# Allow symlinks for secondary dex files. This has be to restricted because
+# symlinks can cause various security issues. We allow "privapp_data_file" just
+# for GMS because so far we only see GMS using symlinks.
+allow artd privapp_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
+
+# Read access to SELinux context files, for restorecon.
+allow artd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow artd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Check validity of SELinux context, for restorecon.
+selinux_check_context(artd)
+
+# Allow scanning /, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
+allow artd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow scanning /data, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
+allow artd system_data_root_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow scanning /mnt, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
+allow artd tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow scanning /mnt/expand, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
+allow artd mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow scanning {/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/{user,user_de}, for cleaning
+# up obsolete managed files.
+allow artd system_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow scanning {/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/{user,user_de}/<user-id> and
+# /mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>, for cleaning up obsolete managed files.
+allow artd system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Never allow running other binaries without a domain transition.
+# The only exception is art_exec. It is allowed to use the artd domain because
+# it is a thin wrapper that executes other binaries on behalf of artd.
+neverallow artd ~{art_exec_exec}:file execute_no_trans;
+allow artd art_exec_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow running other binaries in their own domains.
+domain_auto_trans(artd, profman_exec, profman)
+domain_auto_trans(artd, dex2oat_exec, dex2oat)
+
+# Allow sending sigkill to subprocesses.
+allow artd { profman dex2oat }:process sigkill;
+
+# Allow reading process info (/proc/<pid>/...).
+# This is needed for getting CPU time and wall time spent on subprocesses.
+r_dir_file(artd, profman);
+r_dir_file(artd, dex2oat);
+
+# Allow artd to reopen its own memfd.
+# artd needs to reopen a memfd with readonly in order to pass it to subprocesses
+# that don't have write permissions on memfds.
+allow artd artd_tmpfs:file open;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/asan_extract.te

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
+# public, but conceptually should go with this
+# Technically not a daemon but we do want the transition from init domain to
+# asan_extract to occur.
+with_asan(`
+  typeattribute asan_extract coredomain;
+  init_daemon_domain(asan_extract)
+
+  # We need to signal a reboot when done.
+  set_prop(asan_extract, powerctl_prop)
+')

prebuilts/api/202404/private/atrace.te

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Domain for atrace process.
+# It is spawned either by traced_probes or by init for the boottrace service.
+
+type atrace_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# boottrace services uses /data/misc/boottrace/categories
+allow atrace boottrace_data_file:dir search;
+allow atrace boottrace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow atrace to access tracefs.
+allow atrace debugfs_tracing:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow atrace debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
+allow atrace debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
+
+# Allow atrace to write data when a pipe is used for stdout/stderr.
+# This is used by Perfetto to capture atrace stdout/stderr.
+allow atrace traced_probes:fd use;
+allow atrace traced_probes:fifo_file { getattr write };
+
+# atrace sets debug.atrace.* properties
+set_prop(atrace, debug_prop)
+
+# atrace pokes all the binder-enabled processes at startup with a
+# SYSPROPS_TRANSACTION, to tell them to reload the debug.atrace.* properties.
+
+# Allow discovery of binder services.
+allow atrace {
+  service_manager_type
+  -apex_service
+  -dnsresolver_service
+  -dumpstate_service
+  -incident_service
+  -installd_service
+  -lpdump_service
+  -mdns_service
+  -netd_service
+  -stats_service
+  -tracingproxy_service
+  -vold_service
+  -default_android_service
+}:service_manager { find };
+allow atrace servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+# Allow notifying the processes hosting specific binder services that
+# trace-related system properties have changed.
+binder_use(atrace)
+allow atrace surfaceflinger:binder call;
+allow atrace system_server:binder call;
+allow atrace cameraserver:binder call;
+
+# Similarly, on debug builds, allow specific HALs to be notified that
+# trace-related system properties have changed.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # List HAL interfaces.
+  allow atrace hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
+  # Notify the camera HAL.
+  hal_client_domain(atrace, hal_camera)
+  hal_client_domain(atrace, hal_vibrator)
+')
+
+# Remove logspam from notification attempts to non-allowlisted services.
+dontaudit atrace hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager find;
+dontaudit atrace service_manager_type:service_manager find;
+dontaudit atrace domain:binder call;
+
+# atrace can call atrace HAL
+hal_client_domain(atrace, hal_atrace)
+
+get_prop(atrace, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # atrace is generally invoked as a standalone binary from shell or perf
+  # daemons like Perfetto traced_probes. However, in userdebug builds, there is
+  # a further option to run atrace as an init daemon for boot tracing.
+  init_daemon_domain(atrace)
+
+  allow atrace debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow atrace debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+dontaudit atrace debugfs_tracing_debug:file audit_access;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/attributes

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+hal_attribute(lazy_test);
+
+# This is applied to apps on vendor images with SDK <=30 only,
+# to exempt them from recent mls changes. It must not be applied
+# to any domain on newer system or vendor image.
+attribute mlsvendorcompat;
+
+# Attributes for property types having both system_property_type
+# and vendor_property_type. Such types are ill-formed because
+# property owner attributes must be exclusive.
+attribute system_and_vendor_property_type;
+expandattribute system_and_vendor_property_type false;
+
+# All SDK sandbox domains
+attribute sdk_sandbox_all;
+# The SDK sandbox domains for the current SDK level.
+attribute sdk_sandbox_current;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/audioserver.te

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# audioserver - audio services daemon
+
+typeattribute audioserver coredomain;
+
+type audioserver_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(audioserver)
+tmpfs_domain(audioserver)
+
+r_dir_file(audioserver, sdcard_type)
+r_dir_file(audioserver, fuse)
+
+binder_use(audioserver)
+binder_call(audioserver, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(audioserver, appdomain)
+binder_service(audioserver)
+
+hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_allocator)
+# /system/lib64/hw for always-passthrough Allocator HAL ashmem / mapper .so
+r_dir_file(audioserver, system_file)
+
+hal_client_domain(audioserver, hal_audio)
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # used for TEE sink - pcm capture for debug.
+  allow audioserver media_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+  allow audioserver audioserver_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+  allow audioserver audioserver_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+  # ptrace to processes in the same domain for memory leak detection
+  allow audioserver self:process ptrace;
+')
+
+add_service(audioserver, audioserver_service)
+allow audioserver activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver appops_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver external_vibrator_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver package_native_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver permission_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver permission_checker_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver power_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver sensor_privacy_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver soundtrigger_middleware_service:service_manager find;
+allow audioserver audio_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow read/write access to bluetooth-specific properties
+set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+set_prop(audioserver, bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(audioserver, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+
+# Grant access to audio files to audioserver
+allow audioserver audio_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
+allow audioserver audio_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# allow access to ALSA MMAP FDs for AAudio API
+allow audioserver audio_device:chr_file { read write };
+
+not_full_treble(`allow audioserver audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;')
+not_full_treble(`allow audioserver audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;')
+
+# For A2DP bridge which is loaded directly into audioserver
+unix_socket_connect(audioserver, bluetooth, bluetooth)
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB and shell for CTS testing/dumping
+allow audioserver adbd:fd use;
+allow audioserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow audioserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
+
+# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow audioserver su:fd use;
+  allow audioserver su:fifo_file { read write };
+  allow audioserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+')
+
+# Allow write access to log tag property
+set_prop(audioserver, log_tag_prop);
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# audioserver should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow audioserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow audioserver domain:{ udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow audioserver { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:tcp_socket *;
+
+# Allow using wake locks
+wakelock_use(audioserver)
+
+# Allow reading audio config props, e.g. af.fast_track_multiplier
+get_prop(audioserver, audio_config_prop)
+get_prop(audioserver, system_audio_config_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/auditctl.te

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#
+# /system/bin/auditctl executed for logd
+#
+# Performs maintenance of the kernel auditing system, including
+# setting rate limits on SELinux denials.
+#
+
+type auditctl, domain, coredomain;
+type auditctl_exec, file_type, system_file_type, exec_type;
+
+# Uncomment the line below to put this domain into permissive
+# mode. This helps speed SELinux policy development.
+# userdebug_or_eng(`permissive auditctl;')
+
+init_daemon_domain(auditctl)
+
+allow auditctl self:global_capability_class_set audit_control;
+allow auditctl self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };

prebuilts/api/202404/private/automotive_display_service.te

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Display proxy service for Automotive
+type automotive_display_service, domain, coredomain;
+type automotive_display_service_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute automotive_display_service automotive_display_service_server;
+
+# Allow to add a display service to the hwservicemanager
+add_hwservice(automotive_display_service, fwk_automotive_display_hwservice);
+
+# Allow init to launch automotive display service
+init_daemon_domain(automotive_display_service)
+
+# Allow to use Binder IPC for SurfaceFlinger.
+binder_use(automotive_display_service)
+
+# Allow to use HwBinder IPC for HAL implementations.
+hwbinder_use(automotive_display_service)
+hal_client_domain(automotive_display_service, hal_graphics_composer)
+hal_client_domain(automotive_display_service, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+# Allow to read the target property.
+get_prop(automotive_display_service, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# Allow to find SurfaceFlinger.
+allow automotive_display_service surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow client domain to do binder IPC to serverdomain.
+binder_call(automotive_display_service, surfaceflinger)
+
+# Allow to use a graphics mapper
+allow automotive_display_service hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Allow to use hidl token service
+allow automotive_display_service hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# Allow to access EGL files
+allow automotive_display_service gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow automotive_display_service gpu_device:dir search;
+
+# Allow to add a service to the servicemanager
+add_service(automotive_display_service, fwk_automotive_display_service);
+
+# Allow to communicate with EVS services
+binder_call(automotive_display_service, hal_evs)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/binderservicedomain.te

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Rules common to some specific binder service domains.
+# Deprecated. Consider granting the exact permissions required by your service.
+
+# Allow dumpstate and incidentd to collect information from binder services
+allow binderservicedomain { dumpstate incidentd }:fd use;
+allow binderservicedomain { dumpstate incidentd }:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr };
+allow binderservicedomain { dumpstate incidentd }:fifo_file  { getattr write };
+allow binderservicedomain shell_data_file:file { getattr write };
+
+# Allow dumpsys to work from adb shell or the serial console
+allow binderservicedomain devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow binderservicedomain console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Receive and write to a pipe received over Binder from an app.
+allow binderservicedomain appdomain:fd use;
+allow binderservicedomain appdomain:fifo_file write;
+
+# allow all services to run permission checks
+allow binderservicedomain permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow binderservicedomain keystore:keystore2_key { delete get_info rebind use };
+
+use_keystore(binderservicedomain)
+# binderservicedomain is using apex_info via libvintf
+use_apex_info(binderservicedomain)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/blank_screen.te

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+type blank_screen, domain, coredomain;
+type blank_screen_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(blank_screen)
+
+# hal_light_client has access to hal_light_server
+hal_client_domain(blank_screen, hal_light)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/blkid.te

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# blkid called from vold
+
+typeattribute blkid coredomain;
+
+type blkid_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Allowed read-only access to encrypted devices to extract UUID/label
+allow blkid block_device:dir search;
+allow blkid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+allow blkid dm_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow blkid vold:fd use;
+allow blkid vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# For blkid launched through popen()
+allow blkid blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold
+neverallow { domain -vold } blkid:process transition;
+neverallow * blkid:process dyntransition;
+neverallow blkid { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/blkid_untrusted.te

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# blkid for untrusted block devices
+
+typeattribute blkid_untrusted coredomain;
+
+# Allowed read-only access to vold block devices to extract UUID/label
+allow blkid_untrusted block_device:dir search;
+allow blkid_untrusted vold_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold
+allow blkid_untrusted vold:fd use;
+allow blkid_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
+
+# For blkid launched through popen()
+allow blkid_untrusted blkid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Untrusted blkid should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
+neverallow blkid_untrusted {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  metadata_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdata_block_device
+  cache_block_device
+  dm_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold via blkid binary
+neverallow { domain -vold } blkid_untrusted:process transition;
+neverallow * blkid_untrusted:process dyntransition;
+neverallow blkid_untrusted { file_type fs_type -blkid_exec -shell_exec }:file entrypoint;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bluetooth.te

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# bluetooth app
+
+typeattribute bluetooth coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+app_domain(bluetooth)
+net_domain(bluetooth)
+
+# Socket creation under /data/misc/bluedroid.
+type_transition bluetooth bluetooth_data_file:sock_file bluetooth_socket;
+
+# Allow access to net_admin ioctls
+allowxperm bluetooth self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+wakelock_use(bluetooth);
+
+# Data file accesses.
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_data_file:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms link };
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_logs_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_logs_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Socket creation under /data/misc/bluedroid.
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;
+
+# tethering
+allow bluetooth self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
+allow bluetooth self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow bluetooth tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm bluetooth tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF };
+allow bluetooth efs_file:dir search;
+
+# allow Bluetooth to access uhid device for HID profile
+allow bluetooth uhid_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+allow bluetooth gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow bluetooth gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# proc access.
+allow bluetooth proc_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# For Bluetooth to check what profile are available
+allow bluetooth proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+get_prop(bluetooth, incremental_prop)
+
+# For Bluetooth to check security logging state
+get_prop(bluetooth, device_logging_prop)
+
+# Allow write access to bluetooth specific properties
+set_prop(bluetooth, binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop);
+neverallow { domain -bluetooth -init }
+    binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:property_service set;
+set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(bluetooth, pan_result_prop)
+
+allow bluetooth audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth bluetooth_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth network_stack_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth system_suspend_control_service:service_manager find;
+allow bluetooth hal_audio_service:service_manager find;
+
+# already open bugreport file descriptors may be shared with
+# the bluetooth process, from a file in
+# /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-*.
+allow bluetooth shell_data_file:file read;
+
+# Bluetooth audio needs RT scheduling to meet deadlines, allow sys_nice
+allow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_bluetooth)
+hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_telephony)
+
+# Bluetooth A2DP offload requires binding with audio HAL
+hal_client_domain(bluetooth, hal_audio)
+
+read_runtime_log_tags(bluetooth)
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+### These are things that the bluetooth app should NEVER be able to do
+###
+
+# Superuser capabilities.
+# Bluetooth requires net_{admin,raw,bind_service} and wake_alarm and block_suspend and sys_nice.
+neverallow bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set ~{ net_admin net_raw net_bind_service sys_nice};
+neverallow bluetooth self:global_capability2_class_set ~{ wake_alarm block_suspend };

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bluetoothdomain.te

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Allow clients to use a socket provided by the bluetooth app.
+allow bluetoothdomain bluetooth:unix_stream_socket { getopt setopt getattr read write ioctl shutdown };

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bootanim.te

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+typeattribute bootanim coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(bootanim)
+
+# b/68864350
+dontaudit bootanim unlabeled:dir search;
+
+# Bootanim should not be reading default vendor-defined properties.
+dontaudit bootanim vendor_default_prop:file read;
+
+# Read ro.boot.bootreason b/30654343
+get_prop(bootanim, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+
+get_prop(bootanim, bootanim_config_prop)
+
+# Allow updating boot animation status.
+set_prop(bootanim, bootanim_system_prop)
+
+# Allow accessing /data/misc/bootanim
+r_dir_file(bootanim, bootanim_data_file)
+
+# Allow accessing vendor apex for EGL/GLES
+allow bootanim vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bootstat.te

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+typeattribute bootstat coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(bootstat)
+
+# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
+get_prop(bootstat, boottime_prop)
+
+# Read/Write [persist.]sys.boot.reason and ro.boot.bootreason (write if empty)
+set_prop(bootstat, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
+set_prop(bootstat, system_boot_reason_prop)
+set_prop(bootstat, last_boot_reason_prop)
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -bootanim
+  -bootstat
+  -dumpstate
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+  -init
+  -platform_app
+  -recovery
+  -shell
+  -system_server
+} { bootloader_boot_reason_prop last_boot_reason_prop }:file r_file_perms;
+# ... and refine, as these components should not set the last boot reason
+neverallow { bootanim recovery } last_boot_reason_prop:file r_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -bootstat
+  -init
+  -system_server
+} { bootloader_boot_reason_prop last_boot_reason_prop }:property_service set;
+# ... and refine ... for a ro propertly no less ... keep this _tight_
+neverallow system_server bootloader_boot_reason_prop:property_service set;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/boringssl_self_test.te

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# System and vendor domains for BoringSSL self test binaries.
+#
+# For FIPS compliance, all processes linked against libcrypto perform a startup
+# self test which computes a hash of the BoringSSL Crypto Module (BCM) and, at least once
+# per device boot, also run a series of Known Answer Tests (KAT) to verify functionality.
+#
+# The KATs are expensive, and to ensure they are run as few times as possible, they
+# are skipped if a marker file exists in /dev/boringssl/selftest whose name is
+# the hash of the BCM that was computed earlier.  The files are zero length and their contents
+# should never be read or written.  To avoid giving arbitrary processes access to /dev/boringssl
+# to create these marker files, there are dedicated self test binaries which this policy
+# gives access to and which are run during early-init.
+#
+# Due to build skew, the version of libcrypto in /vendor may have a different hash than
+# the system one.  To cater for this there are vendor variants of the self test binaries
+# which also have permission to write to the same files in /dev/boringssl.  In the case where
+# vendor and system libcrypto have the same hash, there will be a race to create the file,
+# but this is harmless.
+#
+# If the self tests fail, then the device should reboot into firmware and for this reason
+# the system boringssl_self_test domain needs to be in coredomain.  As vendor domains
+# are not allowed in coredomain, this means that the vendor self tests cannot trigger a
+# reboot.  However every binary linked against the vendor libcrypto will abort on startup,
+# so in practice the device will crash anyway in this unlikely scenario.
+
+# System boringssl_self_test domain
+type boringssl_self_test, domain, coredomain;
+type boringssl_self_test_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Vendor boringssl_self_test domain
+type vendor_boringssl_self_test, domain;
+type vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec, vendor_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Switch to boringssl_self_test security domain when running boringssl_self_test_exec
+init_daemon_domain(boringssl_self_test)
+
+# Switch to vendor_boringssl_self_test security domain when running vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec
+init_daemon_domain(vendor_boringssl_self_test)
+
+# Marker files, common to both domains, indicating KAT have been performed on a particular libcrypto
+#
+# The files are zero length so there is no issue if both vendor and system code
+# try to create the same file simultaneously. One will succeed and the other will fail
+# silently, i.e. still indicate success.  Similar harmless naming collisions will happen in the
+# system domain e.g. when system and APEX copies of libcrypto are identical.
+type boringssl_self_test_marker, file_type;
+
+# Allow self test binaries to create/check for the existence of boringssl_self_test_marker files
+allow { boringssl_self_test vendor_boringssl_self_test }
+  boringssl_self_test_marker:file create_file_perms;
+allow { boringssl_self_test vendor_boringssl_self_test }
+  boringssl_self_test_marker:dir ra_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow self test binaries to write their stdout/stderr messages to kmsg_debug
+allow { boringssl_self_test vendor_boringssl_self_test }
+  kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { w_file_perms getattr ioctl };
+
+# No other process should be able to create marker files because their existence causes the
+# boringssl KAT to be skipped.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -vendor_boringssl_self_test
+  -boringssl_self_test
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} boringssl_self_test_marker:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -vendor_boringssl_self_test
+  -boringssl_self_test
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} boringssl_self_test_marker:dir write;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bpfdomain.te

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# platform should have ownership of network attachpoints for BPF
+neverallow {
+  bpfdomain
+  -bpfloader
+  -netd
+  -netutils_wrapper
+  -network_stack
+  -system_server
+} self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
+
+# any domain which uses bpf is a bpfdomain
+neverallow { domain -bpfdomain } *:bpf *;
+
+allow bpfdomain fs_bpf:dir search;
+
+# genfscon doesn't seem to trigger during symlink creation,
+# and thus any created symlinks end up as 'fs_bpf:lnk_type',
+# however this feels like a kernel bug / missing feature,
+# so let's allow all bpffs_type's instead,
+# this will keep things working even if this is fixed.
+allow bpfdomain bpffs_type:lnk_file read;
+
+# Needed for //frameworks/libs/net:
+# common/native/bpf_headers/include/bpf/WaitForProgsLoaded.h
+get_prop(bpfdomain, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bpfloader.te

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+type bpfloader_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+typeattribute bpfloader bpfdomain;
+
+# allow bpfloader to write to the kernel log (starts early)
+allow bpfloader kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+
+# These permissions are required to pin ebpf maps & programs.
+allow bpfloader bpffs_type:dir { add_name create remove_name search write };
+allow bpfloader bpffs_type:file { create getattr read rename setattr };
+allow bpfloader bpffs_type:lnk_file { create getattr read };
+allow { bpffs_type -fs_bpf } fs_bpf:filesystem associate;
+
+# Allow bpfloader to create bpf maps and programs.
+allow bpfloader self:bpf { map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run };
+
+allow bpfloader self:capability { chown sys_admin net_admin };
+
+allow bpfloader sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf:file r_file_perms;
+
+allow bpfloader proc_bpf:file w_file_perms;
+
+set_prop(bpfloader, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
+
+allow bpfloader bpfloader_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+###
+### Neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Note: we don't care about getattr/mounton/search
+neverallow { domain            } bpffs_type:dir ~{ add_name create getattr mounton remove_name search write };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } bpffs_type:dir { add_name create remove_name write };
+
+neverallow { domain            } bpffs_type:file ~{ create getattr map open read rename setattr write };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } bpffs_type:file { create map open rename setattr };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -lmkd -mediaprovider_app -netd -netutils_wrapper                -system_server } fs_bpf:file               { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader                                                                                            } fs_bpf_loader:file        { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader                                                              -network_stack                } fs_bpf_net_private:file   { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader                                                              -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_net_shared:file    { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader                                      -netd                   -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_readonly:file { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader                                      -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server } fs_bpf_netd_shared:file   { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader                                                              -network_stack                } fs_bpf_tethering:file     { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader                                                                                            -uprobestats } fs_bpf_uprobestats:file   { getattr read };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice                          -netd -netutils_wrapper -network_stack -system_server -uprobestats } { bpffs_type -fs_bpf_vendor }:file write;
+
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } bpffs_type:lnk_file ~read;
+neverallow { domain -bpfdomain } bpffs_type:lnk_file read;
+
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
+
+# 'fs_bpf_loader' is for internal use of the BpfLoader oneshot boot time process.
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } fs_bpf_loader:bpf *;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } fs_bpf_loader:file *;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -bpfloader
+  -gpuservice
+  -hal_health_server
+  -mediaprovider_app
+  -netd
+  -netutils_wrapper
+  -network_stack
+  -system_server
+  -uprobestats
+} *:bpf prog_run;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -gpuservice -lmkd -mediaprovider_app -netd -network_stack -system_server -uprobestats } *:bpf { map_read map_write };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+neverallow { coredomain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper } fs_bpf_vendor:file *;
+
+neverallow bpfloader *:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+
+# No domain should be allowed to ptrace bpfloader
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') } bpfloader:process ptrace;
+
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } proc_bpf:file write;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bufferhubd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute bufferhubd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(bufferhubd)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/bug_map

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+dnsmasq netd fifo_file b/77868789
+dnsmasq netd unix_stream_socket b/77868789
+gmscore_app system_data_file dir b/146166941
+gmscore_app kernel security b/303319090
+init app_data_file file b/77873135
+init cache_file blk_file b/77873135
+init logpersist file b/77873135
+init nativetest_data_file dir b/77873135
+init pstorefs dir b/77873135
+init shell_data_file dir b/77873135
+init shell_data_file file b/77873135
+init shell_data_file lnk_file b/77873135
+init shell_data_file sock_file b/77873135
+init system_data_file chr_file b/77873135
+isolated_app privapp_data_file dir b/119596573
+isolated_app app_data_file dir b/120394782
+mediaextractor app_data_file file b/77923736
+mediaextractor radio_data_file file b/77923736
+mediaprovider cache_file blk_file b/77925342
+mediaprovider mnt_media_rw_file dir b/77925342
+mediaprovider shell_data_file dir b/77925342
+mediaswcodec ashmem_device chr_file b/142679232
+platform_app nfc_data_file dir b/74331887
+platform_app system_data_file dir b/306090533
+system_server overlayfs_file file b/142390309
+system_server sdcardfs file b/77856826
+system_server system_server capability b/228030183
+system_server zygote process b/77856826
+tombstone_transmit tombstone_transmit capability b/264420112
+untrusted_app untrusted_app netlink_route_socket b/155595000
+vold system_data_file file b/124108085
+zygote untrusted_app_25 process b/77925912
+zygote labeledfs filesystem b/170748799

prebuilts/api/202404/private/cameraserver.te

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+typeattribute cameraserver coredomain;
+
+typeattribute cameraserver camera_service_server;
+
+init_daemon_domain(cameraserver)
+tmpfs_domain(cameraserver)
+
+allow cameraserver gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow cameraserver gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow cameraserver virtual_camera:binder call;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/canhalconfigurator.te

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+type canhalconfigurator, domain, coredomain;
+type canhalconfigurator_exec, exec_type, system_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(canhalconfigurator)
+
+# This allows the configurator to look up the CAN HAL controller via
+# hwservice_manager and communicate with it.
+hal_client_domain(canhalconfigurator, hal_can_controller)
+
+binder_use(canhalconfigurator)
+binder_call(hal_can_controller, canhalconfigurator)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/charger.te

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+typeattribute charger coredomain;
+
+# charger needs to tell init to continue the boot
+# process when running in charger mode.
+# The system charger needs to be allowed to set these properties on legacy devices.
+set_prop(charger, system_prop)
+set_prop(charger, exported_system_prop)
+set_prop(charger, exported3_system_prop)
+
+# The system charger can read ro.charger.*
+get_prop(charger, charger_prop)
+
+compatible_property_only(`
+    neverallow {
+        domain
+        -init
+        -dumpstate
+        -charger
+    } charger_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+')

prebuilts/api/202404/private/charger_type.te

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# charger needs to tell init to continue the boot
+# process when running in charger mode.
+set_prop(charger_type, charger_status_prop)
+get_prop(charger_type, charger_config_prop)
+
+# get minui properties
+get_prop(charger_type, recovery_config_prop)
+
+### Neverallow rules for charger properties
+
+# charger_config_prop: Only init and vendor_init is allowed to set it
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -vendor_init
+} charger_config_prop:property_service set;
+
+# charger_status_prop: Only init, vendor_init, charger, and charger_vendor
+# are allowed to set it
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -vendor_init
+    -charger
+    -charger_vendor
+} charger_status_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Both charger_config_prop and charger_status_prop:
+# Only init, vendor_init, dumpstate, charger, and charger_vendor
+# are allowed to read it
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -dumpstate
+    -vendor_init
+    -charger
+    -charger_vendor
+} { charger_config_prop charger_status_prop }:file no_rw_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/clatd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# 464xlat daemon
+type clatd, domain, coredomain;
+type clatd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+net_domain(clatd)
+
+# Access objects inherited from system_server.
+allow clatd system_server:fd use;
+allow clatd system_server:packet_socket { read write };
+allow clatd system_server:rawip_socket { read write };
+
+allow clatd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/29.0/29.0.compat.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 29.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 29.0 vendors.
+;;
+
+(typeattribute vendordomain)
+(typeattributeset vendordomain ((and (domain) ((not (coredomain))))))
+(allow vendordomain self (netlink_route_socket (nlmsg_readpriv)))
+
+(typeattributeset mlsvendorcompat (and appdomain vendordomain))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat app_data_file (dir (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock rename open watch watch_reads add_name remove_name reparent search rmdir)))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat app_data_file (file (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock append map unlink rename open watch watch_reads)))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat privapp_data_file (dir (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock rename open watch watch_reads add_name remove_name reparent search rmdir)))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat privapp_data_file (file (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock append map unlink rename open watch watch_reads)))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;;   that have no analogue in 29.0 policy.  Thus, we do not need to map
+;;   these types to previous ones.  Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+(type new_objects)
+(typeattribute new_objects)
+(typeattributeset new_objects
+  ( new_objects
+    aidl_lazy_test_server
+    aidl_lazy_test_server_exec
+    aidl_lazy_test_service
+    adbd_prop
+    apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
+    apex_rollback_data_file
+    apex_wifi_data_file
+    app_integrity_service
+    app_search_service
+    auth_service
+    automotive_display_service
+    automotive_display_service_exec
+    ashmem_libcutils_device
+    blob_store_service
+    binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop
+    binder_cache_system_server_prop
+    binder_cache_telephony_server_prop
+    binderfs
+    binderfs_logs
+    binderfs_logs_proc
+    boringssl_self_test
+    bq_config_prop
+    cacheinfo_service
+    charger_prop
+    cold_boot_done_prop
+    credstore
+    credstore_data_file
+    credstore_exec
+    credstore_service
+    platform_compat_service
+    ctl_apexd_prop
+    dataloader_manager_service
+    device_config_storage_native_boot_prop
+    device_config_sys_traced_prop
+    device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop
+    device_config_configuration_prop
+    emergency_affordance_service
+    exported_camera_prop
+    fastbootd_protocol_prop
+    file_integrity_service
+    fwk_automotive_display_hwservice
+    fusectlfs
+    gmscore_app
+    gnss_device
+    graphics_config_prop
+    hal_can_bus_hwservice
+    hal_can_controller_hwservice
+    hal_identity_service
+    hal_light_service
+    hal_power_service
+    hal_rebootescrow_service
+    hal_tv_tuner_hwservice
+    hal_vibrator_service
+    incremental_control_file
+    incremental_prop
+    incremental_service
+    init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop
+    init_svc_debug_prop
+    iorap_inode2filename
+    iorap_inode2filename_data_file
+    iorap_inode2filename_exec
+    iorap_inode2filename_tmpfs
+    iorap_prefetcherd
+    iorap_prefetcherd_data_file
+    iorap_prefetcherd_exec
+    iorap_prefetcherd_tmpfs
+    mediatranscoding_service
+    mediatranscoding
+    mediatranscoding_exec
+    mediatranscoding_tmpfs
+    mirror_data_file
+    light_service
+    linkerconfig_file
+    lmkd_prop
+    media_variant_prop
+    metadata_bootstat_file
+    mnt_pass_through_file
+    mock_ota_prop
+    module_sdkextensions_prop
+    ota_metadata_file
+    ota_prop
+    prereboot_data_file
+    art_apex_dir
+    rebootescrow_hal_prop
+    securityfs
+    service_manager_service
+    service_manager_vndservice
+    simpleperf
+    snapshotctl_log_data_file
+    socket_hook_prop
+    soundtrigger_middleware_service
+    staged_install_file
+    storage_config_prop
+    surfaceflinger_display_prop
+    sysfs_dm_verity
+    system_adbd_prop
+    system_config_service
+    system_group_file
+    system_jvmti_agent_prop
+    system_passwd_file
+    system_unsolzygote_socket
+    tethering_service
+    traced_perf
+    traced_perf_enabled_prop
+    traced_perf_socket
+    timezonedetector_service
+    untrusted_app_29
+    usb_serial_device
+    userspace_reboot_config_prop
+    userspace_reboot_exported_prop
+    userspace_reboot_log_prop
+    userspace_reboot_test_prop
+    vehicle_hal_prop
+    tv_tuner_resource_mgr_service
+    vendor_apex_file
+    vendor_boringssl_self_test
+    vendor_install_recovery
+    vendor_install_recovery_exec
+    vendor_service_contexts_file
+    vendor_socket_hook_prop
+    vendor_socket_hook_prop
+    virtual_ab_prop))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/30.0/30.0.compat.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 30.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 30.0 vendors.
+;;
+
+(typeattribute vendordomain)
+(typeattributeset vendordomain ((and (domain) ((not (coredomain))))))
+
+;; TODO: Once 30.0 is no longer supported for vendor images,
+;; mlsvendorcompat can be completely from the system policy.
+(typeattributeset mlsvendorcompat (and appdomain vendordomain))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat app_data_file (dir (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock rename open watch watch_reads add_name remove_name reparent search rmdir)))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat app_data_file (file (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock append map unlink rename open watch watch_reads)))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat privapp_data_file (dir (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock rename open watch watch_reads add_name remove_name reparent search rmdir)))
+(allow mlsvendorcompat privapp_data_file (file (ioctl read write create getattr setattr lock append map unlink rename open watch watch_reads)))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;;   that have no analogue in 30.0 policy.  Thus, we do not need to map
+;;   these types to previous ones.  Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+(type new_objects)
+(typeattribute new_objects)
+(typeattributeset new_objects
+  ( new_objects
+    ab_update_gki_prop
+    adbd_config_prop
+    apc_service
+    apex_appsearch_data_file
+    apex_art_data_file
+    apex_art_staging_data_file
+    apex_info_file
+    apex_ota_reserved_file
+    apex_scheduling_data_file
+    apex_system_server_data_file
+    apexd_config_prop
+    app_hibernation_service
+    appcompat_data_file
+    arm64_memtag_prop
+    artd
+    artd_exec
+    artd_service
+    authorization_service
+    bootanim_config_prop
+    camerax_extensions_prop
+    cgroup_desc_api_file
+    cgroup_v2
+    codec2_config_prop
+    ctl_snapuserd_prop
+    dck_prop
+    debugfs_kprobes
+    debugfs_mm_events_tracing
+    debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing
+    debugfs_restriction_prop
+    device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop
+    device_config_connectivity_prop
+    device_config_swcodec_native_prop
+    device_state_service
+    dm_user_device
+    dmabuf_heap_device
+    dmabuf_system_heap_device
+    dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device
+    domain_verification_service
+    dumpstate_tmpfs
+    framework_watchdog_config_prop
+    fs_bpf_tethering
+    fwk_stats_service
+    game_service
+    font_data_file
+    gki_apex_prepostinstall
+    gki_apex_prepostinstall_exec
+    hal_audio_service
+    hal_authsecret_service
+    hal_audiocontrol_service
+    hal_face_service
+    hal_fingerprint_service
+    hal_health_storage_service
+    hal_memtrack_service
+    hal_oemlock_service
+    hint_service
+    gnss_device
+    gnss_time_update_service
+    hal_dumpstate_config_prop
+    hal_gnss_service
+    hal_keymint_service
+    hal_neuralnetworks_service
+    hal_power_stats_service
+    hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_service
+    hal_secureclock_service
+    hal_sharedsecret_service
+    hal_uwb_service
+    hal_weaver_service
+    hw_timeout_multiplier_prop
+    keystore_compat_hal_service
+    keystore_maintenance_service
+    keystore_metrics_service
+    keystore2_key_contexts_file
+    legacy_permission_service
+    legacykeystore_service
+    location_time_zone_manager_service
+    media_communication_service
+    media_metrics_service
+    mediatuner_exec
+    mediatuner_service
+    mediatuner
+    mediatranscoding_tmpfs
+    memtrackproxy_service
+    mm_events_config_prop
+    music_recognition_service
+    nfc_logs_data_file
+    odrefresh
+    odrefresh_exec
+    odsign
+    odsign_data_file
+    odsign_exec
+    pac_proxy_service
+    permission_checker_service
+    people_service
+    persist_vendor_debug_wifi_prop
+    postinstall_dexopt_exec
+    postinstall_device_mnt_dir
+    postinstall_product_mnt_dir
+    postinstall_vendor_mnt_dir
+    power_debug_prop
+    powerstats_service
+    proc_kallsyms
+    proc_locks
+    profcollectd
+    profcollectd_data_file
+    profcollectd_exec
+    profcollectd_node_id_prop
+    profcollectd_service
+    qemu_hw_prop
+    qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop
+    radio_core_data_file
+    reboot_readiness_service
+    remote_prov_app
+    remoteprovisioning_service
+    resolver_service
+    search_ui_service
+    shell_test_data_file
+    smartspace_service
+    snapuserd
+    snapuserd_exec
+    snapuserd_socket
+    soc_prop
+    speech_recognition_service
+    sysfs_block
+    sysfs_devfreq_cur
+    sysfs_devfreq_dir
+    sysfs_devices_cs_etm
+    sysfs_dma_heap
+    sysfs_dmabuf_stats
+    sysfs_uhid
+    system_server_dumper_service
+    system_suspend_control_internal_service
+    task_profiles_api_file
+    texttospeech_service
+    translation_service
+    update_engine_stable_service
+    userdata_sysdev
+    userspace_reboot_metadata_file
+    uwb_service
+    vcn_management_service
+    vd_device
+    vendor_kernel_modules
+    vendor_modprobe
+    vendor_uuid_mapping_config_file
+    vibrator_manager_service
+    virtualization_service
+    vpn_management_service
+    watchdog_metadata_file
+    wifi_key
+    zygote_config_prop))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/31.0/31.0.compat.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 31.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 31.0 vendors.
+;;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;;   that have no analogue in 31.0 policy.  Thus, we do not need to map
+;;   these types to previous ones.  Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+(type new_objects)
+(typeattribute new_objects)
+(typeattributeset new_objects
+  ( new_objects
+    apexd_select_prop
+    artd_service
+    attestation_verification_service
+    camera2_extensions_prop
+    communal_service
+    device_config_nnapi_native_prop
+    dice_maintenance_service
+    dice_node_service
+    diced
+    diced_exec
+    extra_free_kbytes
+    extra_free_kbytes_exec
+    hal_contexthub_service
+    hal_dice_service
+    hal_dumpstate_service
+    hal_graphics_composer_service
+    hal_health_service
+    hal_radio_service
+    hal_sensors_service
+    hal_system_suspend_service
+    hal_tv_tuner_service
+    hal_uwb_service
+    hal_uwb_vendor_service
+    hal_wifi_hostapd_service
+    hal_wifi_supplicant_service
+    hal_nlinterceptor_service
+    hypervisor_prop
+    locale_service
+    power_stats_service
+    snapuserd_prop
+    snapuserd_proxy_socket
+    tare_service
+    transformer_service
+    proc_watermark_boost_factor
+    untrusted_app_30
+    proc_vendor_sched
+    sdk_sandbox_service
+    sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf
+    sysfs_vendor_sched
+    tv_iapp_service
+    vendor_uuid_mapping_config_file
+    vendor_vm_file
+    vendor_vm_data_file
+    virtual_device_service
+  ))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/32.0/32.0.compat.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 32.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 32.0 vendors.
+;;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;;   that have no analogue in 32.0 policy.  Thus, we do not need to map
+;;   these types to previous ones.  Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+(type new_objects)
+(typeattribute new_objects)
+(typeattributeset new_objects
+  ( new_objects
+    adaptive_haptics_prop
+    adservices_manager_service
+    apexd_select_prop
+    artd_service
+    attestation_verification_service
+    bluetooth_config_prop
+    binderfs_features
+    charger_vendor
+    cloudsearch
+    cloudsearch_service
+    connectivity_native_service
+    device_config_nnapi_native_prop
+    device_config_surface_flinger_native_boot_prop
+    device_config_vendor_system_native_prop
+    device_config_vendor_system_native_boot_prop
+    dice_maintenance_service
+    dice_node_service
+    diced
+    diced_exec
+    fwk_automotive_display_service
+    evsmanagerd
+    evsmanagerd_service
+    extra_free_kbytes
+    extra_free_kbytes_exec
+    framework_status_prop
+    fs_bpf_vendor
+    game_mode_intervention_list_file
+    gesture_prop
+    gwp_asan_prop
+    hal_contexthub_service
+    hal_camera_service
+    hal_evs_service
+    hal_dice_service
+    hal_drm_service
+    hal_dumpstate_service
+    hal_graphics_allocator_service
+    hal_graphics_composer_service
+    hal_health_service
+    hal_input_processor_service
+    hal_ir_service
+    hal_nfc_service
+    hal_nlinterceptor_service
+    hal_radio_service
+    hal_sensors_service
+    hal_system_suspend_service
+    hal_tv_tuner_service
+    hal_usb_service
+    hal_uwb_service
+    hal_vehicle_service
+    hal_wifi_hostapd_service
+    hal_wifi_supplicant_service
+    locale_service
+    mdns_service
+    nearby_service
+    persist_wm_debug_prop
+    proc_watermark_boost_factor
+    remotelyprovisionedkeypool_service
+    resources_manager_service
+    rootdisk_sysdev
+    sdk_sandbox_service
+    selection_toolbar_service
+    smart_idle_maint_enabled_prop
+    snapuserd_proxy_socket
+    sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf
+    sysfs_gpu
+    sysfs_lru_gen_enabled
+    system_dlkm_file
+    system_user_mode_emulation_prop
+    tare_service
+    tv_iapp_service
+    untrusted_app_30
+    vendor_uuid_mapping_config_file
+    vendor_vm_data_file
+    vendor_vm_file
+    virtual_device_service
+    wallpaper_effects_generation_service
+))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/33.0/33.0.compat.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 33.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 33.0 vendors.
+;;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;;   that have no analogue in 33.0 policy.  Thus, we do not need to map
+;;   these types to previous ones.  Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+(type new_objects)
+(typeattribute new_objects)
+(typeattributeset new_objects
+  ( new_objects
+    adaptive_haptics_prop
+    apex_ready_prop
+    art_boot
+    art_boot_exec
+    artd
+    bt_device
+    build_attestation_prop
+    composd_vm_art_prop
+    composd_vm_vendor_prop
+    cpu_monitor_service
+    credential_service
+    device_as_webcam
+    device_config_camera_native_prop
+    device_config_core_experiments_team_internal_prop
+    device_config_edgetpu_native_prop
+    device_config_memory_safety_native_boot_prop
+    device_config_memory_safety_native_prop
+    device_config_updatable_service
+    device_config_vendor_system_native_prop
+    device_config_aconfig_flags_prop
+    devicelock_service
+    fwk_altitude_service
+    fwk_camera_service
+    fwk_sensor_service
+    game_manager_config_prop
+    grammatical_inflection_service
+    graphics_config_writable_prop
+    hal_bluetooth_service
+    hal_bootctl_service
+    hal_cas_service
+    hal_ivn_service
+    hal_remoteaccess_service
+    hal_secure_element_service
+    hal_tetheroffload_service
+    hal_thermal_service
+    hal_usb_gadget_service
+    hal_tv_input_service
+    hal_tv_hdmi_cec_service
+    hal_tv_hdmi_connection_service
+    hal_tv_hdmi_earc_service
+    hal_wifi_service
+    healthconnect_service
+    hypervisor_restricted_prop
+    isolated_compute_app
+    keystore_config_prop
+    ondevicepersonalization_system_service
+    fuseblk
+    fuseblkd_untrusted
+    fuseblkd_untrusted_exec
+    fuseblkd
+    fuseblkd_exec
+    ota_build_prop
+    permissive_mte_prop
+    persist_sysui_builder_extras_prop
+    persist_sysui_ranking_update_prop
+    prng_seeder
+    quick_start_prop
+    recovery_usb_config_prop
+    remote_provisioning_service
+    repair_mode_metadata_file
+    rkpdapp
+    servicemanager_prop
+    shutdown_checkpoints_system_data_file
+    snapuserd_log_data_file
+    stats_config_data_file
+    sysfs_fs_fuse_features
+    system_net_netd_service
+    timezone_metadata_prop
+    traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop
+    tuner_config_prop
+    tuner_server_ctl_prop
+    ublk_block_device
+    ublk_control_device
+    usb_uvc_enabled_prop
+    virtual_face_hal_prop
+    virtual_fingerprint_hal_prop
+    hal_gatekeeper_service
+    hal_broadcastradio_service
+    hal_confirmationui_service
+    hal_fastboot_service
+    hal_can_controller_service
+    zoned_block_device
+    future_pm_prop
+    vfio_device
+  ))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/34.0/34.0.compat.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 34.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 34.0 vendors.
+;;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;;   that have no analogue in 34.0 policy.  Thus, we do not need to map these types to
+;;   previous ones.  Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+(type new_objects)
+(typeattribute new_objects)
+(typeattributeset new_objects
+  ( new_objects
+    archive_service
+    artd_pre_reboot_service
+    contextual_search_service
+    dexopt_chroot_setup_service
+    dtbo_block_device
+    ota_build_prop
+    snapuserd_log_data_file
+    fwk_vibrator_control_service
+    ecm_enhanced_confirmation_service
+    hal_authgraph_service
+    hal_graphics_mapper_service
+    hal_secretkeeper_service
+    hal_codec2_service
+    hal_macsec_service
+    hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_service
+    hal_threadnetwork_service
+    hidl_memory_prop
+    hidraw_device
+    virtual_camera_service
+    ot_daemon_service
+    ot_daemon_socket
+    pm_archiving_enabled_prop
+    remote_auth_service
+    security_state_service
+    sensitive_content_protection_service
+    setupwizard_mode_prop
+    sysfs_sync_on_suspend
+    tv_ad_service
+    threadnetwork_service
+    device_config_aconfig_flags_prop
+    virtual_device_native_service
+    next_boot_prop
+    binderfs_logs_stats
+    drm_forcel3_prop
+    proc_percpu_pagelist_high_fraction
+    vendor_microdroid_file
+    threadnetwork_config_prop
+    profiling_service
+    aconfig_storage_metadata_file
+    aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file
+  ))

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compos_fd_server.te

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Make ART inputs and outputs available to the CompOS VM
+type compos_fd_server, domain, coredomain;
+
+# Allow access to open fds inherited from composd
+allow compos_fd_server composd:fd use;
+
+# Allow creating new files and directories in the staging directory.
+allow compos_fd_server apex_art_staging_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow compos_fd_server apex_art_staging_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow creating new files and directories in the artifacts directory.
+allow compos_fd_server apex_art_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow compos_fd_server apex_art_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Use a pipe to signal readiness
+allow compos_fd_server composd:fifo_file write;
+
+# TODO(b/196109647) - remove this when no longer needed by minijail
+allow compos_fd_server composd:fifo_file read;
+
+# Create a listening vsock for the VM to connect back to
+allow compos_fd_server self:vsock_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl listen accept };
+
+# Only composd can enter the domain via exec
+neverallow { domain -composd } compos_fd_server:process transition;
+neverallow * compos_fd_server:process dyntransition;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/compos_verify.te

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Run by odsign to verify a CompOS signature
+type compos_verify, domain, coredomain;
+type compos_verify_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# Start a VM
+binder_use(compos_verify);
+virtualizationservice_use(compos_verify);
+
+# Read instance image & write VM logs
+allow compos_verify apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+allow compos_verify apex_compos_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow compos_verify apex_compos_data_file:file { rw_file_perms create };
+
+# Read CompOS info & signature files
+allow compos_verify apex_art_data_file:dir search;
+allow compos_verify apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow odsign to redirect our stdout/stderr to log
+allow compos_verify odsign:fd use;
+allow compos_verify odsign_devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Only odsign can enter the domain via exec
+neverallow { domain -odsign } compos_verify:process transition;
+neverallow * compos_verify:process dyntransition;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/composd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+type composd, domain, coredomain;
+type composd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Host dynamic AIDL services
+init_daemon_domain(composd)
+binder_use(composd)
+add_service(composd, compos_service)
+
+# Call back into system server
+binder_call(composd, system_server)
+
+# Start a VM
+virtualizationservice_use(composd)
+
+# Prepare staging directory for odrefresh
+allow composd apex_art_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow composd apex_art_staging_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow composd apex_art_staging_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
+
+# Delete files or enable fs-verity in the odrefresh target directory
+allow composd apex_art_data_file:file { open ioctl read unlink write };
+allowxperm composd apex_art_data_file:file ioctl FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY;
+
+# Access our APEX data files
+allow composd apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+allow composd apex_compos_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow composd apex_compos_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Run fd_server in its own domain, and send SIGTERM when finished.
+domain_auto_trans(composd, fd_server_exec, compos_fd_server)
+allow composd compos_fd_server:process signal;
+
+# Read properties used to configure the CompOS VM
+get_prop(composd, composd_vm_art_prop)
+get_prop(composd, composd_vm_vendor_prop)
+
+# Read ART's properties
+get_prop(composd, dalvik_config_prop_type)
+get_prop(composd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# We never create any artifact files directly
+neverallow composd apex_art_data_file:file create;
+
+# ART sets these properties via init script, nothing else should
+neverallow { domain -init } composd_vm_art_prop:property_service set;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/coredomain.te

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+get_prop(coredomain, apex_ready_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, boot_status_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, camera_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, dalvik_config_prop_type)
+get_prop(coredomain, dalvik_runtime_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, exported_pm_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, ffs_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, graphics_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, graphics_config_writable_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, hdmi_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, init_service_status_private_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, lmkd_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, localization_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, pm_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, radio_control_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, rollback_test_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, setupwizard_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, setupwizard_mode_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, sqlite_log_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, storagemanager_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, systemsound_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, telephony_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, usb_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, usb_control_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, vold_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, vts_status_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, zygote_config_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, zygote_wrap_prop)
+
+# TODO(b/170590987): remove this after cleaning up default_prop
+get_prop(coredomain, default_prop)
+
+full_treble_only(`
+neverallow {
+    coredomain
+
+    # for chowning
+    -init
+
+    # generic access to sysfs_type
+    -apexd
+    -ueventd
+    -vold
+} sysfs_leds:file *;
+')
+
+# On TREBLE devices, a limited set of files in /vendor are accessible to
+# only a few allowlisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Limit access to /vendor/app
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -artd
+        -dex2oat
+        -dexoptanalyzer
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -heapprofd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+    } vendor_app_file:dir { open read getattr search };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -artd
+        -dex2oat
+        -dexoptanalyzer
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -heapprofd
+        userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -profman
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+        -mediaserver
+    } vendor_app_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Limit access to /vendor/overlay
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -artd
+        -dex2oat
+        -dexoptanalyzer
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+        -app_zygote
+        -webview_zygote
+        -zygote
+        -heapprofd
+    } vendor_overlay_file:dir { getattr open read search };
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -appdomain
+        -artd
+        -dex2oat
+        -dexoptanalyzer
+        -idmap
+        -init
+        -installd
+        -postinstall_dexopt
+        -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+        -system_server
+        -traced_perf
+        -app_zygote
+        -webview_zygote
+        -zygote
+        -heapprofd
+        userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+        userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+    } vendor_overlay_file:file open;
+')
+
+# Core domains are not permitted to use kernel interfaces which are not
+# explicitly labeled.
+# TODO(b/65643247): Apply these neverallow rules to all coredomain.
+full_treble_only(`
+  # /proc
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -vold
+  } proc:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # /sys
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -apexd
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+    is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `-vfio_handler')
+    -vold
+  } sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # /dev
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -apexd
+    -fsck
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+  } device:{ blk_file file } no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # debugfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    no_debugfs_restriction(`
+      -dumpstate
+      -init
+      -system_server
+    ')
+  } debugfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # tracefs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -atrace
+    -dumpstate
+    -gpuservice
+    -init
+    -traced_perf
+    -traced_probes
+    -shell
+    -system_server
+    -traceur_app
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+  } debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # inotifyfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+  } inotify:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # pstorefs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -bootstat
+    -charger
+    -dumpstate
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+    -init
+    -logd
+    -logpersist
+    -recovery_persist
+    -recovery_refresh
+    -shell
+    -system_server
+  } pstorefs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # configfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -system_server
+  } configfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # functionfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -adbd
+    -init
+    -mediaprovider
+    -system_server
+  } functionfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # usbfs and binfmt_miscfs
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+  }{ usbfs binfmt_miscfs }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+  # dmabuf heaps
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -init
+    -ueventd
+  }{
+    dmabuf_heap_device_type
+    -dmabuf_system_heap_device
+    -dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device
+  }:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Following /dev nodes must not be directly accessed by coredomain, but should
+# instead be wrapped by HALs.
+neverallow coredomain {
+  iio_device
+  radio_device
+}:chr_file { open read append write ioctl };
+
+# TODO(b/120243891): HAL permission to tee_device is included into coredomain
+# on non-Treble devices.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow coredomain tee_device:chr_file { open read append write ioctl };
+')

prebuilts/api/202404/private/cppreopts.te

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# cppreopts
+#
+# This command copies preopted files from the system_b partition to the data
+# partition. This domain ensures that we are only copying into specific
+# directories.
+
+type cppreopts, domain, mlstrustedsubject, coredomain;
+type cppreopts_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Technically not a daemon but we do want the transition from init domain to
+# cppreopts to occur.
+init_daemon_domain(cppreopts)
+domain_auto_trans(cppreopts, preopt2cachename_exec, preopt2cachename);
+
+# Allow cppreopts copy files into the dalvik-cache
+allow cppreopts dalvikcache_data_file:dir { add_name remove_name search write };
+allow cppreopts dalvikcache_data_file:file { create getattr open read rename write unlink };
+
+# Allow cppreopts to execute itself using #!/system/bin/sh
+allow cppreopts shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow us to run find on /postinstall
+allow cppreopts system_file:dir { open read };
+
+# Allow running the cp command using cppreopts permissions. Needed so we can
+# write into dalvik-cache
+allow cppreopts toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Silence the denial when /postinstall cannot be mounted, e.g., system_other
+# is wiped, but cppreopts.sh still runs.
+dontaudit cppreopts postinstall_mnt_dir:dir search;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/crash_dump.te

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+typeattribute crash_dump coredomain;
+
+# Crash dump does not need to access devices passed across exec().
+dontaudit crash_dump { devpts dev_type }:chr_file { read write };
+
+allow crash_dump {
+  domain
+  -apexd
+  -bpfloader
+  -crash_dump
+  -init
+  -kernel
+  -keystore
+  -llkd
+  -logd
+  -ueventd
+  -vendor_init
+  -vold
+}:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow crash_dump {
+    apexd
+    keystore
+    llkd
+    logd
+    vold
+  }:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+')
+
+# Read ART APEX data directory
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow crash dump to read bootstrap libraries
+allow crash_dump system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow crash_dump system_bootstrap_lib_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read Vendor APEX directories
+allow crash_dump vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+###
+### neverallow assertions
+###
+
+# sigchld not explicitly forbidden since it's part of the
+# domain-transition-on-exec macros, and is by itself not sensitive
+neverallow crash_dump {
+  apexd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-apexd')
+  bpfloader
+  init
+  kernel
+  keystore
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-keystore')
+  llkd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
+  logd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-logd')
+  ueventd
+  vendor_init
+  vold
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-vold')
+}:process { ptrace signal sigstop sigkill };
+
+neverallow crash_dump self:process ptrace;
+neverallow crash_dump gpu_device:chr_file *;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/credstore.te

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+typeattribute credstore coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(credstore)
+
+# talk to Identity Credential
+hal_client_domain(credstore, hal_identity)
+
+# talk to keymint, specifically for IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/default
+hal_client_domain(credstore, hal_keymint)
+
+# credstore needs to get keys from the RKPD
+get_prop(credstore, remote_prov_prop)
+allow credstore remote_provisioning_service:service_manager find;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/crosvm.te

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+type crosvm, domain, coredomain;
+type crosvm_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type crosvm_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Let crosvm open VM manager devices such as /dev/kvm.
+allow crosvm vm_manager_device_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Most other domains shouldn't access /dev/kvm.
+neverallow { domain -crosvm -ueventd -shell } kvm_device:chr_file getattr;
+neverallow { domain -crosvm -ueventd } kvm_device:chr_file ~getattr;
+neverallowxperm { domain -crosvm } kvm_device:chr_file ioctl ~{ KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION };
+
+# Most other domains shouldn't access other vm managers either.
+# These restrictions need to be slightly looser than for kvm_device to allow
+# for different implementations.
+neverallow { coredomain appdomain -crosvm -ueventd -shell } vm_manager_device_type:chr_file getattr;
+neverallow { coredomain appdomain -crosvm -ueventd } vm_manager_device_type:chr_file ~getattr;
+
+# Let crosvm create temporary files.
+tmpfs_domain(crosvm)
+
+# Let crosvm receive file descriptors from VirtualizationService.
+allow crosvm virtualizationmanager:fd use;
+
+# Allow sending VirtualizationService the failure reason and console/log from the VM via pipe.
+allow crosvm virtualizationmanager:fifo_file write;
+
+# Let crosvm read the composite disk images (virtualizationservice_data_file), APEXes
+# (staging_data_file), APKs (apk_data_file and shell_data_file where the latter is for test apks in
+# /data/local/tmp), instance.img (app_data_file), and microdroid vendor image (vendor_microdroid_file).
+# Allow crosvm to read the instance image of the service VM saved in apex_virt_data_file.
+# Note that the open permission is not given as the files are passed as file descriptors.
+allow crosvm {
+  virtualizationservice_data_file
+  staging_data_file
+  apk_data_file
+  app_data_file
+  privapp_data_file
+  apex_compos_data_file
+  apex_virt_data_file
+  shell_data_file
+  vendor_microdroid_file
+}:file { getattr read ioctl lock };
+
+# Allow searching the directory where the composite disk images are.
+allow crosvm virtualizationservice_data_file:dir search;
+
+# When running a VM as root we get spurious capability denials.
+# Suppress them.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  dontaudit crosvm self:capability ipc_lock;
+')
+
+# Allow crosvm to tune for performance.
+allow crosvm self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
+
+# Let crosvm access its control socket as created by VS.
+#   read, write, getattr: listener socket polling
+#   accept: listener socket accepting new connection
+# Note that the open permission is not given as the socket is passed by FD.
+allow crosvm virtualizationmanager:unix_stream_socket { accept read write getattr getopt };
+
+# Let crosvm open test artifacts under /data/local/tmp with file path. (e.g. custom pvmfw.img)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow crosvm shell_data_file:dir search;
+  allow crosvm shell_data_file:file open;
+')
+
+# The instance image and the composite image should be writable as well because they could represent
+# mutable disks.
+allow crosvm {
+  virtualizationservice_data_file
+  app_data_file
+  privapp_data_file
+  apex_compos_data_file
+  apex_virt_data_file
+}:file write;
+
+# Allow crosvm to pipe console log to shell or app which could be the owner of a VM.
+allow crosvm adbd:fd use;
+allow crosvm adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow crosvm devpts:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+
+# crosvm tries to use netlink sockets as part its APCI implementation, but we don't need it for AVF (b/228077254)
+dontaudit crosvm self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# crosvm can write files in /data/local/tmp which are usually used for instance.img and logging by
+# compliance tests and demo apps. Write access to instance.img is particularily important because
+# the VM has to initialize the disk image on its first boot. Note that open access is still not
+# granted because the files are expected to be opened by the owner of the VM (apps or shell in case
+# when the vm is created by the `vm` tool) and handed over to crosvm as FD.
+allow crosvm shell_data_file:file write;
+
+# crosvm tries to read serial device, including the write-only pipe from virtualizationmanager (to
+# forward console/log to the host logcat).
+# crosvm only needs write permission, so dontaudit read
+dontaudit crosvm virtualizationmanager:fifo_file { read getattr };
+
+# Required for crosvm to start gdb-server to enable debugging of guest kernel.
+allow crosvm self:tcp_socket { bind create read setopt write accept listen };
+allow crosvm port:tcp_socket name_bind;
+allow crosvm adbd:unix_stream_socket ioctl;
+allow crosvm node:tcp_socket node_bind;
+
+# Allow crosvm to interact to VFIO device
+allow crosvm vfio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow crosvm vfio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow crosvm to access VM DTBO via a file created by virtualizationmanager.
+allow crosvm virtualizationmanager:fd use;
+allow crosvm virtualizationservice_data_file:file read;
+
+# Don't allow crosvm to open files that it doesn't own.
+# This is important because a malicious application could try to start a VM with a composite disk
+# image referring by name to files which it doesn't have permission to open, trying to get crosvm to
+# open them on its behalf. By preventing crosvm from opening any other files we prevent this
+# potential privilege escalation. See http://b/192453819 for more discussion.
+neverallow crosvm {
+  virtualizationservice_data_file
+  staging_data_file
+  apk_data_file
+  app_data_file
+  privapp_data_file
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-shell_data_file')
+}:file open;
+
+# Don't allow crosvm to have access to ordinary vendor files that are not for VMs.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow crosvm {
+    vendor_file_type
+    -vendor_vm_file
+    -vendor_vm_data_file
+    # These types are not required for crosvm, but the access is granted to globally in domain.te
+    # thus should be exempted here.
+    -vendor_configs_file
+    -vendor_microdroid_file
+    -vndk_sp_file
+    -vendor_task_profiles_file
+  }:file *;
+')
+
+# Only allow crosvm to read app data files for clients that can start
+# VMs. Note that the use of app data files is further restricted
+# inside the virtualizationservice by checking the label of all disk
+# image files.
+neverallow crosvm {
+  app_data_file_type
+  -app_data_file
+  -privapp_data_file
+  -shell_data_file
+}:file read;
+
+# Only virtualizationmanager can run crosvm
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -crosvm
+  -virtualizationmanager
+} crosvm_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/derive_classpath.te

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+
+# Domain for derive_classpath
+type derive_classpath, domain, coredomain;
+type derive_classpath_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(derive_classpath)
+
+# Read /apex
+allow derive_classpath apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow derive_classpath vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Create /data/system/environ/classpath file
+allow derive_classpath environ_system_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow derive_classpath environ_system_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# b/183079517 fails on gphone targets otherwise
+allow derive_classpath unlabeled:dir search;
+
+# Allow derive_classpath to write the classpath into ota dexopt
+# - Read the ota's apex dir
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+# - Report the BCP to the ota's dexopt
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:dir search;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:fd use;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:file read;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt:lnk_file read;
+allow derive_classpath postinstall_dexopt_tmpfs:file rw_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/derive_sdk.te

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+
+# Domain for derive_sdk
+type derive_sdk, domain, coredomain;
+type derive_sdk_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(derive_sdk)
+
+# Read /apex
+allow derive_sdk apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow derive_sdk vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Prop rules: writable by derive_sdk, readable by bootclasspath (apps)
+set_prop(derive_sdk, module_sdkextensions_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init -derive_sdk } module_sdkextensions_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Allow derive_sdk to write data back to dumpstate when forked from dumpstate.
+# The shell_data_file permissions are needed when a bugreport is taken:
+# dumpstate will redirect its stdout to a temporary shell_data_file:file, and
+# this makes derive_sdk append to that file.
+allow derive_sdk dumpstate:fd use;
+allow derive_sdk dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow derive_sdk shell_data_file:file { getattr append read write };

prebuilts/api/202404/private/device_as_webcam.te

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Domain for DeviceAsWebcam Service
+type device_as_webcam, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+
+app_domain(device_as_webcam)
+
+allow device_as_webcam system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow device_as_webcam system_app_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow device_as_webcam { app_api_service cameraserver_service }:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow DeviceAsWebcam Service needs to access ro.usb.uvc.enabled property to
+# enale/disable itself
+get_prop(device_as_webcam, usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
+
+# need to access /dev to list all devices
+allow device_as_webcam device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# UVC nodes are mounted as V4L2 nodes (/dev/video*) on the device. These need to
+# be accessed by the DeviceAsWebcam Service.
+allow device_as_webcam video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow device_as_webcam video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/dex2oat.te

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# dex2oat
+type dex2oat, domain, coredomain;
+type dex2oat_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+userfaultfd_use(dex2oat)
+
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, apk_data_file)
+# Access to /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, vendor_app_file)
+# Access /vendor/framework
+allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:file { getattr open read map };
+# Access /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, vendor_overlay_file);
+# Vendor overlay can be found in vendor apex
+allow dex2oat vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir { getattr search };
+
+allow dex2oat tmpfs:file { read getattr map };
+
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, dalvikcache_data_file)
+allow dex2oat dalvikcache_data_file:file write;
+
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/framework/arm/*
+allow dex2oat system_file:file lock;
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:file lock;
+
+# Read already open asec_apk_file file descriptors passed by installd.
+# Also allow reading unlabeled files, to allow for upgrading forward
+# locked APKs.
+allow dex2oat asec_apk_file:file { read map };
+allow dex2oat unlabeled:file { read map };
+allow dex2oat oemfs:file { read map };
+allow dex2oat apk_tmp_file:dir search;
+allow dex2oat apk_tmp_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow dex2oat user_profile_data_file:file { getattr read lock map };
+
+# Allow dex2oat to compile app's secondary dex files which were reported back to
+# the framework.
+allow dex2oat { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read write lock map };
+
+# Allow dex2oat to find files and directories under /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.runtime.
+allow dex2oat apex_module_data_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use devpts passed from odsign.
+allow dex2oat odsign_devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+# Allow dex2oat to write to file descriptors from odrefresh for files
+# in the staging area.
+allow dex2oat apex_art_staging_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat apex_art_staging_data_file:file { getattr map read write unlink };
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read artifacts from odrefresh.
+allow dex2oat apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read runtime native flag properties.
+get_prop(dex2oat, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(dex2oat, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml
+allow dex2oat apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use file descriptors passed from privileged programs.
+allow dex2oat { artd installd odrefresh odsign }:fd use;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read the /proc filesystem for CPU features, etc.
+allow dex2oat proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
+##################
+# A/B OTA Dexopt #
+##################
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use file descriptors from otapreopt.
+allow dex2oat postinstall_dexopt:fd use;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to read files under /postinstall (e.g. APKs under /system, /system/bin/linker).
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:filesystem getattr;
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:file read;
+# Allow dex2oat to use libraries under /postinstall/system (e.g. /system/lib/libc.so).
+# TODO(b/120266448): Remove when Bionic libraries are part of the Runtime APEX.
+allow dex2oat postinstall_file:file { execute getattr open };
+
+# Allow dex2oat access to /postinstall/apex.
+allow dex2oat postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:dir { getattr search };
+allow dex2oat postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dex2oat access to files in /data/ota.
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Create and read symlinks in /data/ota/dalvik-cache. This is required for PIC mode boot images,
+# where the oat file is symlinked to the original file in /system.
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:lnk_file { create read };
+
+# It would be nice to tie this down, but currently, because of how images are written, we can't
+# pass file descriptors for the preopted boot image to dex2oat. So dex2oat needs to be able to
+# create them itself (and make them world-readable).
+allow dex2oat ota_data_file:file { create w_file_perms setattr };
+
+###############
+# APEX Update #
+###############
+
+# /dev/zero is inherited.
+allow dex2oat apexd:fd use;
+
+# Allow dex2oat to use file descriptors from preinstall.
+
+##############
+# Neverallow #
+##############
+
+neverallow dex2oat app_data_file_type:notdevfile_class_set open;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/dexopt_chroot_setup.te

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+type dexopt_chroot_setup, domain, coredomain;
+type dexopt_chroot_setup_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type dexopt_chroot_setup_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+# Allow dexopt_chroot_setup to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
+binder_use(dexopt_chroot_setup)
+add_service(dexopt_chroot_setup, dexopt_chroot_setup_service)
+allow dexopt_chroot_setup dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write };
+allow dexopt_chroot_setup dumpstate:fd use;
+
+init_daemon_domain(dexopt_chroot_setup)
+
+# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by dexopt_chroot_setup their
+# own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
+# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by dexopt_chroot_setup vs other
+# processes.
+tmpfs_domain(dexopt_chroot_setup)
+
+# libart (mark_compact.cc) has some intialization code that touches the cache
+# info file and userfaultfd.
+allow dexopt_chroot_setup apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+r_dir_file(dexopt_chroot_setup, apex_art_data_file)
+userfaultfd_use(dexopt_chroot_setup)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/dexoptanalyzer.te

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# dexoptanalyzer
+type dexoptanalyzer, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type dexoptanalyzer_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type dexoptanalyzer_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+r_dir_file(dexoptanalyzer, apk_data_file)
+# Access to /vendor/app
+r_dir_file(dexoptanalyzer, vendor_app_file)
+
+# Reading an APK opens a ZipArchive, which unpack to tmpfs.
+# Use tmpfs_domain() which will give tmpfs files created by dexoptanalyzer their
+# own label, which differs from other labels created by other processes.
+# This allows to distinguish in policy files created by dexoptanalyzer vs other
+# processes.
+tmpfs_domain(dexoptanalyzer)
+
+userfaultfd_use(dexoptanalyzer)
+
+# Allow dexoptanalyzer to read files in the dalvik cache.
+allow dexoptanalyzer dalvikcache_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow dexoptanalyzer dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read symlinks in /data/dalvik-cache. This is required for PIC mode boot
+# app_data_file the oat file is symlinked to the original file in /system.
+allow dexoptanalyzer dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file read;
+
+# Allow dexoptanalyzer to read files in the ART APEX data directory.
+allow dexoptanalyzer { apex_art_data_file apex_module_data_file }:dir { getattr search };
+allow dexoptanalyzer apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow dexoptanalyzer to use file descriptors from odrefresh.
+allow dexoptanalyzer odrefresh:fd use;
+
+# Use devpts and fd from odsign (which exec()'s odrefresh)
+allow dexoptanalyzer odsign:fd use;
+allow dexoptanalyzer odsign_devpts:chr_file { read write };
+
+allow dexoptanalyzer installd:fd use;
+allow dexoptanalyzer installd:fifo_file { getattr write };
+
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/framework/arm/*
+allow dexoptanalyzer system_file:file lock;
+
+# Allow reading secondary dex files that were reported by the app to the
+# package manager.
+allow dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read map };
+
+# dexoptanalyzer checks the DM files next to dex files. We don't need this check
+# for secondary dex files, but it's not harmful. Just deny it and ignore it.
+dontaudit dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir search;
+
+# Allow testing /data/user/0 which symlinks to /data/data
+allow dexoptanalyzer system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr };
+
+# Allow query ART device config properties
+get_prop(dexoptanalyzer, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+get_prop(dexoptanalyzer, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
+# Allow dexoptanalyzer to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml
+allow dexoptanalyzer apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/dhcp.te

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+typeattribute dhcp coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(dhcp)
+type_transition dhcp system_data_file:{ dir file } dhcp_data_file;
+
+set_prop(dhcp, dhcp_prop)
+set_prop(dhcp, pan_result_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/dmesgd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+type dmesgd, domain, coredomain;
+type dmesgd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(dmesgd)
+
+allow dmesgd dmesgd_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow dmesgd dmesgd_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow dmesgd kernel:system syslog_read;
+allow dmesgd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow dmesgd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+binder_use(dmesgd)
+binder_call(dmesgd, system_server)
+allow dmesgd dropbox_service:service_manager find;
+allow dmesgd proc_version:file r_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/dnsmasq.te

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute dnsmasq coredomain;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/domain.te

@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
+# This occurs when the process crashes.
+# We do not apply this to the su domain to avoid interfering with
+# tests (b/114136122)
+domain_auto_trans({ domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
+allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
+
+# Allow every process to check the heapprofd.enable properties to determine
+# whether to load the heap profiling library. This does not necessarily enable
+# heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
+# necessary SELinux permissions.
+get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
+
+# See private/crash_dump.te
+define(`dumpable_domain',`{
+  domain
+  -apexd
+  -bpfloader
+  -crash_dump
+  -crosvm # TODO(b/236672526): Remove exception for crosvm
+  -init
+  -kernel
+  -keystore
+  -llkd
+  -logd
+  -ueventd
+  -vendor_init
+  -vold
+}')
+
+# Allow heap profiling by heapprofd.
+# Zygotes are excluded due to potential issues with holding open file
+# descriptors or other state across forks. Other exclusions conflict with
+# neverallows, and are not considered important to profile.
+can_profile_heap({
+  dumpable_domain
+  -app_zygote
+  -hal_configstore_server
+  -logpersist
+  -recovery
+  -recovery_persist
+  -recovery_refresh
+  -webview_zygote
+  -zygote
+})
+
+# Allow profiling using perf_event_open by traced_perf.
+can_profile_perf({
+  dumpable_domain
+  -app_zygote
+  -hal_configstore_server
+  -webview_zygote
+  -zygote
+})
+
+# Everyone can access the IncFS list of features.
+r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_fs_incfs_features);
+
+# Everyone can access the fuse list of features.
+r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_fs_fuse_features);
+
+# Path resolution access in cgroups.
+allow domain cgroup:dir search;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow domain cgroup_v2:dir search;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
+allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain task_profiles_api_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain vendor_task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow all domains to read sys.use_memfd to determine
+# if memfd support can be used if device supports it
+get_prop(domain, use_memfd_prop);
+
+# Read access to sdkextensions props
+get_prop(domain, module_sdkextensions_prop)
+
+# Read access to bq configuration values
+get_prop(domain, bq_config_prop);
+
+# Allow all domains to check whether MTE is set to permissive mode.
+get_prop(domain, permissive_mte_prop);
+
+# Allow ART to be configurable via device_config properties
+# (ART "runs" inside the app process), and MTE bootloader override to be
+# observed by everything
+get_prop(domain, device_config_memory_safety_native_boot_prop);
+get_prop(domain, device_config_memory_safety_native_prop);
+get_prop(domain, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop);
+get_prop(domain, device_config_runtime_native_prop);
+
+# For now, everyone can access core property files
+# Device specific properties are not granted by default
+not_compatible_property(`
+    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
+    get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
+    get_prop(domain, exported3_system_prop)
+    get_prop(domain, vendor_default_prop)
+')
+compatible_property_only(`
+    # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, core_property_type)
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_camera_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_log_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_test_prop)
+    get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
+')
+
+# Public readable properties
+get_prop(domain, aaudio_config_prop)
+get_prop(domain, apexd_select_prop)
+get_prop(domain, arm64_memtag_prop)
+get_prop(domain, bluetooth_config_prop)
+get_prop(domain, bootloader_prop)
+get_prop(domain, build_odm_prop)
+get_prop(domain, build_prop)
+get_prop(domain, build_vendor_prop)
+get_prop(domain, debug_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_config_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_default_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_dumpstate_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_secure_prop)
+get_prop(domain, exported_system_prop)
+get_prop(domain, fingerprint_prop)
+get_prop(domain, framework_status_prop)
+get_prop(domain, gwp_asan_prop)
+get_prop(domain, hal_instrumentation_prop)
+get_prop(domain, hw_timeout_multiplier_prop)
+get_prop(domain, init_service_status_prop)
+get_prop(domain, libc_debug_prop)
+get_prop(domain, locale_prop)
+get_prop(domain, logd_prop)
+get_prop(domain, mediadrm_config_prop)
+get_prop(domain, property_service_version_prop)
+get_prop(domain, soc_prop)
+get_prop(domain, socket_hook_prop)
+get_prop(domain, surfaceflinger_prop)
+get_prop(domain, telephony_status_prop)
+get_prop(domain, timezone_prop)
+get_prop({domain -untrusted_app_all -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app },  userdebug_or_eng_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vendor_socket_hook_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vndk_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vold_status_prop)
+get_prop(domain, vts_config_prop)
+
+# Binder cache properties are world-readable
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop)
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_telephony_server_prop)
+
+# Allow access to fsverity keyring.
+allow domain kernel:key search;
+# Allow access to keys in the fsverity keyring that were installed at boot.
+allow domain fsverity_init:key search;
+# For testing purposes, allow access to keys installed with su.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow domain su:key search;
+')
+
+# Allow access to linkerconfig file
+allow domain linkerconfig_file:dir search;
+allow domain linkerconfig_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow all processes to check for the existence of the boringssl_self_test_marker files.
+allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;
+
+# Allow all processes to read the file_logger property that liblog uses to check if file_logger
+# should be used.
+get_prop(domain, log_file_logger_prop)
+
+# Allow all processes to connect to PRNG seeder daemon.
+unix_socket_connect(domain, prng_seeder, prng_seeder)
+
+# No domains other than a select few can access the misc_block_device. This
+# block device is reserved for OTA use.
+# Do not assert this rule on userdebug/eng builds, due to some devices using
+# this partition for testing purposes.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') # exclude debuggable builds
+  -fastbootd
+  -hal_bootctl_server
+  -init
+  -uncrypt
+  -update_engine
+  -vendor_init
+  -vendor_misc_writer
+  -vold
+  -recovery
+  -ueventd
+  -mtectrl
+} misc_block_device:blk_file { append link relabelfrom rename write open read ioctl lock };
+
+# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
+# with other UIDs to these allowlisted domains.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -vold
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
+  -dumpstate
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+  -storaged
+  -system_server
+} self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+
+# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
+neverallow { domain -priv_app -gmscore_app } *:keystore2_key gen_unique_id;
+neverallow { domain -system_server } *:keystore2_key use_dev_id;
+neverallow { domain -system_server } keystore:keystore2 { clear_ns lock reset unlock };
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
+} debugfs_tracing_debug:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# System_server owns dropbox data, and init creates/restorecons the directory
+# Disallow direct access by other processes.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-dumpstate')
+} dropbox_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-dumpstate')
+} dropbox_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+###
+# Services should respect app sandboxes
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -artd # compile secondary dex files
+  -installd # creation of sandbox
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+# Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
+# directories.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -appdomain
+  -app_zygote
+  -artd # compile secondary dex files
+  -dexoptanalyzer
+  -installd
+  -profman
+  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+  -runas
+  -system_server
+  -viewcompiler
+  -zygote
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir *;
+
+# Only apps should be modifying app data. installd is exempted for
+# restorecon and package install/uninstall.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -artd # compile secondary dex files
+  -installd
+  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir ~r_dir_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -app_zygote
+  -artd # compile secondary dex files
+  -installd
+  -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file_class_set open;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -artd # compile secondary dex files
+  -installd # creation of sandbox
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -artd # compile secondary dex files
+  -installd
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# The staging directory contains APEX and APK files. It is important to ensure
+# that these files cannot be accessed by other domains to ensure that the files
+# do not change between system_server staging the files and apexd processing
+# the files.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -apexd
+  -installd
+  -priv_app
+  -virtualizationmanager
+} staging_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_app
+  -system_server
+  -apexd
+  -adbd
+  -kernel
+  -installd
+  -priv_app
+  -shell
+  -virtualizationmanager
+  -crosvm
+} staging_data_file:file *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -installd} staging_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+# apexd needs the link and unlink permissions, so list every `no_w_file_perms`
+# except for `link` and `unlink`.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:file
+  { append create relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain # for oemfs
+    -bootanim # for oemfs
+    -recovery # for /tmp/update_binary in tmpfs
+} { fs_type -rootfs }:file execute;
+
+#
+# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
+# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few allowlisted domains.
+# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
+# we want to avoid. See
+# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
+#
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -appdomain
+    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+    -system_server_startup # for memfd backed executable regions
+    -app_zygote
+    -webview_zygote
+    -zygote
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaextractor')
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaswcodec')
+} {
+    file_type
+    -system_file_type
+    -system_lib_file
+    -system_linker_exec
+    -vendor_file_type
+    -exec_type
+    -postinstall_file
+}:file execute;
+
+# Only init is allowed to write cgroup.rc file
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} cgroup_rc_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init # TODO: limit init to relabelfrom for files
+  -zygote
+  -installd
+  -postinstall_dexopt
+  -cppreopts
+  -dex2oat
+  -otapreopt_slot
+  -artd
+} dalvikcache_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -installd
+  -postinstall_dexopt
+  -cppreopts
+  -dex2oat
+  -zygote
+  -otapreopt_slot
+  -artd
+} dalvikcache_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+# Only authorized processes should be writing to /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art as it
+# contains boot class path and system server AOT artifacts following an ART APEX Mainline update.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  # art-related processes
+  -composd
+  -compos_fd_server
+  -odrefresh
+  -odsign
+  # others
+  -apexd
+  -init
+  -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} apex_art_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  # art-related processes
+  -composd
+  -compos_fd_server
+  -odrefresh
+  -odsign
+  # others
+  -apexd
+  -init
+  -vold_prepare_subdirs
+} apex_art_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+# Protect most domains from executing arbitrary content from /data.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+} {
+  data_file_type
+  -apex_art_data_file
+  -dalvikcache_data_file
+  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
+  -apk_data_file
+}:file no_x_file_perms;
+
+# Minimize dac_override and dac_read_search.
+# Instead of granting them it is usually better to add the domain to
+# a Unix group or change the permissions of a file.
+define(`dac_override_allowed', `{
+  apexd
+  artd
+  dnsmasq
+  dumpstate
+  init
+  installd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`llkd')
+  lmkd
+  migrate_legacy_obb_data
+  netd
+  postinstall_dexopt
+  recovery
+  rss_hwm_reset
+  sdcardd
+  tee
+  ueventd
+  uncrypt
+  vendor_init
+  vold
+  vold_prepare_subdirs
+  zygote
+}')
+neverallow ~dac_override_allowed self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
+# Since the kernel checks dac_read_search before dac_override, domains that
+# have dac_override should also have dac_read_search to eliminate spurious
+# denials.  Some domains have dac_read_search without having dac_override, so
+# this list should be a superset of the one above.
+neverallow ~{
+  dac_override_allowed
+  traced_perf
+  traced_probes
+  heapprofd
+} self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
+
+# Limit what domains can mount filesystems or change their mount flags.
+# sdcard_type (including vfat and exfat) and fusefs_type are exempt as a larger
+# set of domains need this capability, including device-specific domains.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -apexd
+    recovery_only(`-fastbootd')
+    -init
+    -kernel
+    -otapreopt_chroot
+    -recovery
+    -update_engine
+    -vold
+    -zygote
+} { fs_type
+    -sdcard_type
+    -fusefs_type
+}:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+enforce_debugfs_restriction(`
+  neverallow {
+    domain userdebug_or_eng(`-init')
+  } { debugfs_type -debugfs_tracing_debug }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
+')
+
+# Limit raw I/O to these allowlisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
+  -kernel
+  -gsid
+  -init
+  -recovery
+  -ueventd
+  -uncrypt
+  -tee
+  -hal_bootctl_server
+  -fastbootd
+} self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
+
+# Limit directory operations that doesn't need to do app data isolation.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -fsck
+  -init
+  -installd
+  -zygote
+} mirror_data_file:dir *;
+
+# This property is being removed. Remove remaining access.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:file read;
+
+# Only core domains are allowed to access package_manager properties
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } pm_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -coredomain } pm_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow reading the last boot timestamp from system properties
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -dumpstate } firstboot_prop:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow ART to set its config properties in its oneshot boot service, in
+# addition to the common init and vendor_init access.
+neverallow { domain -art_boot -init -vendor_init } dalvik_config_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Kprobes should only be used by adb root
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } debugfs_kprobes:file *;
+
+# On TREBLE devices, most coredomains should not access vendor_files.
+# TODO(b/71553434): Remove exceptions here.
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -bootanim
+    -crash_dump
+    -heapprofd
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+    -init
+    -kernel
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+    -traced_perf
+    -ueventd
+  } vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms open };
+')
+
+# Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate communications to core domain sockets
+full_treble_only(`
+  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
+    domain
+    -coredomain
+    -appdomain
+    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
+  }, {
+    coredomain
+    -logd # Logging by writing to logd Unix domain socket is public API
+    -netd # netdomain needs this
+    -mdnsd # netdomain needs this
+    -prng_seeder # Any process using libcrypto needs this
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
+    -init
+    -tombstoned # linker to tombstoned
+    -heapprofd
+    -traced
+    -traced_perf
+  });
+')
+
+full_treble_only(`
+  # Do not allow system components access to /vendor files except for the
+  # ones allowed here.
+  neverallow {
+    coredomain
+    # TODO(b/37168747): clean up fwk access to /vendor
+    -crash_dump
+    -crosvm # loads vendor-specific disk images
+    -init # starts vendor executables
+    -kernel # loads /vendor/firmware
+    -heapprofd
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+    -shell
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+    -system_executes_vendor_violators
+    -traced_perf # library/binary access for symbolization
+    -ueventd # reads /vendor/ueventd.rc
+    -vold # loads incremental fs driver
+  } {
+    vendor_file_type
+    -same_process_hal_file
+    -vendor_app_file
+    -vendor_apex_file
+    -vendor_apex_metadata_file
+    -vendor_configs_file
+    -vendor_microdroid_file
+    -vendor_service_contexts_file
+    -vendor_framework_file
+    -vendor_idc_file
+    -vendor_keychars_file
+    -vendor_keylayout_file
+    -vendor_overlay_file
+    -vendor_public_framework_file
+    -vendor_public_lib_file
+    -vendor_task_profiles_file
+    -vendor_uuid_mapping_config_file
+    -vndk_sp_file
+  }:file *;
+')
+
+# mlsvendorcompat is only for compatibility support for older vendor
+# images, and should not be granted to any domain in current policy.
+# (Every domain is allowed self:fork, so this will trigger if the
+# intsersection of domain & mlsvendorcompat is not empty.)
+neverallow domain mlsvendorcompat:process fork;
+
+# Only init and otapreopt_chroot should be mounting filesystems on locations
+# labeled system or vendor (/product and /vendor respectively).
+neverallow { domain -init -otapreopt_chroot } { system_file_type vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;
+
+# Only allow init and vendor_init to read/write mm_events properties
+# NOTE: dumpstate is allowed to read any system property
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+  -dumpstate
+} mm_events_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow the tracing daemon and callstack sampler to use kallsyms to symbolize
+# kernel traces. Addresses are not disclosed, they are repalced with symbol
+# names (if available). Traces don't disclose KASLR.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
+  -vendor_init
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+  -traced_probes
+  -traced_perf
+} proc_kallsyms:file { open read };
+
+# debugfs_kcov type is not included in this neverallow statement since the KCOV
+# tool uses it for kernel fuzzing.
+# vendor_modprobe is also exempted since the kernel modules it loads may create
+# debugfs files in its context.
+enforce_debugfs_restriction(`
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -vendor_modprobe
+    userdebug_or_eng(`
+      -init
+      -hal_dumpstate
+      -incidentd
+    ')
+  } { debugfs_type
+      userdebug_or_eng(`-debugfs_kcov')
+      -tracefs_type
+  }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Restrict write access to etm sysfs interface.
+neverallow { domain -ueventd -vendor_init } sysfs_devices_cs_etm:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Restrict CAP_PERFMON.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -vendor_modprobe
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-simpleperf_boot')
+  -kernel
+  -uprobestats
+} self:capability2 perfmon;
+
+# Restrict direct access to shell owned files. The /data/local/tmp directory is
+# untrustworthy, and non-allowed domains should not be trusting any content in
+# those directories. We allow shell files to be passed around by file
+# descriptor, but not directly opened.
+# artd doesn't need to access /data/local/tmp, but it needs to access
+# /data/{user,user_de}/<user-id>/com.android.shell/... for compiling secondary
+# dex files.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -appdomain
+  -artd
+  -dumpstate
+  -installd
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationmanager')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationservice')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-crosvm')
+} shell_data_file:file open;
+
+# In addition to the symlink reading restrictions above, restrict
+# write access to shell owned directories. The /data/local/tmp
+# directory is untrustworthy, and non-allowed domains should
+# not be trusting any content in those directories.
+# artd doesn't need to access /data/local/tmp, but it needs to access
+# /data/{user,user_de}/<user-id>/com.android.shell/... for compiling secondary
+# dex files.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -artd
+  -dumpstate
+  -installd
+  -init
+  -shell
+  -vold
+} shell_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -appdomain
+  -artd
+  -dumpstate
+  -init
+  -installd
+  -simpleperf_app_runner
+  -system_server # why?
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
+} shell_data_file:dir open;
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -adbd
+  -appdomain
+  -artd
+  -dumpstate
+  -init
+  -installd
+  -simpleperf_app_runner
+  -system_server # why?
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-virtualizationmanager')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-crosvm')
+} shell_data_file:dir search;
+
+# respect system_app sandboxes
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -appdomain
+  -artd # compile secondary dex files
+  -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
+  -installd # creation of app sandbox
+  -traced_probes # resolve inodes for i/o tracing.
+                 # only needs open and read, the rest is neverallow in
+                 # traced_probes.te.
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+neverallow {
+  isolated_app_all
+  ephemeral_app
+  priv_app
+  sdk_sandbox_all
+  untrusted_app_all
+} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
+
+neverallow { domain -init } mtectrl:process { dyntransition transition };
+
+# For now, don't allow processes other than gmscore to access /data/misc_ce/<userid>/checkin
+neverallow { domain -gmscore_app -init -vold_prepare_subdirs } checkin_data_file:{dir file} *;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/drmserver.te

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+typeattribute drmserver coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(drmserver)
+
+type_transition drmserver apk_data_file:sock_file drmserver_socket;
+
+typeattribute drmserver_socket coredomain_socket;
+
+get_prop(drmserver, drm_service_config_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/dumpstate.te

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+typeattribute dumpstate coredomain;
+type dumpstate_tmpfs, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(dumpstate)
+
+# Execute and transition to the vdc domain
+domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, vdc_exec, vdc)
+
+# Create tmpfs files for using memfd descriptors to get output from child
+# processes.
+tmpfs_domain(dumpstate)
+
+# Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock from ip[6]tables
+allow dumpstate system_file:file lock;
+
+allow dumpstate storaged_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# /data/misc/a11ytrace for accessibility traces
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate accessibility_trace_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow dumpstate accessibility_trace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# /data/misc/wmtrace for wm traces
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate wm_trace_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow dumpstate wm_trace_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# /data/system/dropbox for dropbox entries
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate dropbox_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+  allow dumpstate dropbox_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to incidentd
+binder_call(dumpstate, incidentd)
+
+# Kill incident in case of a timeout
+allow dumpstate incident:process { signal sigkill };
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to storaged service
+binder_call(dumpstate, storaged)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to make binder calls to statsd
+binder_call(dumpstate, statsd)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to gpuservice over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, gpuservice);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to idmap over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, idmap);
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to profcollectd over binder
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  binder_call(dumpstate, profcollectd)
+')
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to automotive_display_service over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, automotive_display_service)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to virtual_camera service over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, virtual_camera)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to ot_daemon service over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, ot_daemon)
+
+# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
+get_prop(dumpstate, boottime_prop)
+
+# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
+allow dumpstate {
+  mediatranscoding
+  statsd
+  netd
+  virtual_camera
+  ot_daemon
+}:process signal;
+
+# Only allow dumpstate to dump Keystore on debuggable builds.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow dumpstate keystore:process signal;
+')
+dontaudit dumpstate keystore:process { signal };
+
+# For collecting bugreports.
+no_debugfs_restriction(`
+  allow dumpstate debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+allow dumpstate dev_type:blk_file getattr;
+allow dumpstate webview_zygote:process signal;
+allow dumpstate sysfs_dmabuf_stats:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit dumpstate update_engine:binder call;
+
+# Read files in /proc
+allow dumpstate {
+  config_gz
+  proc_net_tcp_udp
+  proc_pid_max
+}:file r_file_perms;
+
+# For comminucating with the system process to do confirmation ui.
+binder_call(dumpstate, incidentcompanion_service)
+
+# Set properties.
+# dumpstate_prop is used to share state with the Shell app.
+set_prop(dumpstate, dumpstate_prop)
+set_prop(dumpstate, exported_dumpstate_prop)
+
+# dumpstate_options_prop is used to pass extra command-line args.
+set_prop(dumpstate, dumpstate_options_prop)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to kill vendor dumpstate service by init
+set_prop(dumpstate, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
+
+# For dumping dynamic partition information.
+set_prop(dumpstate, lpdumpd_prop)
+binder_call(dumpstate, lpdumpd)
+
+# For dumping hypervisor information.
+get_prop(dumpstate, hypervisor_prop)
+
+# For dumping device-mapper and snapshot information.
+allow dumpstate gsid_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+set_prop(dumpstate, ctl_gsid_prop)
+binder_call(dumpstate, gsid)
+
+r_dir_file(dumpstate, ota_metadata_file)
+
+# For starting (and killing) perfetto --save-for-bugreport. If a labelled trace
+# is being recorded, the command above will serialize it into
+# /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport/*.pftrace .
+domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, perfetto_exec, perfetto)
+allow dumpstate perfetto:process signal;
+allow dumpstate perfetto_traces_data_file:dir { search };
+allow dumpstate perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
+
+# When exec-ing /system/bin/perfetto, dumpstates redirects stdio to /dev/null
+# (which is labelled as dumpstate_tmpfs) to avoid leaking a FD to the bugreport
+# zip file. These rules are to allow perfetto.te to inherit dumpstate's
+# /dev/null.
+allow perfetto dumpstate_tmpfs:file rw_file_perms;
+allow perfetto dumpstate:fd use;
+
+# system_dlkm_file for /system_dlkm partition
+allow dumpstate system_dlkm_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Allow dumpstate to execute derive_sdk in its own domain
+domain_auto_trans(dumpstate, derive_sdk_exec, derive_sdk)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/ephemeral_app.te

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+###
+### Ephemeral apps.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for apps with the ephemeral
+### feature.
+###
+### The ephemeral_app domain is a reduced permissions sandbox allowing
+### ephemeral applications to be safely installed and run. Non ephemeral
+### applications may also opt-in to ephemeral to take advantage of the
+### additional security features.
+###
+### PackageManager flags an app as ephemeral at install time.
+
+typeattribute ephemeral_app coredomain;
+
+net_domain(ephemeral_app)
+app_domain(ephemeral_app)
+
+# Allow ephemeral apps to read/write files in visible storage if provided fds
+allow ephemeral_app { sdcard_type fuse media_rw_data_file }:file {read write getattr ioctl lock append};
+
+# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
+# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
+allow ephemeral_app privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+allow ephemeral_app app_data_file:file     { r_file_perms execute };
+
+# Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality.
+allow ephemeral_app privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow the renderscript compiler to be run.
+domain_auto_trans(ephemeral_app, rs_exec, rs)
+
+# Allow loading and deleting shared libraries created by trusted system
+# components within an application home directory.
+allow ephemeral_app app_exec_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute unlink };
+
+# services
+allow ephemeral_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_api_service:service_manager find;
+
+# allow ephemeral apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow ephemeral_app system_server:udp_socket {
+        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
+
+allow ephemeral_app ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+neverallow ephemeral_app app_data_file_type:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Receive or send uevent messages.
+neverallow ephemeral_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+
+# Receive or send generic netlink messages
+neverallow ephemeral_app domain:netlink_socket *;
+
+# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
+# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
+neverallow ephemeral_app debugfs_type:file read;
+
+# execute gpu_device
+neverallow ephemeral_app gpu_device:chr_file execute;
+
+# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
+neverallow ephemeral_app sysfs:file *;
+
+# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
+# Create a more specific label if needed
+neverallow ephemeral_app proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+
+# Directly access external storage
+neverallow ephemeral_app { sdcard_type fuse media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
+neverallow ephemeral_app { sdcard_type fuse media_rw_data_file }:dir search;
+
+# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
+# ongoing connections.
+neverallow ephemeral_app proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/evsmanagerd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# evsmanager
+typeattribute evsmanagerd coredomain;
+typeattribute evsmanagerd evsmanager_service_server;
+
+type evsmanagerd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(evsmanagerd);
+
+# Declares as a binder service
+binder_service(evsmanagerd)
+
+# Allows to add a service to service_manager
+add_service(evsmanagerd, evsmanagerd_service)
+
+# Allows to use the binder IPC
+binder_use(evsmanagerd)
+
+# Allows binder IPCs to the various system services
+binder_call(evsmanagerd, system_server)
+
+# Allows to use EVS HAL implementations
+hal_client_domain(evsmanagerd, hal_evs)
+
+# Allows to write messages to the shell
+allow evsmanagerd shell:fd use;
+allow evsmanagerd shell:fifo_file write;
+
+# Allows to use the graphics allocator
+allow evsmanagerd hal_graphics_allocator:fd use;
+
+# Allows to use a bootstrap statsd
+allow evsmanagerd statsbootstrap_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allows binder IPCs to the CarService
+binder_call(evsmanagerd, appdomain)
+
+# For HIDL evs manager implementation
+allow evsmanagerd hal_evs_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;
+allow evsmanagerd hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/extra_free_kbytes.te

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute extra_free_kbytes coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(extra_free_kbytes)
+
+# Only extra_free_kbytes script is allowed to store these properties
+set_prop(extra_free_kbytes, init_storage_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fastbootd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+typeattribute fastbootd coredomain;
+
+# The allow rules are only included in the recovery policy.
+# Otherwise fastbootd is only allowed the domain rules.
+recovery_only(`
+  # Reboot the device
+  set_prop(fastbootd, powerctl_prop)
+
+  # Read serial number of the device from system properties
+  get_prop(fastbootd, serialno_prop)
+
+  # Set sys.usb.ffs.ready.
+  get_prop(fastbootd, ffs_config_prop)
+  set_prop(fastbootd, ffs_control_prop)
+
+  userdebug_or_eng(`
+    get_prop(fastbootd, persistent_properties_ready_prop)
+  ')
+
+  set_prop(fastbootd, gsid_prop)
+
+  # Determine allocation scheme (whether B partitions needs to be
+  # at the second half of super.
+  get_prop(fastbootd, virtual_ab_prop)
+  get_prop(fastbootd, snapuserd_prop)
+
+  # Needed for TCP protocol
+  allow fastbootd node:tcp_socket node_bind;
+  allow fastbootd port:tcp_socket name_bind;
+  allow fastbootd self:tcp_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl listen accept };
+
+  # Start snapuserd for merging VABC updates
+  set_prop(fastbootd, ctl_snapuserd_prop)
+
+  # Needed to communicate with snapuserd to complete merges.
+  allow fastbootd snapuserd_socket:sock_file write;
+  allow fastbootd snapuserd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+  allow fastbootd dm_user_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Get fastbootd protocol property
+  get_prop(fastbootd, fastbootd_protocol_prop)
+
+  # Mount /metadata to interact with Virtual A/B snapshots.
+  allow fastbootd labeledfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
+  set_prop(fastbootd, boottime_prop)
+
+  # Needed for reading boot properties.
+  allow fastbootd proc_bootconfig:file r_file_perms;
+  # Let this domain use the hal fastboot service
+  binder_use(fastbootd)
+  hal_client_domain(fastbootd, hal_fastboot)
+')
+
+# This capability allows fastbootd to circumvent memlock rlimits while using
+# io_uring. An Alternative would be to up the memlock rlimit for the fastbootd service.
+allow fastbootd self:capability ipc_lock;
+io_uring_use(fastbootd)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/file.te

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+# /proc/config.gz
+type config_gz, fs_type, proc_type;
+
+# /sys/fs/bpf/<dir> for mainline tethering use
+# TODO: move S+ fs_bpf_tethering here from public/file.te
+type fs_bpf_net_private, fs_type, bpffs_type;
+type fs_bpf_net_shared, fs_type, bpffs_type;
+type fs_bpf_netd_readonly, fs_type, bpffs_type;
+type fs_bpf_netd_shared, fs_type, bpffs_type;
+type fs_bpf_loader, fs_type, bpffs_type;
+type fs_bpf_uprobestats, fs_type, bpffs_type;
+
+# /data/misc/storaged
+type storaged_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/wmtrace for wm traces
+type wm_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+
+# /data/misc/a11ytrace for accessibility traces
+type accessibility_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/perfetto-traces for perfetto traces
+type perfetto_traces_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport for perfetto traces for bugreports.
+type perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/perfetto-configs for perfetto configs
+type perfetto_configs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/uprobestats-configs for uprobestats configs
+type uprobestats_configs_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /apex/com.android.art/bin/oatdump
+type oatdump_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# /data/misc_{ce/de}/<user>/sdksandbox root data directory for sdk sandbox processes
+type sdk_sandbox_system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# /data/misc_{ce/de}/<user>/sdksandbox/<app-name>/* subdirectory for sdk sandbox processes
+type sdk_sandbox_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, app_data_file_type;
+
+# /sys/kernel/debug/kcov for coverage guided kernel fuzzing in userdebug builds.
+type debugfs_kcov, fs_type, debugfs_type;
+
+# App executable files in /data/data directories
+type app_exec_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+typealias app_exec_data_file alias rs_data_file;
+
+# /data/misc_[ce|de]/rollback : Used by installd to store snapshots
+# of application data.
+type rollback_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc_ce/checkin for checkin apps.
+type checkin_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/gsi/ota
+type ota_image_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/gsi_persistent_data
+type gsi_persistent_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/emergencynumberdb
+type emergency_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/profcollectd
+type profcollectd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art
+type apex_art_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/staging
+type apex_art_staging_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.compos
+type apex_compos_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.virt
+type apex_virt_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.tethering
+type apex_tethering_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+
+# legacy labels for various /data/misc[_ce|_de]/*/apexdata directories - retained
+# for backward compatibility b/217581286
+type apex_appsearch_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+type apex_permission_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+type apex_scheduling_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+type apex_wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/font/files
+type font_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/dmesgd
+type dmesgd_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/odrefresh
+type odrefresh_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/odsign
+type odsign_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/odsign_metrics
+type odsign_metrics_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/virtualizationservice
+# The type needs to be mlstrustedobject to allow for being accessed from
+# virtualizationmanager, which runs at a more constrained MLS level.
+type virtualizationservice_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+
+# /data/system/environ
+type environ_system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /data/misc/bootanim
+type bootanim_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+
+# /dev/kvm
+# The type needs to be mlstrustedobject to allow for being accessed from
+# crosvm, which runs at a more constrained MLS level.
+type kvm_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject, vm_manager_device_type;
+
+# /apex/com.android.virt/bin/fd_server
+type fd_server_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# /apex/com.android.compos/bin/compsvc
+type compos_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+# /apex/com.android.compos/bin/compos_key_helper
+type compos_key_helper_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+# /apex/com.android.art/bin/art_exec
+# This executable does not have its own domain because it is executed in the caller's domain. For
+# example, it is executed in the `artd` domain when artd calls it.
+type art_exec_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Filesystem entry for for PRNG seeder socket.  Processes require
+# write permission on this to connect, and needs to be mlstrustedobject
+# in to satisfy MLS constraints for trusted domains.
+type prng_seeder_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+
+# /proc/device-tree/avf and /sys/firmware/devicetree/base/avf
+type sysfs_dt_avf, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type proc_dt_avf, fs_type, proc_type;
+
+# Type for /system/fonts/font_fallback.xm
+type system_font_fallback_file, system_file_type, file_type;
+
+# Type for /sys/devices/uprobe.
+type sysfs_uprobe, fs_type, sysfs_type;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/file_contexts

@@ -0,0 +1,892 @@
+###########################################
+# Entries in this file describe the security context associated with a file
+# path. They are used when building the device image, to include the security
+# context within the extended file attributes of the file system. They are also
+# used at runtime when calling restorecon.
+#
+# Entries are merged with other file_contexts from other partitions (e.g.,
+# vendor or odm, see the full list at libselinux/src/android/android.c).
+#
+# The entries are evaluated by the following rules:
+# - Static entries (that is, not using regular expressions) are always
+#   evaluated first.
+# - The first matching entry is used.
+# - Entries are evaluated from the bottom to the top.
+#
+# Based on these rules, it is recommended that the less specific entries appear
+# first. For instance:
+#    /dev(/.*)?        u:object_r:device:s0
+#    /dev/block(/.*)?  u:object_r:block_device:s0
+#    /dev/block/my_dev u:object_r:my_dev:s0
+#
+
+# Root
+/                   u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# Data files
+/adb_keys           u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
+/build\.prop        u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/default\.prop      u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/fstab\..*          u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/init\..*           u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/res(/.*)?          u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/selinux_version    u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/ueventd\..*        u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/verity_key         u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# Executables
+/init               u:object_r:init_exec:s0
+/sbin(/.*)?         u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# For kernel modules
+/lib(/.*)?          u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/system_dlkm(/.*)?  u:object_r:system_dlkm_file:s0
+
+# Empty directories
+/lost\+found        u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/acct               u:object_r:cgroup:s0
+/config             u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/data_mirror        u:object_r:mirror_data_file:s0
+/debug_ramdisk      u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
+/mnt                u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
+/proc               u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/second_stage_resources u:object_r:tmpfs:s0
+/sys                u:object_r:sysfs:s0
+/apex               u:object_r:apex_mnt_dir:s0
+/bootstrap-apex     u:object_r:apex_mnt_dir:s0
+/tmp                u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
+
+# Postinstall directories
+/postinstall         u:object_r:postinstall_mnt_dir:s0
+/postinstall/apex    u:object_r:postinstall_apex_mnt_dir:s0
+
+/apex/(\.(bootstrap|default)-)?apex-info-list.xml u:object_r:apex_info_file:s0
+
+# Symlinks
+/bin                u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/bugreports         u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/charger            u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/d                  u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/etc                u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+/sdcard             u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+
+# SELinux policy files
+/vendor_file_contexts   u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_file_contexts     u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/product_file_contexts  u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/mapping_sepolicy\.cil   u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_sepolicy\.cil      u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/product_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor_property_contexts   u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor_seapp_contexts      u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/sepolicy           u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/plat_service_contexts   u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_hwservice_contexts   u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/plat_keystore2_key_contexts u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor_service_contexts    u:object_r:vendor_service_contexts_file:s0
+/vendor_hwservice_contexts    u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/vndservice_contexts   u:object_r:vndservice_contexts_file:s0
+
+##########################
+# Devices
+#
+/dev(/.*)?		u:object_r:device:s0
+/dev/adf[0-9]*		u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/adf-interface[0-9]*\.[0-9]*	u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/adf-overlay-engine[0-9]*\.[0-9]*	u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/ashmem		u:object_r:ashmem_device:s0
+/dev/ashmem(.*)?	u:object_r:ashmem_libcutils_device:s0
+/dev/audio.*		u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/binder		u:object_r:binder_device:s0
+/dev/block(/.*)?	u:object_r:block_device:s0
+/dev/block/by-name/zoned_device	u:object_r:zoned_block_device:s0
+/dev/block/dm-[0-9]+	u:object_r:dm_device:s0
+/dev/block/ublkb[0-9]+	u:object_r:ublk_block_device:s0
+/dev/block/loop[0-9]*	u:object_r:loop_device:s0
+/dev/block/vd[a-z][0-9]*  u:object_r:vd_device:s0
+/dev/block/vold/.+	u:object_r:vold_device:s0
+/dev/block/ram[0-9]*	u:object_r:ram_device:s0
+/dev/block/zram[0-9]*	u:object_r:ram_device:s0
+/dev/boringssl/selftest(/.*)?	u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_marker:s0
+/dev/bus/usb(.*)?       u:object_r:usb_device:s0
+/dev/console		u:object_r:console_device:s0
+/dev/cpu_variant:.*     u:object_r:dev_cpu_variant:s0
+/dev/dma_heap(/.*)?     u:object_r:dmabuf_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dma_heap/system    u:object_r:dmabuf_system_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dma_heap/system-uncached    u:object_r:dmabuf_system_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dma_heap/system-secure(.*)	 u:object_r:dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:s0
+/dev/dm-user(/.*)?	u:object_r:dm_user_device:s0
+/dev/ublk-control	u:object_r:ublk_control_device:s0
+/dev/device-mapper	u:object_r:dm_device:s0
+/dev/eac		u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/event-log-tags     u:object_r:runtime_event_log_tags_file:s0
+/dev/cgroup_info(/.*)?  u:object_r:cgroup_rc_file:s0
+/dev/fscklogs(/.*)?	u:object_r:fscklogs:s0
+/dev/fuse		u:object_r:fuse_device:s0
+/dev/gnss[0-9]+		u:object_r:gnss_device:s0
+/dev/graphics(/.*)?	u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/hidraw[0-9]+	u:object_r:hidraw_device:s0
+/dev/hw_random		u:object_r:hw_random_device:s0
+/dev/hwbinder		u:object_r:hwbinder_device:s0
+/dev/input(/.*)?	u:object_r:input_device:s0
+/dev/iio:device[0-9]+   u:object_r:iio_device:s0
+/dev/ion		u:object_r:ion_device:s0
+/dev/keychord   u:object_r:keychord_device:s0
+/dev/loop-control	u:object_r:loop_control_device:s0
+/dev/modem.*		u:object_r:radio_device:s0
+/dev/mtp_usb		u:object_r:mtp_device:s0
+/dev/pmsg0		u:object_r:pmsg_device:s0
+/dev/pn544		u:object_r:nfc_device:s0
+/dev/port		u:object_r:port_device:s0
+/dev/ptmx		u:object_r:ptmx_device:s0
+/dev/pvrsrvkm		u:object_r:gpu_device:s0
+/dev/kmsg		u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0
+/dev/kmsg_debug	u:object_r:kmsg_debug_device:s0
+/dev/kvm		u:object_r:kvm_device:s0
+/dev/null		u:object_r:null_device:s0
+/dev/nvhdcp1		u:object_r:video_device:s0
+/dev/random		u:object_r:random_device:s0
+/dev/rpmsg-omx[0-9]	u:object_r:rpmsg_device:s0
+/dev/rproc_user	u:object_r:rpmsg_device:s0
+/dev/rtc[0-9]      u:object_r:rtc_device:s0
+/dev/snd(/.*)?		u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/socket(/.*)?	u:object_r:socket_device:s0
+/dev/socket/adbd	u:object_r:adbd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/dnsproxyd	u:object_r:dnsproxyd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/dumpstate	u:object_r:dumpstate_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/fwmarkd	u:object_r:fwmarkd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/lmkd        u:object_r:lmkd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/logd	u:object_r:logd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/logdr	u:object_r:logdr_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/logdw	u:object_r:logdw_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/statsdw	u:object_r:statsdw_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/mdns	u:object_r:mdns_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/mdnsd	u:object_r:mdnsd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/ot-daemon(/.*)?  u:object_r:ot_daemon_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/buffer_hub	u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_dir:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/buffer_hub/client	u:object_r:pdx_bufferhub_client_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/performance	u:object_r:pdx_performance_dir:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/performance/client	u:object_r:pdx_performance_client_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display	u:object_r:pdx_display_dir:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/client	u:object_r:pdx_display_client_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/manager	u:object_r:pdx_display_manager_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/screenshot	u:object_r:pdx_display_screenshot_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/pdx/system/vr/display/vsync	u:object_r:pdx_display_vsync_endpoint_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/prng_seeder	u:object_r:prng_seeder_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/property_service	u:object_r:property_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/property_service_for_system  u:object_r:property_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/recovery    u:object_r:recovery_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/rild	u:object_r:rild_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/rild-debug	u:object_r:rild_debug_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/snapuserd u:object_r:snapuserd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/snapuserd_proxy u:object_r:snapuserd_proxy_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_crash u:object_r:tombstoned_crash_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_java_trace u:object_r:tombstoned_java_trace_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_intercept u:object_r:tombstoned_intercept_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_consumer	u:object_r:traced_consumer_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_perf	u:object_r:traced_perf_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_producer	u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/heapprofd	u:object_r:heapprofd_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/uncrypt	u:object_r:uncrypt_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/wpa_eth[0-9] u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/wpa_wlan[0-9] u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/zygote	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/zygote_secondary	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/usap_pool_primary	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/usap_pool_secondary	u:object_r:zygote_socket:s0
+/dev/spdif_out.*	u:object_r:audio_device:s0
+/dev/sys/block/by-name/rootdisk(/.*)?	u:object_r:rootdisk_sysdev:s0
+/dev/sys/block/by-name/userdata(/.*)?	u:object_r:userdata_sysdev:s0
+/dev/sys/fs/by-name/userdata(/.*)?	u:object_r:userdata_sysdev:s0
+/dev/tty		u:object_r:owntty_device:s0
+/dev/tty[0-9]*		u:object_r:tty_device:s0
+/dev/ttyS[0-9]*		u:object_r:serial_device:s0
+/dev/ttyUSB[0-9]*	u:object_r:usb_serial_device:s0
+/dev/ttyACM[0-9]*	u:object_r:usb_serial_device:s0
+/dev/tun		u:object_r:tun_device:s0
+/dev/uhid		u:object_r:uhid_device:s0
+/dev/uinput		u:object_r:uhid_device:s0
+/dev/uio[0-9]*		u:object_r:uio_device:s0
+/dev/urandom		u:object_r:random_device:s0
+/dev/usb_accessory	u:object_r:usbaccessory_device:s0
+/dev/v4l-touch[0-9]*	u:object_r:input_device:s0
+/dev/vfio(/.*)?		u:object_r:vfio_device:s0
+/dev/vhost-vsock	u:object_r:kvm_device:s0
+/dev/video[0-9]*	u:object_r:video_device:s0
+/dev/vndbinder		u:object_r:vndbinder_device:s0
+/dev/watchdog		u:object_r:watchdog_device:s0
+/dev/xt_qtaguid	u:object_r:qtaguid_device:s0
+/dev/zero		u:object_r:zero_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__ u:object_r:properties_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override u:object_r:properties_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__/property_info   u:object_r:property_info:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info   u:object_r:property_info:s0
+#############################
+# Linker configuration
+#
+/linkerconfig(/.*)?          u:object_r:linkerconfig_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# System files
+#
+/system(/.*)?		u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/system/apex/com.android.art	u:object_r:art_apex_dir:s0
+/system/lib(64)?(/.*)?		u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/system/lib(64)?/bootstrap(/.*)? u:object_r:system_bootstrap_lib_file:s0
+/system/bin/mm_events		u:object_r:mm_events_exec:s0
+/system/bin/atrace	u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0
+/system/bin/auditctl	u:object_r:auditctl_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bcc                 u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/blank_screen	u:object_r:blank_screen_exec:s0
+/system/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
+/system/bin/prng_seeder		u:object_r:prng_seeder_exec:s0
+/system/bin/charger		u:object_r:charger_exec:s0
+/system/bin/e2fsdroid		u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mke2fs		u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/e2fsck	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/extra_free_kbytes\.sh u:object_r:extra_free_kbytes_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsck\.exfat	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsck\.f2fs	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/init		u:object_r:init_exec:s0
+# TODO(/123600489): merge mini-keyctl into toybox
+/system/bin/mini-keyctl	--	u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsverity_init	u:object_r:fsverity_init_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sload_f2fs	--	u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/make_f2fs	--	u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fsck_msdos	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tcpdump	--	u:object_r:tcpdump_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tune2fs	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/resize2fs	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/toolbox	--	u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
+/system/bin/toybox	--	u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
+/system/bin/ld\.mc              u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logcat	--	u:object_r:logcat_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logcatd	--	u:object_r:logcat_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sh		--	u:object_r:shell_exec:s0
+/system/bin/run-as	--	u:object_r:runas_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootanimation u:object_r:bootanim_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootstat		u:object_r:bootstat_exec:s0
+/system/bin/app_process32	u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
+/system/bin/app_process64	u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
+/system/bin/servicemanager	u:object_r:servicemanager_exec:s0
+/system/bin/surfaceflinger	u:object_r:surfaceflinger_exec:s0
+/system/bin/gpuservice	u:object_r:gpuservice_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bufferhubd	u:object_r:bufferhubd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/performanced	u:object_r:performanced_exec:s0
+/system/bin/drmserver	u:object_r:drmserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/drmserver32	u:object_r:drmserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/drmserver64	u:object_r:drmserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dumpstate   u:object_r:dumpstate_exec:s0
+/system/bin/incident   u:object_r:incident_exec:s0
+/system/bin/incidentd   u:object_r:incidentd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/incident_helper  u:object_r:incident_helper_exec:s0
+/system/bin/iw                   u:object_r:iw_exec:s0
+/system/bin/netutils-wrapper-1\.0    u:object_r:netutils_wrapper_exec:s0
+/system/bin/vold	u:object_r:vold_exec:s0
+/system/bin/netd	u:object_r:netd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/wificond	u:object_r:wificond_exec:s0
+/system/bin/audioserver	u:object_r:audioserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediadrmserver	u:object_r:mediadrmserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaserver	u:object_r:mediaserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaserver32	u:object_r:mediaserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaserver64	u:object_r:mediaserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediametrics	u:object_r:mediametrics_exec:s0
+/system/bin/cameraserver	u:object_r:cameraserver_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaextractor	u:object_r:mediaextractor_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediaswcodec	u:object_r:mediaswcodec_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediatranscoding	u:object_r:mediatranscoding_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mediatuner	        u:object_r:mediatuner_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mdnsd	u:object_r:mdnsd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/installd	u:object_r:installd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/otapreopt_chroot   u:object_r:otapreopt_chroot_exec:s0
+/system/bin/otapreopt_slot   u:object_r:otapreopt_slot_exec:s0
+/system/bin/credstore	u:object_r:credstore_exec:s0
+/system/bin/keystore	u:object_r:keystore_exec:s0
+/system/bin/keystore2	u:object_r:keystore_exec:s0
+/system/bin/fingerprintd u:object_r:fingerprintd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/gatekeeperd u:object_r:gatekeeperd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tombstoned u:object_r:tombstoned_exec:s0
+/system/bin/recovery-persist     u:object_r:recovery_persist_exec:s0
+/system/bin/recovery-refresh     u:object_r:recovery_refresh_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sdcard      u:object_r:sdcardd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/snapshotctl      u:object_r:snapshotctl_exec:s0
+/system/bin/remount              u:object_r:remount_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dhcpcd      u:object_r:dhcp_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dhcpcd-6\.8\.2	u:object_r:dhcp_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dmesgd	u:object_r:dmesgd_exec:s0
+/system/xbin/su		u:object_r:su_exec:s0
+/system/bin/dnsmasq     u:object_r:dnsmasq_exec:s0
+/system/bin/linker(64)? u:object_r:system_linker_exec:s0
+/system/bin/linkerconfig u:object_r:linkerconfig_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootstrap/linker(64)? u:object_r:system_linker_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bootstrap/linkerconfig u:object_r:linkerconfig_exec:s0
+/system/bin/llkd        u:object_r:llkd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/lmkd        u:object_r:lmkd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/usbd   u:object_r:usbd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/inputflinger u:object_r:inputflinger_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logd        u:object_r:logd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/lpdumpd        u:object_r:lpdumpd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/rss_hwm_reset	u:object_r:rss_hwm_reset_exec:s0
+/system/bin/perfetto        u:object_r:perfetto_exec:s0
+/system/bin/mtectrl         u:object_r:mtectrl_exec:s0
+/system/bin/traced        u:object_r:traced_exec:s0
+/system/bin/traced_perf        u:object_r:traced_perf_exec:s0
+/system/bin/traced_probes        u:object_r:traced_probes_exec:s0
+/system/bin/heapprofd        u:object_r:heapprofd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/uncrypt     u:object_r:uncrypt_exec:s0
+/system/bin/update_verifier u:object_r:update_verifier_exec:s0
+/system/bin/logwrapper  u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/system/bin/vdc         u:object_r:vdc_exec:s0
+/system/bin/cppreopts\.sh   u:object_r:cppreopts_exec:s0
+/system/bin/preloads_copy\.sh u:object_r:preloads_copy_exec:s0
+/system/bin/preopt2cachename u:object_r:preopt2cachename_exec:s0
+/system/bin/viewcompiler     u:object_r:viewcompiler_exec:s0
+/system/bin/sgdisk      u:object_r:sgdisk_exec:s0
+/system/bin/blkid       u:object_r:blkid_exec:s0
+/system/bin/flags_health_check -- u:object_r:flags_health_check_exec:s0
+/system/bin/idmap2(d)?           u:object_r:idmap_exec:s0
+/system/bin/update_engine        u:object_r:update_engine_exec:s0
+/system/bin/profcollectd         u:object_r:profcollectd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/profcollectctl       u:object_r:profcollectd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/storaged             u:object_r:storaged_exec:s0
+/system/bin/virtual_touchpad     u:object_r:virtual_touchpad_exec:s0
+/system/bin/virtual_camera       u:object_r:virtual_camera_exec:s0
+/system/bin/hw/android\.frameworks\.bufferhub@1\.0-service    u:object_r:fwk_bufferhub_exec:s0
+/system/bin/hw/android\.system\.suspend-service               u:object_r:system_suspend_exec:s0
+/system/etc/cgroups\.json               u:object_r:cgroup_desc_file:s0
+/system/etc/task_profiles/cgroups_[0-9]+\.json               u:object_r:cgroup_desc_api_file:s0
+/system/etc/event-log-tags              u:object_r:system_event_log_tags_file:s0
+/system/etc/font_fallback.xml           u:object_r:system_font_fallback_file:s0
+/system/etc/group                       u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
+/system/etc/ld\.config.*                u:object_r:system_linker_config_file:s0
+/system/etc/passwd                      u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
+/system/etc/seccomp_policy(/.*)?        u:object_r:system_seccomp_policy_file:s0
+/system/etc/security/cacerts(/.*)?      u:object_r:system_security_cacerts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/mapping/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(\.compat)?\.cil       u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_service_contexts  u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_hwservice_contexts  u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_keystore2_key_contexts  u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts  u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_seapp_contexts  u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_sepolicy\.cil       u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/selinux/plat_and_mapping_sepolicy\.cil\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/system/etc/task_profiles\.json  u:object_r:task_profiles_file:s0
+/system/etc/task_profiles/task_profiles_[0-9]+\.json  u:object_r:task_profiles_api_file:s0
+/system/usr/share/zoneinfo(/.*)? u:object_r:system_zoneinfo_file:s0
+/system/bin/adbd                 u:object_r:adbd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/vold_prepare_subdirs u:object_r:vold_prepare_subdirs_exec:s0
+/system/bin/stats                u:object_r:stats_exec:s0
+/system/bin/statsd               u:object_r:statsd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/bpfloader            u:object_r:bpfloader_exec:s0
+/system/bin/netbpfload           u:object_r:bpfloader_exec:s0
+/system/bin/watchdogd            u:object_r:watchdogd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/apexd                u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/gsid                 u:object_r:gsid_exec:s0
+/system/bin/simpleperf           u:object_r:simpleperf_exec:s0
+/system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner    u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
+/system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data u:object_r:migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec:s0
+/system/bin/android\.frameworks\.automotive\.display@1\.0-service u:object_r:automotive_display_service_exec:s0
+/system/bin/snapuserd            u:object_r:snapuserd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/odsign               u:object_r:odsign_exec:s0
+/system/bin/vehicle_binding_util     u:object_r:vehicle_binding_util_exec:s0
+/system/bin/cardisplayproxyd     u:object_r:automotive_display_service_exec:s0
+/system/bin/evsmanagerd          u:object_r:evsmanagerd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/android\.automotive\.evs\.manager@1\.[0-9]+ u:object_r:evsmanagerd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/uprobestats           u:object_r:uprobestats_exec:s0
+
+#############################
+# Vendor files
+#
+/(vendor|system/vendor)(/.*)?                  u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/sh                 u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toybox_vendor      u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toolbox            u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/cgroups\.json      u:object_r:vendor_cgroup_desc_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/task_profiles\.json    u:object_r:vendor_task_profiles_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/avf/microdroid(/.*)?   u:object_r:vendor_microdroid_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)?     u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)? u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/manifest\.xml           u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/compatibility_matrix\.xml u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/vintf(/.*)?        u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/app(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/priv-app(/.*)?         u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/overlay(/.*)?          u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/framework(/.*)?        u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/apex(/[^/]+){0,2}                      u:object_r:vendor_apex_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/misc_writer                        u:object_r:vendor_misc_writer_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64)         u:object_r:vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
+
+# HAL location
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw            u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
+
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/selinux/vendor_service_contexts u:object_r:vendor_service_contexts_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# OEM and ODM files
+#
+/(odm|vendor/odm)(/.*)?                       u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)?          u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/hw                 u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/lib(64)?/vndk-sp(/.*)?      u:object_r:vndk_sp_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/bin/sh                      u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc(/.*)?                   u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/app(/.*)?                   u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/priv-app(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/overlay(/.*)?               u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/framework(/.*)?             u:object_r:vendor_framework_file:s0
+
+# secure-element service: vendor uuid mapping config file
+/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/etc/hal_uuid_map_(.*)?\.xml    u:object_r:vendor_uuid_mapping_config_file:s0
+
+
+# Input configuration
+/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/keylayout(/.*)?\.kl        u:object_r:vendor_keylayout_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/keychars(/.*)?\.kcm        u:object_r:vendor_keychars_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm|vendor|system/vendor)/usr/idc(/.*)?\.idc             u:object_r:vendor_idc_file:s0
+
+/oem(/.*)?              u:object_r:oemfs:s0
+/oem/overlay(/.*)?      u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+/oem/media/bootanimation.zip            u:object_r:bootanim_oem_file:s0
+/oem/media/shutdownanimation.zip        u:object_r:bootanim_oem_file:s0
+/oem/media/userspace-reboot.zip         u:object_r:bootanim_oem_file:s0
+
+# The precompiled monolithic sepolicy will be under /odm only when
+# BOARD_USES_ODMIMAGE is true: a separate odm.img is built.
+/odm/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy                           u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/odm/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy\.plat_and_mapping\.sha256 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_sepolicy\.cil                 u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_file_contexts                 u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_seapp_contexts                u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_property_contexts             u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_service_contexts              u:object_r:vendor_service_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_hwservice_contexts            u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_keystore2_key_contexts        u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/(odm|vendor/odm)/etc/selinux/odm_mac_permissions\.xml          u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Product files
+#
+/(product|system/product)(/.*)?                                 u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/group                             u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/passwd                            u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/overlay(/.*)?                         u:object_r:system_file:s0
+
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_file_contexts      u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_hwservice_contexts u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_keystore2_key_contexts u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_property_contexts  u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_seapp_contexts     u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_service_contexts   u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/(product|system/product)/etc/selinux/product_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+
+/(product|system/product)/lib(64)?(/.*)?                         u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# SystemExt files
+#
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)(/.*)?               u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/group           u:object_r:system_group_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/passwd          u:object_r:system_passwd_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/overlay(/.*)?       u:object_r:vendor_overlay_file:s0
+
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_file_contexts        u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_hwservice_contexts   u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_keystore2_key_contexts u:object_r:keystore2_key_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_property_contexts    u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_seapp_contexts       u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_service_contexts     u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/userdebug_plat_sepolicy\.cil    u:object_r:sepolicy_file:s0
+
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/aidl_lazy_test_server    u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/aidl_lazy_cb_test_server u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/hidl_lazy_test_server    u:object_r:hidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/hidl_lazy_cb_test_server u:object_r:hidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/hwservicemanager         u:object_r:hwservicemanager_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/hw/android\.hidl\.allocator@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_allocator_default_exec:s0
+
+
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/canhalconfigurator(-aidl)? u:object_r:canhalconfigurator_exec:s0
+
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/lib(64)?(/.*)?      u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# VendorDlkm files
+# This includes VENDOR Dynamically Loadable Kernel Modules and other misc files.
+#
+/(vendor_dlkm|vendor/vendor_dlkm|system/vendor/vendor_dlkm)(/.*)?         u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(vendor_dlkm|vendor/vendor_dlkm|system/vendor/vendor_dlkm)/etc(/.*)?     u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# OdmDlkm files
+# This includes ODM Dynamically Loadable Kernel Modules and other misc files.
+#
+/(odm_dlkm|vendor/odm_dlkm|system/vendor/odm_dlkm)(/.*)?                  u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(odm_dlkm|vendor/odm_dlkm|system/vendor/odm_dlkm)/etc(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Vendor files from /(product|system/product)/vendor_overlay
+#
+# NOTE: For additional vendor file contexts for vendor overlay files,
+# use device specific file_contexts.
+#
+/(product|system/product)/vendor_overlay/[0-9]+/.*          u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Data files
+#
+# NOTE: When modifying existing label rules, changes may also need to
+# propagate to the "Expanded data files" section.
+#
+/data		u:object_r:system_data_root_file:s0
+/data/(.*)?		u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/data/system/environ(/.*)? u:object_r:environ_system_data_file:s0
+/data/system/packages\.list u:object_r:packages_list_file:s0
+/data/system/game_mode_intervention\.list u:object_r:game_mode_intervention_list_file:s0
+/data/unencrypted(/.*)?         u:object_r:unencrypted_data_file:s0
+/data/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+/data/secure/backup(/.*)?	u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+/data/system/ndebugsocket	u:object_r:system_ndebug_socket:s0
+/data/system/unsolzygotesocket  u:object_r:system_unsolzygote_socket:s0
+/data/drm(/.*)?		u:object_r:drm_data_file:s0
+/data/resource-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:resourcecache_data_file:s0
+/data/dalvik-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/data/ota(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_data_file:s0
+/data/ota_package(/.*)? u:object_r:ota_package_file:s0
+/data/adb(/.*)?		u:object_r:adb_data_file:s0
+/data/anr(/.*)?		u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0
+/data/apex(/.*)?		u:object_r:apex_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/active/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/backup/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/decompressed/(.*)?    u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/apex/ota_reserved(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_ota_reserved_file:s0
+/data/app(/.*)?                       u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+# Traditional /data/app/[packageName]-[randomString]/base.apk location
+/data/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?                u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+# /data/app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
+/data/app/[^/]+/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?                u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)?           u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
+/data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)?           u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/data/app-private(/.*)?               u:object_r:apk_private_data_file:s0
+/data/app-private/vmdl.*\.tmp(/.*)?   u:object_r:apk_private_tmp_file:s0
+/data/gsi(/.*)?        u:object_r:gsi_data_file:s0
+/data/gsi_persistent_data    u:object_r:gsi_persistent_data_file:s0
+/data/gsi/ota(/.*)?    u:object_r:ota_image_data_file:s0
+/data/tombstones(/.*)?	u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0
+/data/local/tests(/.*)?	u:object_r:shell_test_data_file:s0
+/data/local/tmp(/.*)?	u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
+/data/local/tmp/ltp(/.*)?   u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
+/data/local/traces(/.*)?	u:object_r:trace_data_file:s0
+/data/media             u:object_r:media_userdir_file:s0
+/data/media/.*          u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
+/data/mediadrm(/.*)?	u:object_r:media_data_file:s0
+/data/nativetest(/.*)?	u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
+/data/nativetest64(/.*)?	u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
+# This directory was removed after Q Beta 2, but we need to preserve labels for upgrading devices.
+/data/pkg_staging(/.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/property(/.*)?	u:object_r:property_data_file:s0
+/data/preloads(/.*)?	u:object_r:preloads_data_file:s0
+/data/preloads/media(/.*)?	u:object_r:preloads_media_file:s0
+/data/preloads/demo(/.*)?	u:object_r:preloads_media_file:s0
+/data/server_configurable_flags(/.*)? u:object_r:server_configurable_flags_data_file:s0
+/data/app-staging(/.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+# Ensure we have the same labels as /data/app or /data/apex/active
+# to avoid restorecon conflicts
+/data/rollback/\d+/[^/]+/.*\.apk  u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+/data/rollback/\d+/[^/]+/.*\.apex u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
+/data/fonts/files(/.*)?     u:object_r:font_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce             u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/misc_de             u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/system_ce           u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/system_de           u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/user                u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/user_de             u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+
+# Misc data
+/data/misc/adb(/.*)?            u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
+/data/misc/a11ytrace(/.*)?      u:object_r:accessibility_trace_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.art(/.*)?           u:object_r:apex_art_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.compos(/.*)?        u:object_r:apex_compos_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.virt(/.*)?          u:object_r:apex_virt_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.scheduling(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.tethering(/.*)?     u:object_r:apex_tethering_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.uwb(/.*)?           u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?          u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apns(/.*)?           u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/appcompat(/.*)?      u:object_r:appcompat_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/audio(/.*)?          u:object_r:audio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/audioserver(/.*)?    u:object_r:audioserver_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/audiohal(/.*)?       u:object_r:audiohal_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bootstat(/.*)?       u:object_r:bootstat_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/boottrace(/.*)?      u:object_r:boottrace_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluetooth(/.*)?      u:object_r:bluetooth_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluetooth/logs(/.*)? u:object_r:bluetooth_logs_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluedroid(/.*)?      u:object_r:bluetooth_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/bluedroid/\.a2dp_ctrl u:object_r:bluetooth_socket:s0
+/data/misc/bluedroid/\.a2dp_data u:object_r:bluetooth_socket:s0
+/data/misc/camera(/.*)?         u:object_r:camera_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/carrierid(/.*)?      u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/dhcp(/.*)?           u:object_r:dhcp_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/dhcp-6\.8\.2(/.*)?     u:object_r:dhcp_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/dmesgd(/.*)?         u:object_r:dmesgd_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/emergencynumberdb(/.*)?     u:object_r:emergency_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/gatekeeper(/.*)?     u:object_r:gatekeeper_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/incidents(/.*)?	    u:object_r:incident_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/installd(/.*)?		u:object_r:install_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/keychain(/.*)?       u:object_r:keychain_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/credstore(/.*)?       u:object_r:credstore_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/keystore(/.*)?       u:object_r:keystore_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/logd(/.*)?           u:object_r:misc_logd_file:s0
+/data/misc/media(/.*)?          u:object_r:media_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/net(/.*)?            u:object_r:net_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/network_watchlist(/.*)? u:object_r:network_watchlist_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/telephonyconfig(/.*)? u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/nfc/logs(/.*)?       u:object_r:nfc_logs_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/odrefresh(/.*)?      u:object_r:odrefresh_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/odsign(/.*)?         u:object_r:odsign_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/odsign/metrics(/.*)? u:object_r:odsign_metrics_file:s0
+/data/misc/perfetto-traces(/.*)?          u:object_r:perfetto_traces_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport(.*)? u:object_r:perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/perfetto-configs(/.*)?         u:object_r:perfetto_configs_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/uprobestats-configs(/.*)?      u:object_r:uprobestats_configs_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/prereboot(/.*)?      u:object_r:prereboot_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/profcollectd(/.*)?   u:object_r:profcollectd_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/radio(/.*)?          u:object_r:radio_core_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/recovery(/.*)?       u:object_r:recovery_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/shared_relro(/.*)?   u:object_r:shared_relro_file:s0
+/data/misc/sms(/.*)?            u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/snapshotctl_log(/.*)?      u:object_r:snapshotctl_log_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-active-metric(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-data(/.*)?     u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-service(/.*)?  u:object_r:stats_config_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-metadata(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/systemkeys(/.*)?     u:object_r:systemkeys_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/textclassifier(/.*)?       u:object_r:textclassifier_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/train-info(/.*)?     u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/user(/.*)?           u:object_r:misc_user_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/virtualizationservice(/.*)? u:object_r:virtualizationservice_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/vpn(/.*)?            u:object_r:vpn_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/wifi(/.*)?           u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/wifi/sockets(/.*)?   u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
+/data/misc/wifi/sockets/wpa_ctrl.*   u:object_r:system_wpa_socket:s0
+/data/misc/vold(/.*)?           u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/update_engine(/.*)?  u:object_r:update_engine_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/update_engine_log(/.*)?  u:object_r:update_engine_log_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/snapuserd_log(/.*)?  u:object_r:snapuserd_log_data_file:s0
+/data/system/dropbox(/.*)?      u:object_r:dropbox_data_file:s0
+/data/system/heapdump(/.*)?     u:object_r:heapdump_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/trace(/.*)?          u:object_r:method_trace_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/wmtrace(/.*)?        u:object_r:wm_trace_data_file:s0
+# TODO(calin) label profile reference differently so that only
+# profman run as a special user can write to them
+/data/misc/profiles/cur(/[0-9]+)?   u:object_r:user_profile_root_file:s0
+/data/misc/profiles/cur/[0-9]+/.*   u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/profiles/ref(/.*)?       u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/profman(/.*)?        u:object_r:profman_dump_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_ce                 u:object_r:vendor_userdir_file:s0
+/data/vendor_ce/.*              u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_de                 u:object_r:vendor_userdir_file:s0
+/data/vendor_de/.*              u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor/tombstones/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:tombstone_wifi_data_file:s0
+
+# storaged proto files
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/storaged(/.*)?       u:object_r:storaged_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/storaged(/.*)?       u:object_r:storaged_data_file:s0
+
+# checkin data files
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/checkin(/.*)? u:object_r:checkin_data_file:s0
+
+# Fingerprint data
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)? u:object_r:fingerprintd_data_file:s0
+
+# Fingerprint vendor data file
+/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)? u:object_r:fingerprint_vendor_data_file:s0
+
+# Face vendor data file
+/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/facedata(/.*)? u:object_r:face_vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_ce/[0-9]+/facedata(/.*)? u:object_r:face_vendor_data_file:s0
+
+# Iris vendor data file
+/data/vendor_de/[0-9]+/irisdata(/.*)? u:object_r:iris_vendor_data_file:s0
+
+# Bootchart data
+/data/bootchart(/.*)?		u:object_r:bootchart_data_file:s0
+
+# Sandbox sdk data (managed by installd)
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/sdksandbox       u:object_r:sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/sdksandbox       u:object_r:sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:s0
+
+# App data snapshots (managed by installd).
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/rollback(/.*)?       u:object_r:rollback_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/rollback(/.*)?       u:object_r:rollback_data_file:s0
+
+# Apex data directories
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.appsearch(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?        u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)?        u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.uwb(/.*)?         u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com\.android\.uwb(/.*)?         u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+
+# Apex rollback directories
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
+
+# Incremental directories
+/data/incremental(/.*)?                                 u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.pending_reads         u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
+/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.log                   u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
+/data/incremental/MT_[^/]+/mount/.blocks_written        u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0
+
+# Boot animation data
+/data/misc/bootanim(/.*)? u:object_r:bootanim_data_file:s0
+#############################
+# Expanded data files
+#
+/mnt/expand                                         u:object_r:mnt_expand_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+(/.*)?                             u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app(/.*)?                         u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?               u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+# /mnt/expand/..../app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?        u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)?          u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)?      u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/local/tmp(/.*)?                   u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/media                             u:object_r:media_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/media/.*                          u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc/vold(/.*)?                   u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc_ce                           u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc_de                           u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/user                              u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/user_de                           u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+
+# coredump directory for userdebug/eng devices
+/cores(/.*)?                    u:object_r:coredump_file:s0
+
+# Wallpaper files
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_lock_orig	u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_lock	u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper_orig	u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/wallpaper		u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0
+
+# Ringtone files
+/data/system_de/[0-9]+/ringtones(/.*)?          u:object_r:ringtone_file:s0
+
+# ShortcutManager icons, e.g.
+#   /data/system_ce/0/shortcut_service/bitmaps/com.example.app/1457472879282.png
+/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/shortcut_service/bitmaps(/.*)? u:object_r:shortcut_manager_icons:s0
+
+# User icon files
+/data/system/users/[0-9]+/photo\.png             u:object_r:icon_file:s0
+
+# Shutdown-checkpoints files
+/data/system/shutdown-checkpoints(/.*)?          u:object_r:shutdown_checkpoints_system_data_file:s0
+
+# vold per-user data
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/vold(/.*)?           u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/vold(/.*)?           u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+
+# Backup service persistent per-user bookkeeping
+/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+# Backup service temporary per-user data for inter-change with apps
+/data/system_ce/[0-9]+/backup_stage(/.*)?	u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# efs files
+#
+/efs(/.*)?		u:object_r:efs_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Cache files
+#
+/cache(/.*)?		u:object_r:cache_file:s0
+/cache/recovery(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0
+# General backup/restore interchange with apps
+/cache/backup_stage(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_backup_file:s0
+# LocalTransport (backup) uses this subtree
+/cache/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:cache_private_backup_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Overlayfs support directories
+#
+/cache/overlay(/.*)?            u:object_r:overlayfs_file:s0
+/mnt/scratch(/.*)?              u:object_r:overlayfs_file:s0
+
+/data/cache(/.*)?		u:object_r:cache_file:s0
+/data/cache/recovery(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_recovery_file:s0
+# General backup/restore interchange with apps
+/data/cache/backup_stage(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_backup_file:s0
+# LocalTransport (backup) uses this subtree
+/data/cache/backup(/.*)?	u:object_r:cache_private_backup_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# Metadata files
+#
+/metadata(/.*)?           u:object_r:metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/apex(/.*)?      u:object_r:apex_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/vold(/.*)?      u:object_r:vold_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi(/.*)?       u:object_r:gsi_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/active  u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/booted  u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/lp_names  u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/dsu/[^/]+/metadata_encryption_dir u:object_r:gsi_public_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi/ota(/.*)?   u:object_r:ota_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/password_slots(/.*)?    u:object_r:password_slot_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/ota(/.*)?       u:object_r:ota_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/bootstat(/.*)?  u:object_r:metadata_bootstat_file:s0
+/metadata/staged-install(/.*)?    u:object_r:staged_install_file:s0
+/metadata/userspacereboot(/.*)?    u:object_r:userspace_reboot_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/watchdog(/.*)?    u:object_r:watchdog_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/repair-mode(/.*)?    u:object_r:repair_mode_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/aconfig(/.*)?    u:object_r:aconfig_storage_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/aconfig/flags(/.*)?    u:object_r:aconfig_storage_flags_metadata_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# asec containers
+/mnt/asec(/.*)?             u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0
+/mnt/asec/[^/]+/[^/]+\.zip  u:object_r:asec_public_file:s0
+/mnt/asec/[^/]+/lib(/.*)?   u:object_r:asec_public_file:s0
+/data/app-asec(/.*)?        u:object_r:asec_image_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# external storage
+/mnt/media_rw(/.*)?         u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0
+/mnt/user(/.*)?             u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0
+/mnt/pass_through(/.*)?     u:object_r:mnt_pass_through_file:s0
+/mnt/sdcard                 u:object_r:mnt_sdcard_file:s0
+/mnt/runtime(/.*)?          u:object_r:storage_file:s0
+/storage(/.*)?              u:object_r:storage_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# mount point for read-write vendor partitions
+/mnt/vendor(/.*)?           u:object_r:mnt_vendor_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# mount point for read-write product partitions
+/mnt/product(/.*)?          u:object_r:mnt_product_file:s0
+
+#############################
+# /postinstall file contexts
+/(system|product)/bin/check_dynamic_partitions  u:object_r:postinstall_exec:s0
+/(system|product)/bin/otapreopt_script          u:object_r:postinstall_exec:s0
+/(system|product)/bin/otapreopt                 u:object_r:postinstall_dexopt_exec:s0

prebuilts/api/202404/private/file_contexts_asan

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/data/asan/system/lib(/.*)?                u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/system/lib64(/.*)?              u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/vendor/lib(/.*)?                u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/vendor/lib64(/.*)?              u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/odm/lib(/.*)?                   u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/odm/lib64(/.*)?                 u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/product/lib(/.*)?               u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/product/lib64(/.*)?             u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/lib(/.*)?     u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/data/asan/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/lib64(/.*)?   u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/system/asan.options           u:object_r:system_asan_options_file:s0
+/system/bin/asan_extract       u:object_r:asan_extract_exec:s0
+/system/bin/asanwrapper        u:object_r:asanwrapper_exec:s0
+/system/bin/asan/app_process   u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
+/system/bin/asan/app_process32 u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0
+/system/bin/asan/app_process64 u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0

prebuilts/api/202404/private/file_contexts_overlayfs

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#############################
+# Overlayfs support directories for userdebug/eng devices
+#
+/cache/overlay/(system|product)/upper       u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/cache/overlay/(vendor|odm)/upper           u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/cache/overlay/oem/upper                    u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/mnt/scratch/overlay/(system|product)/upper u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/mnt/scratch/overlay/(vendor|odm)/upper     u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/mnt/scratch/overlay/oem/upper              u:object_r:vendor_file:s0

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fingerprintd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+typeattribute fingerprintd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(fingerprintd)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/flags_health_check.te

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+typeattribute flags_health_check coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(flags_health_check)
+
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_boot_count_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_core_experiments_team_internal_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_edgetpu_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_reset_performed_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_input_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_lmkd_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_netd_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_nnapi_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_media_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_mglru_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_statsd_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_statsd_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_swcodec_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_sys_traced_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_configuration_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_connectivity_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_surface_flinger_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_aconfig_flags_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_vendor_system_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_vendor_system_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_virtualization_framework_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_memory_safety_native_boot_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_memory_safety_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_remote_key_provisioning_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_camera_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_tethering_u_or_later_native_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, next_boot_prop)
+
+# system property device_config_boot_count_prop is used for deciding when to perform server
+# configurable flags related disaster recovery. Mistakenly set up by unrelated components can, at a
+# wrong timing, trigger server configurable flag related disaster recovery, which will override
+# server configured values of all flags with default values.
+neverallow { domain -init -flags_health_check } device_config_boot_count_prop:property_service set;
+
+# system property device_config_reset_performed_prop is used for indicating whether server
+# configurable flags have been reset during booting. Mistakenly modified by unrelated components can
+# cause bad server configurable flags synced back to device.
+neverallow { domain -init -flags_health_check } device_config_reset_performed_prop:property_service set;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fs_use

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Label inodes via getxattr.
+fs_use_xattr yaffs2 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr jffs2 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr ext2 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr ext3 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr ext4 u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr xfs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr btrfs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr f2fs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr squashfs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr overlay u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr erofs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr incremental-fs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+fs_use_xattr virtiofs u:object_r:labeledfs:s0;
+
+# Label inodes from task label.
+fs_use_task pipefs u:object_r:pipefs:s0;
+fs_use_task sockfs u:object_r:sockfs:s0;
+
+# Label inodes from combination of task label and fs label.
+# Define type_transition rules if you want per-domain types.
+fs_use_trans devpts u:object_r:devpts:s0;
+fs_use_trans tmpfs u:object_r:tmpfs:s0;
+fs_use_trans devtmpfs u:object_r:device:s0;
+fs_use_trans shm u:object_r:shm:s0;
+fs_use_trans mqueue u:object_r:mqueue:s0;
+

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fsck.te

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+typeattribute fsck coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(fsck)
+
+allow fsck metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fsck_untrusted.te

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+typeattribute fsck_untrusted coredomain;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fsverity_init.te

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+type fsverity_init, domain, coredomain;
+type fsverity_init_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(fsverity_init)
+
+# Allow to read /proc/keys for searching key id.
+allow fsverity_init proc_keys:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Ignore denials to access irrelevant keys, as a side effect to access /proc/keys.
+dontaudit fsverity_init domain:key view;
+allow fsverity_init kernel:key { view search write setattr };
+allow fsverity_init fsverity_init:key { view search write };
+
+# Read the on-device signing certificate, to be able to add it to the keyring
+allow fsverity_init odsign:fd use;
+allow fsverity_init odsign_data_file:file { getattr read };

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fuseblkd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Compartmentalized domain specifically for mounting fuseblk filesystems.
+# We need this to not grant fuseblkd_untrusted sys_admin permissions.
+type fuseblkd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type fuseblkd, domain;
+
+typeattribute fuseblkd coredomain;
+
+# Required for mount and unmounting. We can't minimize this permission,
+# even though we only allow mount/unmount.
+allow fuseblkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# Permissions for the fuseblk filesystem.
+allow fuseblkd fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fuseblkd fuseblk:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow fuseblkd fuseblkd_untrusted:fd use;
+
+# Look through block devices to find the correct one.
+allow fuseblkd block_device:dir search;
+
+# Permissions to mount on the media_rw directory for USB drives.
+allow fuseblkd mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+allow fuseblkd mnt_media_rw_stub_file:dir mounton;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Only allow entry from fuseblkd_untrusted, and only through fuseblkd_exec binary.
+neverallow { domain -fuseblkd_untrusted } fuseblkd:process transition;
+neverallow * fuseblkd:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fuseblkd { file_type fs_type -fuseblkd_exec }:file entrypoint;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fuseblkd_untrusted.te

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Fuseblk is a Filesystem in USErspace for block device. It should only be used
+# to mount untrusted blocks like USB drives.
+type fuseblkd_untrusted_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type fuseblkd_untrusted, domain;
+
+typeattribute fuseblkd_untrusted coredomain;
+
+domain_auto_trans(fuseblkd_untrusted, fuseblkd_exec, fuseblkd);
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted vold:fd use;
+
+# Allows fuseblk to read block devices.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted block_device:dir search;
+
+# Permissions to read dynamic partitions blocks.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted super_block_device:blk_file getattr;
+
+# Permissions to access FUSE character devices.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted fuse_device:chr_file { getattr open read write };
+
+# Permissions to access /mnt/media_rw/.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted mnt_media_rw_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted mnt_media_rw_stub_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Permissions to read device mappers.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted sysfs_dm:dir search;
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted sysfs_dm:file { getattr open read };
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted dm_device:blk_file getattr;
+
+# Permissions to read links in tmpfs.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted tmpfs:lnk_file read;
+
+# Permissions to read loop device blocks.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted loop_device:blk_file getattr;
+
+# Permissions to access the /proc/filesystems file.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted proc_filesystems:file { open read getattr };
+
+###
+### dontaudit rules
+###
+
+# ntfs-3g wants this permission to read a fork return code, for some reason.
+# It's unclear why, because it still reads the fork return code correctly,
+# and nothing breaks. If enforce is set to permissive, the audit goes away.
+dontaudit fuseblkd_untrusted self:capability sys_admin;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Fuseblk should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data.
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  metadata_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdata_block_device
+  cache_block_device
+  dm_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold, and only through fuseblkd_untrusted_exec binaries.
+neverallow { domain -vold } fuseblkd_untrusted:process transition;
+neverallow * fuseblkd_untrusted:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fuseblkd_untrusted_exec }:file entrypoint;
+
+# Under no circumstances should fuseblkd_untrusted or any other fuseblk filesystem be
+# given sys_admin access. They are fundementally untrusted, insecure filesystems.
+# The correct solution here is to compartmentalize permissions correctly so that
+# a smaller binary can get the required permissions. See fuseblkd.te.
+# Similar to above, we don't need setgid or setuid permissions.
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted self:capability { setgid setuid sys_admin };
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid sys_admin };
+
+# Since we can't have sys_admin permissions, we definitely can't have mount/unmount
+# permissions, since we won't be able to use them. Same with relabel permissions.
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted fuseblk:filesystem { mount unmount relabelto relabelfrom};

prebuilts/api/202404/private/fwk_bufferhub.te

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+type fwk_bufferhub, domain, coredomain;
+type fwk_bufferhub_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+hal_client_domain(fwk_bufferhub, hal_graphics_allocator)
+allow fwk_bufferhub ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+init_daemon_domain(fwk_bufferhub)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/gatekeeperd.te

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+typeattribute gatekeeperd coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(gatekeeperd)
+
+# For checking whether GSI is running
+get_prop(gatekeeperd, gsid_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/genfs_contexts

@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+# Label inodes with the fs label.
+genfscon rootfs / u:object_r:rootfs:s0
+# proc labeling can be further refined (longest matching prefix).
+genfscon proc / u:object_r:proc:s0
+genfscon proc /asound u:object_r:proc_asound:s0
+genfscon proc /bootconfig u:object_r:proc_bootconfig:s0
+genfscon proc /buddyinfo u:object_r:proc_buddyinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /cmdline u:object_r:proc_cmdline:s0
+genfscon proc /config.gz u:object_r:config_gz:s0
+genfscon proc /cpu/alignment u:object_r:proc_cpu_alignment:s0
+genfscon proc /device-tree/avf u:object_r:proc_dt_avf:s0
+genfscon proc /diskstats u:object_r:proc_diskstats:s0
+genfscon proc /filesystems u:object_r:proc_filesystems:s0
+genfscon proc /interrupts u:object_r:proc_interrupts:s0
+genfscon proc /iomem u:object_r:proc_iomem:s0
+genfscon proc /kallsyms u:object_r:proc_kallsyms:s0
+genfscon proc /keys u:object_r:proc_keys:s0
+genfscon proc /kmsg u:object_r:proc_kmsg:s0
+genfscon proc /loadavg u:object_r:proc_loadavg:s0
+genfscon proc /locks u:object_r:proc_locks:s0
+genfscon proc /lowmemorykiller u:object_r:proc_lowmemorykiller:s0
+genfscon proc /meminfo u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0
+genfscon proc /misc u:object_r:proc_misc:s0
+genfscon proc /modules u:object_r:proc_modules:s0
+genfscon proc /mounts u:object_r:proc_mounts:s0
+genfscon proc /net u:object_r:proc_net:s0
+genfscon proc /net/tcp u:object_r:proc_net_tcp_udp:s0
+genfscon proc /net/udp u:object_r:proc_net_tcp_udp:s0
+genfscon proc /net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl u:object_r:proc_qtaguid_ctrl:s0
+genfscon proc /net/xt_qtaguid/ u:object_r:proc_qtaguid_stat:s0
+genfscon proc /cpuinfo u:object_r:proc_cpuinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /pagetypeinfo u:object_r:proc_pagetypeinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /pressure/cpu u:object_r:proc_pressure_cpu:s0
+genfscon proc /pressure/io u:object_r:proc_pressure_io:s0
+genfscon proc /pressure/memory u:object_r:proc_pressure_mem:s0
+genfscon proc /slabinfo u:object_r:proc_slabinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /softirqs u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
+genfscon proc /stat u:object_r:proc_stat:s0
+genfscon proc /swaps u:object_r:proc_swaps:s0
+genfscon proc /sysrq-trigger u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0
+genfscon proc /kpageflags u:object_r:proc_kpageflags:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/abi/swp u:object_r:proc_abi:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/pipe-max-size u:object_r:proc_pipe_conf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_hardlinks u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/protected_symlinks u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/fs/suid_dumpable u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/bpf_ u:object_r:proc_bpf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/core_pattern u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/core_pipe_limit u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/domainname u:object_r:proc_hostname:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hostname u:object_r:proc_hostname:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hung_task_ u:object_r:proc_hung_task:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/kptr_restrict u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modules_disabled u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/panic_on_oops u:object_r:proc_panic:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_cpu_time_max_percent u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/perf_event_mlock_kb u:object_r:proc_perf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/pid_max u:object_r:proc_pid_max:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/random u:object_r:proc_random:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/randomize_va_space u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_child_runs_first u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_latency_ns u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_rt_period_us u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_schedstats u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_tunable_scaling u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_util_clamp_max u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_util_clamp_min u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_util_clamp_min_rt_default u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sched_wakeup_granularity_ns u:object_r:proc_sched:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/sysrq u:object_r:proc_sysrq:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_ u:object_r:proc_bpf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/usermodehelper u:object_r:usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/net u:object_r:proc_net:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/net/core/bpf_ u:object_r:proc_bpf:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/dirty_background_ratio u:object_r:proc_dirty:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/dirty_expire_centisecs u:object_r:proc_dirty:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/extra_free_kbytes u:object_r:proc_extra_free_kbytes:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/max_map_count u:object_r:proc_max_map_count:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_min_addr u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits u:object_r:proc_security:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/page-cluster u:object_r:proc_page_cluster:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/drop_caches u:object_r:proc_drop_caches:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/overcommit_memory u:object_r:proc_overcommit_memory:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/min_free_order_shift u:object_r:proc_min_free_order_shift:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/watermark_boost_factor u:object_r:proc_watermark_boost_factor:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/watermark_scale_factor u:object_r:proc_watermark_scale_factor:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/percpu_pagelist_high_fraction u:object_r:proc_percpu_pagelist_high_fraction:s0
+genfscon proc /timer_list u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
+genfscon proc /timer_stats u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
+genfscon proc /tty/drivers u:object_r:proc_tty_drivers:s0
+genfscon proc /uid/ u:object_r:proc_uid_time_in_state:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_cputime/show_uid_stat u:object_r:proc_uid_cputime_showstat:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_cputime/remove_uid_range u:object_r:proc_uid_cputime_removeuid:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_io/stats u:object_r:proc_uid_io_stats:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_procstat/set u:object_r:proc_uid_procstat_set:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_time_in_state u:object_r:proc_uid_time_in_state:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_concurrent_active_time u:object_r:proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_concurrent_policy_time u:object_r:proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:s0
+genfscon proc /uid_cpupower/ u:object_r:proc_uid_cpupower:s0
+genfscon proc /uptime u:object_r:proc_uptime:s0
+genfscon proc /version u:object_r:proc_version:s0
+genfscon proc /vmallocinfo u:object_r:proc_vmallocinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /vmstat u:object_r:proc_vmstat:s0
+genfscon proc /zoneinfo u:object_r:proc_zoneinfo:s0
+genfscon proc /vendor_sched u:object_r:proc_vendor_sched:s0
+
+genfscon fusectl / u:object_r:fusectlfs:s0
+
+# selinuxfs booleans can be individually labeled.
+genfscon selinuxfs / u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0
+genfscon cgroup / u:object_r:cgroup:s0
+genfscon cgroup2 / u:object_r:cgroup_v2:s0
+# sysfs labels can be set by userspace.
+genfscon sysfs / u:object_r:sysfs:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/cs_etm                    u:object_r:sysfs_devices_cs_etm:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/system/cpu u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/android_usb                 u:object_r:sysfs_android_usb:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/extcon                      u:object_r:sysfs_extcon:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/gpu                         u:object_r:sysfs_gpu:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/leds                        u:object_r:sysfs_leds:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/net                         u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill0/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill1/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill2/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rfkill/rfkill3/state        u:object_r:sysfs_bluetooth_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/rtc                         u:object_r:sysfs_rtc:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/switch                      u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
+genfscon sysfs /class/wakeup                      u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/platform/nfc-power/nfc_power u:object_r:sysfs_nfc_power_writable:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/android_usb     u:object_r:sysfs_android_usb:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/            u:object_r:sysfs_devices_block:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/dm-       u:object_r:sysfs_dm:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/loop       u:object_r:sysfs_loop:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram0     u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram1     u:object_r:sysfs_zram:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram0/uevent    u:object_r:sysfs_zram_uevent:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/block/zram1/uevent    u:object_r:sysfs_zram_uevent:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/misc/hw_random    u:object_r:sysfs_hwrandom:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/net             u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/switch          u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/wakeup          u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
+genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/avf u:object_r:sysfs_dt_avf:s0
+genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android u:object_r:sysfs_dt_firmware_android:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/ext4/features                  u:object_r:sysfs_fs_ext4_features:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/f2fs                           u:object_r:sysfs_fs_f2fs:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/fuse/bpf_prog_type_fuse        u:object_r:sysfs_fs_fuse_bpf:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/fuse/features                  u:object_r:sysfs_fs_fuse_features:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/incremental-fs/features        u:object_r:sysfs_fs_incfs_features:s0
+genfscon sysfs /fs/incremental-fs/instances       u:object_r:sysfs_fs_incfs_metrics:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/autosleep u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/state u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/suspend_stats u:object_r:sysfs_suspend_stats:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/sync_on_suspend u:object_r:sysfs_sync_on_suspend:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/wakeup_count u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/wake_lock u:object_r:sysfs_wake_lock:s0
+genfscon sysfs /power/wake_unlock u:object_r:sysfs_wake_lock:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/memory_state_time u:object_r:sysfs_power:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/dma_heap u:object_r:sysfs_dma_heap:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/ion u:object_r:sysfs_ion:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/ipv4 u:object_r:sysfs_ipv4:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage u:object_r:sysfs_transparent_hugepage:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/mm/lru_gen/enabled u:object_r:sysfs_lru_gen_enabled:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/notes u:object_r:sysfs_kernel_notes:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/uevent_helper u:object_r:sysfs_usermodehelper:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/wakeup_reasons u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup_reasons:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/dmabuf/buffers u:object_r:sysfs_dmabuf_stats:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/dm_verity/parameters/prefetch_cluster u:object_r:sysfs_dm_verity:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/lowmemorykiller u:object_r:sysfs_lowmemorykiller:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/tcp_cubic/parameters u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/wlan/parameters/fwpath u:object_r:sysfs_wlan_fwpath:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/timed_output/vibrator/enable u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/misc/uhid u:object_r:sysfs_uhid:s0
+genfscon sysfs /kernel/vendor_sched u:object_r:sysfs_vendor_sched:s0
+genfscon sysfs /devices/uprobe u:object_r:sysfs_uprobe:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /kprobes                             u:object_r:debugfs_kprobes:s0
+genfscon debugfs /mmc0                                u:object_r:debugfs_mmc:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_debug:s0
+genfscon tracefs /                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_debug:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/tracing_on                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /tracing_on                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /trace                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/per_cpu/cpu                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /per_cpu/cpu                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/hyp                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /hyp                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances/bootreceiver      u:object_r:debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances/bootreceiver              u:object_r:debugfs_bootreceiver_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances/mm_events         u:object_r:debugfs_mm_events_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances/mm_events                 u:object_r:debugfs_mm_events_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/instances/wifi              u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /instances/wifi                      u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace_marker                u:object_r:debugfs_trace_marker:s0
+genfscon tracefs /trace_marker                        u:object_r:debugfs_trace_marker:s0
+genfscon debugfs /wakeup_sources                      u:object_r:debugfs_wakeup_sources:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/printk_formats              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_printk_formats:s0
+genfscon tracefs /printk_formats                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_printk_formats:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/header_page                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_get_data_block/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_iget/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_begin/              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/f2fs/f2fs_write_end/                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_begin/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_da_write_end/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_enter/   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_exit/    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_load_inode/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/block/block_rq_issue/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/block/block_rq_complete/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon tracefs /events/header_page                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_get_data_block/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_iget/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_write_begin/              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/f2fs/f2fs_write_end/                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_da_write_begin/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_da_write_end/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_enter/   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_es_lookup_extent_exit/    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_load_inode/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_enter/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ext4/ext4_sync_file_exit/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/block/block_rq_issue/               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/block/block_rq_complete/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon tracefs /synthetic_events                                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/synthetic_events                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon tracefs /events/synthetic/rss_stat_throttled                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/synthetic/rss_stat_throttled            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/synthetic/suspend_resume_minimal                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/synthetic/suspend_resume_minimal        u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon tracefs /trace_clock                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /buffer_size_kb                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /options/overwrite                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /options/print-tgid                                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /options/record-tgid                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /saved_cmdlines_size                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_switch/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_wakeup/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_wakeup_new/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_waking/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_blocked_reason/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_cpu_hotplug/                        u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_process_exit/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_process_free/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sched/sched_pi_setprio/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cgroup/                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_idle/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/clock_enable/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/clock_disable/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/clock_set_rate/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/cpu_frequency_limits/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/gpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/gpu_work_period/                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/power/suspend_resume/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpufreq_interactive/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_begin/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_end/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_wake/                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_sleep/                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction/                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction_received/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_lock/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_locked/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_unlock/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_transaction_alloc_buf/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_set_priority/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_command/                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/binder/binder_return/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/lowmemorykiller/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/sync/                                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/fence/                                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/dma_fence/                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/filemap/mm_filemap_add_to_page_cache/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/filemap/mm_filemap_delete_from_page_cache/      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/rss_stat/                                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/ion_heap_grow/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/kmem/ion_heap_shrink/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ion/ion_stat/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/mm_event/mm_event_record/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/oom/mark_victim/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_rename/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_newtask/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ftrace/print/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/gpu_mem/gpu_mem_total                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/thermal/thermal_temperature/                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/thermal/cdev_update/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_enter/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_exit/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/cpuhp/cpuhp_pause/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ipi/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/irq/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/clk/clk_enable/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/clk/clk_disable/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/clk/clk_set_rate/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace_clock                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/buffer_size_kb                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/overwrite                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/print-tgid                                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/options/record-tgid                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/saved_cmdlines_size                                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_wakeup/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_wakeup_new/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_blocked_reason/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_cpu_hotplug/                        u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_process_exit/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_process_free/                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sched/sched_pi_setprio/                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cgroup/                                         u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_idle/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/clock_enable/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/clock_disable/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/clock_set_rate/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/cpu_frequency_limits/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/gpu_frequency/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/gpu_work_period/                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/power/suspend_resume/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpufreq_interactive/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_begin/          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_direct_reclaim_end/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_wake/                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/vmscan/mm_vmscan_kswapd_sleep/                  u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction/                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction_received/             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_lock/                             u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_locked/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_unlock/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_transaction_alloc_buf/            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_set_priority/                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_command/                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/binder/binder_return/                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/lowmemorykiller/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/sync/                                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/fence/                                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/dma_fence/                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/filemap/mm_filemap_add_to_page_cache/           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/filemap/mm_filemap_delete_from_page_cache/      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/rss_stat/                                          u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/ion_heap_grow/                                     u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/kmem/ion_heap_shrink/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ion/ion_stat/                                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/mm_event/mm_event_record/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/oom/mark_victim/                                        u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/task/task_rename/                                       u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/task/task_newtask/                                      u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ftrace/print/                                   u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/gpu_mem/gpu_mem_total                           u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/thermal/thermal_temperature/                    u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/thermal/cdev_update/                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpuhp/cpuhp_enter/                              u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/cpuhp/cpuhp_exit/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ipi/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/irq/                                            u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/clk/clk_enable/                                 u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/clk/clk_disable/                                u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/clk/clk_set_rate/                               u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+
+genfscon debugfs /kcov								 u:object_r:debugfs_kcov:s0
+
+genfscon securityfs / u:object_r:securityfs:s0
+
+genfscon binder /binder u:object_r:binder_device:s0
+genfscon binder /hwbinder u:object_r:hwbinder_device:s0
+genfscon binder /vndbinder u:object_r:vndbinder_device:s0
+genfscon binder /binder_logs u:object_r:binderfs_logs:s0
+genfscon binder /binder_logs/proc u:object_r:binderfs_logs_proc:s0
+genfscon binder /binder_logs/stats u:object_r:binderfs_logs_stats:s0
+genfscon binder /features u:object_r:binderfs_features:s0
+
+genfscon inotifyfs / u:object_r:inotify:s0
+genfscon vfat / u:object_r:vfat:s0
+genfscon binder / u:object_r:binderfs:s0
+genfscon exfat / u:object_r:exfat:s0
+genfscon debugfs / u:object_r:debugfs:s0
+genfscon fuse / u:object_r:fuse:s0
+genfscon fuseblk / u:object_r:fuseblk:s0
+genfscon configfs / u:object_r:configfs:s0
+genfscon sdcardfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
+genfscon esdfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
+genfscon pstore / u:object_r:pstorefs:s0
+genfscon functionfs / u:object_r:functionfs:s0
+genfscon usbfs / u:object_r:usbfs:s0
+genfscon binfmt_misc / u:object_r:binfmt_miscfs:s0
+
+genfscon bpf / u:object_r:fs_bpf:s0
+genfscon bpf /loader u:object_r:fs_bpf_loader:s0
+genfscon bpf /net_private u:object_r:fs_bpf_net_private:s0
+genfscon bpf /net_shared u:object_r:fs_bpf_net_shared:s0
+genfscon bpf /netd_readonly u:object_r:fs_bpf_netd_readonly:s0
+genfscon bpf /netd_shared u:object_r:fs_bpf_netd_shared:s0
+genfscon bpf /tethering u:object_r:fs_bpf_tethering:s0
+genfscon bpf /vendor u:object_r:fs_bpf_vendor:s0
+genfscon bpf /uprobestats u:object_r:fs_bpf_uprobestats:s0

prebuilts/api/202404/private/gki_apex_prepostinstall.te

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# GKI pre- & post-install hooks.
+#
+# Allow to run pre- and post-install hooks for GKI APEXes
+
+type gki_apex_prepostinstall, domain, coredomain;
+type gki_apex_prepostinstall_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Execute /system/bin/sh.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Execute various toolsbox utilities.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow preinstall.sh to execute update_engine_stable_client binary.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall gki_apex_prepostinstall_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# Allow preinstall hook to communicate with update_engine to execute update.
+binder_use(gki_apex_prepostinstall)
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall update_engine_stable_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(gki_apex_prepostinstall, update_engine)
+
+# /dev/zero is inherited although it is not used. See b/126787589.
+allow gki_apex_prepostinstall apexd:fd use;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/gmscore_app.te

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing the PrebuiltGMSCore app.
+###
+typeattribute gmscore_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(gmscore_app)
+
+allow gmscore_app sysfs_type:dir search;
+# Read access to /sys/block/zram*/mm_stat
+r_dir_file(gmscore_app, sysfs_zram)
+
+r_dir_file(gmscore_app, rootfs)
+
+# Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf
+allow gmscore_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
+
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
+binder_call(gmscore_app, update_engine)
+allow gmscore_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged.
+binder_call(gmscore_app, storaged)
+allow gmscore_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow GMS core to access system_update_service (e.g. to publish pending
+# system update info).
+allow gmscore_app system_update_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow GMS core to communicate with statsd.
+binder_call(gmscore_app, statsd)
+
+# Allow GMS core to receive Perfetto traces through the framework
+# (i.e. TracingServiceProxy) and sendfile them into its private directory
+# for reporting when network and battery conditions are appropriate.
+allow gmscore_app perfetto:fd use;
+allow gmscore_app perfetto_traces_data_file:file { read getattr };
+
+# Allow GMS core to generate unique hardware IDs
+allow gmscore_app keystore:keystore2_key gen_unique_id;
+
+# Allow GMS core to access /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check
+allow gmscore_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
+
+# suppress denials for non-API accesses.
+dontaudit gmscore_app exec_type:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app device:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app fs_bpf:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app kernel:security *;
+dontaudit gmscore_app net_dns_prop:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_interrupts:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_modules:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_net:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_stat:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app proc_version:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_android_usb:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_dm:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_loop:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_net:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app sysfs_net:dir r_dir_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app { wifi_prop wifi_hal_prop }:file r_file_perms;
+dontaudit gmscore_app mirror_data_file:dir search;
+dontaudit gmscore_app mnt_vendor_file:dir search;
+
+# Access the network
+net_domain(gmscore_app)
+
+# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
+allow gmscore_app self:process ptrace;
+
+# Allow loading executable code from writable priv-app home
+# directories. This is a W^X violation, however, it needs
+# to be supported for now for the following reasons.
+# * /data/user_*/0/*/code_cache/* POSSIBLE uses (b/117841367)
+#   1) com.android.opengl.shaders_cache
+#   2) com.android.skia.shaders_cache
+#   3) com.android.renderscript.cache
+# * /data/user_de/0/com.google.android.gms/app_chimera
+# TODO: Tighten (b/112357170)
+allow gmscore_app privapp_data_file:file execute;
+
+# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables
+# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422)
+allow gmscore_app system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
+allow gmscore_app privapp_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
+# /proc access
+allow gmscore_app proc_vmstat:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow interaction with gpuservice
+binder_call(gmscore_app, gpuservice)
+allow gmscore_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
+
+# find services that expose both @SystemAPI and normal APIs.
+allow gmscore_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app network_watchlist_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
+allow gmscore_app stats_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Write to /cache.
+allow gmscore_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow gmscore_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms;
+# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
+allow gmscore_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
+allow gmscore_app ota_package_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow gmscore_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Write the checkin metadata to /data/misc_ce/<userid>/checkin
+allow gmscore_app checkin_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow gmscore_app checkin_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
+# running "adb install foo.apk".
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow gmscore_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
+allow gmscore_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# b/148974132: com.android.vending needs this
+allow gmscore_app priv_app:tcp_socket { read write };
+
+# b/168059475 Allow GMSCore to read Virtual AB properties to determine
+# if device supports VAB.
+get_prop(gmscore_app, virtual_ab_prop)
+
+# b/186488185: Allow GMSCore to read dck properties
+get_prop(gmscore_app, dck_prop)
+
+# Allow GMSCore to read RKP properties for the purpose of GTS testing.
+get_prop(gmscore_app, remote_prov_prop)
+
+# Allow GmsCore to read Quick Start properties and prevent access from other
+# policies.
+get_prop(gmscore_app, quick_start_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init -dumpstate -vendor_init -gmscore_app } quick_start_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Do not allow getting permission-protected network information from sysfs.
+neverallow gmscore_app sysfs_net:file *;
+
+# Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
+# ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
+neverallowxperm gmscore_app domain:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+neverallow gmscore_app *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
+neverallow gmscore_app *:{
+  socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
+  netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
+  netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
+  netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
+  netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
+  netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
+  netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket
+  ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket
+  atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
+  bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
+  alg_socket nfc_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
+} *;

prebuilts/api/202404/private/gpuservice.te

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# gpuservice - server for gpu stats and other gpu related services
+typeattribute gpuservice coredomain;
+typeattribute gpuservice bpfdomain;
+
+type gpuservice_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(gpuservice)
+
+binder_call(gpuservice, adbd)
+binder_call(gpuservice, shell)
+binder_call(gpuservice, system_server)
+binder_use(gpuservice)
+
+# Access the GPU.
+allow gpuservice gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# GPU service will need to load GPU driver, for example Vulkan driver in order
+# to get the capability of the driver.
+allow gpuservice same_process_hal_file:file { open read getattr execute map };
+allow gpuservice ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+get_prop(gpuservice, hwservicemanager_prop)
+hwbinder_use(gpuservice)
+
+# Access /dev/graphics/fb0.
+allow gpuservice graphics_device:dir search;
+allow gpuservice graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell access
+allow gpuservice adbd:fd use;
+allow gpuservice adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow gpuservice shell:fifo_file { getattr read write };
+
+# Needed for perfetto producer.
+perfetto_producer(gpuservice)
+
+# Needed for interactive shell
+allow gpuservice devpts:chr_file { read write getattr };
+
+# Needed for dumpstate to dumpsys gpu.
+allow gpuservice dumpstate:fd use;
+allow gpuservice dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# Needed for stats callback registration to statsd.
+allow gpuservice stats_service:service_manager find;
+allow gpuservice statsmanager_service:service_manager find;
+# TODO(b/146461633): remove this once native pullers talk to StatsManagerService
+binder_call(gpuservice, statsd);
+
+# Needed for reading tracepoint ids in order to attach bpf programs.
+allow gpuservice debugfs_tracing:file r_file_perms;
+allow gpuservice self:perf_event { cpu kernel open write };
+neverallow gpuservice self:perf_event ~{ cpu kernel open write };
+
+# Needed for interact with bpf fs.
+# Write is needed to open read/write bpf maps.
+allow gpuservice fs_bpf:file { read write };
+
+# Needed for enabling bpf programs and accessing bpf maps (read-only and read/write).
+allow gpuservice bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
+
+add_service(gpuservice, gpu_service)
+
+# Needed for enabling write access to persist.graphics.egl from developer option switch UI, through gpuservice.
+set_prop(gpuservice, graphics_config_writable_prop)
+
+neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init -gpuservice } graphics_config_writable_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Needed for querying permission
+allow gpuservice permission_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Only uncomment below line when in development
+# userdebug_or_eng(`permissive gpuservice;')

prebuilts/api/202404/private/gsid.te

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+# gsid - Manager for GSI Installation
+
+type gsid, domain;
+type gsid_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+typeattribute gsid coredomain;
+
+init_daemon_domain(gsid)
+
+binder_use(gsid)
+binder_service(gsid)
+add_service(gsid, gsi_service)
+
+# Manage DSU metadata encryption key through vold.
+allow gsid vold_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(gsid, vold)
+
+set_prop(gsid, gsid_prop)
+
+# Needed to create/delete device-mapper nodes, and read/write to them.
+allow gsid dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+dontaudit gsid self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
+
+# On FBE devices (not using dm-default-key), gsid will use loop devices to map
+# images rather than device-mapper.
+allow gsid loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid loop_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allowxperm gsid loop_device:blk_file ioctl {
+  LOOP_GET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_STATUS64
+  LOOP_SET_FD
+  LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE
+  LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO
+  LOOP_CLR_FD
+  BLKFLSBUF
+};
+
+# libfiemap_writer uses sysfs to derive the bottom of a device-mapper stacking.
+# This requires traversing /sys/block/dm-N/slaves/* and reading the list of
+# file names.
+r_dir_file(gsid, sysfs_dm)
+
+# libfiemap_writer needs to read /sys/fs/f2fs/<dev>/features to determine
+# whether pin_file support is enabled.
+r_dir_file(gsid, sysfs_fs_f2fs)
+
+# Needed to read fstab, which is used to validate that system verity does not
+# use check_once_at_most for sdcard installs. (Note: proc_cmdline is needed
+# to get the A/B slot suffix).
+read_fstab(gsid)
+allow gsid sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow gsid sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Needed to stat /data/gsi/* and realpath on /dev/block/by-name/*
+allow gsid block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow querying the size of super_block_device_type.
+allow gsid super_block_device_type:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# liblp queries these block alignment properties.
+allowxperm gsid {
+  userdata_block_device
+  sdcard_block_device
+  super_block_device_type
+}:blk_file ioctl {
+  BLKIOMIN
+  BLKALIGNOFF
+};
+
+# When installing images to an sdcard, gsid needs to be able to stat() the
+# block device. gsid also calls realpath() to remove symlinks.
+allow gsid mnt_media_rw_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow gsid mnt_media_rw_stub_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# When installing images to an sdcard, gsid must bypass sdcardfs and install
+# directly to vfat, which supports the FIBMAP ioctl.
+allow gsid vfat:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow gsid vfat:file create_file_perms;
+allow gsid sdcard_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+# This is needed for FIBMAP unfortunately. Oddly FIEMAP does not carry this
+# requirement, but the kernel does not implement FIEMAP support for VFAT.
+allow gsid self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
+
+# Allow rules for gsi_tool.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  # gsi_tool passes the system image over the adb connection, via stdin.
+  allow gsid adbd:fd use;
+  # Needed when running gsi_tool through "su root" rather than adb root.
+  allow gsid adbd:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms;
+  # gsi_tool passes a FIFO to gsid if invoked with pipe redirection.
+  allow gsid { shell su }:fifo_file r_file_perms;
+  # Allow installing images from /storage/emulated/...
+  allow gsid { sdcard_type fuse }:file r_file_perms;
+')
+
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -gsid
+  -init
+  -update_engine_common
+  -recovery
+  -fastbootd
+} gsid_prop:property_service set;
+
+# gsid needs to store images on /data, but cannot use file I/O. If it did, the
+# underlying blocks would be encrypted, and we couldn't mount the GSI image in
+# first-stage init. So instead of directly writing to /data, we:
+#
+#   1. fallocate a file large enough to hold the signed GSI
+#   2. extract its block layout with FIEMAP
+#   3. create a dm-linear device using the FIEMAP, targeting /dev/block/by-name/userdata
+#   4. write system_gsi into that dm device
+#
+# To make this process work, we need to unwrap the device-mapper stacking for
+# userdata to reach the underlying block device. To verify the result we use
+# stat(), which requires read access.
+allow gsid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# gsid uses /metadata/gsi to communicate GSI boot information to first-stage
+# init. It cannot use userdata since data cannot be decrypted during this
+# stage.
+#
+# gsid uses /metadata/gsi to store three files:
+#   install_status - A short string indicating whether a GSI image is bootable.
+#   lp_metadata    - LpMetadata blob describing the block ranges on userdata
+#                    where system_gsi resides.
+#   booted         - An empty file that, if exists, indicates that a GSI is
+#                    currently running.
+#
+allow gsid metadata_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow gsid {
+    gsi_metadata_file_type
+}:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+allow gsid {
+    ota_metadata_file
+}:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+allow gsid {
+    gsi_metadata_file_type
+    ota_metadata_file
+}:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow restorecon to fix context of gsi_public_metadata_file.
+allow gsid file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow gsid gsi_metadata_file:file relabelfrom;
+allow gsid gsi_public_metadata_file:file relabelto;
+
+allow gsid {
+      gsi_data_file
+      ota_image_data_file
+}:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow gsid {
+      gsi_data_file
+      ota_image_data_file
+}:file create_file_perms;
+allowxperm gsid {
+      gsi_data_file
+      ota_image_data_file
+}:file ioctl {
+      FS_IOC_FIEMAP
+      FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+};
+
+allow gsid system_server:binder call;
+
+# Prevent most processes from writing to gsi_metadata_file_type, but allow
+# adding rules for path resolution of gsi_public_metadata_file and reading
+# gsi_public_metadata_file.
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+    -fastbootd
+} gsi_metadata_file_type:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+    -fastbootd
+} { gsi_metadata_file_type -gsi_public_metadata_file }:file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+    -fastbootd
+} gsi_public_metadata_file:file_class_set ~{ r_file_perms };
+
+# Prevent apps from accessing gsi_metadata_file_type.
+neverallow {
+    appdomain
+    -shell
+} gsi_metadata_file_type:dir_file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -init
+    -gsid
+} gsi_data_file:dir_file_class_set *;
+
+neverallow {
+    domain
+    -gsid
+} gsi_data_file:file_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };

prebuilts/api/202404/private/hal_allocator_default.te

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+type hal_allocator_default, domain, coredomain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_allocator_default, hal_allocator)
+
+type hal_allocator_default_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_allocator_default)
+
+# to force stop the service when it's not supported
+set_prop(hal_allocator_default, hidl_memory_prop)

prebuilts/api/202404/private/hal_lazy_test.te

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_lazy_test, hal_lazy_test_hwservice)
+')

prebuilts/api/202404/private/halclientdomain.te

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+###
+### Rules for all domains which are clients of a HAL
+###
+
+# Find out whether a HAL in passthrough/in-process mode or
+# binderized/out-of-process mode
+hwbinder_use(halclientdomain)
+
+# Used to wait for hwservicemanager
+get_prop(halclientdomain, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# Wait for HAL server to be up (used by getService)
+allow halclientdomain hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;