diff --git a/private/access_vectors b/private/access_vectors
index 6393c166d..efd4924b5 100644
--- a/private/access_vectors
+++ b/private/access_vectors
@@ -577,12 +577,6 @@ class keystore_key
 	user_changed
 }
 
-class debuggerd
-{
-	dump_tombstone
-	dump_backtrace
-}
-
 class drmservice {
 	consumeRights
 	setPlaybackStatus
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index b0c7ac761..b1171f442 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
+# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
+# This occurs when the process crashes.
+domain_auto_trans(domain, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
+allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
+
 # Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
 # with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
 neverallow {
   domain
-  -debuggerd
   -vold
+  -crash_dump
   -dumpstate
   -storaged
   -system_server
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index f6e1be1b7..3209073a8 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@
 /dev/socket/racoon	u:object_r:racoon_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/rild	u:object_r:rild_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/rild-debug	u:object_r:rild_debug_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_crash u:object_r:tombstoned_crash_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/tombstoned_intercept u:object_r:tombstoned_intercept_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/uncrypt	u:object_r:uncrypt_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/vold	u:object_r:vold_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/webview_zygote	u:object_r:webview_zygote_socket:s0
@@ -192,8 +194,9 @@
 /system/bin/keystore	u:object_r:keystore_exec:s0
 /system/bin/fingerprintd u:object_r:fingerprintd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/gatekeeperd u:object_r:gatekeeperd_exec:s0
-/system/bin/debuggerd	u:object_r:debuggerd_exec:s0
-/system/bin/debuggerd64	u:object_r:debuggerd_exec:s0
+/system/bin/crash_dump32 u:object_r:crash_dump_exec:s0
+/system/bin/crash_dump64 u:object_r:crash_dump_exec:s0
+/system/bin/tombstoned u:object_r:tombstoned_exec:s0
 /system/bin/wpa_supplicant	u:object_r:wpa_exec:s0
 /system/bin/recovery-persist     u:object_r:recovery_persist_exec:s0
 /system/bin/recovery-refresh     u:object_r:recovery_refresh_exec:s0
diff --git a/private/security_classes b/private/security_classes
index 680d3ddbc..19fd5db36 100644
--- a/private/security_classes
+++ b/private/security_classes
@@ -103,8 +103,5 @@ class service_manager           # userspace
 # Keystore Key
 class keystore_key              # userspace
 
-# debuggerd service
-class debuggerd                 # userspace
-
 class drmservice                # userspace
 # FLASK
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 7e0c2fb85..0e3566033 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # public, but conceptually should go with this
 # Define a type for tmpfs-backed ashmem regions.
 tmpfs_domain(system_server)
-# Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
+# Create a socket for connections from crash_dump.
 type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
 
 allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
diff --git a/private/debuggerd.te b/private/tombstoned.te
similarity index 79%
rename from private/debuggerd.te
rename to private/tombstoned.te
index bd835af55..73fdb1bdf 100644
--- a/private/debuggerd.te
+++ b/private/tombstoned.te
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 # type_transition must be private policy the domain_trans rules could stay
 # public, but conceptually should go with this
-init_daemon_domain(debuggerd)
+init_daemon_domain(tombstoned)
diff --git a/public/adbd.te b/public/adbd.te
index 17a98d911..d60f8f16d 100644
--- a/public/adbd.te
+++ b/public/adbd.te
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ allow adbd rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
 
-# No transitions from adbd to non-shell domains. adbd only ever
-# transitions to the shell domain. In particular, we never want
-# to see a transition from adbd to su (aka "adb root")
-neverallow adbd { domain -shell }:process transition;
+# No transitions from adbd to non-shell, non-crash_dump domains. adbd only ever
+# transitions to the shell domain (except when it crashes). In particular, we
+# never want to see a transition from adbd to su (aka "adb root")
+neverallow adbd { domain -crash_dump -shell }:process transition;
 neverallow adbd { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:process dyntransition;
diff --git a/public/app.te b/public/app.te
index 57b76f172..e350f45f2 100644
--- a/public/app.te
+++ b/public/app.te
@@ -353,10 +353,12 @@ neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
     { sigkill sigstop signal };
 
 # Transition to a non-app domain.
-# Exception for the shell domain and the su domain, can transition to runas,
-# etc.
+# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
+# Exception for crash_dump.
+neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } { domain -appdomain -crash_dump }:process
+    { transition };
 neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') } { domain -appdomain }:process
-    { transition dyntransition };
+    { dyntransition };
 
 # Write to rootfs.
 neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
diff --git a/public/crash_dump.te b/public/crash_dump.te
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..af74247f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/crash_dump.te
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+type crash_dump, domain;
+type crash_dump_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+
+allow crash_dump self:capability { sys_ptrace kill };
+allow crash_dump {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -crash_dump
+  -keystore
+  -logd
+}:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow crash_dump logd:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+')
+
+# Use inherited file descriptors
+allow crash_dump domain:fd use;
+allow crash_dump domain:fifo_file write;
+
+r_dir_file(crash_dump, domain)
+allow crash_dump exec_type:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
+allow crash_dump dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
+allow crash_dump dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Unwind through libart.
+allow crash_dump libart_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Talk to tombstoned
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, tombstoned_crash, tombstoned)
+
+# Talk to ActivityManager.
+unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, system_ndebug, system_server)
+
+# Append to ANR files.
+allow crash_dump anr_data_file:file { append getattr };
+
+# Append to tombstone files.
+allow crash_dump tombstone_data_file:file { append getattr };
+
+read_logd(crash_dump)
+
+###
+### neverallow assertions
+###
+
+# A domain transition must occur for crash_dump to get the privileges needed to trace the process.
+# Do not allow the execution of crash_dump without a domain transition.
+neverallow domain crash_dump_exec:file execute_no_trans;
diff --git a/public/debuggerd.te b/public/debuggerd.te
deleted file mode 100644
index e8e930268..000000000
--- a/public/debuggerd.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-# debugger interface
-type debuggerd, domain;
-type debuggerd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
-
-typeattribute debuggerd mlstrustedsubject;
-allow debuggerd self:capability { dac_override sys_ptrace chown kill fowner setuid setgid };
-allow debuggerd self:capability2 { syslog };
-allow debuggerd domain:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow debuggerd domain:file r_file_perms;
-allow debuggerd domain:lnk_file read;
-allow debuggerd {
-  domain
-  -adbd
-  -debuggerd
-  -healthd
-  -init
-  -keystore
-  -logd
-  -ueventd
-  -watchdogd
-}:process { execmem ptrace getattr };
-
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow debuggerd logd:process { execmem ptrace getattr };
-')
-
-allow debuggerd tombstone_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow debuggerd tombstone_data_file:file create_file_perms;
-allow debuggerd shared_relro_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow debuggerd shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
-allow debuggerd domain:process { sigstop sigkill signal };
-allow debuggerd { exec_type libart_file }:file r_file_perms;
-allow debuggerd apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-allow debuggerd apk_data_file:dir search;
-# Access app library
-allow debuggerd system_data_file:file open;
-# Allow debuggerd to redirect a dump_backtrace request to itself.
-# This only happens on 64 bit systems, where all requests go to the 64 bit
-# debuggerd and get redirected to the 32 bit debuggerd if the process is 32 bit.
-
-allow debuggerd {
-  audioserver
-  bluetooth
-  cameraserver
-  drmserver
-  inputflinger
-  mediacodec
-  mediadrmserver
-  mediaextractor
-  mediaserver
-  sdcardd
-  surfaceflinger
-}:debuggerd dump_backtrace;
-
-# Connect to system_server via /data/system/ndebugsocket.
-unix_socket_connect(debuggerd, system_ndebug, system_server)
-
-# Get stack traces for VTS executables
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow debuggerd nativetest_data_file:dir search;
-  allow debuggerd nativetest_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-')
-
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow debuggerd input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
-  allow debuggerd input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-')
-
-# logd access
-read_logd(debuggerd)
-
-# Check SELinux permissions.
-selinux_check_access(debuggerd)
-
-# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
-allow debuggerd dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
-allow debuggerd dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index fdfcf94c9..9151fd318 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -53,12 +53,6 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow domain coredump_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
 ')
 
-###
-### Talk to debuggerd.
-###
-allow domain debuggerd:process sigchld;
-allow domain debuggerd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-
 # Root fs.
 allow domain rootfs:dir search;
 allow domain rootfs:lnk_file read;
@@ -106,7 +100,7 @@ allow domain libart_file:file { execute read open getattr };
 auditallow {
   domain
   -appdomain
-  -debuggerd
+  -crash_dump
   -dex2oat
   -dumpstate
   -profman
@@ -462,6 +456,16 @@ neverallow { domain -system_server } zygote_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow { domain -system_server -webview_zygote } webview_zygote:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 neverallow { domain -system_server } webview_zygote_socket:sock_file write;
 
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -tombstoned
+  -crash_dump
+  -dumpstate
+  -system_server
+} tombstoned:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow { domain -crash_dump } tombstoned_crash_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -system_server } tombstoned_intercept_socket:sock_file write;
+
 # Android does not support System V IPCs.
 #
 # The reason for this is due to the fact that, by design, they lead to global
@@ -691,3 +695,6 @@ neverallow {
   domain
   -recovery
 } self:capability setfcap;
+
+# Enforce AT_SECURE for executing crash_dump.
+neverallow domain crash_dump:process noatsecure;
diff --git a/public/domain_deprecated.te b/public/domain_deprecated.te
index d092d0911..1f535c350 100644
--- a/public/domain_deprecated.te
+++ b/public/domain_deprecated.te
@@ -123,5 +123,5 @@ auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -surfaceflinger -system_server -
 # Get SELinux enforcing status.
 allow domain_deprecated selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow domain_deprecated selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
-auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -debuggerd -init -installd -keystore -postinstall_dexopt -runas -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -zygote } selinuxfs:dir { open getattr read ioctl lock }; # search granted in domain
-auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -debuggerd -init -installd -keystore -postinstall_dexopt -runas -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -zygote } selinuxfs:file { open read ioctl lock }; # getattr granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -installd -keystore -postinstall_dexopt -runas -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -zygote } selinuxfs:dir { open getattr read ioctl lock }; # search granted in domain
+auditallow { domain_deprecated -appdomain -init -installd -keystore -postinstall_dexopt -runas -servicemanager -system_server -ueventd -zygote } selinuxfs:file { open read ioctl lock }; # getattr granted in domain
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index ee617e5ff..d64a4b457 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -65,19 +65,9 @@ allow dumpstate {
   sdcardd
   surfaceflinger
 }:process signal;
-# Ask debuggerd for the backtraces of these processes.
-allow dumpstate {
-  audioserver
-  cameraserver
-  drmserver
-  inputflinger
-  mediacodec
-  mediadrmserver
-  mediaextractor
-  mediaserver
-  sdcardd
-  surfaceflinger
-}:debuggerd dump_backtrace;
+
+# Connect to tombstoned to intercept dumps.
+unix_socket_connect(dumpstate, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
 
 # TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
 allow dumpstate sysfs_usb:file w_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 077b25a5f..4b27c889d 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -236,6 +236,8 @@ type rild_socket, file_type;
 type rild_debug_socket, file_type;
 type system_wpa_socket, file_type;
 type system_ndebug_socket, file_type;
+type tombstoned_crash_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type tombstoned_intercept_socket, file_type;
 type uncrypt_socket, file_type;
 type vold_socket, file_type;
 type webview_zygote_socket, file_type;
diff --git a/public/logd.te b/public/logd.te
index 6478123f0..b7fc11ac1 100644
--- a/public/logd.te
+++ b/public/logd.te
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ neverallow logd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
 neverallow logd domain:process ptrace;
 
 # ... and nobody may ptrace me (except on userdebug or eng builds)
-neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-debuggerd') } logd:process ptrace;
+neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-crash_dump') } logd:process ptrace;
 
 # Write to /system.
 neverallow logd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
diff --git a/public/su.te b/public/su.te
index 38d7f5cad..8cb386d4b 100644
--- a/public/su.te
+++ b/public/su.te
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ userdebug_or_eng(`
   dontaudit su service_manager_type:service_manager *;
   dontaudit su servicemanager:service_manager list;
   dontaudit su keystore:keystore_key *;
-  dontaudit su domain:debuggerd *;
   dontaudit su domain:drmservice *;
   dontaudit su unlabeled:filesystem *;
   dontaudit su postinstall_file:filesystem *;
diff --git a/public/system_server.te b/public/system_server.te
index 0e1b9c06b..d2e6ade80 100644
--- a/public/system_server.te
+++ b/public/system_server.te
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ allow system_server zygote:process sigchld;
 
 # May kill zygote on crashes.
 allow system_server zygote:process sigkill;
+allow system_server crash_dump:process sigkill;
 
 # Read /system/bin/app_process.
 allow system_server zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;
@@ -178,14 +179,15 @@ binder_call(system_server, hal_vr)
 binder_call(system_server, hal_wifi)
 binder_call(system_server, wpa)
 
-# Ask debuggerd to dump backtraces for native stacks of interest.
-#
+# Talk to tombstoned to get ANR traces.
+unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)
+
+# Send signals to trigger ANR traces.
 # This is derived from the list that system server defines as interesting native processes
 # to dump during ANRs or watchdog aborts, defined in NATIVE_STACKS_OF_INTEREST in
 # frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
 allow system_server {
   audioserver
-  bluetooth
   cameraserver
   drmserver
   inputflinger
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ allow system_server {
   mediaanalytics
   sdcardd
   surfaceflinger
-}:debuggerd dump_backtrace;
+}:process { signal };
 
 # Use sockets received over binder from various services.
 allow system_server audioserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
@@ -624,9 +626,13 @@ neverallow system_server { bluetooth_data_file nfc_data_file shell_data_file app
 # getting worse. b/28035297
 neverallow system_server { file_type -toolbox_exec -logcat_exec }:file execute_no_trans;
 
-# System server should never transition to a new domain. This compliments
-# and enforces the already pre-existing PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS flag.
-neverallow system_server *:process { transition dyntransition };
+# Ensure that system_server doesn't perform any domain transitions other than
+# transitioning to the crash_dump domain when a crash occurs.
+neverallow system_server { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
+neverallow system_server *:process dyntransition;
+
+# Only allow crash_dump to connect to system_ndebug_socket.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock_file { open write };
 
 # system_server should never be executing dex2oat. This is either
 # a bug (for example, bug 16317188), or represents an attempt by
diff --git a/public/tombstoned.te b/public/tombstoned.te
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c830d93cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tombstoned.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# debugger interface
+type tombstoned, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
+type tombstoned_exec, exec_type, file_type;
+
+# Write to arbitrary pipes given to us.
+allow tombstoned domain:fd use;
+allow tombstoned domain:fifo_file write;
+
+allow tombstoned domain:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow tombstoned domain:file r_file_perms;
+allow tombstoned tombstone_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow tombstoned tombstone_data_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/webview_zygote.te b/public/webview_zygote.te
index 93bbbb1ef..29e5ba4e0 100644
--- a/public/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/public/webview_zygote.te
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ selinux_check_access(webview_zygote)
 # Only permit transition to isolated_app.
 neverallow webview_zygote { domain -isolated_app }:process dyntransition;
 
-# Only setcon() transitions, no exec() based transitions
-neverallow webview_zygote *:process transition;
+# Only setcon() transitions, no exec() based transitions, except for crash_dump.
+neverallow webview_zygote { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
 
 # Must not exec() a program without changing domains.
 # Having said that, exec() above is not allowed.