Allow artd to access files for restorecon.
Otherwise, we will get SELinux denials like: W binder:5750_1: type=1400 audit(0.0:133): avc: denied { read } for name="plat_file_contexts" dev="dm-1" ino=979 scontext=u:r:artd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 W binder:5750_1: type=1400 audit(0.0:134): avc: denied { read } for name="system_ext_file_contexts" dev="dm-3" ino=92 scontext=u:r:artd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Bug: 262230400 Test: No longer see such SELinux denials. Change-Id: Iec586c554fa2dc33f0a428321bada484add620ed
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@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ allow artd app_data_file_type:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
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# for GMS because so far we only see GMS using symlinks.
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allow artd privapp_data_file:lnk_file { getattr read };
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# Read access to SELinux context files, for restorecon.
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allow artd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow artd seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Check validity of SELinux context, for restorecon.
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selinux_check_context(artd)
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# Never allow running other binaries without a domain transition.
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# The only exception is art_exec. It is allowed to use the artd domain because
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# it is a thin wrapper that executes other binaries on behalf of artd.
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