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neverallow untrusted_app as a mlstrustedsubject.

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Assigning mlstrustedsubject to untrusted_app would undermine
the per-user isolation model being enforced via levelFrom=user
in seapp_contexts and the mls constraints.  There is no direct
way to specify a neverallow on attribute assignment, but this
makes use of a particular property of the fork permission to
prevent ever adding mlstrustedsubject to untrusted_app.

A similar restriction for app_data_file and mlstrustedobject
is also important for the same reason, but cannot be expressed
as a neverallow.

Change-Id: I5170cadc55cc614aef0cd5f6491de8f69a4fa2a0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This commit is contained in:
Stephen Smalley 2015-03-13 16:54:48 -04:00
parent b8caf7fdd4
commit eaece936f2
1 changed files with 10 additions and 0 deletions
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untrusted_app.te
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@ -166,3 +166,13 @@ neverallow untrusted_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
neverallow untrusted_app property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow untrusted_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
neverallow untrusted_app property_type:property_service set;
# Do not allow untrusted_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
# and untrusted_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
neverallow untrusted_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;