Move untrusted_app policy to private
This leaves only the existence of untrusted_app domain as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and
are thus now private.
Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
disappearance of all allow rules from untrusted_domain_current
attribute (as expected).
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: Ief71fa16cfc38437cbe5c58100bba48b9a497c92
This commit is contained in:
Alex Klyubin
parent
e427a2b2be
commit
fce60d3dbc
2 changed files with 196 additions and 182 deletions
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@ -1,5 +1,201 @@
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###
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### Untrusted apps.
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###
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### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
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### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
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### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
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### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
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### directory). The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
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### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
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### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
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### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this
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### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
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### that are not signed by the platform key. To move
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### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
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### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
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### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
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### seapp_contexts.
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###
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app_domain(untrusted_app)
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net_domain(untrusted_app)
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bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
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# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
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# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
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create_pty(untrusted_app)
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# Legacy text relocations
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allow untrusted_app apk_data_file:file execmod;
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# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
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# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
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allow untrusted_app app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
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# ASEC
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allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Execute libs in asec containers.
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allow untrusted_app asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
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# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
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# running "adb install foo.apk".
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# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
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# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
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allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
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# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
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# cropping or taking user photos.
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allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
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#
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# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
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# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
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#
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# Access to /data/media.
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allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
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# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
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allow untrusted_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
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# allow cts to query all services
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allow untrusted_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
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allow untrusted_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app radio_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
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# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
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# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
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# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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')
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
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allow untrusted_app self:process ptrace;
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# Cts: HwRngTest
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allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
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allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow apps to view preloaded content
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allow untrusted_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow untrusted_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
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# are running in an emulated environment.
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# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
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# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
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allow untrusted_app proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# Receive or send uevent messages.
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neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
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# Receive or send generic netlink messages
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neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_socket *;
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# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
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# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
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neverallow untrusted_app debugfs_type:file read;
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# Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
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# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
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# services.
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neverallow untrusted_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
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# Do not allow untrusted_apps to connect to the property service
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# or set properties. b/10243159
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neverallow untrusted_app property_socket:sock_file write;
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neverallow untrusted_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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neverallow untrusted_app property_type:property_service set;
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# Do not allow untrusted_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
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# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
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# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
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# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
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# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
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# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
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# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
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# and untrusted_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
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neverallow untrusted_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
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# Do not allow untrusted_app to hard link to any files.
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# In particular, if untrusted_app links to other app data
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# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
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# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
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# bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted_app never has this
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# capability.
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neverallow untrusted_app file_type:file link;
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# Do not allow untrusted_app to access network MAC address file
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neverallow untrusted_app sysfs_mac_address:file no_rw_file_perms;
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# Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
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# ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
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neverallowxperm untrusted_app domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
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neverallow untrusted_app *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
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neverallow untrusted_app *:{
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socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
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netlink_firewall_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
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netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_ip6fw_socket
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netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
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netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
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netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
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netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
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} *;
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# Do not allow untrusted_app access to /cache
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neverallow untrusted_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
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neverallow untrusted_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
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# Do not allow untrusted_app to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
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# internal storage or sdcard.
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# World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
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# with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
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# application un-installation.
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neverallow untrusted_app {
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fs_type
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-fuse # sdcard
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-sdcardfs # sdcard
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-vfat
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file_type
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-app_data_file # The apps sandbox itself
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-media_rw_data_file # Internal storage. Known that apps can
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# leave artfacts here after uninstall.
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-user_profile_data_file # Access to profile files
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-user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file # Access to profile files
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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-method_trace_data_file # only on ro.debuggable=1
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-coredump_file # userdebug/eng only
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')
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}:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
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# Do not allow untrusted_app to directly open tun_device
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neverallow untrusted_app tun_device:chr_file open;
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# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
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neverallow untrusted_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
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neverallow untrusted_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
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# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
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# Create a more specific label if needed
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neverallow untrusted_app proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
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@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
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###
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### Untrusted apps.
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###
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### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
|
||||
### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
|
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### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
|
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### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
|
||||
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@ -16,186 +15,5 @@
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### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
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### seapp_contexts.
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###
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### untrusted_app includes all the appdomain rules, plus the
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### additional following rules:
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###
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type untrusted_app, domain;
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net_domain(untrusted_app)
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bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
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# Legacy text relocations
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allow untrusted_app apk_data_file:file execmod;
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# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
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# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
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allow untrusted_app app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
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# ASEC
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allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
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# Execute libs in asec containers.
|
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allow untrusted_app asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
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|
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# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
|
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# running "adb install foo.apk".
|
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# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
|
||||
# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
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allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
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# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
|
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# cropping or taking user photos.
|
||||
allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
|
||||
# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
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# Access to /data/media.
|
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allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
|
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allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
|
||||
# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
|
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allow untrusted_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
|
||||
|
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# allow cts to query all services
|
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allow untrusted_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
|
||||
|
||||
allow untrusted_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow untrusted_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
|
||||
allow untrusted_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
|
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allow untrusted_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app radio_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
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allow untrusted_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
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|
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# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
|
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# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
|
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# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
|
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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')
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# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
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allow untrusted_app self:process ptrace;
|
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|
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# Cts: HwRngTest
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allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
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allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
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|
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# Allow apps to view preloaded content
|
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allow untrusted_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
|
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allow untrusted_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
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# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
|
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# are running in an emulated environment.
|
||||
# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
|
||||
# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
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allow untrusted_app proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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|
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# Receive or send uevent messages.
|
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neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Receive or send generic netlink messages
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_socket *;
|
||||
|
||||
# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
|
||||
# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app debugfs_type:file read;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
|
||||
# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
|
||||
# services.
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow untrusted_apps to connect to the property service
|
||||
# or set properties. b/10243159
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app property_socket:sock_file write;
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app property_type:property_service set;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow untrusted_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
|
||||
# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
|
||||
# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
|
||||
# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
|
||||
# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
|
||||
# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
|
||||
# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
|
||||
# and untrusted_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow untrusted_app to hard link to any files.
|
||||
# In particular, if untrusted_app links to other app data
|
||||
# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
|
||||
# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
|
||||
# bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted_app never has this
|
||||
# capability.
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app file_type:file link;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow untrusted_app to access network MAC address file
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app sysfs_mac_address:file no_rw_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
|
||||
# ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
|
||||
neverallowxperm untrusted_app domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app *:{
|
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socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
|
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netlink_firewall_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
|
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netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_ip6fw_socket
|
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netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
|
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netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
|
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netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
|
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netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket
|
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} *;
|
||||
|
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# Do not allow untrusted_app access to /cache
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow untrusted_app to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
|
||||
# internal storage or sdcard.
|
||||
# World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
|
||||
# with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
|
||||
# application un-installation.
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app {
|
||||
fs_type
|
||||
-fuse # sdcard
|
||||
-sdcardfs # sdcard
|
||||
-vfat
|
||||
file_type
|
||||
-app_data_file # The apps sandbox itself
|
||||
-media_rw_data_file # Internal storage. Known that apps can
|
||||
# leave artfacts here after uninstall.
|
||||
-user_profile_data_file # Access to profile files
|
||||
-user_profile_foreign_dex_data_file # Access to profile files
|
||||
userdebug_or_eng(`
|
||||
-method_trace_data_file # only on ro.debuggable=1
|
||||
-coredump_file # userdebug/eng only
|
||||
')
|
||||
}:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not allow untrusted_app to directly open tun_device
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app tun_device:chr_file open;
|
||||
|
||||
# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
|
||||
|
||||
# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
|
||||
# Create a more specific label if needed
|
||||
neverallow untrusted_app proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue