Move mtectrl to private

Because mtectrl is a system internal domain, and we don't need to expose
the type to vendor.

Bug: 206895651
Test: build and boot
Change-Id: Idb5c4a4c6f175e338722971944bf08ba99835476
Merged-In: Idb5c4a4c6f175e338722971944bf08ba99835476
This commit is contained in:
Inseob Kim 2022-01-26 08:45:17 +09:00 committed by Florian Mayer
parent 949e1d0a76
commit feae699152
5 changed files with 21 additions and 22 deletions

View file

@ -86,7 +86,6 @@
memtrackproxy_service
mm_events_config_prop
music_recognition_service
mtectrl
nfc_logs_data_file
odrefresh
odrefresh_exec

View file

@ -112,6 +112,26 @@ allow domain linkerconfig_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow all processes to check for the existence of the boringssl_self_test_marker files.
allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;
# No domains other than a select few can access the misc_block_device. This
# block device is reserved for OTA use.
# Do not assert this rule on userdebug/eng builds, due to some devices using
# this partition for testing purposes.
neverallow {
domain
userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') # exclude debuggable builds
-fastbootd
-hal_bootctl_server
-init
-uncrypt
-update_engine
-vendor_init
-vendor_misc_writer
-vold
-recovery
-ueventd
-mtectrl
} misc_block_device:blk_file { append link relabelfrom rename write open read ioctl lock };
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
# with other UIDs to these allowlisted domains.
neverallow {

View file

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
# mtectrl is a tool to request MTE (Memory Tagging Extensions) from the bootloader.
type mtectrl, domain, coredomain;
type mtectrl_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(mtectrl)

View file

@ -610,26 +610,6 @@ neverallow {
-update_engine
} system_block_device:blk_file { write append };
# No domains other than a select few can access the misc_block_device. This
# block device is reserved for OTA use.
# Do not assert this rule on userdebug/eng builds, due to some devices using
# this partition for testing purposes.
neverallow {
domain
userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') # exclude debuggable builds
-fastbootd
-hal_bootctl_server
-init
-uncrypt
-update_engine
-vendor_init
-vendor_misc_writer
-vold
-recovery
-ueventd
-mtectrl
} misc_block_device:blk_file { append link relabelfrom rename write open read ioctl lock };
# Only (hw|vnd|)servicemanager should be able to register with binder as the context manager
neverallow { domain -servicemanager -hwservicemanager -vndservicemanager } *:binder set_context_mgr;
# The service managers are only allowed to access their own device node

View file

@ -1 +0,0 @@
type mtectrl, domain, coredomain;