For unlabeled files, revert to DAC rules. This is for backwards
compatibility, as files created before SELinux was in place may
not be properly labeled.
Over time, the number of unlabeled files will decrease, and we can
(hopefully) remove this rule in the future.
To prevent inadvertantly introducing the "relabelto" permission, add
a neverallow domain, and add apps which have a legitimate need to
relabel to this domain.
Bug: 9777552
Change-Id: I71b0ff8abd4925432062007c45b5be85f6f70a88
Allow netd to set ctl.* properties. Currently, mdnsd is broken because
it can't set this property.
Bug: 9777774
Change-Id: I2f32504d77b651e66e0a0067e65a5ed44b427f5a
This fixes the issue where paid apps failed to install via Google
Play with "Package file has a bad manifest" error. The issue appears
to be caused by vold being prevented by SELinux policy from setting
the setgid bit on the ASEC container directory into which the APK is
decrypted. As a result, the APK is not readable to PackageParser.
Bug: 9736808
Change-Id: I07546a9f9caac3de8b720499bd1bf1604edea0fe
This fixes the issue where paid apps failed to install via Google
Play with "Package file has a bad manifest" error. The issue appears
to be caused by vold being prevented by SELinux policy from setting
the setgid bit on the ASEC container directory into which the APK is
decrypted. As a result, the APK is not readable to PackageParser.
Bug: 9736808
Change-Id: I07546a9f9caac3de8b720499bd1bf1604edea0fe
This change enables SELinux security enforcement on the installd
process.
For the installd.te file only, this change is equivalent to reverting
the following commits:
* 50e37b93ac
* 77d4731e9d
No other changes were required.
Testing: As much as possible, I've tested that package installation
works, from both adb and via Android market. There were no denials
in the kernel dmesg log, and everything appears to be working correctly.
It's quite possible I've missed something. If we experience problems,
I'm happy to roll back this change.
Bug: 9662644
Change-Id: Id93d4ee7b517dfa28c9a0b1d45d936b56892ac0a
This change enables SELinux security enforcement on zygote
(but not zygote spawned apps).
For the zygote.te file only, this change is equivalent to reverting
the following commits:
* 50e37b93ac
* 77d4731e9d
No other changes were required.
Testing: As much as possible, I've tested that zygote properly
starts up, and that there's no problem spawning zygote or zygote
apps. There were no denials in the kernel dmesg log, and
everything appears to work correctly. It's quite
possible I've missed something. If we experience problems, I
happy to roll back this change.
Bug: 9657732
Change-Id: Id2a7adcbeebda5d1606cb13470fad6c3fcffd558
This change enables SELinux security enforcement on vold.
For the vold.te file ONLY, this change is conceptually a revert of
77d4731e9d and
50e37b93ac, with the following
additional changes:
1) Removal of "allow vold proc:file write;" and
"allow vold self:capability { sys_boot };". As of system/vold
change adfba3626e76c1931649634275d241b226cd1b9a, vold no longer
performs it's own reboots, so these capabilities are no longer
needed.
2) Addition of the powerctl property, which vold contacts to
tell init to reboot.
3) Removal of "allow vold kernel:system module_request;". As of
CTS commit f2cfdf5c057140d9442fcfeb4e4a648e8258b659, Android
devices no longer ship with loadable modules, hence we don't
require this rule.
4) Removal of "fsetid" from "self:capability". Any setuid / setgid
bits SHOULD be cleared if vold is able to change the permissions
of files. IMHO, it was a mistake to ever include this capability in
the first place.
Testing: As much as possible, I've tested filesystem related
functionality, including factory reset and device encryption.
I wasn't able to test fstrim functionality, which is a fairly
new feature. I didn't see any policy denials in dmesg. It's quite
possible I've missed something. If we experience problems, I
happy to roll back this change.
Bug: 9629920
Change-Id: I683afa0dffe9f28952287bfdb7ee4e0423c2e97a
This change does several things:
1) Restore domain.te to the version present at
cd516a3266 . This is the version
currently being distributed in AOSP.
2) Add "allow domain properties_device:file r_file_perms;" to
domain.te, to allow all domains to read /dev/__properties__ .
This change was missing from AOSP.
3) Restore netd.te to the version present at
80c9ba5267 . This is the version
currently being distributed in AOSP.
4) Remove anything involving module loading from netd.te. CTS
enforces that Android kernels can't have module loading enabled.
5) Add several new capabilities, plus data file rules, to
netd.te, since netd needs to write to files owned by wifi.
6) Add a new unconfined domain called dnsmasq.te, and allow
transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up
the dnsmasq.te domain.
7) Add a new unconfined domain called hostapd.te, and allow
transitions from netd to that domain. Over time, we'll tighten up
the hostapd.te domain.
The net effect of these changes is to re-enable SELinux protections
for netd. The policy is FAR from perfect, and allows a lot of wiggle
room, but we can improve it over time.
Testing: as much as possible, I've exercised networking related
functionality, including turning on and off wifi, entering airplane
mode, and enabling tethering and portable wifi hotspots. It's quite
possible I've missed something, and if we experience problems, I
can roll back this change.
Bug: 9618347
Change-Id: I23ff3eebcef629bc7baabcf6962f25f116c4a3c0
In the process of taking a bugreport, "dumpstate -B" will instruct
zygote to fire up com.android.shell, which runs as UID=2000.
This transition was not included in seapp_contexts, so zygote
didn't know how to properly set the context for the shell user.
Add an entry to allow zygote to know what to do with UID=2000
requests.
Bug: 9588981
Change-Id: I2e726be8d58437ef1de3bcbad3b897a97ed18e22
In the process of taking a bugreport, "dumpstate -B" will instruct
zygote to fire up com.android.shell, which runs as UID=2000.
This transition was not included in seapp_contexts, so zygote
didn't know how to properly set the context for the shell user.
Add an entry to allow zygote to know what to do with UID=2000
requests.
Bug: 9588981
Change-Id: I2e726be8d58437ef1de3bcbad3b897a97ed18e22
System server needs to be able to tell Zygote to create processes
with differing ids, capabilities, and SELinux security information.
Allow it.
These rules are not in unconfined.te, and as a result, are not
automatically allowed by SELinux in enforcing mode.
Change-Id: I010eaa2b0e0cee5d995e08e6c785cc5e01b2c974
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.
Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
