/dev/uinput is accessed in the same way as /dev/uhid,
and unlike /dev/input/*. bluetooth requires access to
the former and not to the latter, while shell requires access
to the latter and not the former. This is also consistent
with their DAC group ownerships (net_bt_stack for /dev/uinput
and /dev/uhid vs input for /dev/input/*).
Change-Id: I0059d832a7fe036ed888c91e1fb96f3e6e0bd2d4
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Every device has a CPU. This is not device specific.
Allow every domain to read these files/directories.
For unknown reasons, these files are accessed by A LOT
of processes.
Allow ueventd to write to these files. This addresses
the following denials seen on mako:
<5>[ 4.935602] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:4): avc: denied { read } for pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 4.935785] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:5): avc: denied { open } for pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 4.935937] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:6): avc: denied { search } for pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="cpu0" dev="sysfs" ino=3163 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 4.936120] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:7): avc: denied { write } for pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=3164 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 4.936303] type=1400 audit(1383167737.512:8): avc: denied { open } for pid=140 comm="ueventd" name="uevent" dev="sysfs" ino=3164 scontext=u:r:ueventd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file
Change-Id: I4766dc571762d8fae06aa8c26828c070b80f5936
Often times OEMs and other integrators will need to create PEM
files from presigned APKs they are integrating. This patch will
update the README to include a technique for doing so.
Change-Id: Ica52269542409d2038cfe30cbd5f28ead2fba4de
Some bluetooth implementations write to bluetooth.* properties.
It seems reasonable to allow this for all bluetooth implementations.
This addresses the following denial (seen on mako):
<4>[ 132.182755] avc: denied { set } for property=bluetooth.hciattach scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 tclass=property_service
Change-Id: I6d92c0ff108838dd1107c5fb3c436699ef824814
Since Change-Id: If4f169d9ed4f37b6ebd062508de058f3baeafead
the insert_keys.py tool has had support for expanding
environment variable strings. This change addresses the lack
of an updated README covering said change.
Change-Id: I88e81ea58fb84110da3fc3cfb8b49fd0d6c027c2
In 9af6f1bd59, the -d option
was dropped from insertkeys.py. This was done to allow an
Android distribution to replace the default version of
keys.conf distributed in external/sepolicy/keys.conf. keys.conf
was modified to reference the publicly known test keys in
build/target/product/security.
Unfortunately, this broke Google's build of Android. Instead
of incorporating our keys directory, we were using the
default AOSP keys. As a result, apps were getting assigned
to the wrong SELinux domain. (see "Steps to reproduce" below)
This change continues to allow others to replace keys.conf,
but makes DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE available as an
environment variable in case the customized version wants to
make reference to it. This change also modifies the stock
version of keys.conf to use DEFAULT_SYSTEM_DEV_CERTIFICATE,
which should be appropriate for most Android distributions.
It doesn't make any sense to force each OEM to have a copy of
this file.
Steps to reproduce.
1) Compile and boot Android.
2) Run the following command: "adb shell ps -Z | grep process.media"
Expected:
$ adb shell ps -Z | grep process.media
u:r:media_app:s0 u0_a5 1332 202 android.process.media
Actual:
$ adb shell ps -Z | grep process.media
u:r:untrusted_app:s0 u0_a5 3617 187 android.process.media
Bug: 11327304
Change-Id: Ica24fb25c5f9c0e2f4d181718c757cf372467822
Confine the mediaserver domain, restoring our rules for it,
but leave it permissive until sufficient testing has been
performed.
Change-Id: I3d10ee16f5125b11295bc40ff6f2e14080b4bd00
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>