As with heapprofd, it's useful to profile the platform itself on debug
builds (compared to just apps on "user" builds).
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I8630c20e0da9c67e4927496802a4cd9cacbeb81a
System_server will listen on incoming packets from zygotes.
Bug: 136036078
Test: atest CtsAppExitTestCases:ActivityManagerAppExitInfoTest
Change-Id: I42feaa317615b90c5277cd82191e677548888a71
app_zygote used by for example Google Chrome needs access
to at least search /oem partition.
Google chrome version: 76.0.3809.132 is running in app_zygote
and the following access is blocked by selinux causing Chrome
to hang.
avc: denied { search } for pid=813 comm="d.chrome_zygote"
name="/" dev="sda42" ino=2 scontext=u:r:app_zygote:s0:c214,c256,c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:oemfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0 ppid=798
pcomm="d.chrome_zygote" pgid=798 pgcomm="d.chrome_zygote"
Change-Id: Idcce1a5ad1a8be3d7bd057c12ec477baa9669235
This change allows those daemons of the audio and Bluetooth which
include HALs to access the bluetooth_audio_hal_prop. This property is
used to force disable the new BluetoothAudio HAL.
- persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled
Bug: 128825244
Test: audio HAL can access the property
Change-Id: I87a8ba57cfbcd7d3e4548aa96bc915d0cc6b2b74
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.
Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
The app_zygote should never use any unix sockets, except the
logd socket and some sockets only available on userdebug/eng.
Prevent it from using ptrace.
Bug: 111434506
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ic47cfca51fba0b150a136194ba0e4a8a488c9996
The application zygote is a new sort of zygote process that is a
child of the regular zygote. Each application zygote is tied to the
application for which it's launched. Once it's started, it will
pre-load some of the code for that specific application, much like
the regular zygote does for framework code.
Once the application zygote is up and running, it can spawn
isolated service processes that run in the isolated_app domain. These
services can then benefit from already having the relevant
application code and data pre-loaded.
The policy is largely the same as the webview_zygote domain,
however there are a few crucial points where the policy is different.
1) The app_zygote runs under the UID of the application that spawned
it.
2) During app_zygote launch, it will call a callback that is
controlled by the application, that allows the application to
pre-load code and data that it thinks is relevant.
Especially point 2 is imporant: it means that untrusted code can run
in the app_zygote context. This context is severely limited, and the
main concern is around the setgid/setuid capabilities. Those conerns
are mitigated by installing a seccomp filter that only allows
setgid/setuid to be called in a safe range.
Bug: 111434506
Test: app_zygote can start and fork children without denials.
Change-Id: I1cc49ee0042d41e5ac6eb81d8f8a10ba448d4832
