Updates statsd sepolicy so it can use the thermal hal.
Test: verified these policies solved sepolicy issues with thermal hal.
Change-Id: I36839a72494b084d5742c4d83c3ce9814102b974
ro.radio.noril is used for modem-less products including emulator.
Bug: 73871799
Test: succeeded building and tested with taimen
Change-Id: I2270374a2523889aa4874840594d8267614f93ad
These two selinux policy violations keep showing up from statsd's CTS
tests, although statsd and the CTS test seemed to function fine despite
them. Nonetheless, they seem reasonable to add to the list.
Bug: 73548694
Test: N/A. It didn't seem to be causing any issues in the first place.
Change-Id: Id36c5229c0d7de83675166caeb07c87b719dc374
After 9 amazing years with Android, it's time to try something new.
I've moved over to Fuchsia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Fuchsia)
where I'll be helping define security for a new, experimental operating
system.
My time in Android has been the most rewarding of my life. I couldn't
be more proud of our work in creating a trustworthy operating system
used by billions(!) of people, from rich to poor. It's quotes like this
which give me the warm fuzzies:
https://threatpost.com/whats-new-in-android-8-0-oreo-security/128061/
"Android O is a big step forward," said Duo Security’s Lady.
He said with O, Google closes the security gap on the iPhone.
"It used to be if you cared about security you had to pay a
premium and buy an iPhone. Soon, even a $50 Android device
running O will be on par with a $1,000 iPhone X when it comes
to security."
The platform team is in good hands, with Rene Mayrhofer now leading the
charge to make Android the most secure, privacy preserving operating
system in existence. And thank you to the rest of the team for making
my time in Android so wonderful.
And a special thank you to Stephen Smalley of the Trusted Systems
Research Group for his leadership and guidance. Android Security would
not be where it is today without you.
=====
Keeping with the principle of least privilege, this change removes
myself from the OWNERS file for system/sepolicy. Let us always strive to
build systems so strong that we ourselves cannot even break into them,
and so private that people can trust us with their most sensitive data.
=====
Test: Tested every day by billions of users. ;-)
Change-Id: Ia7d0f3f75fdbd69cc720d02fd5a9b9e92ae607ae
The webview_zygote is now launched as a child-zygote process from the
main zygote process.
Bug: 63749735
Test: m
Test: Launch "Third-party licenses" activity from Settings, and it
renders correctly via the WebView.
Merged-In: I9c948b58a969d35d5a5add4b6ab62b8f990645d1
Change-Id: I153476642cf14883b0dfea0d9f5b3b5e30ac1c08
Neverallow errors include the file name and line number of the
violated rule. However, if multiple neverallow rules are included
within a single macro, then the line number is for the entire macro,
not the individual neverallow rule that is violated. To fix this,
only include one neverallow rule per macro.
This changes nothing on device, nor does it change the results of
compilation, it only makes the printed errors more useful.
Bug: 69139821
Test: build aosp_taimen-userdebug (neverallow rules are build time
tests)
Change-Id: Id0fc5906431db20e71265c7e9d55fbee4bdf53db
This required for kernel to do loopback mounts on filesystem
images created by the kernel system call tests in LTP.
Add a corresponding neverallow to stop all domains from accessing
the location at /data/local/tmp/ltp.
Bug: 73220071
Test: Boot sailfish successfully
Test: run vts-kernel -m VtsKernelLtp -t syscalls.fchown04
Change-Id: I73f5f14017e22971fc246a05751ba67be4653bca
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The previous selinux rules obtained via audit2allow didn't really
work with the case of apps connecting to the producer socket,
despite all the allow rules being correctly in place.
This was failing our CTS tests.
The reason for the failure (see denials pasted below) is due to
Multi Level Security (for multi-user), which was still preventing
apps form a different level to connect to the traced producer
socket and write to the shmem buffers they get passed back.
This CL tags the objects being accessed as mlstrusted.
CTS tests pass with this CL.
Denials:
avc: denied { write } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" name="traced_producer" dev="tmpfs" ino=23629 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
avc: denied { write } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" name="traced_producer" dev="tmpfs" ino=23629 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
avc: denied { connectto } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/socket/traced_producer" scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:traced:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1
avc: denied { connectto } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" path="/dev/socket/traced_producer" scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:traced:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=1
avc: denied { write } for pid=8545 comm="traced_probes" path=2F6D656D66643A706572666574746F5F73686D656D202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=104483 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:traced_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Change-Id: I1598bc0b07bf39b8d0420b66caf06a4ca884f383
Bug: 73340039
Test: CtsPerfettoTestCases
Bug: 73660835
Test: With the other commit on this topic, clearing all trace files via
the app works properly.
Change-Id: I27a4a5a14d9afe817683f1b046a644648a84badc
