Ideally, public should only contain APIs (types / attributes) for
vendor. The other statements like allow/neverallow/typeattributes are
regarded as implementation detail for platform and should be in private.
Bug: 232023812
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: diff <(git diff --staged | grep "^-" | cut -b2- | sort) \
<(git diff --staged | grep "^+" | cut -b2- | sort)
Test: remove comments on plat_sepolicy.cil, replace base_typeattr_*
to base_typeattr and then compare old and new plat_sepolicy.cil
Change-Id: I5e7d2da4465ab0216de6bacdf03077d37f6ffe12
Required for nicer stacks for crashes
and ANRs, etc..
Bug: N/A
Test: adb shell am hang, check servicemanager
section no longer displays warnings now that
that it is dumped by watchdog
Change-Id: I49a93c1fec9c3219c11dc1a82440c7c2a1944010
Protected guest memory maps are now unmapped when crash_dump forks off
of crosvm, so we don't need or want this exception anymore.
Bug: 238324526
Test: ran debuggerd on protected vm
Change-Id: Iccff5dcc441dcf769fcdaa89e7b8e686341821fd
This patch:
* allows for heap and perf profiling of all processes on the system
(minus undumpable and otherwise incompatible domains). For apps, the
rest of the platform will still perform checks based on
profileable/debuggable manifest flags. For native processes, the
profilers will check that the process runs as an allowlisted UID.
* allows for all apps (=appdomain) to act as perfetto tracing data
writers (=perfetto_producer) for the ART java heap graph plugin
(perfetto_hprof).
* allows for system_server to act a perfetto_producer for java heap
graphs.
Bug: 247858731
Change-Id: I792ec1812d94b4fa9a8688ed74f2f62f6a7f33a6
There don't seem to be any security issues raised by allowing crash dump
to access keystore. More specifically, all key material is encrypted by
KeyMint anyways in the absolute worst case, so even if key exposure
occurred, there would be no harm.
Fixes: 186868271
Test: The comment is gone.
Change-Id: Ib09fc8e1eaa3f1a0876139e175dc28be9e0d4a4a
A crosvm instance running a protected VM contains a memory mapping of
the VM's protected memory. crash_dump can trigger a kernel panic if it
attaches to such crosvm instance and tries to dump this memory region.
Until we have a means of excluding only the protected memory from
crash_dump, prevent crash_dump from dumping crosvm completely by taking
away its SELinux permission to ptrace crosvm.
Bug: 236672526
Test: run 'killall -s SIGSEGV crosvm' while running crosvm
Change-Id: I6672746c479183cc2bbe3dce625e5b5ebcf6d822
This will make debugging of keystore issues in dogfood populations much
easier than it previously was, as developers will have detailed crash
dump reporting on any issues that do occur.
Bug: 186868271
Bug: 184006658
Test: crash dumps appear if keystore2 explodes
Change-Id: Ifb36cbf96eb063c9290905178b2fdc5934050b99
odrefresh is the process responsible for checking and creating ART
compilation artifacts that live in the ART APEX data
directory (/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art).
There are two types of change here:
1) enabling odrefresh to run dex2oat and write updated boot class path
and system server AOT artifacts into the ART APEX data directory.
2) enabling the zygote and assorted diagnostic tools to use the
updated AOT artifacts.
odrefresh uses two file contexts: apex_art_data_file and
apex_art_staging_data_file. When odrefresh invokes dex2oat, the
generated files have the apex_art_staging_data_file label (which allows
writing). odrefresh then moves these files from the staging area to
their installation area and gives them the apex_art_data_file label.
Bug: 160683548
Test: adb root && adb shell /apex/com.android.art/bin/odrefresh
Change-Id: I9fa290e0c9c1b7b82be4dacb9f2f8cb8c11e4895
The following denial caused a presubmit failure:
06-15 15:16:24.176 956 956 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:4): avc:
denied { read write } for comm="crash_dump64" path="/dev/pts/3"
dev="devpts" ino=6 scontext=u:r:crash_dump:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
Suppress these denials. They are not needed by crash_dump and are only
caused by the default behavior of sharing FDs across exec.
Test: build
Change-Id: I183f7a54e6b807fdf46b04d67dd4b819d4f0e507
In userdebug, for better diagnostics, allow crash_dump to "connect
to" apexd.
Considering apexd is quite powerful, user devices remain restricted.
Bug: 118771487
Test: m
Change-Id: Id42bd2ad7505cd5578138bfccd8840acba9a334d
And add neverallow so that it's removed from partner policy if
it was added there due to denials.
Fixes: 124476401
Test: build
Change-Id: I16903ba43f34011a0753b5267c35425dc7145f05
We're investigating a bug where vold gets wedged, and we need to
collect ANR stack traces from it to debug further.
avc: denied { signal } for comm="watchdog" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=process permissive=0
avc: denied { ptrace } for scontext=u:r:crash_dump:s0 tcontext=u:r:vold:s0 tclass=process permissive=0
Bug: 122090837
Test: manual
Change-Id: I738e63717715189b9ae2317472f671e3563afaa9
apexd is a new daemon for managing APEX packages installed
on the device. It hosts a single binder service, "apexservice".
Bug: 112455435
Test: builds, binder service can be registered,
apexes can be accessed, verified and mounted
Change-Id: I634ad100f10b2edcd9a9c0df0d33896fa5d4ed97
Add additional compile time constraints on the ability to ptrace various
sensitive domains.
llkd: remove some domains which llkd should never ptrace, even on
debuggable builds, such as kernel threads and init.
crash_dump neverallows: Remove the ptrace neverallow checks because
it duplicates other neverallow assertions spread throughout the policy.
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Change-Id: Ia4240d1ce7143b983bb048e046bb4729d0af5a6e
llkd needs the ptrace capabilities and dac override to monitor for
live lock conditions on the stack dumps.
Test: compile
Bug: 33808187
Change-Id: Ibc1e4cc10395fa9685c4ef0ca214daf212a5e126
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
