If the sdcard daemon is restarted (crash or otherwise), one of the first
things it attempts to do is umount the previously mounted /mnt/shell/emulated
fuse filesystem, which is denied by SELinux with the following denial:
sdcard : type=1400 audit(0.0:6997): avc: denied { unmount } for scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0
Allow the operation.
Steps to reproduce:
1) adb shell into the device and su to root
2) run "kill -9 [PID OF SDCARD]
Expected:
sdcard daemon successfully restarts without error message.
Actual:
SELinux denial above, plus attempts to mount a new filesystem
on top of the existing filesystem.
Bug: 17383009
Change-Id: I386bfc98e2b5b32b1d11408f7cfbd6e3c1af68f4
As described in the system/core commit with the same Change-Id,
there's a race condition between installd and sdcard when it
comes to accessing /data/media. Resolve the race by checking
/data/.layout_version to make sure the filesystem has been upgraded.
Maybe indirectly fixes the following SELinux denial:
sdcard : type=1400 audit(0.0:3): avc: denied { write } for name="media" dev="mmcblk0p17" ino=102753 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
Bug: 16329437
Change-Id: I5e164f08009c1036469f8734ec07cbae9c5e262b
These are obsoleted by the restorecon_recursive /data/media call
added to the device init*.rc files, e.g.
see I4a191d32a46104a68f6644398c152b274c7937a6
for the hammerhead change.
If/when Ib8d9751a47c8e0238cf499fcec61898937945d9d is merged, this
will also be addressed for all devices by the restorecon_recursive /data
call added to the main init.rc file.
Change-Id: Idbe2006a66817d6bb284d138a7565dec24dc6745
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Should resolve b/13060688 - emulator writes to /storage/sdcard failing.
Change-Id: I9f00d9dfcd1c4f84c2320628257beca71abf170b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.
Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.
This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.
Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.
Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
/data/media presently is left in system_data_file, which requires
anything that wants to write to it to be able to write to system_data_file.
Introduce a new type for /data/media, media_rw_data_file (to match
the media_rw UID assigned to it and distinguish it from /data/misc/media
which has media UID and media_data_file type), and allow access to it.
We allow this for all platform app domains as WRITE_MEDIA_STORAGE permission is granted
to signature|system. We should not have to allow it to untrusted_app.
Set up type transitions in sdcardd to automatically label any directories
or files it creates with the new type.
Change-Id: I5c7e6245b854a9213099e40a41d9583755d37d42
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init
In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.
When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:
1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.
Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.
Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
Two new types are introduced:
sdcard_internal
sdcard_external
The existing type of sdcard, is dropped and a new attribute
sdcard_type is introduced.
The boolean app_sdcard_rw has also been changed to allow for
controlling untrusted_app domain to use the internal and external
sdcards.
Change-Id: Ic7252a8e1703a43cb496413809d01cc6cacba8f5
