We add a new back end for SELinux based keystore2_key namespaces.
This patch adds the rump policy and build system infrastructure
for installing keystore2_key context files on the target devices.
Bug: 158500146
Bug: 159466840
Test: None
Change-Id: I423c9e68ad259926e4a315d052dfda97fa502106
Merged-In: I423c9e68ad259926e4a315d052dfda97fa502106
This is unused currently & there are no concrete plans to use it
in the future.
Bug: 130080335
Test: Device boots up & connects to networks.
Test: Will send for regression tests
Change-Id: I785389bc2c934c8792c8f631362d6aa0298007af
Merged-In: I785389bc2c934c8792c8f631362d6aa0298007af
(cherry picked from commit 56dfc06397)
When an OTA is downloaded, the RecoverySystem can be triggered to store
the user's lock screen knowledge factor in a secure way using the
IRebootEscrow HAL. This will allow the credential encrypted (CE)
storage, keymaster credentials, and possibly others to be unlocked when
the device reboots after an OTA.
Bug: 63928581
Test: make
Test: boot emulator with default implementation
Test: boot Pixel 4 with default implementation
Change-Id: I1f02e7a502478715fd642049da01eb0c01d112f6
This introduces some attributes that can be used to restrict access to
exported properties so that one can easily check from which the
properties can be accessed, and that OEMs can extend their own exported
properties.
Bug: 71814576
Bug: 131162102
Test: boot aosp_cf_x86_phone-userdebug
Test: logcat | grep "avc: "
Change-Id: I6f988ec1cb94fa64563ca6cb91b7702da5d604e3
Before this change, access to HALs from untrusted apps was prohibited
except for the whitelisted ones like the gralloc HAL, the renderscript
HAL, etc. As a result, any HAL that is added by partners can't be
accessed from apps. This sometimes is a big restriction for them when
they want to access their own HALs in the same-process HALs running in
apps. Although this is a vendor-to-vendor communication and thus is not
a Treble violation, that was not allowed because their HALs are not in
the whitelist in AOSP.
This change fixes the problem by doing the access control in the
opposite way; access to HALs are restricted only for the blacklisted
ones.
All the hwservice context that were not in the whitelist are now put
to blacklist.
This change also removes the neverallow rule for the binder access to
the halserverdomain types. This is not needed as the protected
hwservices living in the HAL processes are already not accessible; we
have a neverallow rule for preventing hwservice_manager from finding
those protected hwservices from untrusted apps.
Bug: 139645938
Test: m
Merged-In: I1e63c11143f56217eeec05e2288ae7c91e5fe585
(cherry picked from commit 580375c923)
Change-Id: I4e611091a315ca90e3c181f77dd6a5f61d3a6468
The only distinction that matters for security is if a service is
served by vendor or not AND which process is allowed to talk to which.
coredomain is allowed to talk to vintf_service OR vendor_service, it's
just that for a non-@VintfStability service user-defined APIs (as
opposed to pingBinder/dump) are restricted.
Bug: 136027762
Test: N/A
Change-Id: If3b047d65ed65e9ee7f9dc69a21b7e23813a7789
These attributes are intended to be used w/ services using the system
copy of libbinder (for vendor, this is libbinder_ndk).
Switching vndservicemanager users using the libbinder copy of vendor to
be able to use the system copy of libbinder for registration is an open
problem.
Bug: 136027762
Test: N/A
Change-Id: I1d70380edcb39ca8ef2cb98c25617701b67ba7e1
This reverts commit 6b2eaade82.
Reason for revert: reland original CL
Separate runtime infrastructure now makes sure that only Stable AIDL
interfaces are used system<->vendor.
Bug: 136027762
Change-Id: Id5ba44c36a724e2721617de721f7cffbd3b1d7b6
Test: boot device, use /dev/binder from vendor
Separate runtime infrastructure now makes sure that only Stable AIDL
interfaces are used system<->vendor.
Bug: 136027762
Test: boot device, use /dev/binder from vendor
Change-Id: Icdf207c5d5a4ef769c0ca6582dc58306f65be67e
Bug: 130734497
Test: m selinux_policy; system_server and statds still have permission
to export HIDL services.
Change-Id: I6e87b236bdbdd939fca51fb7255e97635118ed2d
Merged-In: I6e87b236bdbdd939fca51fb7255e97635118ed2d
(cherry picked from commit 1d34b8cc31)
Bug: 130734497
Test: m selinux_policy; system_server and statds still have permission
to export HIDL services.
Change-Id: I6e87b236bdbdd939fca51fb7255e97635118ed2d
This is the type used on super partition block devices.
- On devices launch with DAP, super is already marked
as super_block_device_type.
- On retrofit devices, appropriate block devices must
be marked as super_block_device_type, for example:
typeattribute system_block_device super_block_device_type;
Bug: 128991918
Test: builds
Change-Id: I7e26d85b577ce08d8dc1574ddc43146d65843d9c
System suspend service is not a HAL, so avoid using HAL-specific macros
and attributes.
Use system_suspend_server attribute for ISystemSuspend.hal permissions.
Use system_suspend type directly for internal .aidl interface
permissions.
Bug: 126259100
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: blueline boots; wakelocks can still be acquired; device suspends
if left alone.
Change-Id: Ie811e7da46023705c93ff4d76d15709a56706714
Add the required permissions for the InputClassifier HAL.
Bug: 62940136
Test: no selinux denials in logcat when HAL is used inside input flinger.
Change-Id: Ibc9b115a83719421d56ecb4bca2fd196ec71fd76
Notes:
- Added face hal domain, context and file types for the default
SELinux policy.
- Please see aosp/q/topic:"Face+Authentication"
Bug: 80155388
Test: Built successfully.
Change-Id: I2e02cf6df009c5ca476dfd842b493c6b76b7712a
Also giving statsd permission to access it. This change copies the internal sepolicy to AOSP.
Bug: 111185513
Bug: 120551881
Test: make
Change-Id: I7e0386777e05580299caf9b97cb7804459f1a9d0
Set up a new service for sw media codec services.
Bug: 111407413
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev --module CtsMediaTestCases --compatibility:module-arg CtsMediaTestCases:include-annotation:android.platform.test.annotations.RequiresDevice
Change-Id: Ia1c6a9ef3f0c1d84b2be8756eb1853ffa0597f8e
system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.
Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
...to reflect that the HAL operates on storage devices,
not filesystem.
Bug: 111655771
Test: compiles
Change-Id: Ibb0572cb1878359e5944aa6711331f0c7993ba6e
Merged-In: Ibb0572cb1878359e5944aa6711331f0c7993ba6e
In cases when a device upgrades to system-as-root from O to P, it needs a mount
point for an already existing partition that is accessed by both system and
vendor.
Devices launching with P must not have /mnt/vendor accessible to system.
Bug: 78598545
Test: m selinx_policy
Change-Id: Ia7bcde44e2b8657a7ad9e0d9bae7a7259f40936f
Bug: 110887137
Test: Flash new system policy onto a device with vendor policy that uses
untrusted_app_visible_* attributes, and check that old and new attributes
are applied to exactly same types.
Change-Id: Ibee0ec645878fcc8c93cd0fbd169a8d45129d79e
Merged-In: Ibee0ec645878fcc8c93cd0fbd169a8d45129d79e
(cherry picked from commit 7abca51d19)
The attribute is used to capture system properties added from outside of
AOSP (e.g. by OEM), but are not device-specific and thus are used only
inside the system partition.
Access to the the system properties from outside of the system partition
is prevented by the neverallow rule.
Bug: 80382020
Bug: 78598545
Test: m -j selinux_policy
Merged-In: I22c083dc195dab84c9c21a79fbe3ad823a3bbb46
Change-Id: I22c083dc195dab84c9c21a79fbe3ad823a3bbb46
(cherry picked from commit c0f8f2f82a)
System properties can be abused to get around Treble requirements of
having a clean system/vendor split. This CL seeks to prevent that by
neverallowing coredomain from writing vendor properties.
Bug: 78598545
Test: build 2017 Pixels
Test: build aosp_arm64
Change-Id: I5e06894150ba121624d753228e550ba9b81f7677
(cherry picked from commit cdb1624c27)
(breaks vendor blobs, will have to be regenerated
after this CL)
This moves mediacodec to vendor so it is replaced with
hal_omx_server. The main benefit of this is that someone
can create their own implementation of mediacodec without
having to alter the one in the tree. mediacodec is still
seccomp enforced by CTS tests.
Fixes: 36375899
Test: (sanity) YouTube
Test: (sanity) camera pics + video
Test: check for denials
Change-Id: I31f91b7ad6cd0a891a1681ff3b9af82ab400ce5e
Add an exemption to neverallow rule to use sockets from HAL servers only
for automotive build
Bug: 78901167
Test: assign this attribute to hal_vehicle_default and try to open
socket from HAL implementation
Test: verify that new CTS test will fail for non-automotive build with
this attribute buing used
Test: make cts && cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info
--skip-preconditions --abi arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases
-t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest
Merged-In: I27976443dad4fc5b7425c089512cac65bb54d6d9
(cherry picked from commit 4cafae77a4)
Change-Id: I58e25a0f86579073aa568379b10b6599212134c6
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
* Note on cherry-pick: Some of the dependent changes are not in AOSP.
In order to keep hostapd running correctly in AOSP, I've modified this
change to only include policy additions.
Change sepolicy permissions to now classify hostapd as a HAL exposing
HIDL interface.
Sepolicy denial for accessing /data/vendor/misc/wifi/hostapd:
12-27 23:40:55.913 4952 4952 W hostapd : type=1400 audit(0.0:19): avc:
denied { write } for name="hostapd" dev="sda13" ino=4587601
scontext=u:r:hal_wifi_hostapd_default:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
01-02 19:07:16.938 5791 5791 W hostapd : type=1400 audit(0.0:31): avc:
denied { search } for name="net" dev="sysfs" ino=30521
scontext=u:r:hal_wifi_hostapd_default:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Bug: 36646171
Test: Device boots up and able to turn on SoftAp.
Change-Id: Ibacfcc938deab40096b54b8d0e608d53ca91b947
Merged-In: Ibacfcc938deab40096b54b8d0e608d53ca91b947
(cherry picked from commit 5bca3e860d)
