Commit graph

24 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jeff Vander Stoep
f627e5581c restore permissions to /vendor for non-treble devices
Relabeling /vendor and /system/vendor to vendor_file removed
previously granted permissions. Restore these for non-treble devices.

Addresses:
avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for pid=2944 comm="dumpstate"
path="/system/vendor/bin/wpa_cli" dev="mmcblk0p10" ino=1929
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
tclass=file

And potentially some other bugs that have yet to surface.

Bug: 37105075
Test: build Fugu
Change-Id: I8e7bd9c33819bf8206f7c110cbce72366afbcef8
2017-04-14 10:01:14 -07:00
Daniel Nicoara
6907e39aa4 VR: Add sepolicy for VR HWC service
VR HWC is being split out of VR Window Manager. It creates a HW binder
interface used by SurfaceFlinger which implements the HWComposer HAL and
a regular binder interface which will be used by a system app to receive
the SurfaceFlinger output.

Bug: b/36051907
Test: Ran in permissive mode and ensured no permission errors show in
logcat.

Change-Id: If1360bc8fa339a80100124c4e89e69c64b29d2ae
2017-03-31 10:25:53 -04:00
Steven Moreland
f20b04efdb Allow bugreport to dump some HAL processes.
Whitelist several hals which can be dumped by bugreports. Don't want to
dump more because of the time it takes and also certain hals have
sensitive data which shouldn't be dumped (i.e. keymaster).

Test: dumps work for given hals
Bug: 36414311
Change-Id: Ic0eddfa95fa33abbc983d3b5161e42c240663f22
2017-03-23 12:19:17 -07:00
Alex Klyubin
9e6b24c6a5 Annotate most remaining HALs with _client/_server
This switches most remaining HALs to the _client/_server approach.
To unblock efforts blocked on majority of HALs having to use this
model, this change does not remove unnecessary rules from clients of
these HALs. That work will be performed in follow-up commits. This
commit only adds allow rules and thus does not break existing
functionality.

The HALs not yet on the _client/_server model after this commit are:
* Allocator HAL, because it's non-trivial to declare all apps except
  isolated apps as clients of this HAL, which they are.
* Boot HAL, because it's still on the non-attributized model and I'm
  waiting for update_engine folks to answer a couple of questions
  which will let me refactor the policy of this HAL.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: Device boots in recovery mode, no new denials
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I03e6bcec2fa02f14bdf17d11f7367b62c68a14b9
2017-03-16 19:55:16 -07:00
Calin Juravle
2b291121b9 SElinux: Clean up code related to foreign dex use
We simplified the way we track whether or not a dex file is used by
other apps. DexManager in the framework keeps track of the data and we
no longer need file markers on disk.

Test: device boots, foreign dex markers are not created anymore

Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I464ed6b09439cf0342020ee07596f9aa8ae53b62
2017-03-07 10:59:26 -08:00
Alex Klyubin
47174e3b9f Switch Dumpstate HAL policy to _client/_server
This switches Dumpstate HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of Dumpstate HAL.

Domains which are clients of Dumpstate HAL, such as dumpstate domain,
are granted rules targeting hal_dumpstate only when the Dumpstate HAL
runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the
HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting
hal_dumpstate are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Dumpstate HAL, such
as hal_dumpstate_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_dumpstate.

Test: adb bugreport
Test: Take bugreport through system UI
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I3e827534af03cdfa876921c5fa4af3a53025ba27
2017-02-22 10:15:24 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
6bae84a535 dumpstate: assert no process ptrace
dumpstate has CAP_SYS_PTRACE solely for the purpose of reading sensitive
/proc/PID files, not for using ptrace attach. Add an assert to ensure
that's the case.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I975308fae3f8e9a039b9efdc0e9605192b405ce7
2017-02-18 08:24:13 -08:00
Nick Bray
084faf0259 Add policies for new services.
Bug: 30989383
Bug: 34731101
Test: manual
Change-Id: Icf9d48568b505c6b788f2f5f456f2d709969fbeb
2017-02-09 15:15:11 -08:00
Joe Onorato
41f93db9de Add incident command and incidentd daemon se policy.
Test: adb shell incident
Bug: 31122534
Change-Id: I4ac9c9ab86867f09b63550707673149fe60f1906
2017-02-07 15:52:07 -08:00
Calin Juravle
01ee59a7b4 Remove SElinux audit to libart_file
Since it was introduced it caused quite a few issues and it spams the
SElinux logs unnecessary.

The end goal of the audit was to whitelist the access to the
interpreter. However that's unfeasible for now given the complexity.

Test: devices boots and everything works as expected
      no more auditallow logs

Bug: 29795519
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I9a7a65835e1e1d3f81be635bed2a3acf75a264f6
2017-01-31 23:43:14 +00:00
Mark Salyzyn
d33a9a194b logd: restrict access to /dev/event-log-tags
Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags.  Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access.  Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.

Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e
2017-01-31 15:50:15 +00:00
Steven Moreland
ba68f5547e Dumpstate: hwbinder_use
Dumpstate needs the hwbinder_use permission in order to talk to hardware
services.

Bug: 34709307
Test: no denials submitting bugreport
Change-Id: Ic51da5371cd346c0fa9fb3881a47adaf53c93566
2017-01-26 15:00:21 -08:00
William Roberts
606d2fd665 te_macros: introduce add_service() macro
Introduce the add_service() macro which wraps up add/find
permissions for the source domain with a neverallow preventing
others from adding it. Only a particular domain should
add a particular service.

Use the add_service() macro to automatically add a neverallow
that prevents other domains from adding the service.

mediadrmserver was adding services labeled mediaserver_service.
Drop the add permission as it should just need the find
permission.

Additionally, the macro adds the { add find } permission which
causes some existing neverallow's to assert. Adjust those
neverallow's so "self" can always find.

Test: compile and run on hikey and emulator. No new denials were
found, and all services, where applicable, seem to be running OK.

Change-Id: Ibbd2a5304edd5f8b877bc86852b0694732be993c
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
2017-01-26 04:43:16 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
d5b6043f51 more ephemeral_app cleanup
As of https://android-review.googlesource.com/324092, ephemeral_app is
now an appdomain, so places where both appdomain and ephemeral_app are
granted the same set of rules can be deleted.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ideee710ea47af7303e5eb3af1331653afa698415
2017-01-20 14:35:17 +00:00
Josh Gao
cb3eb4eef9 Introduce crash_dump debugging helper.
Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.

Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed
2017-01-18 15:03:24 -08:00
Alex Klyubin
20151072a7 Restrict access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno
This restricts access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno, the two
system properties which contain the device's serial number, to a
select few SELinux domains which need the access. In particular, this
removes access to these properties from Android apps. Apps can access
the serial number via the public android.os.Build API. System
properties are not public API for apps.

The reason for the restriction is that serial number is a globally
unique identifier which cannot be reset by the user. Thus, it can be
used as a super-cookie by apps. Apps need to wean themselves off of
identifiers not resettable by the user.

Test: Set up fresh GMS device, install some apps via Play, update some apps, use Chrome
Test: Access the device via ADB (ADBD exposes serial number)
Test: Enable MTP over USB, use mtp-detect to confirm that serial number is reported in MTP DeviceInfo
Bug: 31402365
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: I4713133b8d78dbc63d8272503e80cd2ffd63a2a7
2016-12-22 11:38:29 -08:00
Steven Moreland
d86a30a273 Add hal_dumpstate attribute.
- Also allow dumpstate to talk to hal_dumpstate.

Bug: 31982882
Test: compiles
Change-Id: Ib9cf0027ee7e71fa40b9ccc29fc8dccea6977e5c
2016-12-16 10:48:32 -08:00
dcashman
2e00e6373f sepolicy: add version_policy tool and version non-platform policy.
In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317
2016-12-06 08:56:02 -08:00
Steven Moreland
839c7ded30 dumpstate: talk to vibrator hal
Bug: 33067126
Test: Dumpstate vibrator works.
Change-Id: I46ff453218ba77f156e13b448e3cba9a291df0e7
2016-11-29 15:44:40 -08:00
Felipe Leme
b5f5931e8c Added permissions for the dumpstate service.
- Allow dumpstate to create the dumpservice service.
- Allow System Server and Shell to find that service.
- Don't allow anyone else to create that service.
- Don't allow anyone else to find that service.

BUG: 31636879
Test: manual verification
Change-Id: I642fe873560a2b123e6bafde645467d45a5f5711
2016-11-01 10:43:25 -07:00
Nick Kralevich
2c8ea36ad8 Get rid of more auditallow spam
Addresses the following audit messages:

[    7.984957] type=1400 audit(33873666.610:40): avc: granted { getattr
} for pid=1 comm="init" name="system@framework@boot-ext.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106324 scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

[   65.528068] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:96): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.530425] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:97): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.530487] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open }
for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.530800] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open }
for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.530842] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.531138] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.531176] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup"
ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0
tclass=dir

[   65.531465] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup"
ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0
tclass=dir

[   65.531502] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open
} for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks"
dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.531789] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open
} for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks"
dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.531827] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.713056] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

Bug: 32246161
Test: policy compiles
Test: dumpstate no longer generates the audit messages above.
Change-Id: Id5afe2ebeb24f8a7407aac1a0a09806b1521b0e4
2016-10-29 08:15:08 -07:00
Nick Kralevich
79a08e13bd Get rid of auditallow spam.
Fixes the following SELinux messages when running adb bugreport:

avc: granted { read } for name="libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { getattr } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read execute } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so"
dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { getattr } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64" dev="dm-2"
ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { getattr } for
path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { read } for name="system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for
path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

[  169.349480] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:129): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350030] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350361] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350399] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350963] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351002] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351330] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351366] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351861] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351910] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353105] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353186] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353594] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353636] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.354230] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.354437] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.395359] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

Test: policy compiles
Test: adb bugreport runs without auditallow messages above.
Bug: 32246161
Change-Id: Ie0ab2ed3c6babc1f93d3b8ae47c92dd905ebc93a
2016-10-28 11:46:00 -07:00
Chad Brubaker
06cf31eb63 Rename autoplay_app to ephemeral_app
Test: Builds and boots
Change-Id: I3db64e12f0390c6940f5745eae83ce7efa7d65a9
2016-10-07 09:52:31 -07:00
dcashman
cc39f63773 Split general policy into public and private components.
Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
2016-10-06 13:09:06 -07:00
Renamed from dumpstate.te (Browse further)