There is a problem with on-disk labeling of files created by secondary
dex background compilation which is causing unexpected denials to show
up. Drop the auditallow rule to avoid logspam.
Steps to reproduce:
1) boot android device.
2) adb root
3) Run cmd package compile -r bg-dexopt --secondary-dex com.google.android.gms
4) Examine the files in /data/user_de/0/com.google.android.gms
Expected:
All files have the label privapp_data_file
Actual:
The files in /data/user_de/0/com.google.android.gms/app_chimera/m
are labeled "app_data_file", not "privapp_data_file".
Addresses the following audit logspam:
type=1400 audit(0.0:117): avc: granted { execute } for comm=4173796E635461736B202331 path="/data/user_de/0/com.google.android.gms/app_chimera/m/00000002/oat/arm/DynamiteLoader.odex" dev="dm-0" ino=5775 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c111,c256,c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file app=com.android.chrome
Additionally, this removes auditallow statements for older untrusted
apps. Lots of big apps are executing files from their home directory.
Additional restrictions in this area will need to be tied to API
versions.
Addresses the following audit logspam:
type=1400 audit(0.0:619): avc: granted { execute } for comm="na:notification" path="/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libbreakpad.so" dev="dm-3" ino=28333 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file app=com.facebook.katana
type=1400 audit(0.0:129): avc: granted { execute } for comm="ticlock" path="/data/data/is.shortcut/files/ticlock/ticlock" dev="dm-3" ino=58614 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file app=is.shortcut
type=1400 audit(0.0:1239): avc: granted { execute } for comm="Analytics-Norma" path="/data/data/com.facebook.orca/lib-xzs/libchipsetmerged.so" dev="dm-3" ino=50243 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file app=com.facebook.orca
type=1400 audit(0.0:58): avc: granted { execute_no_trans } for comm="sh" path="/data/data/is.shortcut/files/ticlock/ticlock" dev="dm-3" ino=58614 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file app=is.shortcut
type=1400 audit(0.0:1948): avc: granted { execute_no_trans } for comm="sh" path="/data/data/com.mxdata.tube.Market/files/osmcore" dev="sda13" ino=2752651 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file app=com.mxdata.tube.Market
type=1400 audit(0.0:2875): avc: granted { execute_no_trans } for comm="ThreadPoolManag" path="/data/data/com.amazon.kindle/files/hardwareTest" dev="sda13" ino=1935346 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file app=com.amazon.kindle
This reverts commit 4738b93db2.
Bug: 112357170
Test: policy compiles
Text relocation support was removed from the linker for apps targeting
API >= 23. See
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/master/android-changes-for-ndk-developers.md#text-relocations-enforced-for-api-level-23
However, the security policy was not updated to remove the execmod
permission at that time, since we didn't have support for targeting
SELinux policies to API versions.
Remove execmod permissions for apps targeting API 26 or greater. The
linker support was removed, so it's pointless to keep around the SELinux
permissions.
Retain execmod support for apps targeting API 25 or lower. While in
theory we could remove support for API 23-25, that would involve the
introduction of a new SELinux domain (and the associated rule
explosion), which I would prefer to avoid.
This change helps protect application executable code from modification,
enforcing W^X properties on executable code pages loaded from files.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX
Test: auditallow rules were added and nothing triggered for apps
targeting API >= 26. Code compiles and device boots.
Bug: 111544476
Change-Id: Iab9a0bd297411e99699e3651c110e57eb02a3a41
Executing files from an application home directory violates
W^X (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX) constraints (loading executable code
from a writable file) and is an unsafe application behavior. Test to see if we
can get rid of it and establish some baseline metrics.
Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: I756c281fcbf750821307327642cc0d06605951b0
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
Remove the exemptions for untrusted apps and broaden the neverallow so
they can't be reinstated. Modifying executable pages is unsafe. Text
relocations are not supported.
Bug: 111544476
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: Ibff4f34d916e000203e38574bb063513e4428bb7
This is so we can get data on which apps are actually doing this.
Bug: 111544476
Test: Device boots. No audits seen on test device.
Change-Id: I5f72200ed8606775904d353c4d3d790373fe7dea
The recommended solution is to not access encrypted storage until
after the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered.
Test: build
Fixes: 72811052
Fixes: 72550646
Change-Id: I80eb743e26047b7864de983c5a46c28b6f753a59
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
Because applications should be able to set the receive
timeout on UDP encapsulation sockets, we need to allow
setsockopt(). getsockopt() is an obvious allowance as
well.
Bug: 68689438
Test: compilation
Merged-In: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
Change-Id: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
This is a partial cherry pick of commit 6231b4d9
'Enforce per-app data protections for targetSdk 28+'.
Untrusted_app_27 remains unreachable, but it's existence
prevents future merge conflicts.
Bug: 63897054
Test: build/boot aosp_walleye-userdebug
Change-Id: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
Merged-In: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
(cherry picked from commit 6231b4d9fc)
This change will allow traceur to pass a file descriptor to another app
in order to allow that app to process trace data files. E.g. in the use
case that someone would like to email the traces they collected and pass
the trace data files to gmail, this will now be permitted.
Bug:68126425
Test: Traceur can pass fd's to untrusted apps for processing
Change-Id: If0507b5d1f06fd8400e04bd60e06a44153dc59b7
This gives the privilege to system apps, platform apps,
ephemeral apps, and privileged apps to receive a
UDP socket from the system server. This is being added
for supporting UDP Encapsulation sockets for IPsec, which
must be provided by the system.
This is an analogous change to a previous change that
permitted these sockets for untrusted_apps:
0f75a62e2c
Bug: 70389346
Test: IpSecManagerTest, System app verified with SL4A
Change-Id: Iec07e97012e0eab92a95fae9818f80f183325c31
Perfetto is a performance instrumentation and logging framework,
living in AOSP's /external/pefetto.
Perfetto introduces in the system one binary and two daemons
(the binary can specialize in either depending on the cmdline).
1) traced: unprivileged daemon. This is architecturally similar to logd.
It exposes two UNIX sockets:
- /dev/socket/traced_producer : world-accessible, allows to stream
tracing data. A tmpfs file descriptor is sent via SCM_RIGHTS
from traced to each client process, which needs to be able to
mmap it R/W (but not X)
- /dev/socket/traced_consumer : privilege-accessible (only from:
shell, statsd). It allows to configure tracing and read the trace
buffer.
2) traced_probes: privileged daemon. This needs to:
- access tracingfs (/d/tracing) to turn tracing on and off.
- exec atrace
- connect to traced_producer to stream data to traced.
init.rc file:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/external/perfetto/+/575382/14/perfetto.rc
Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: Ia3b5fdacbd5a8e6e23b82f1d6fabfa07e4abc405
Vendor apps may only use servicemanager provided services
marked as app_api_service. surfaceflinger_service should be
available to vendor apps, so add this attribute and clean up
duplicate grants.
Addresses:
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:qtelephony:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:ssr_detector:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:qcneservice:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Bug: 69064190
Test: build
Change-Id: I00fcf43b0a8bde232709aac1040a5d7f4792fa0f
The typical use case is where vendor apps which run as untrusted apps
use libraries that are packaged withing the apk
Bug: 37753883
Test: Tested by runnig pre-installed app that packages a library from
/vendor/app
Change-Id: I445144e37e49e531f4f43b13f34d6f2e78d7a3cf
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Rules defined in utrusted_app_all do not apply to all untrusted apps,
update the comments to reflect that.
Test: builds
Change-Id: I6f064bd93c13d8341128d941be34fdfaa0bec5da
We need more time to investigate the effect that this change will
have on DRM solutions. Until the investigation is done, revert.
This reverts commit 38d3eca0d4.
Bug: 30146890
Bug: 20013628
Bug: 35323421
Change-Id: I5ad69ef5ee12081ce7fc0a8440712f7f8f77cf16
Test: policy compiles.
Drop support for execmod (aka text relocations) for newer API versions.
Retain it for older app APIs versions.
Bug: 30146890
Bug: 20013628
Bug: 35323421
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie54fdb385e9c4bb997ad6fcb6cff74f7e32927bb
Motivation:
Provide the ability to phase in new security policies by
applying them to apps with a minimum targetSdkVersion.
Place untrusted apps with targetSdkVersion<=25 into the
untrustd_app_25 domain. Apps with targetSdkVersion>=26 are placed
into the untrusted_app domain. Common rules are included in the
untrusted_app_all attribute. Apps with a more recent targetSdkVersion
are granted fewer permissions.
Test: Marlin builds and boots. Apps targeting targetSdkVersion<=25
run in untrusted_app_25 domain. Apps targeting the current development
build >=26 run in the untrusted_app domain with fewer permissions. No
new denials observed during testing.
Bug: 34115651
Bug: 35323421
Change-Id: Ie6a015566fac07c44ea06c963c40793fcdc9a083
