kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order
of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of
dac_override and dac_read_search checks. Domains that have dac_override
will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also
have that permission. Since dac_override is a strict superset of
dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have
dac_override to get rid of the denials.
Bug: 114280985
Bug: crbug.com/877588
Test: Booted on a device running 4.14.
Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4
shipping API version:
For devices shipped on O-MR1 nothing changes, data is stored
under /data/system/users/<user-id>/fpdata/...
Devices shipped from now on will instead store fingerprint data under
/data/vendor_de/<user-id>/fpdata.
Support for /data/vendor_de and /data/vendor_ce has been added to vold.
Bug: 36997597
Change-Id: Ibc7cc33b756f64abe68a749c0ada0ca4f6d92514
Merged-In: Ibc7cc33b756f64abe68a749c0ada0ca4f6d92514
Test: manually
(cherry picked from commit 6116daa71a)
Bug: 78591623
Test: Create a new user with a fingerprint. Reboot. Delete that user.
Check for denials, files left over in /data/*_{c,d}e/10
Merged-In: Ib818e112a98c5b954ee829e93ebd69c3b12940cf
Change-Id: Ib818e112a98c5b954ee829e93ebd69c3b12940cf
After adding a new user, deleting it, and rebooting, some of the user's data still remained. This adds the SELinux permissions necessary to remove all of the data. It fixes the followign denials:
avc: denied { rmdir } for scontext=u:r:vold_prepare_subdirs:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { unlink } for scontext=u:r:vold_prepare_subdirs:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
Bug: 74866238
Test: Create user, delete user, reboot user, see no denials or
leftover data.
Change-Id: Ibc43bd2552b388a9708bf781b5ad206f21df62dc
Restrictions introduced in vendor init mean that new devices
may not no longer exempt vendor init from writing to system_data_file.
This means we must introduce a new label for /data/vendor which
vendor_init may write to.
Bug: 73087047
Test: build and boot Taimen and Marlin. Complete SUW, enroll fingerprint
No new denials.
Change-Id: I65f904bb28952d4776aab947515947e14befbe34
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
AIUI permissions should be in private unless they need to be public.
Bug: 25861755
Test: Boot device, create and remove a user, observe logs
Change-Id: I6c3521d50dab2d508fce4b614d51e163e7c8f3da
