This is intended for wm properties related to wmshell/sysui.
Using this context allows sysui to manipulate these properties
in debug builds.
Bug: 219067621
Test: manual
Change-Id: I5808bf92dbba37e9e6da5559f8e0a5fdac016bf3
This is useful for certain tests. Note that it is already possible to
access these files without root via adb pull, since adbd has
access. Shell also already has access to non-updated APEXes on
/system/apex.
Bug: 220918654
Test: adb unroot; pm install --apex /data/apex/decompressed/X.decompressed.apex
Change-Id: I35725499365b297a64c9005c8e45325531d3991d
Remove some allow rules for odsign, since it no longer directly
modifies CompOs files. Instead allow it to run compos_verify_key in
its own domain.
Grant compos_verify_key what it needs to access the CompOs files and
start up the VM.
Currently we directly connect to the CompOs VM; that will change once
some in-flight CLs have landed.
As part of this I moved the virtualizationservice_use macro to
te_macros so I can use it here. I also expanded it to include
additional grants needed by any VM client that were previously done
for individual domains (and then deleted those rules as now
redundant).
I also removed the grant of VM access to all apps; instead we allow it
for untrusted apps, on userdebug or eng builds only. (Temporarily at
least.)
Bug: 193603140
Test: Manual - odsign successfully runs the VM at boot when needed.
Change-Id: I62f9ad8c7ea2fb9ef2d468331e26822d08e3c828
The shell context can invoke app_process (ART runtime), which in turn
reads odsign_prop to determine whether we determined that the generated
artifacts are valid. Since this was denied until now, app processes
invoked through shell would fall back to JIT Zygote. This is probably
fine, but since fixing the denial is really simple (and not risky), this
option might be preferred over adding it to the bug map.
Bug: 194630189
Test: `adb shell sm` no longer generates a denial
Change-Id: Ia7c10aec53731e5fabd05f036b12e10d63878a30
Also guard all profcollect related entries with userdebug/eng only and
move them into one place.
Test: manual
Bug: 183487233
Bug: 194155753
Change-Id: If3399bb78b60f0367267e67573007ed72508279a
... to connect to the programs running in the guest VM
Bug: 192904048
Test: atest MicrodroidHostTestCases
Change-Id: Iccb48c14ace11cc940bb9ab1e07cc4926182e06e
/apex/apex-info-list.xml is used by ART mainline module, hence it needs
to have CTS test for it. Giving adbd and shell read-only permission
allows us to write host-driven CTS test that pull
/apex/apex-info-list.xml from the device and inspects it's content.
Similar (albeit not exactly the same information) is already available
via PackageManager APIs/PackageManager shell command.
Bug: 190185664
Test: m
Test: adb shell cat /apex/apex-info-list.xml
Change-Id: Ib7f2ca79a7493f8cd40d0c419569e85135f6bbda
Enables CTS testing of the bootstrap apexes.
Bug: 186767843
Test: adb shell cat bootstrap-apex-info-list.xml works without root
Change-Id: Icf56d32d296f5a42160dbd9ea90a89c8b4db6aa7
These are moved to packages/modules/Virtualization.
Bug: 189165759
Test: boot device and microdroid
Test: atest MicrodroidHostTestCases
Change-Id: I050add7fef56ced4787117f338e7b5d1fda1c193
Microdroid_manager is an executable in microdroid. It's role is to manage tasks
in microdroid and communicate with host's virtualizationservice.
To execute a task in microdroid, microdroid_manager should
- read "metadata" partition
- read VM payload config
- exec a command
Bug: 189301496
Test: atest MicrodroidHostTestCases
Change-Id: Iabbe0d3c8832f00df5c545e6b13fc55afa820b33
Microdroid_launcher is an executable in microdroid. It's role is to load
a shared library in an APK that is shared from the host Android and
execute it by calling an entry point (android_native_main) in it.
For now, it is executed from shell, but will eventually be executed from
a binder service (which also is running in microdroid) called
microdroid_manager.
Bug: 188513012
Test: atest MicrodroidHostTestCases
Change-Id: I150a958c1ed0e3e960f4b4b577e808e54e898644
Allow the MediaProvider app to write the system property
fuse.passthrough.enabled in case FUSE passthrough is enabled.
The need for this additional system property is due to the ScopedStorage
CTS tests that are assuming FUSE passtrhough is always on for devices
supporting it, but there may be some cases (e.g., GSI mixed builds)
where this is not possible true and the feature is disabled at runtime,
thus causing the tests to fail.
This additional system property is only set when FUSE passthrough is
actually being used by the system.
Bug: 186635810
Test: CtsScopedStorageDeviceOnlyTest
Signed-off-by: Alessio Balsini <balsini@google.com>
Change-Id: I623042d67399253a9167188c3748d93eb0f2d41f
* Permits setting the sys.drop_caches property from shell.
* Permits init to read and write to the drop_caches file.
* Can only be set to 3 (drop_caches) and 0 (unset).
Bug: 178647679
Test: flashed user build and set property; no avc denials.
Test: flashed userdebug build and dropped caches w/o root.
Change-Id: Idcedf83f14f6299fab383f042829d8d548fb4f5d
This property is set to true in rollback tests to prevent
fallback-to-copy when enabling rollbacks by hard linking.
This gives us insights into how hard linking fails where
it shouldn't.
Bug: 168562373
Test: m
Change-Id: Iab22954e9b9da21f0c3c26487cda60b8a1293b47
Also move verity_status_prop to system_restricted_prop since we
need to query it in cts tests
Bug: 175236047
Test: atest CtsNativeVerifiedBootTestCases
Change-Id: I82b26edaf5c5ad233bd83dff77eaafb9174646ef
This is a follow-up to r.android.com/1542764.
1. In order to allow priv_app to
stat(/data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport/*) we need
also the `search` permission to traverse the parent
directory /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
2. Allow shell to read the new bugreport/ directory.
shell can read bugreports anyways and this is needed
for CTS tests.
Bug: 177761174
Bug: 177684571
Test: manual (changpa@)
Change-Id: I39d6a1c7941bcdcdc314a7538c0accfd37c52ca2
These flags should be writeable to the shell for both root and non-root
users. They should be readable everywhere, as they're read in libc
during initialization (and there's nothing secret to hide). We just
don't want to allow apps to set these properties.
These properties are non-persistent, are for local developer debugging
only.
Bug: 135772972
Bug: 172365548
Test: `adb shell setprop memtag.123 0` in non-root shell succeeds.
Change-Id: If9ad7123829b0be27c29050f10081d2aecdef670
Restrict access to controlling snapuserd via ctl properties. Allow
update_engine to control snapuserd, and connect/write to its socket.
update_engine needs this access so it can create the appropriate dm-user
device (which sends queries to snapuserd), which is then used to build
the update snapshot.
This also fixes a bug where /dev/dm-user was not properly labelled. As a
result, snapuserd and update_engine have been granted r_dir_perms to
dm_user_device.
Bug: 168554689
Test: full ota with VABC enabled
Change-Id: I1f65ba9f16a83fe3e8ed41a594421939a256aec0
These are read by some apps, but don't have any corresponding property
contexts. This adds a new context as we're going to remove default_prop
access.
Bug: 173360450
Test: no sepolicy denials
Change-Id: I9be28d8e641eb6380d080150bee785a3cc304ef4
This is required for ART's Checker tests, which are part of
(host-driven) ART run-tests, and will also be required to run ART
run-tests via TradeFed in AOT-compilation modes in the future.
Test: Run `atest art-run-test-004-checker-UnsafeTest18` with
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/tools/tradefederation/+/1484277
merged in, on a device where `adb` commands are not run as root
Bug: 162408889
Bug: 147812905
Change-Id: I3e4824bf15bdbad1ddf26601f871feec11313ecc
Users are unable to pass config files directly to
perfetto via `perfetto -c /path/to/config` and have to
resort to awkward quirks like `cat config | perfetto -c -'.
This is because /system/bin/perfetto runs in its own SELinux
domain for reasons explained in the bug.
This causes problem to test infrastructures authors. Instead
of allowing the use of /data/local/tmp which is too ill-scoped
we create a dedicated folder and allow only shell and perfetto
to operate on it.
Bug: 170404111
Test: manual, see aosp/1459023
Change-Id: I6fefe066f93f1f389c6f45bd18214f8e8b07079e
In addition, allow shell to read this property.
Test: getprop -Z
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsGestureTestCases
and check /sdcard/device-info-files/PropertyDeviceInfo.deviceinfo.json
Bug: 169169031
Change-Id: Ib71b01bac326354696e159129f9dea4c2e918c51
The list permission protects the ability to list arbitrary namespaces.
This is not a namespace specific permission but a Keystore specific
permission. Listing the entries of a given namsepace is covered by the
get_info permission already.
Test: N/A
Merged-In: If6e79fd863a79acf8d8ab10c6362a4eeaa88a5b8
Change-Id: If6e79fd863a79acf8d8ab10c6362a4eeaa88a5b8
Add a keystore2_key namespace that can be used by `shell` for testing.
Bug: 158500146
Bug: 162265751
Test: keystore2_test
Change-Id: I78b9b285969dd503a09609f7bcb02552b24d1a6b
Merged-In: I78b9b285969dd503a09609f7bcb02552b24d1a6b
We have various apps which inherently work across all users,
configured in seapp_contexts with levelFrom=None (usually implicitly).
This change marks those apps, where they have private data files, as
mlstrustedsubject, to allow us to increase restrictions on cross-user
access without breaking them.
Currently these apps are granted full access to [priv_]app__data_file
via TE rules, but are blocked from calling open (etc) by mls rules
(they don't have a matching level).
This CL changes things round so they are granted access by mls, but
blocked from calling open by TE rules; the overall effect is thus the
same - they do not have access.
A neverallow rule is added to ensure this remains true.
Note that there are various vendor apps which are appdomain,
levelFrom=None; they will also need modified policy.
Test: builds, boots, no new denials.
Bug: 141677108
Change-Id: Ic14f24ec6e8cbfda7a775adf0c350b406d3a197e
This is to remove exported3_default_prop. Contexts of these properties
are changed.
- ro.boot.wificountrycode
This becomes wifi_config_prop
- ro.opengles.version
This becomes graphics_config_prop. Also it's read by various domains, so
graphics_config_prop is now readable from coredomain.
- persist.config.calibration_fac
This becomes camera_calibration_prop. It's only readable by appdomain.
Bug: 155844385
Test: no denials on Pixel devices
Test: connect wifi
Change-Id: If2b6c10fa124e29d1612a8f94ae18b223849e2a9
This does not yet list all the required capabilities for profcollectd,
but it at least allows the service to start under permissive mode.
Bug: 79161490
Test: start profcollectd
Change-Id: I92c6192fa9b31840b2aba26f83a6dc9f9e835030
A device must indicate whether GPU profiling is supported or not through
setting these two properties properly. CTS needs to read these two
properties in order to run corresponding compliance tests. Hence need to
update sepolicy for these two properties.
Bug: b/157832445
Test: Test on Pixel 4
Change-Id: I6f400ecbbd5e78b645bb620fa24747e9367c2ff3
Merged-In: I6f400ecbbd5e78b645bb620fa24747e9367c2ff3
public/property split is landed to selectively export public types to
vendors. So rules happening within system should be in private. This
introduces private/property.te and moves all allow and neverallow rules
from any coredomains to system defiend properties.
Bug: 150331497
Test: system/sepolicy/tools/build_policies.sh
Change-Id: I0d929024ae9f4ae3830d4bf3d59e999febb22cbe
Merged-In: I0d929024ae9f4ae3830d4bf3d59e999febb22cbe
(cherry picked from commit 42c7d8966c)
This property type represents properties used in CTS tests of userspace
reboot. For example, test.userspace_reboot.requested property which is
used to check that userspace reboot was successful and didn't result in
full reboot, e.g.:
* before test setprop test.userspace_reboot.requested 1
* adb reboot userspace
* wait for boot to complete
* verify that value of test.userspace_reboot.requested is still 1
Test: adb shell setprop test.userspace_reboot.requested 1
Bug: 150901232
Change-Id: I45d187f386149cec08318ea8545ab864b5810ca8
Merged-In: I45d187f386149cec08318ea8545ab864b5810ca8
(cherry picked from commit 3bd53a9cee)
sys.linker property was defined to enable / disable generate linker
configuration, but the property has been removed. Remove sys.linker
property definition as it is no longer in use
Bug: 149335054
Test: m -j passed && cuttlefish worked without sepolicy error
Change-Id: Iacb2d561317d0920f93104717ce4f4bb424cc095
Merged-In: Iacb2d561317d0920f93104717ce4f4bb424cc095
This patch adds the necessary rules to support the existing usage of
perf_event_open by the system partition, which almost exclusively
concerns the simpleperf profiler. A new domain is introduced for some
(but not all) executions of the system image simpleperf. The following
configurations are supported:
* shell -> shell process (no domain transition)
* shell -> debuggable app (through shell -> runas -> runas_app)
* shell -> profileable app (through shell -> simpleperf_app_runner ->
untrusted_app -> simpleperf)
* debuggable/profile app -> self (through untrusted_app -> simpleperf)
simpleperf_app_runner still enters the untrusted_app domain immediately
before exec to properly inherit the categories related to MLS. My
understanding is that a direct transition would require modifying
external/selinux and seapp_contexts as with "fromRunAs", which seems
unnecessarily complex for this case.
runas_app can still run side-loaded binaries and use perf_event_open,
but it checks that the target app is exactly "debuggable"
(profileability is insufficient).
system-wide profiling is effectively constrained to "su" on debug
builds.
See go/perf-event-open-security for a more detailed explanation of the
scenarios covered here.
Tested: "atest CtsSimpleperfTestCases" on crosshatch-user/userdebug
Tested: manual simpleperf invocations on crosshatch-userdebug
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I2100929bae6d81f336f72eff4235fd5a78b94066
This is needed to get Java heap graphs.
Test: flash aosp; profile system_server with setenforce 1
Bug: 136210868
Change-Id: I87dffdf28d09e6ce5f706782422510c615521ab3
