Every process needs to be able to determine the IncFS features
to choose the most efficient APIs to call
Bug: 184357957
Test: build + atest PackageManagerShellCommandTest
Change-Id: Ia84e3fecfd7be1209af076452cc27cc68aefd80d
Vold needs to be able to search for keystore2 and keystore2 maintenance
services, and call methods provided by those services.
Bug: 181910578
Change-Id: I6e336c3bfaabe158b850dc175b6c9a942dd717be
Grant ReadDefaultFstab() callers
allow scontext { metadata_file gsi_metadata_file_type }:dir search;
allow scontext gsi_public_metadata_file:file r_file_perms;
so they can search / read DSU metadata files.
The DSU metadata files are required to deduce the correct fstab.
Also tighten the neverallow rules in gsid.te.
Bug: 181110285
Test: Build pass, presubmit test
Test: Boot and check avc denials
Test: Boot with DSU and check avc denials
Change-Id: Ie464b9a8f7a89f9cf8f4e217dad1322ba3ad0633
Split gsi_metadata_file into gsi_metadata_file plus
gsi_public_metadata_file, and add gsi_metadata_file_type attribute.
Files that are okay to be publicly readable are labeled with
gsi_public_metadata_file. Right now only files needed to infer the
device fstab belong to this label.
The difference between gsi_metadata_file and gsi_public_metadata_file is
that gsi_public_metadata_file has relaxed neverallow rules, so processes
who wish to read the fstab can add the respective allow rules to their
policy files.
Allow gsid to restorecon on gsi_metadata_file to fix the file context of
gsi_public_metadata_file.
Bug: 181110285
Test: Build pass
Test: Issue a DSU installation then verify no DSU related denials and
files under /metadata/gsi/ are labeled correctly.
Change-Id: I54a5fe734dd345e28fd8c0874d5fceaf80ab8c11
Vendor boot hal, init, and vold processes all require permission.
Test: build and boot aosp_cf_x86_64_phone
Bug: 173815685
Change-Id: I15692dcd39dfc9c3a3b7d8c12d03eff0a7c96f72
IncFS in S adds a bunch of new ioctls, and requires the users
to read its features in sysfs directory. This change adds
all the features, maps them into the processes that need to
call into them, and allows any incfs user to query the features
Bug: 170231230
Test: incremental unit tests
Change-Id: Ieea6dca38ae9829230bc17d0c73f50c93c407d35
user_profile_data_file is mlstrustedobject. And it needs to be,
because we want untrusted apps to be able to write to their profile
files, but they do not have levels.
But now we want to apply levels in the parent directories that have
the same label, and we want them to work so they need to not be
MLS-exempt. To resolve that we introduce a new label,
user_profile_root_file, which is applied to those directories (but no
files). We grant mostly the same access to the new label as
directories with the existing label.
Apart from appdomain, almost every domain which accesses
user_profile_data_file, and now user_profile_root_file, is already
mlstrustedsubject and so can't be affected by this change. The
exception is postinstall_dexopt which we now make mlstrustedobject.
Bug: 141677108
Bug: 175311045
Test: Manual: flash with wipe
Test: Manual: flash on top of older version
Test: Manual: install & uninstall apps
Test: Manual: create & remove user
Test: Presubmits.
Change-Id: I4e0def3d513b129d6c292f7edb076db341b4a2b3
Bug: 168571434
Test: 1. Install a DSU system.
2. Boot the DSU system and reboot back to the host system.
3. Wipe the DSU installation.
4. DSU metadata key dir /metadata/vold/metadata_encryption/dsu/dsu is
destroyed.
Change-Id: I229a02abb7bd1f070bb078bdaf89fb27cc4bfa47
Add allow rules for destroyDsuMetadataKey() to securely discard key
files labeled as vold_metadata_file.
Bug: 168571434
Test: Wipe a DSU installation and verify that there's no avc denial.
Change-Id: I01acb6d732f345a5d937a2781befda80c64844b9
To allow vold to abort it.
Bug: 153411204
Test: vold can access it
Merged-In: I334eaf3459905c27d614db8eda18c27e62bea5fa
Change-Id: I334eaf3459905c27d614db8eda18c27e62bea5fa
public/property split is landed to selectively export public types to
vendors. So rules happening within system should be in private. This
introduces private/property.te and moves all allow and neverallow rules
from any coredomains to system defiend properties.
Bug: 150331497
Test: system/sepolicy/tools/build_policies.sh
Change-Id: I0d929024ae9f4ae3830d4bf3d59e999febb22cbe
Merged-In: I0d929024ae9f4ae3830d4bf3d59e999febb22cbe
(cherry picked from commit 42c7d8966c)
/mnt/pass_through was introduced to allow the FUSE daemon unrestricted
access to the lower filesystem (or sdcardfs).
At zygote fork time, the FUSE daemon will have /mnt/pass_through/0
bind mounted to /storage instead of /mnt/user/0. To keep /sdcard
(symlink to /storage/self/primary) paths working, we create a
'self' directory with an additional 'primary' symlink to
/mnt/pass_through/0/emulated/0 which is a FUSE mount point.
The following components need varying sepolicy privileges:
Vold: Creates the self/primary symlink and mounts the lower filesystem
on /mnt/pass_through/0/emulated. So needs create_dir and mount access
+ create_file access for the symlink
zygote: In case zygote starts an app before vold sets up the paths.
This is unlikely but can happen if the FUSE daemon (a zygote forked app)
is started before system_server completes vold mounts.
Same sepolicy requirements as vold
installd: Needs to clear/destroy app data using lower filesystem
mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to walk
/mnt/pass_through
priv_app (FUSE daemon): Needs to server content from the lower
filesystem mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to
walk /mnt/pass_through
Bug: 135341433
Test: adb shell ls /mnt/pass_through/0/self/primary
Change-Id: I16e35b9007c2143282600c56adbc9468a1b7f240
For performance reasons, we want to bind-mount parts of the lower
filesystem on top of /data/media.
Bug: 137890172
Test: No denials when mounting
Change-Id: Ide8fc07cdeb6a6816585af1582bee69bc68043af
The property is set to inform kernel to do a warm_reset on the next
reboot. This is useful to persist the logs to debug device boot
failures. More details in http://go/rvc-ota-persist-logs.
The property is set to 1 by update_engine after an OTA. And it's set to
0 by update_verifier or vold after we mark the current slot boot
successful.
The property is read by vendor_init. And according to its value,
vendor_init writes a particular sysfs file to schedule a warm reset
on the following reboot.
Without the new context, the denial message says:
[ 13.423163] audit: type=1107 audit(1746393.166:8): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=u:r:init:s0 msg='avc: denied { read } for property=ota.warm_reset pid=0 uid=0 gid=0 scontext=u:r:vendor_init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:default_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0'
[ 23.096497] init: Unable to set property 'OTA.warm_reset' from uid:0 gid:2001 pid:841: SELinux permission check failed
[ 23.096574] type=1107 audit(1573768000.668:42): uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=u:r:init:s0 msg='avc: denied { set } for property=OTA.warm_reset pid=841 uid=0 gid=2001 scontext=u:r:update_verifier:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:default_prop:s0 tclass=property_service permissive=0'
[ 23.108430] update_verifier: Failed to reset the warm reset flag
Bug: 143489994
Test: check the property can be set by update_engine, and read by vendor_init
Change-Id: I87c12a53a138b72ecfed3ab6a4d846c20f5a8484
Also add neverallow rules to enforce that unintended domains aren't
allowed to use any of the fscrypt ioctls.
(Originally based on a patch by Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>)
Bug: 140500828
Test: see I296ef78138578a3fd773797ac0cd46af1296b959
Change-Id: I01e81edf0d948af254ddf4275702e7224b2698e4
Give /data itself a different label to its contents, to ensure that
only init creates files and directories there.
This change originally landed as aosp/1106014 and was reverted in
aosp/1116238 to fix b/140402208. aosp/1116298 fixes the underlying
problem, and with that we can re-land this change.
Bug: 139190159
Bug: 140402208
Test: aosp boots, logs look good
Change-Id: I1a366c577a0fff307ca366a6844231bcf8afe3bf
Give /data itself a different label to its contents, to ensure that
only init creates files and directories there.
Bug: 139190159
Test: aosp boots, logs look good
Change-Id: I3ee654a928bdab3f5d435ab6ac24040d9bdd9abe
vold needs write permissions for /sys/block/*/uevent to perform a
coldboot.
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/vold/+/refs/heads/master/main.cpp#139
This denial is seen on cuttlefish:
avc: denied { write } for name=uevent dev=sysfs ino=11649
scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_block:s0
tclass=file permissive=1
Pixel devices resolve this denial in device policy, but since coldboot
is performed from platform code, the corresponding permission should be
in /system/sepolicy
Bug: 28053261
Test: boot cuttlefish without above denial
Change-Id: I2de08db603e2d287e8021af70ee8e69266d7736f
System suspend service is not a HAL, so avoid using HAL-specific macros
and attributes.
Use system_suspend_server attribute for ISystemSuspend.hal permissions.
Use system_suspend type directly for internal .aidl interface
permissions.
Bug: 126259100
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: blueline boots; wakelocks can still be acquired; device suspends
if left alone.
Change-Id: Ie811e7da46023705c93ff4d76d15709a56706714
This lets update_verifier call supportsCheckpoint to defer marking the
boot as successful when we may end up failing before we would commit
the checkpoint. In this case, we will mark the boot as successful just
before committing the checkpoint.
Test: Check that marking the boot as succesful was deferred in
update_verifier, and done later on.
Change-Id: I9b4f3dd607ff5301860e78f4604b600b4ee416b7
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.
Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
To configure read-ahead on loop devices, eg.
/sys/devices/virtual/block/loop0/queue/read_ahead_kb
Bug: 120776455
Test: configuring read-ahead on loop devices works from apexd
Change-Id: Ib25372358e8ca62fa634daf286e4b64e635fac58
