Commit graph

31 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Patrick Rohr
02b55354bd sepolicy: allow TUNSETLINK and TUNSETCARRIER
This is required for testing new ethernet APIs in T.

Test: TH
Bug: 171872016
Change-Id: I1e6024d7d649be50aa2321543b289f81fcdfc483
2022-05-31 20:36:33 -07:00
Jaegeuk Kim
b0f5998f1d Allow zoned device support in f2fs
This patch allows ioctls() to support zoned device.

Bug: 172377740
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>
Change-Id: I69b322ceffd45c7e191d3a37e67ac7324c5b7ee2
2022-05-25 00:33:57 +00:00
Carlos Llamas
630f915345 sepolicy: allow new BINDER_GET_EXTENDED_ERROR ioctl
All domains using libbinder need access to this new ioctl in order to
pull precise information upon failed binder operations.

Bug: 28321379
Tested: clients can now use the ioctl through libbinder
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Change-Id: I8d6e5ca6b133b934855a7545cc1a9786e2c4ad65
2022-05-10 04:20:09 +00:00
Jaegeuk Kim
3a45ffec11 Allow shutdown /data
Bug: 229406072
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>
Change-Id: I7bdd9acd2e85311ecb59b3f0eb1f503a93e240ef
2022-04-22 09:34:02 -07:00
Joel Galenson
6dd5117864 Correctly alphabetize a newly-added ioctl definition.
Thanks to nnk for noticing this!

Test: Build
Change-Id: I3d6e5b223aabcf3ec93dc62112fc194af13e6a60
2021-07-22 09:38:53 -07:00
Macpaul Lin
641c5ae99d Add FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_ALLOC to ioctl_defines and mediaprovider.te
We've got a SELinux warning in kernel-5.10 when "File Transfer" (MTP)
has been enabled by user.

Error log:
avc: denied { ioctl } for  pid=5521 comm="MtpServer" path="/dev/usb-ffs/mtp/ep1" dev="functionfs" ino=102677 ioctlcmd=0x67e7 scontext=u:r:mediaprovider:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Repeat steps:
  1. Connect the phone to PC with USB cable.
  2. Select "File Transfer" (MTP) in "USB Preferences" Menu.
  3. Selinux warning will arise after "File Transfer" has been enabled by user
     due to an IOCTL access to /dev/usb-ffs/mtp/ep1.

Solution:
  To solve this warning, add a sepolicy to allow this type of IOCTL is required.

Signed-off-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin@mediatek.com>
Change-Id: Id340fb98062b3cee239343f3800f6dfceadeb572
Bug: 193473440
2021-07-13 09:33:15 +08:00
Jaegeuk Kim
da1d8a3ce6 sepolicy: add f2fs ioctls
This cleans up ioctl definitions.

Bug: 189169940
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@google.com>
Change-Id: I8cf2daa11911ef2fb817e125fcfc4f8ad91af0ed
2021-05-25 05:54:14 -07:00
Songchun Fan
979a1f8f34 [sepolicy] allow system_server to ioctl INCFS_IOC_GET_LAST_READ_ERROR
Solves the denial message like:

04-30 03:54:46.972 21944 21944 I Binder:21944_17: type=1400 audit(0.0:502): avc: denied { ioctl } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F6170705F766D646C3133352F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 ioctlcmd=0x6727 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

BUG: 184844615
Test: manual
Change-Id: I3ef32613de348bca1d58cddf4ec1296d4828b51a
2021-04-30 16:46:06 +00:00
Hang Lu
a251b7ed65 sepolicy: allow BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION for all processes
BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION is used to enable/disable oneway
spamming detection in binder driver, and can be set per-proc.

Bug: 181190340
Change-Id: Id799b19ee5a74b458e286dc29122c140a047bdad
2021-04-20 14:07:56 +08:00
Yurii Zubrytskyi
80dfa06984 IncFS: update SE policies for the new API
IncFS in S adds a bunch of new ioctls, and requires the users
to read its features in sysfs directory. This change adds
all the features, maps them into the processes that need to
call into them, and allows any incfs user to query the features

Bug: 170231230
Test: incremental unit tests
Change-Id: Ieea6dca38ae9829230bc17d0c73f50c93c407d35
2021-01-19 12:57:15 -08:00
Yo Chiang
e939cbdd37 Add F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE ioctl code
`secdiscard` calls ioctl(F2FS_IOC_SEC_TRIM_FILE). Add the ioctl
definition and allow rule.

Bug: 170275781
Bug: 140759142
Bug: 168571434
Test: Build pass
Change-Id: I967e0a3c1216f36174f08d5ace2f7a6bcd4103b6
2020-10-07 17:39:46 +00:00
Marco Ballesio
9e7e3fd55f sepolicy: allow system server for BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO
the new ioctl allows system server to verfiry the state of a frozen
binder inderface before unfreezing a process.

Bug: 143717177
Test: verified ActivityManager could access the ioctl
Change-Id: Id9d90d072ce997ed20faa918ec68f1110e2bac8f
2020-09-11 15:41:31 -07:00
Marco Ballesio
5fe69e082a sepolicy: restrict BINDER_FREEZE to system_server
BINDER_FREEZE is used to block ipc transactions to frozen processes, so
only system_server must be allowed to use it.

Bug: 143717177
Test: manually verified that attempts to use BINDER_FREEZE by processes
other
than system_server receive a sepolicy denial
Test: verified that system_server can enable/disable the freezer in
binder

Change-Id: I0fae3585c6ec409809e8085c1cc9862be4755889
2020-09-03 14:12:17 -07:00
Songchun Fan
1d4f2221cd Merge "[selinux] allow system_server to call INCFS_IOC_GET_FILLED_BLOCKS ioctl" 2020-08-20 17:07:40 +00:00
Songchun Fan
4be0afbfb7 [selinux] allow system_server to call INCFS_IOC_GET_FILLED_BLOCKS ioctl
This allows Incremental Service (part of system_server) to query the
filled blocks of files on Incremental File System.

Test: atest service.incremental_test
BUG: 165799231
Change-Id: Id63f8f325d92fef978a1ad75bd6eaa8aa5e9e68b
2020-08-20 16:00:00 +00:00
Martijn Coenen
47f61db25e Add policy for LOOP_CONFIGURE ioctl.
This is a new ioctl for configuring loop devices, and is used by apexd.

Bug: 148607611
Bug: 161575393
Test: boot on device with/without LOOP_CONFIGURE
Change-Id: I9ef940c7c9f91eb32a01e68b858169c140d15d0f
Merged-In: I9ef940c7c9f91eb32a01e68b858169c140d15d0f
2020-08-11 13:22:09 +00:00
Songchun Fan
2679d8e3a3 [selinux] permissions on new ioctls for filling blocks
(Cherry-picking)

Denial messages:

03-17 20:30:54.274  1445  1445 I PackageInstalle: type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { ioctl } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F313134353234353836342F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 ioctlcmd=0x6721 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

03-17 20:30:54.274  1445  1445 I PackageInstalle: type=1400 audit(0.0:7): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/data/incremental/MT_data_incremental_tmp_1145245864/mount/.index/2b300000000000000000000000000000" dev="incremental-fs" ino=6794 ioctlcmd=0x6720 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

03-17 20:49:11.797 16182 16182 I Binder:16182_6: type=1400 audit(0.0:13): avc: denied { ioctl } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F3537383539353635322F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 ioctlcmd=0x6721 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.android.vending

03-17 20:49:11.797 16182 16182 I Binder:16182_6: type=1400 audit(0.0:14): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/data/incremental/MT_data_incremental_tmp_578595652/mount/.index/626173652e61706b0000000000000000" dev="incremental-fs" ino=5810 ioctlcmd=0x6720 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.android.vending

Test: manual
BUG: 150809360
Merged-In: If43fa9edad0848a59c0712b124adfcdbbd0c99a4
Change-Id: I10e95caba43e1e1c272b59b7191b36b1cff4ff67
2020-03-19 16:31:52 -07:00
Songchun Fan
3922253de9 permissions for incremental control file
=== for mounting and create file ===

02-12 21:09:41.828   593   593 I Binder:593_2: type=1400 audit(0.0:832): avc: denied { relabelto } for name=".pending_reads" dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
02-12 21:09:41.838   593   593 I Binder:593_2: type=1400 audit(0.0:833): avc: denied { read } for name=".pending_reads" dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
02-12 21:09:41.838   593   593 I Binder:593_2: type=1400 audit(0.0:834): avc: denied { open } for path="/data/incremental/MT_data_incremental_tmp_1485189518/mount/.pending_reads" dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
02-12 21:09:41.838   593   593 I Binder:593_2: type=1400 audit(0.0:835): avc: denied { getattr } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F313438353138393531382F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
02-12 21:09:41.838   593   593 I Binder:593_2: type=1400 audit(0.0:836): avc: denied { read } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F313438353138393531382F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
02-12 21:09:41.841  1429  1429 I PackageInstalle: type=1400 audit(0.0:837): avc: denied { ioctl } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F313438353138393531382F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 ioctlcmd=0x671e scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

=== for reading signature from file ===
02-12 21:09:47.931  8972  8972 I android.vending: type=1400 audit(0.0:848): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/data/app/vmdl951541350.tmp/base.apk" dev="incremental-fs" ino=6416 ioctlcmd=0x671f scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.android.vending
02-12 21:09:47.994  1429  1429 I AppIntegrityMan: type=1400 audit(0.0:849): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/data/app/vmdl951541350.tmp/base.apk" dev="incremental-fs" ino=6416 ioctlcmd=0x671f scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
02-12 21:09:50.034  8972  8972 I com.android.vending: type=1400 audit(0.0:850): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm=62674578656375746F72202332 path="/data/app/vmdl951541350.tmp/base.apk" dev="incremental-fs" ino=6416 ioctlcmd=0x671f scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 app=com.android.vending
02-12 21:09:52.914  1429  1429 I PackageManager: type=1400 audit(0.0:851): avc: denied { ioctl } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F313438353138393531382F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 ioctlcmd=0x671e scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

=== data loader app reading from log file ===
02-12 22:09:19.741  1417  1417 I Binder:1417_3: type=1400 audit(0.0:654): avc: denied { read } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F3131393237303339342F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
02-12 22:09:19.741 15903 15903 I Binder:15903_4: type=1400 audit(0.0:655): avc: denied { getattr } for path=2F646174612F696E6372656D656E74616C2F4D545F646174615F696E6372656D656E74616C5F746D705F3131393237303339342F6D6F756E742F2E70656E64696E675F7265616473202864656C6574656429 dev="incremental-fs" ino=2 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:incremental_control_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Test: manual with incremental installation
BUG: 133435829
Change-Id: Ie973be6bc63faf8fe98c9e684060e9c81d124e6e
2020-02-13 12:53:36 -08:00
Martijn Coenen
e0ab03aee3 Add FS_IOC_FS(G|S)ETXATTR to ioctl_defines and allow vold to use it.
Bug: 146419093
Test: vold can call the ioctl
Change-Id: I409b702d00bc5ef5f42f9c613d8f89195fefb800
2020-01-22 10:53:33 +01:00
Eric Biggers
36ae6631e3 Allow vold to use new ioctls to add/remove fscrypt keys
Also add neverallow rules to enforce that unintended domains aren't
allowed to use any of the fscrypt ioctls.

(Originally based on a patch by Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>)

Bug: 140500828
Test: see I296ef78138578a3fd773797ac0cd46af1296b959
Change-Id: I01e81edf0d948af254ddf4275702e7224b2698e4
2019-09-30 13:11:49 -07:00
Eric Biggers
b57af5d0e6 Allow shell to get encryption policy for CTS
Allow the shell domain to use the FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY and
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX ioctls so that we can write a CTS test
which checks that the device complies with the CDD requirements to use
appropriate algorithms for file-based encryption.

The information returned by these ioctls is already available in logcat,
but scraping the log for a CTS test seems fragile; I assume that people
would prefer a more robust solution.

For more details see change I9082241066cba82b531e51f9a5aec14526467162

Bug: 111311698
Test: the CTS test works after this change.
Change-Id: Ib9ce6b42fcfb6b546eb80a93ae8d17ac5a433984
2019-09-27 15:24:27 -07:00
Victor Hsieh
7397ebd1e1 Allow fs-verity setup within system_server
The original fs-verity implementation requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN and thus
the actual setup is proxied through installd.  Instead, upstream
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl checks write permission to inode, and thus
can happen in system_server.

Also, replace the old measure ioctl with FS_IOC_SET_VERITY_MEASUREMENT.
Note that although the number is name, they work differently.

Test: set ro.apk_verity.mode=2, in-progress CTS passed without denial
Bug: 112037636
Change-Id: I3e8d14321df8904dfed68b83aae8b3dd99c211ac
2019-01-11 12:21:59 -08:00
Dan Austin
55d9096652 SEPolicy changes to allow kcov access in userdebug.
This includes the SELinux policy changes to allow for
kcov access in userdebug builds for coverage-guided
kernel fuzzing.

Bug: 117990869

Test: Ran syzkaller with Android untrusted_app sandbox with coverage.
Change-Id: I1fcaad447c7cdc2a3360383b5dcd76e8a0f93f09
2018-11-30 10:56:29 -08:00
Jiyong Park
173a1d9add Allow apexd more ioctl cmds for loop devices
apexd is using following additional ioctl cmds to mount the mini
filesystem inside APEXs:

 LOOP_SET_STATUS64
 LOOP_SET_FD
 LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE
 LOOP_SET_DIRECT_IO
 LOOP_CLR_FD

Test: m; m apex.test; adb push <the_built_apex> /data/apex; adb reboot

/apex/com.android.example.apex exists

Change-Id: I68388cc4f323e4fcff370c8cdc0958cbd827e9cc
2018-10-26 21:33:29 +09:00
Nick Kralevich
6bb05751ef FIONCLEX: fix MIPS ioctl number
The ioctl number varies between MIPS devices and other devices.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I107ccd2eca626148d2573f51753ec433e20d6b74
2018-10-17 12:03:17 -07:00
Nick Kralevich
0045ecb0c4 installd: add fsverity ioctls
installd calls fsverity ioctls FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY and
FS_IOC_SET_VERITY_MEASUREMENT on APKs in /data/app. Allow it.

Addresses the following denials:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:13): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="Binder:912_1"
  path="/data/app/com.android.vending-QZXfga9NZzHdv31lJzPTdQ==/base.apk"
  dev="dm-3" ino=43887 ioctlcmd=0x6686 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

  type=1400 audit(0.0:40): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="Binder:876_1"
  path="/data/app/com.android.settings-0xUwDcuYseP40L3WMUTGIw==/base.apk"
  dev="dm-0" ino=6855 ioctlcmd=0x6685 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Test: policy compiles and device boots
Bug: 30972906
Change-Id: Ifc88ae6909971c2f2bb24479f5e748fc7900447d
2018-10-12 08:56:48 -07:00
Nick Kralevich
19d8ae9d4d ioctl_defines: add encryption ioctls
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I855ce7c706ebf11de8376b9f97b706d97419db4b
2018-10-09 14:18:49 -07:00
Nick Kralevich
a605b04f88 ioctl_defines: Add F2FS ioctls
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Icda25a34ce61c28fa2399a1f1f44c9ef7ba44745
2018-10-09 10:39:12 -07:00
Nick Kralevich
61fce68d66 ioctl_defines: sort file
Sort file by ioctl name. This will make it hopefully easier to find
entries.

Alternatives considered: sorting file by ioctl value. This has the
advantage that it's easier to map an SELinux ioctlcmd= avc message into
a variable name, but would otherwise make this file harder to read.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I09b1dd4c055446f73185b90c4de5f3cdd98eb4b7
2018-10-09 10:24:18 -07:00
Lazar Trsic
f58f1499c1 Fix TIOCSCTTY ioctl definition for mips
Change-Id: I721a48a441c4a416c1119b17086462f7cb8e5097
2017-08-31 18:16:46 +02:00
dcashman
cc39f63773 Split general policy into public and private components.
Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
2016-10-06 13:09:06 -07:00
Renamed from ioctl_defines (Browse further)