Bug: 168907513
Test: verified the correct working of the v2 uid/pid hierarchy in normal
and recovery modes
This reverts commit aa8bb3a29b.
Change-Id: Ib344d500ea49b86e862e223ab58a16601eebef47
a54bed6907
Bug: 151660495
Test: verified proper boot in regular mode and proper working of adb in
recovery
Change-Id: Id70d27a6162af6ede94661005d80a2a780057089
the cgroups v2 uid/gid hierarchy will replace cgroup for all sepolicy
rules. For this reason, old rules have to be duplicated to cgroup_v2,
plus some rules must be added to allow the ownership change for cgroup
files created by init and zygote.
Test: booted device, verified correct access from init, system_server
and zygote to the uid/pid cgroup files
Change-Id: I80c2a069b0fb409b442e1160148ddc48e31d6809
Allow incidentd to run incident-helper-cmd, a Java program spawn by
app_process.
Allow incidentd to read /data/misc/logd and its files on userdebug
and eng build.
Bug: 147924172
Test: Build, flash and verify "adb shell incident -p EXPLICIT 1116"
can parse persisted logs.
Change-Id: Id0aa4286c304a336741ce8c0949b12ec559c2e16
There is no reason to deny dumpstate from reading /data/misc/logd on
user builds. Logpersist is disallowed from running on those builds,
so there is no harm in copying this directory.
Bug: 136978224
Test: build
Change-Id: Ia58bde10e1f45978975597cd2ea1951a784d3b49
Bug: http://b/135139675
Coverage files are written to /data/misc/trace (governed by the
method_trace_data_file selinux type). Allow all domains to access
(create directories, access files) this directory when native coverage
is enabled (by setting NATIVE_COVERAGE to true) in an userdebug or eng
build.
Also relax neverallow constraints to allow access to
method_trace_data_file for native coverage builds.
Test: Build 32-bit cuttlefish with coverage:
m NATIVE_COVERAGE=true COVERAGE_PATHS="*"
and verify that there are no selinux denials in kernel log and
logcat.
Change-Id: I3fe7c77612854b9de7de7a0ddd5cbf44a2f5c21e
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
The event log tag service uses /dev/event-log-tags, pstore and
/data/misc/logd/event-log-tags as sticky storage for the invented
log tags.
Test: gTest liblog-unit-tests, logd-unit-tests & logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Change-Id: Iacc8f36f4a716d4da8dca78a4a54600ad2a288dd
Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags. Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access. Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.
Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e
- transition to logpersist from init
- sort some overlapping negative references
- intention is to allow logpersist to be used by vendor
userdebug logging
Test: gTest liblog-unit-tests, logd-unit-tests & logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: I7806f5a2548cbe0c1f257a0ba2855f2eb69d8e7c
