Grant untrusted_app and isolated_app unpriv_sock_perms, neverallow
priv_sock_perms to disallow access to MAC address and ESSID.
Change-Id: Idac3b657a153e7d7fdc647ff34b876a325d759b3
Grant untrusted_app and isolated_app unpriv_sock_perms, neverallow
priv_sock_perms to disallow access to MAC address and ESSID.
Change-Id: Idac3b657a153e7d7fdc647ff34b876a325d759b3
Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
when necessary.
Bug: 25433265
Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
Temporarily move from policy version 30 to 29 until device kernels
and prebuilts are all upgraded to the accepted upstream version of
the selinux ioctl command whitelisting code.
(cherry picked from commit 89765083f7)
Bug: 22846070
Change-Id: I31d1e80aaee164cf41a2f01c6ca846a000898ef4
neverallow access to untrusted_app and isolated app
Access to cache is a system|signature permission. Only
priv/system/platform apps should be allowed access.
Change-Id: I7ebd38ce6d39950e74c0a164479bc59e694c852d
service_manager_local_audit_domain was used to fine tune the service_manager
auditallow rules when introducing the service_manager SELinux rules. This is no
longer needed.
(cherry-pick of commit: eab26faa60)
Bug: 21656807
Change-Id: Ia042a887e7bf9eb2a2b08b8d831e68dfe6395f75
Create a macro of unprivileged ioctls including
- All common socket ioctls except MAC address
- All wireless extensions ioctls except get/set ESSID
- Some commonly used tty ioctls
Bug: 21657002
Change-Id: Ib08be9cb70d08c1fa2c8bddbae519e7c2df5293c
Chrome's WebSQL implementation works by running sqlite in the
sandboxed renderer process, and sqlite expects to be able to
call flock() on the database file.
Bug: 20134929
Change-Id: Id33a2cd19b779144662056c6f3aba3365b0a2a54
isolated apps should only be able to access 2 services.
Remove access permissions for services inappropriately added,
and add a neverallow rule to prevent regressions.
Change-Id: I2783465c4a22507849b2a64894fb76690a27bc01
Chrome team recommends reverting this patch and introducing
it into a future version of Android, to avoid potential
compatibility issues.
This reverts commit 9de62d6ffe.
Bug: 17471434
Bug: 18609318
Change-Id: I9adaa9d0e4cb6a592011336e442e9d414dbac470
Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.
Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef
All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
Only allow it to read/write/stat already open app data files
received via Binder or local socket IPC.
Change-Id: Ie66f240e109410a17aa93d9d5dea4c2b87d47009
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This is causing the version of Chrome in Android's tree to crash. The
version of Chrome in Android's tree does not have the following patch:
https://codereview.chromium.org/630123003
Until Chrome updates the version in Android's tree, we need to revert.
Works around the following denials:
audit(0.0:19): avc: denied { search } for name="com.android.chrome" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1474658 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir
audit(0.0:20): avc: denied { getattr } for path="/data/data/com.android.chrome" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1474658 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir
audit(0.0:21): avc: denied { getattr } for path="/data/data/com.android.chrome" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=1474658 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=dir
This reverts commit 669a977303.
Bug: 18006219
Change-Id: Id44137ec6a0dfe4a597b34ab3dad9e3feecc2a5e
Only allow it to read/write/stat already open app data files
received via Binder or local socket IPC.
Change-Id: I3c096607a74fd0f360d41f3e6f06535ca00c58ec
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
isolated_app performs no direct network socket communication, so
we can remove net_domain() from it.
Change-Id: I112aa4140fd577a5ea28f7a3d62567ebabcdb48d
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
In commit ad891591e6, we allowed
isolated processes to execute files from /data/data/APPNAME.
I'm pretty sure all the necessary linker changes have been made
so that this functionality isn't required anymore. Remove the
allow rule.
This is essentially a revert of ad891591e6.
Change-Id: I1b073916f66f4965dfc53c0ea2b624bbb2fe8816
Further refined auditallow statements associated with
service_manager and added dumpstate to the
service_manager_local_audit_domain.
Change-Id: I2ecc42c8660de6a91f3b4e56268344fbd069ccc0
Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964
Chrome renderer processes dlopen() a shared library from
gmscore. Open and read on app data file is already allowed,
but execute isn't, so the dlopen() fails. This is a regression
from K, where the dlopen succeeded.
Longer term, there's questions about whether this is appropriate
behavior for an isolated app. For now, allow the behavior.
See the discussion in b/15902433 for details.
Addresses the following denial:
I/auditd ( 5087): type=1400 audit(0.0:76): avc: denied { execute } for comm="CrRendererMain" path="/data/data/com.google.android.gms/files/libAppDataSearchExt_armeabi_v7a.so" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=83196 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0 tclass=file
Bug: 15902433
Change-Id: Ie98605d43753be8c31a6fe510ef2dde0bdb52678
Coalesce a number of allow rules replicated among multiple
app domains.
Get rid of duplicated rules already covered by domain, appdomain,
or platformappdomain rules.
Split the platformappdomain rules to their own platformappdomain.te
file, document them more fully, and note the inheritance in each
of the relevant *_app.te files.
Generalize isolated app unix_stream_socket rules to all app domains
to resolve denials such as:
avc: denied { read write } for pid=11897 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[203881]" dev="sockfs" ino=203881 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getattr } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 path="socket:[203881]" dev="sockfs" ino=203881 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getopt } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { read write } for pid=6890 comm="Binder_10" path="socket:[205010]" dev="sockfs" ino=205010 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getattr } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 path="socket:[205010]" dev="sockfs" ino=205010 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getopt } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
Change-Id: I770d7d51d498b15447219083739153265d951fe5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
There is some overlap between socket rules in app.te and the net.te rules,
but they aren't quite identical since not all app domains presently include
the net_domain() macro and because the rules in app.te allow more permissions
for netlink_route_socket and allow rawip_socket permissions for ping.
The current app.te rules prevent one from ever creating a non-networked app
domain. Resolve this overlap by:
1) Adding the missing permissions allowed by app.te to net.te for
netlink_route_socket and rawip_socket.
2) Adding net_domain() calls to all existing app domains that do not already
have it.
3) Deleting the redundant socket rules from app.te.
Then we'll have no effective change in what is allowed for apps but
allow one to define app domains in the future that are not allowed
network access.
Also cleanup net.te to use the create_socket_perms macro rather than *
and add macros for stream socket permissions.
Change-Id: I6e80d65b0ccbd48bd2b7272c083a4473e2b588a9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
From the commit that added these rules, this appears to have been
an artifact of having dumpstate running in the init domain.
Change-Id: Iec2b9c3f5673d0e2cce9a0bf297e23555c423e87
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
r_dir_file(appdomain, isolated_app) was in both app.te and isolated_app.te;
delete it from isolated_app.te.
binder_call(appdomain, isolated_app) is a subset of binder_call(appdomain, appdomain); delete it.
Change-Id: I3fd90ad9c8862a0e4dad957425cbfbc9fa97c63f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
For additional context-
The denials related to init_tmpfs are of the form:
denied { read } for pid=12315 comm=""dboxed_process0"" path=2F6465762F6173686D656D2F64616C76696B2D68656170202864656C6574656429 dev=""tmpfs"" ino=9464 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:init_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file
(the path above is "/dev/ashmem/dalvik-heap (deleted)")
The denials related to executing things from the dalvik cache are of the form:
enied { execute } for pid=3565 comm=""dboxed_process0"" path=""/data/dalvik-cache/system@app@Chrome.apk@classes.dex"" dev=""mmcblk0p28"" ino=105983 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file
The denials related to isolated_app and the init socket are:
denied { getattr } for pid=3824 comm=""Binder_2"" path=""socket:[14059]"" dev=""sockfs"" ino=14059 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
The getopt denials for the aforementioned socket are:
denied { getopt } for pid=3824 comm=""Binder_2"" path=""/dev/socket/dumpstate"" scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
Change-Id: I3c57702e2af5a779a7618da9aa40930e7f12ee49
OTAs aren't properly labeling /system, which is causing SELinux
breakage. Temporarily put isolated_app.te and untrusted_app.te
into permissive.
Bug: 9878561
Change-Id: Icaf674ad6b3d59cbca3ae796c930c98ab67cae9c
This is my first attempt at creating an enforcing SELinux domain for
apps, untrusted_apps, and isolated_apps. Much of these rules are based on the
contents of app.te as of commit 11153ef349
with extensive modifications, some of which are included below.
* Allow communication with netd/dnsproxyd, to allow netd to handle
dns requests
* Allow binder communications with the DNS server
* Allow binder communications with surfaceflinger
* Allow an app to bind to tcp/udp ports
* Allow all domains to read files from the root partition, assuming
the DAC allows access.
In addition, I added a bunch of "neverallow" rules, to assert that
certain capabilities are never added.
This change has a high probability of breaking someone, somewhere.
If it does, then I'm happy to fix the breakage, rollback this change,
or put untrusted_app into permissive mode.
Change-Id: I83f220135d20ab4f70fbd7be9401b5b1def1fe35
app.te covers a lot of different apps types (platform_app, media_app,
shared_app, release_app, isolated_app, and untrusted_app), all
of which are going to have slightly different security policies.
Separate the different domains from app.te. Over time, these
files are likely to grow substantially, and mixing different domain types
is a recipe for confusion and mistakes.
No functional change.
Change-Id: Ida4e77fadb510f5993eb2d32f2f7649227edff4f
