Similar to the way we handle /dev/random and /dev/urandom, make
/proc/sys/kernel/random available to everyone.
hostname:/proc/sys/kernel/random # ls -laZ
total 0
dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 .
dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc:s0 0 2017-11-20 18:32 ..
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 boot_id
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 entropy_avail
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 poolsize
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 read_wakeup_threshold
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 urandom_min_reseed_secs
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 uuid
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 write_wakeup_threshold
boot_id (unique random number per boot) is commonly used by
applications, as is "uuid". As these are random numbers, no sensitive
data is leaked. The other files are useful to allow processes to
understand the state of the entropy pool, and should be fairly benign.
Addresses the following denial:
type=1400 audit(0.0:207): avc: denied { read } for name="boot_id"
dev="proc" ino=76194 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Bug: 69294418
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ieeca1c654ec755123e19b4693555990325bd58cf
New types:
1. proc_random
2. sysfs_dt_firmware_android
Labeled:
1. /proc/sys/kernel/random as proc_random.
2. /sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/{compatible, fstab,
vbmeta} as sysfs_dt_firmware_android.
Changed access:
1. uncrypt, update_engine, postinstall_dexopt have access to generic proc
and sysfs labels removed.
2. appropriate permissions were added to uncrypt, update_engine,
update_engine_common, postinstall_dexopt.
Bug: 67416435
Bug: 67416336
Test: fake ota go/manual-ab-ota runs without denials
Test: adb sideload runs without denials to new types
Change-Id: Id31310ceb151a18652fcbb58037a0b90c1f6505a
Grant update_engine access to sysfs.
Ran fake ota go/manual-ab-ota, and this denial was fixed:
avc: denied { read } for pid=912 comm="update_engine" name="compatible"
dev="sysfs" ino=17399 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Test: boots with no new denials
Change-Id: I8697da3af254aea1cec44d9dbb1eca18be31859c
Remove "granted" logspam. Grante the observed permissions to the
individual processes that need them and remove the permission from
domain_deprecated.
avc: granted { read open } for comm="ndroid.settings"
path="/proc/version" dev="proc" ino=4026532081
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm=4173796E635461736B202332
path="/proc/pagetypeinfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532129
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="uncrypt" path="/proc/cmdline"
dev="proc" ino=4026532072 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine"
path="/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id" dev="proc" ino=15852829
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="tiveportallogin"
path="/proc/vmstat" dev="proc" ino=4026532130
scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0
tclass=file
This change is specifically not granting the following since it
should not be allowed:
avc: granted { read open } for comm="crash_dump64"
path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416
scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for comm="crash_dump64" name="filesystems"
dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="crash_dump64"
path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416
scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
Bug: 64032843
Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: Ib309e97b6229bdf013468dca34f606c0e8da96d0
This fixes the following denial in O:
update_engine: type=1400 audit(0.0:2100): avc: denied { sigkill } for scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:r:postinstall:s0 tclass=process permissive=0
Bug: 35111618
Test: update_engine_client --cancel during postinstall
Change-Id: I7456a95b5ca6fbdb268a5e16a13e2409758141f5
Label /proc/misc and allow access to untrusted_apps targeting older API
versions, as well as update_engine_common.
/proc/misc is used by some banking apps to try to detect if they are
running in an emulated environment.
TODO: Remove access to proc:file from update_engine_common after more
testing.
Bug: 35917228
Test: Device boots and no new denials.
Change-Id: If1b97a9c55a74cb74d1bb15137201ffb95b5bd75
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.
Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.
Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
