There were a few instances where allow rules were appended
after the neverallow rules stanza in the .te file. Also
there were some regular allow rules inserted into the CTS-specific
rules section of app.te. Just move the rules as appropriate.
Should be no change in policy.
Change-Id: Iec76f32d4b531d245bbf5dd9f621a71ff5c71f3e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
Aside from the keystore daemon itself, only init needs any access
to keystore_data_file (in order to create and potentially restorecon
/data/misc/keystore). The exceptions for the kernel and recovery domains
are unnecessary; no allow rule permits this access in current policy.
Change-Id: I5cf6f29ec08174017ac8f5fb36fef166ce360ca0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964
Add keystore_key class and an action for each action supported
by keystore. Add policies that replicate the access control that
already exists in keystore. Add auditallow rules for actions
not known to be used frequently. Add macro for those domains
wishing to access keystore.
Change-Id: Iddd8672b9e9b72b45ee208e6eda608cc9dc61edc
Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
Add a type that groups the services for each of the
processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
name to target label.
Bug: 12909011
Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d
Only keystore itself should be reading / writing it's files.
Remove keystore file access from other SELinux domains, including
unconfined. Add neverallow rules to protect against regressions.
Allow init limited access to recurse into keystore's directory.
Change-Id: I0bb5de7804f4314997c16fac18507933014bcadf
On manta, the keystore CTS tests are failing, because
keystore isn't allowed to talk to the tee. Allow it.
I've only seen this bug on manta, but it seems appropriate
for all domains.
Fixes the following denial:
<5>[ 286.249563] type=1400 audit(1389210059.924:6): avc: denied { connectto } for pid=126 comm="keystore" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
Bug: 12450710
Change-Id: I07133d9abeaf967392118ba478a5a391cf0c5fa5
This is causing runtime restarts on flo/deb when uninstalling
some APKs. Revert while I investigate it.
11-04 21:52:41.487 687 704 I ActivityManager: Force stopping com.android.development appid=10078 user=-1: uninstall pkg
11-04 21:52:41.487 687 712 W PackageManager: Couldn't delete native library directory /data/app-lib/com.android.development
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 W dalvikvm: threadid=20: thread exiting with uncaught exception (group=0x959dfae8)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: *** FATAL EXCEPTION IN SYSTEM PROCESS: PackageManager
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: java.lang.NullPointerException
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at android.security.KeyStore.clearUid(KeyStore.java:327)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.removeKeystoreDataIfNeeded(PackageManagerService.java:9787)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.removePackageDataLI(PackageManagerService.java:9384)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deleteInstalledPackageLI(PackageManagerService.java:9503)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deletePackageLI(PackageManagerService.java:9612)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.deletePackageX(PackageManagerService.java:9239)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService.access$4100(PackageManagerService.java:178)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at com.android.server.pm.PackageManagerService$7.run(PackageManagerService.java:9173)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.Handler.handleCallback(Handler.java:733)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:95)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:136)
11-04 21:52:41.557 687 712 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.HandlerThread.run(HandlerThread.java:61)
11-04 21:52:41.567 687 712 I Process : Sending signal. PID: 687 SIG: 9
and
[ 7.324554] type=1400 audit(1383601030.823:5): avc: denied { read write } for pid=192 comm="keystore" name="qseecom" dev="tmpfs" ino=7521 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=chr_file
This reverts commit 709d71836d.
Bug: 11518274
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init
In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.
When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:
1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.
Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.
Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master.
Primarily this consists of changes around the bluetooth subsystem.
The zygote also needs further permissions to set up /storage/emulated.
adbd service now gets a socket under /dev/socket.
keystore uses the binder.
Change-Id: I8c5aeb8d100313c75169734a0fa614aa974b3bfc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
