dumpstate runs "df" on all mounted filesystems. Allow dumpstate
to access /storage/emulated so df works.
Addresses the following denial:
avc: denied { search } for pid=4505 comm="df" name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=6207 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:storage_file:s0 tclass=dir
Change-Id: I99dac8321b19952e37c0dd9d61a680a27beb1ae8
Assign the alarm, appwidget, assetatlas, audio, backup and batterystats services
the appropriate service access levels and move into enforcing.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: If3210bb25f3076edfdb6eec36ef6521ace1bd8d7
Move accessibility, account, appops and activity services into enforcing with
app_api_service level of access, with additional grants to mediaserver and
isolated app.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I1d5a79b9223026415f1690e8e9325ec4c270e3dd
System services differ in designed access level. Add attributes reflecting this
distinction and label services appropriately. Begin moving access to the newly
labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly
made system_server_service attribute. Reflect the move of system_server_service
from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b
Apps, shell and adbd should all have identical access to external
storage. Also document where we have files and/or symlinks.
Bug: 20055945
Change-Id: I133ffcf28cc3ccdb0541aba18ea3b9ba676eddbe
For the reasons explained in the pre-existing code, we don't want
to grant fsetid to netd, nor do we want denial messages to be
generated.
Change-Id: I34dcea81acd25b4eddc46bb54ea0d828b33c5fdc
Same change as 9819a6 but for nfc.
Nfc can receive bugreport data for beaming to another device.
This comes across as an open file descriptor. Allow nfc access
to bugreports.
Addresses the following denial:
avc: denied { read } for path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2015-03-30-04-49-57.txt" dev="mmcblk0p27" ino=82334 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file op_res=-13 ppid=435 pcomm="main" tgid=23475 tgcomm="m.android.shell"
Change-Id: I3efefcdb46444a1a6520803cb5e68bbdf29d3ad6
Some devices still have pre-built binaries with text relocations
on them. As a result, it's premature to assert a neverallow rule
for files in /system
Bug: 20013628
Change-Id: I3a1e43db5c610164749dee6882f645a0559c789b
system_server no longer has universal service_manager_type permissions and so no
longer needs the auditallow rules therewith associated.
Change-Id: I1e6584c120f6fc464a4bf6b377d9d7ea90441477
vold works with two broad classes of block devices: untrusted devices
that come in from the wild, and trusted devices.
When running blkid and fsck, we pick which SELinux execution domain
to use based on which class the device belongs to.
Bug: 19993667
Change-Id: I44f5bac5dd94f0f76f3e4ef50ddbde5a32bd17a5
Executing dumpsys meminfo over the console shell requires that output go to the
console_device. meminfo passes a fd to each applicaiton thread so that it can
do this in IApplicationThread.dumpMemInfo(). Allow use of this fd.
Addresses the following denial:
type=1400 audit(1426793987.944:4224): avc: denied { read write } for pid=1809 comm="Binder_4" path="/dev/console" dev="tmpfs" ino=5684 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:console_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
Bug: 17135173
Change-Id: Id5340a1fb3c8dbf41bda427720c4a0047bc557fc
Add rules to let sgdisk read/write to pts when forked from vold.
avc: denied { read write } for path="/dev/pts/14" dev="devpts" ino=17 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devpts:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
Also add rule to let it kick kernel to reload partition tables after
we finish editing them. Without this capability, it leaves this
message and violation:
Warning: The kernel is still using the old partition table.
The new table will be used at the next reboot.
GPT data structures destroyed! You may now partition the disk using fdisk or
other utilities.
avc: denied { sys_admin } for capability=21 scontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tcontext=u:r:sgdisk:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0
Change-Id: If26a40f9fd3b1ab2c50156ae8bdb128676521b57
Creates new directory at /data/misc/vold for storing key material
on internal storage. Only vold should have access to this label.
Change-Id: I7f2d1314ad3b2686e29e2037207ad83d2d3bf465
As suggested in the comments on
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/141560/
drop BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION and simplify the build_policy logic.
Union all files found under BOARD_SEPOLICY_DIRS.
Unlike BOARD_SEPOLICY_REPLACE/IGNORE, on which we trigger an error
to catch any lingering uses and force updating of the BoardConfig.mk
files, we only warn on uses of BOARD_SEPOLICY_UNION to avoid
breaking the build until all device BoardConfig*.mk files have been
updated, and since they should be harmless - the files will be unioned
regardless.
Change-Id: I4214893c999c23631f5456cb1b8edd59771ef13b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This is for the new addAuthToken keystore method from
I7f7647d9a36ea453ec6d62fc84087ca8f76e53dd. These tokens will be used to
authorize keymaster operations. The tokens are HMAC'd and so shouldn't
be fakeable but this is still limited to system_server only.
Change-Id: I3ff46b676ecac8a878d3aa0a25ba9a8b0c5e1f47
Create new vold_fsck domain that only has access to vold_block
devices to prevent any access to internal userdata.
Change-Id: I25ddcd16cbf83d7a25b70bc64d95f5345d0d5731
Add wakelock_use to slideshow.te to fix the following denial:
avc: denied { block_suspend } for pid=137 comm="slideshow" capability=36 scontext=u:r:slideshow:s0 tcontext=u:r:slideshow:s0 tclass=capability2 permissive=0
Change-Id: If84f167cd235e8196eadf3fb85cc725a5ea464e6
This fixes the following policy violation:
avc: denied { read } pid=30295 comm="app_process"
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=lnk_file
permissive=0 ppid=26813 pcomm="dumpstate"
pgid=26813 pgcomm="dumpstate"
See 0e32726 in app.te for a symmetrical
change.
Change-Id: Iecbccd5fd0046ec193f08b26f9db618dee7a80c1
The deprecated/deleted usbfs kernel driver gets really unhappy when
SELinux denies it access to directories. On flo (3.4.0 kernel), this
comes across as an SELinux denial followed by a kernel panic.
Steps to reproduce:
1. plug in a USB device.
2. notice nothing happens.
3. unplug the USB device
4. plug it in again, watch for restart.
Expected:
USB device works
Actual:
[329180.030242] Host mode: Set DC level as 0x68 for flo.
[329180.030395] msm_hsusb_host msm_hsusb_host: Qualcomm On-Chip EHCI Host Controller
[329180.030639] Unable to create devices usbfs file
[329180.030944] type=1400 audit(1425327845.292:12): avc: denied { search } for pid=24033 comm="kworker/0:1" name="/" dev="usbfs" ino=291099 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:usbfs:s0 tclass=dir
[329180.060394] msm_hsusb_host msm_hsusb_host: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1
[329180.091583] msm_hsusb_host msm_hsusb_host: irq 132, io mem 0x12500000
[deleted]
[329180.120178] hub 1-0:1.0: USB hub found
[329180.120452] hub 1-0:1.0: 1 port detected
[329180.123199] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000070
[329180.123443] pgd = c0004000
[329180.123809] [00000070] *pgd=00000000
[329180.124206] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[329180.124481] CPU: 0 Tainted: G W (3.4.0-g2e8a935 #1)
[329180.124908] PC is at mutex_lock+0xc/0x48
[329180.125122] LR is at fs_create_file+0x4c/0x128
[329180.125518] pc : [<c0916708>] lr : [<c0440ec4>] psr: a0000013
[deleted]
[329180.281005] [<c0916708>] (mutex_lock+0xc/0x48) from [<c0440ec4>] (fs_create_file+0x4c/0x128)
[329180.281280] [<c0440ec4>] (fs_create_file+0x4c/0x128) from [<c04410c8>] (usbfs_notify+0x84/0x2a8)
[329180.281738] [<c04410c8>] (usbfs_notify+0x84/0x2a8) from [<c009c3b8>] (notifier_call_chain+0x38/0x68)
[329180.282257] [<c009c3b8>] (notifier_call_chain+0x38/0x68) from [<c009c600>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x58)
[329180.282745] [<c009c600>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x58) from [<c009c628>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x18)
[329180.283264] [<c009c628>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x18) from [<c043ef8c>] (generic_probe+0x74/0x84)
[329180.283752] [<c043ef8c>] (generic_probe+0x74/0x84) from [<c04387c4>] (usb_probe_device+0x58/0x68)
[329180.284240] [<c04387c4>] (usb_probe_device+0x58/0x68) from [<c03adc78>] (driver_probe_device+0x148/0x360)
[329180.284576] [<c03adc78>] (driver_probe_device+0x148/0x360) from [<c03ac76c>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x4c/0x84)
[329180.285034] [<c03ac76c>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x4c/0x84) from [<c03adfc8>] (device_attach+0x74/0xa0)
[329180.285522] [<c03adfc8>] (device_attach+0x74/0xa0) from [<c03ac94c>] (bus_probe_device+0x28/0x98)
[329180.286041] [<c03ac94c>] (bus_probe_device+0x28/0x98) from [<c03ab014>] (device_add+0x444/0x5e4)
[329180.286529] [<c03ab014>] (device_add+0x444/0x5e4) from [<c042f180>] (usb_new_device+0x248/0x2e4)
[329180.286804] [<c042f180>] (usb_new_device+0x248/0x2e4) from [<c043472c>] (usb_add_hcd+0x420/0x64c)
[329180.287292] [<c043472c>] (usb_add_hcd+0x420/0x64c) from [<c044600c>] (msm_otg_sm_work+0xe74/0x1774)
[329180.287811] [<c044600c>] (msm_otg_sm_work+0xe74/0x1774) from [<c0091d8c>] (process_one_work+0x280/0x488)
[329180.288299] [<c0091d8c>] (process_one_work+0x280/0x488) from [<c00921a8>] (worker_thread+0x214/0x3b4)
[329180.288787] [<c00921a8>] (worker_thread+0x214/0x3b4) from [<c0096b14>] (kthread+0x84/0x90)
[329180.289276] [<c0096b14>] (kthread+0x84/0x90) from [<c000f3c8>] (kernel_thread_exit+0x0/0x8)
Allow the usbfs operation.
Bug: 19568950
Change-Id: Iffdc7bd93ebde8bb75c57a324b996e1775a0fd1e
Modify create_file_perms and create_dir_perms so it doesn't have
the "link" permission. This permission controls whether hard links
are allowed or not on the given file label. Hard links are a common
source of security bugs, and isn't something we want to support by
default.
Get rid of link_file_perms and move the necessary permissions into
create_file_perms and create_dir_perms. Nobody is using this macro,
so it's pointless to keep it around.
Get rid of unlink on directories. It returns EISDIR if you attempt to
do it, independent of SELinux permissions.
SELinux domains which have a need for hard linking for a particular
file type can add it back to their permission set on an as-needed basis.
Add a compile time assertion (neverallow rule) for untrusted_app.
It's particularly dangerous for untrusted_app to ever have hard
link capabilities, and the neverallow rule will prevent regressions.
Bug: 19953790
Change-Id: I5e9493d2bf5da460d074f0bc5ad8ba7c14dec6e0
Add a compile time assertion that capabilities other than setuid
and setgid are never granted to run-as.
This is a compile time assertion only. No new capabilities are granted
or removed.
Change-Id: Ie86d651b539cdfb6f3eaafef0d5d3b716610a220
