Since /odm is an extension of /vendor, its default property contexts
should be consistent with ones of /vendor.
Bug: 36796459
Test: tested on wahoo devices
Change-Id: Ia67ebe81e9c7102aab35a34f14738ed9a24811d3
Add a new set of sepolicy for the process that only netd use to load
and run ebpf programs. It is the only process that can load eBPF
programs into the kernel and is only used to do that. Add some
neverallow rules regarding which processes have access to bpf objects.
Test: program successfully loaded and pinned at sys/fs/bpf after device
boot. No selinux violation for bpfloader
Bug: 30950746
Change-Id: Ia6bb1afda29ae0749bdc368e2dfc5faa12e81b2f
CpuFrequency.java seems to be the only thing that depends on
/sys/devices/system/cpu in system_server. And according to
b/68988722#comment15, that dependency is not exercised.
Bug: 68988722
Test: walleye boots without denials to sysfs_devices_system_cpu
Change-Id: If777b716bf74188581327b7f5aa709f5d88aad2d
There is a race condition between when /data is mounted
and when processes attempt to access it. Attempting to access
/data before it's mounted causes an selinux denial. Attribute
these denials to a bug.
07-04 23:48:53.646 503 503 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:7): avc:
denied { search } for comm="surfaceflinger" name="/" dev="sda35" ino=2
scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0
07-15 17:41:18.100 582 582 I auditd : type=1400 audit(0.0:4): avc:
denied { search } for comm="BootAnimation" name="/" dev="sda35" ino=2
scontext=u:r:bootanim:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=dir
permissive=0
Bug: 68864350
Test: build
Change-Id: I07f751d54b854bdc72f3e5166442a5e21b3a9bf5
Duplicate property names are supported now for prefix and exact
matching.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: Ifd9d32eaece7370d69f121e88d5541f7a2e34458
The NeuralNetworks runtime is a library that communicates with
NeuralNetworks HIDL services and is linked by applications. To enable
the NN runtime to use these services, applications must have explicit
sepolicy permissions to find the NN services and communicate across
binder.
This CL relaxes neverallow rules for hal_neuralnetworks_*.
Because it is affecting pre-existing neverallow rules, this CL requires
a CTS rebuild.
Bug: 70340780
Test: mm
Test: ran neuralnetworks vts and cts binaries
Change-Id: I84f73ac77486681f91d1f8687268c0fa22a7ba0b
(cherry picked from commit 598870bebc4bb34542df81799b46f3cdcfb6723b)
We use this attribute to annotate coredomains that execute vendor code
in a Treble-violating way.
Bug: 62041836
Test: sepolicy builds
Change-Id: Ie6052209b3901eaad8496b8fc9681421d7ee3c1c
This gives the privilege to system apps, platform apps,
ephemeral apps, and privileged apps to receive a
UDP socket from the system server. This is being added
for supporting UDP Encapsulation sockets for IPsec, which
must be provided by the system.
This is an analogous change to a previous change that
permitted these sockets for untrusted_apps:
0f75a62e2c
Bug: 70389346
Test: IpSecManagerTest, System app verified with SL4A
Change-Id: Iec07e97012e0eab92a95fae9818f80f183325c31
This patch adds a flag that can be used to ignore neverallow rules.
By adding
SELINUX_IGNORE_NEVERALLOWS := true
into the BoardConfig.mk file, neverallow violations will be ignored
silently. This flag can only be enabled on userdebug and eng builds.
Users of this flag should be very careful. Since it does not work on
user builds, it must be disabled to pass CTS, and enabling it for
too long could hide issues that need to be addressed.
As a happy side effect, this patch should also improve the error
messages when violating a neverallow rules. Specifically, the file
and line number should be correct.
Bug: 70950899
Bug: 33960443
Test: Built walleye-{user,eng} with and without this new option and
a neverallow violation. Built policy for all targets.
Change-Id: Id0d65123cdd230d6b90faa6bb460d544054bb906
