On boot, Android runs restorecon on a number of virtual directories,
such as /sys and /sys/kernel/debug, to ensure that the SELinux labels
are correct. To avoid causing excessive boot time delays, the restorecon
code aggressively prunes directories, to avoid recursing down directory
trees which will never have a matching SELinux label.
See:
* https://android-review.googlesource.com/93401
* https://android-review.googlesource.com/109103
The key to this optimization is avoiding unnecessarily broad regular
expressions in file_contexts. If an overly broad regex exists, the tree
pruning code is ineffective, and the restorecon ends up visiting lots of
unnecessary directories.
The directory /sys/kernel/debug/tracing contains approximately 4500
files normally, and on debuggable builds, this number can jump to over
9000 files when the processing from wifi-events.rc occurs. For
comparison, the entire /sys/kernel/debug tree (excluding
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing) only contains approximately 8000 files. The
regular expression "/sys/kernel(/debug)?/tracing/(.*)?" ends up matching
a significant number of files, which impacts boot performance.
Instead of using an overly broad regex, refine the regex so only the
files needed have an entry in file_contexts. This list of files is
essentially a duplicate of the entries in
frameworks/native/cmds/atrace/atrace.rc .
This change reduces the restorecon_recursive call for /sys/kernel/debug
from approximately 260ms to 40ms, a boot time reduction of approximately
220ms.
Bug: 35248779
Test: device boots, no SELinux denials, faster boot.
Change-Id: I70f8af102762ec0180546b05fcf014c097135f3e
Use the default filesystem label from genfs_contexts for the directory
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing and /sys/kernel/tracing, instead of explicitly
attempting to relabel it.
There are three cases we need to consider:
1) Old-style tracing functionality is on debugfs
2) tracing functionality is on tracefs, but mounted under debugfs
3) tracefs is mounted at /sys/kernel/tracing
For #1, the label on /sys/kernel/debug/tracing will be debugfs, and all
processes are allowed debugfs:dir search, so having the label be debugfs
instead of debugfs_tracing will not result in any permission change.
For #2, the label on /sys/kernel/debug/tracing will be debugfs_tracing,
which is the same as it is today. The empty directory
/sys/kernel/tracing wlll retain the sysfs label, avoiding the denial
below.
For #3, /sys/kernel/debug/tracing won't exist, and /sys/kernel/tracing
will have the debugfs_tracing label, where processes are allowed search
access.
Addresses the following denial:
avc: denied { associate } for pid=1 comm="init" name="tracing"
dev="sysfs" ino=95 scontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0
Bug: 31856701
Bug: 35197529
Test: no denials on boot
Change-Id: I7233ea92c6987b8edfce9c2f1d77eb25c7df820f
Add a file context for keeping track of last reboot reason and label
directory /data/misc/reboot/ for this purpose.
Bug: 30994946
Test: manual: reboot ocmmand, setprop sys.powerctl, SoC thermal mgr
Change-Id: I9569420626b4029a62448b3f729ecbbeafbc3e66
The rules for the two types were the same and /data/app-ephemeral is
being removed. Remove these types.
Test: Builds
Change-Id: I520c026395551ad1362dd2ced53c601d9e6f9b28
This change adds selinux policy for configstore@1.0 hal. Currently, only
surfaceflinger has access to the HAL, but need to be widen.
Bug: 34314793
Test: build & run
Merged-In: I40e65032e9898ab5f412bfdb7745b43136d8e964
Change-Id: I40e65032e9898ab5f412bfdb7745b43136d8e964
(cherry picked from commit 5ff0f178ba)
Since it was introduced it caused quite a few issues and it spams the
SElinux logs unnecessary.
The end goal of the audit was to whitelist the access to the
interpreter. However that's unfeasible for now given the complexity.
Test: devices boots and everything works as expected
no more auditallow logs
Bug: 29795519
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I9a7a65835e1e1d3f81be635bed2a3acf75a264f6
Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags. Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access. Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.
Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e
Bug: 33746484
Test: Successfully boot with original service and property contexts.
Successfully boot with split serivce and property contexts.
Change-Id: I87f95292b5860283efb2081b2223e607a52fed04
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
This adds the premissions required for
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service to access the keymaster TA
as well as for keystore and vold to lookup and use
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service.
IT DOES NOT remove the privileges from keystore and vold to access
the keymaster TA directly.
Test: Run keystore CTS tests
Bug: 32020919
(cherry picked from commit 5090d6f324)
Change-Id: Ib02682da26e2dbcabd81bc23169f9bd0e832eb19
Bug: 31015010
cherry-pick from b6e4d4bdf1
Test: checked for selinux denial msgs in the dmesg logs.
Change-Id: I8285ea05162ea0d75459e873e5c2bad2dbc7e5ba
reflect the change from "mediaanalytics" to "mediametrics"
Also incorporates a broader access to the service -- e.g. anyone.
This reflects that a number of metrics submissions come from application
space and not only from our controlled, trusted media related processes.
The metrics service (in another commit) checks on the source of any
incoming metrics data and limits what is allowed from unprivileged
clients.
Bug: 34615027
Test: clean build, service running and accessible
Change-Id: I657c343ea1faed536c3ee1940f1e7a178e813a42
This CLs adds SElinux policies necessary to compile secondary dex files.
When an app loads secondary dex files via the base class loader the
files will get reported to PM. During maintance mode PM will compile the
secondary dex files which were used via the standard installd model
(fork, exec, change uid and lower capabilities).
What is needed:
dexoptanalyzer - needs to read the dex file and the boot image in order
to decide if we need to actually comppile.
dex2oat - needs to be able to create *.oat files next to the secondary
dex files.
Test: devices boots
compilation of secondary dex files works without selinux denials
cmd package compile --secondary-dex -f -m speed
com.google.android.gms
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I038955b5bc9a72d49f6c24c1cb76276e0f53dc45
Test: Device boots
Can take photos
Run "adb shell atrace -c -b 16000 -t 5 gfx" without root and check produces
output
Run "python systrace.py view gfx freq sched am wm dalvik
binder_driver" from external/chromium-trace after adb root and
check populated
Bug: 31856701
Change-Id: Ic319f8a0a3e395efa7ee8ba33a868ac55cb44fe4
/sys/class/leds is the standard location for linux files dealing with
leds, however the exact contents of this directory is non-standard
(hence the need for a hal).
Bug: 32022100
Test: compiles and works for the subset of common files
Change-Id: I7571d7267d5ed531c4cf95599d5f2acc22287ef4
Revise policy, to allow init and system_server to configure,
clear, and read kernel trace events. This will enable us to
debug certain WiFi failures.
Note that system_server is restricted to only accessing
a wifi-specific trace instance. (Hence, system_server is
not allowed to interfere with atrace.) Moreover, even for
the wifi trace instance, system_server is granted limited
permissions. (system_server can not, e.g., change which
events are traced.)
Note also that init and system_server are only granted these
powers on userdebug or eng builds.
The init.te and system_server.te changes resolve the
following denials:
// Denials when wifi-events.rc configures tracing
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ add_name } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ create } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="buffer_size_kb" dev="debugfs" ino=18061 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
// Denials when system_server sets up fail-safe
// (auto-terminate tracing if system_server dies)
{ search } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
// Denials when system_server toggles tracing on or off
// (WifiStateMachine is a thread in system_server)
{ search } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
// Denials when system_server reads the event trace
// (This happens in response to a dumpsys request)
{ search } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Bug: 27254565
Test: manual
Manual test:
- Build this CL along with CL:322337
- Verify that system boots, and that we can connect to GoogleGuest.
(Testing of actual trace functionality with require some more
patches in frameworks/opt/net/wifi.)
$ adb root && adb shell dmesg | egrep 'avc: denied.+debugfs'
Change-Id: Ib6eb4116549277f85bd510d25fb30200f1752f4d
Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.
Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed
- Allow cameraservice to talk to hwbinder, hwservicemanager
- Allow hal_camera to talk to the same interfaces as cameraservice
Test: Compiles, confirmed that cameraservice can call hwservicemanager
Bug: 32991422
Change-Id: Ied0a3f5f7149e29c468a13887510c78d555dcb2a
Bug: 33746484
Test: Successfully boot with original service and property contexts.
Successfully boot with split serivce and property contexts.
Change-Id: I7881af8922834dc69b37dae3b06d921e05206564
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Bug: 33746484
Test: Successfully boot with original service and property contexts.
Successfully boot with split serivce and property contexts.
Change-Id: Ide67d37d85273c60b9e387e72fbeb87be6da306a
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Move from fingerprintd to new fingerprint_hal and update SeLinux policy.
Test: Boot with no errors related to fingerprint sepolicy
Bug: 33199080
Change-Id: Idfde0cb0530e75e705033042f64f3040f6df22d6
The following are the avc denials that are addressed:
avc: denied { call } for pid=889 comm="system_server"
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
tclass=binder permissive=0
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
avc: denied { read } for name="hw" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1837
scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { open } for path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="mmcblk0p43"
ino=1837 scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Bug:31974439
Test: Checked that there no more related avc denial messages related to
the GNSS HAL in dmesg.
Change-Id: I5b43dc088017a5568dd8e442726d2bf52e95b1d5
It seems likely that there is no reason to keep around a number of
devices that are configured to be included into the pixel kernels. Init
and ueventd should be the only processes with r/w access to these
devices, so auditallow rules have been added to ensure that they aren't
actually used.
/dev/keychord was given its own type since it's one of the few character
devices that's actually legitimately used and would cause log spam in
the auditallow otherwise.
Bug: 33347297
Test: The phone boots without any apparent log spam.
Change-Id: I3dd9557df8a9218b8c802e33ff549d15849216fb
Simulate platform and non-platform split by compiling two different
file_contexts files and loading them together on-device. Leave the existing
file_contexts.bin in place until we're ready to build images based on the new
files.
Bug: 31363362
Test: Builds and boots without additional denials.
Change-Id: I7248f876e2230cee3b3cbf386422063da1e3dde0
Bring back file_contexts.bin.
Change-Id: Ifec2c363579151080fdec48e8bc46bbbc8c97674
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Bug: http://b/32905206
Test: Boot sailfish and no new selinux failures observed in logs
Change-Id: Id9a46180074a61f8cf8d176a7b2ebc995a13b9f9
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Test: tested with default health HAL on angler running as service.
Bug: b/32754732
Change-Id: Ie0b70d43cb23cd0878e1b7b99b9bebdbd70d17c7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit ef62fd9159)
healthd is being split into 'charger' and 'healthd' processes, that
will never run together. 'charger' is to be run only in charge-only
and recovery, while healthd runs with Android.
While they both share much of battery monitoring code, they both now
have reduced scope. E.g. 'charger', doesn't need to use binder anymore
and healthd doesn't need to do charging ui animation. So, amend the
SEPolicy for healthd to reduce it's scope and add a new one for charger.
Test: Tested all modes {recovery, charger-only, android} with new policy
Change-Id: If7f81875c605f7f07da4d23a313f308b9dde9ce8
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit c73d0022ad)
Simulate platform and non-platform split by sending the split files to the
device to be compiled by init.
Bug: 31363362
Test: Policy builds on-device and boots. sediff shows no difference.
Change-Id: I9627d1c66ca37786d97a049666278a4992ad7579
After a series of recent commits, installd has fully migrated over
to Binder, and all socket-based communication has been removed.
Test: builds, boots, apps install fine, pre-OTA dexopt works
Bug: 13758960, 30944031
Change-Id: Ia67b6260de58240d057c99b1bbd782b44376dfb5
Only init and ueventd have any access to /dev/port, and neither should
have any use for it. As it stands, leaving port in just represents
additional attack surface with no useful functionality, so it should be
removed if possible, not only from Pixel devices, but from all Android
devices.
Test: The phone boots successfully
Bug:33301618
Change-Id: Iedc51590f1ffda02444587d647889ead9bdece3f
media framework analytics are gathered in a separate service.
define a context for this new service, allow various
media-related services and libraries to access this new service.
Bug: 30267133
Test: ran media CTS, watched for selinux denials.
Change-Id: I5aa5aaa5aa9e82465b8024f87ed32d6ba4db35ca
/data/bugreports is moving to /bugreports
Bug: 27262109
Bug: 27204904
Bug: 32799236
Test: new symlink is in /bugreports and is labeled correctly
Change-Id: Ib6a492fba8388bf43debad28cfc851679f8c6151
urandom_device and random_device have the exact same security
properties. Collapse them into one type.
Test: device boots and /dev/urandom is labeled correctly.
Change-Id: I12da30749291bc5e37d99bc9422bb86cb58cec41
HAL policy defines how the platform and a given HAL interact, but not how the
HAL is implemented. This policy should be represented as an attribute that all
processes implementing the HAL can include.
Bug: 32123421
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: I17e5612c0835773c28e14f09e2ce7bdc3f210c15
The webview_zygote is a new unprivileged zygote and has its own sockets for
listening to fork requests. However the webview_zygote does not run as root
(though it does require certain capabilities) and only allows dyntransition to
the isolated_app domain.
Test: m
Test: angler boots
Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: I89a72ffe6dcb983c4a44048518efd7efb7ed8e83
Renaming vibrator sepolicy to remove the version number.
Also moving the related binder_call() to maintain alphabetical order.
Bug: 32123421
Change-Id: I2bfa835085519ed10f61ddf74e7e668dd12bda04
Test: booted, and checked vibrate on keypress on bullhead
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.
Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.
Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
