IncFS in S adds a bunch of new ioctls, and requires the users
to read its features in sysfs directory. This change adds
all the features, maps them into the processes that need to
call into them, and allows any incfs user to query the features
Bug: 170231230
Test: incremental unit tests
Change-Id: Ieea6dca38ae9829230bc17d0c73f50c93c407d35
Access to /proc/locks is necessary to activity manager to determine
wheter a process holds a lock or not prior freezing it.
Test: verified access of /proc/locks while testing other CLs in the same
topic.
Bug: 176928302
Change-Id: I14a65da126ff26c6528edae137d3ee85d3611509
See go/rescue-party-reboot for more context.
One integer will be stored in a file in this
directory, which will be read and then deleted at the
next boot. No userdata is stored.
Test: Write and read from file from PackageWatchdog
Bug: 171951174
Change-Id: I18f59bd9ad324a0513b1184b2f4fe78c592640db
ConnectivityService is going to become mainline and can not
access hidden APIs. Telephony and Settings were both accessing
the hidden API ConnectivityManager#getMobileProvisioningUrl.
Moving #getMobileProvisioningUrl method into telephony means
that there is one less access to a hidden API within the overall
framework since the Connectivity stack never needed this value.
Thus, move getMobileProvisioningUrl parsing to telephony surface
and provide the corresponding sepolicy permission for its access.
The exsting radio_data_file is an app data type and may allow
more permission than necessary. Thus create a new type and give
the necessary read access only.
Bug: 175177794
Test: verify that the radio process could read
/data/misc/radio/provisioning_urls.xml successfully
Change-Id: I191261a57667dc7936c22786d75da971f94710ef
user_profile_data_file is mlstrustedobject. And it needs to be,
because we want untrusted apps to be able to write to their profile
files, but they do not have levels.
But now we want to apply levels in the parent directories that have
the same label, and we want them to work so they need to not be
MLS-exempt. To resolve that we introduce a new label,
user_profile_root_file, which is applied to those directories (but no
files). We grant mostly the same access to the new label as
directories with the existing label.
Apart from appdomain, almost every domain which accesses
user_profile_data_file, and now user_profile_root_file, is already
mlstrustedsubject and so can't be affected by this change. The
exception is postinstall_dexopt which we now make mlstrustedobject.
Bug: 141677108
Bug: 175311045
Test: Manual: flash with wipe
Test: Manual: flash on top of older version
Test: Manual: install & uninstall apps
Test: Manual: create & remove user
Test: Presubmits.
Change-Id: I4e0def3d513b129d6c292f7edb076db341b4a2b3
Define access rights to new per-API level task profiles and cgroup
description files under /etc/task_profiles/.
Bug: 172066799
Test: boot with per-API task profiles
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Change-Id: I04c9929fdffe33a9fc82d431a53f47630f9dcfc3
This gives us an easy way for the policy to refer to all existing or
future types used for app private data files in type= assignments in
seapp_contexts.
Apply the label to all the existing types, then refactor rules to use
the new attribute.
This is intended as a pure refactoring, except that:
- Some neverallow rules are extended to cover types they previous
omitted;
- We allow iorap_inode2filename limited access to shell_data_file and
nfc_data_file;
- We allow zygote limited access to system_app_data_file.
This mostly reverts the revert in commit
b01e1d97bf, restoring commit
27e0c740f1. Changes to check_seapp to
enforce use of app_data_file_type is omitted, to be included in a
following CL.
Test: Presubmits
Bug: 171795911
Change-Id: I02b31e7b3d5634c94763387284b5a154fe5b71b4
This gives us an easy way for the policy to refer to all existing or
future types used for app private data files in type= assignments in
seapp_contexts.
Apply the label to all the existing types, then refactor rules to use
the new attribute.
This is intended as a pure refactoring, except that:
- Some neverallow rules are extended to cover types they previous
omitted;
- We allow iorap_inode2filename limited access to shell_data_file and
nfc_data_file;
- We allow zygote limited access to system_app_data_file.
Also extend check_seapp to check that all types specified in
seapp_contexts files have the attribute, to ensure that the neverallow
rules apply to them. As a small bonus, also verify that domain and
type values are actually types not attributes.
Test: Presubmits
Test: Manual: specify an invalid type, build breaks.
Bug: 171795911
Change-Id: Iab6018af449dab3b407824e635dc62e3d81e07c9
Test: ls -lZ /sys/kernel/tracing/printk_formats
[...] u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_printk_formats:s0 [...]
Test: setenforce 0;
runcon u:r:system_server:s0 cat /sys/kernel/tracing/printk_formats
logcat complains about /sys/kernel/tracing/printk_formats
Test: setenforce 0;
runcon u:r:traced_probes:s0 cat /sys/kernel/tracing/printk_formats
logcat does not complain about /sys/kernel/tracing/printk_formats
(need to setenforce 0, because otherwise the exec of ls is denied).
Bug: 70292203
Change-Id: I15ddef686f979c59daaba5263fa99aca3cd139e5
dm-user is a new device-mapper module, providing a FUSE-like service for
block devices. It creates control nodes as misc devices under
/dev/dm-user/. Make sure these nodes get a unique selabel.
snapuserd is a daemon for servicing requests from dm-user. It is a
low-level component of Virtual A/B updates, and provides the bridge
betewen dm-snapshot and the new COW format. For this reason it needs
read/write access to device-mapper devices.
Bug: 168259959
Test: ctl.start snapuserd, no denials
vts_libsnapshot_test, no denials
Change-Id: I36858a23941767f6127d6fbb9e6755c68b91ad31
This CL allows the traced_probes service to temporarily
lower kptr_restrict and read /proc/kallsyms.
This is allowed only on userdebug/eng builds.
The lowering of kptr_restrict is done via an init
property because the kernel checks that the kptr_restrict
writer is CAP_SYS_ADMIN, regardless of the /proc file ACLs [1].
[1] 4cbffc461e/kernel/sysctl.c (L2254)
Bug: 136133013
Design doc: go/perfetto-kallsyms
Test: perfetto_integrationtests --gtest_filter=PerfettoTest.KernelAddressSymbolization in r.android.com/1454882
Change-Id: Ic06e7a9a74c0f3e42fa63f7f41decc385c9fea2c
Per http://cs/aosp-master/system/sepolicy/private/genfs_contexts?l=21
genfscon proc /net u:object_r:proc_net:s0
/proc/net/... portion of proc should be 'proc_net' not the default of 'proc'
For example on a bonito:
$ adbb shell ls -alZd /proc /proc/net/xt_quota
dr-xr-xr-x 757 root root u:object_r:proc:s0 0 1969-12-31 16:00 /proc
dr-xr-xr-x 2 root root u:object_r:proc_net:s0 0 2020-10-20 11:02 /proc/net/xt_quota
This already mostly works, but occasionally on 4.19 devices we see
(apparently spurious) denials (my gut feeling is kernel behaviour
changed and/or is racy):
[ 37.434457] type=1400 audit(1574821413.359:2102): avc: denied { associate } for comm="Binder:762_1" name="globalAlert" scontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=1
Presumably caused by a binder rpc into netd:
http://cs/aosp-master/system/netd/server/BandwidthController.cpp?l=635&rcl=cdd79f13c670605819333de2d7b67d7f8a42210c
Things seem to work anyway, presumably because eventually it does somehow
get set to 'proc_net' anyway...
This patch will allow the removal of:
allow proc_net proc:filesystem { associate };
and
dontaudit proc_net proc:filesystem associate;
from device specific configs.
Bug: 145579144
Bug: 170265025
Test: treehugger will
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I46294d8b1526e846a5eddb350adf51c76634b8f1
Also make shared_relro_file mlstrustedobject to ensure these files can
still be read by any app in any user.
Bug: 170622707
Test: Manual: delete the files, check they are re-created and accessible.
Test: Manual: no denials seen
Test: Presubmits
Change-Id: Icce4ee858219e3fd0e307f3edfb3c66005872a45
/boot/etc/build.prop is a file available at first_stage_init to
be moved into /second_stage_resources.
The file is only read by first_stage_init before SELinux is
initialized. No other domains are allowed to read it.
Test: build aosp_hawk
Test: boot and getprop
Bug: 170364317
Change-Id: I0f8e3acc3cbe6d0bae639d2372e1423acfc683c7
Add updateable_module_file that describes all files under /modules. If
more directories (e.g. /modules/apex etc.) are added in the future,
separate labels should be applied to them.
Bug: 163543381
Test: on CF check /proc/mounts
Change-Id: Iceafebd85a2ffa47a73dce70d268d8a6fb5a5103
Add a domain for /data/local/tests which will be used by atest
to execute tests on devices as shell or root.
Bug: 138450837
Test: atest binderVendorDoubleLoadTest memunreachable_unit_test memunreachable_binder_test
Change-Id: Ia34314bd9430e21c8b3304ac079e3d9b5705e19c
Add userspace_reboot_metadata_file, which is written to by init,
and read by system server. System server will also handle the
deletion policy and organization of files within this directory,
so it needs additional permissions.
Test: Builds
Bug: 151820675
Change-Id: Ifbd70a6564e2705e3edf7da6b05486517413b211
cgroup v2 is going to be used for freezer v2 support. The cgroup v2 hiearchy
will be mounted by init under /sys/fs/cgroup hence proper access rights
are necessary for sysfs. After mounting, the cgroup v2 kernfs will use
the label cgroup_v2 and system_manager will handle the freezer
Bug: 154548692
Test: verified that files undes sysfs and cgroup v2 kernfs are accessed
as required to allow proper functioning for the freezer.
Change-Id: Idfb3f6e77b60dad032d1e306d2f9b58cd5775960
We add a new back end for SELinux based keystore2_key namespaces.
This patch adds the rump policy and build system infrastructure
for installing keystore2_key context files on the target devices.
Bug: 158500146
Bug: 159466840
Test: None
Change-Id: I423c9e68ad259926e4a315d052dfda97fa502106
Merged-In: I423c9e68ad259926e4a315d052dfda97fa502106
Due to AIDL HAL introduction, vendors can publish services
with servicemanager. vendor_service_contexts is labeled as
vendor_service_contexts_file, not nonplat_service_contexts_file.
And pack it to vendor partition.
Bug: 154066722
Test: check file label
Change-Id: Ic74b12e4c8e60079c0872b6c27ab2f018fb43969
To allow vold to abort it.
Bug: 153411204
Test: vold can access it
Merged-In: I334eaf3459905c27d614db8eda18c27e62bea5fa
Change-Id: I334eaf3459905c27d614db8eda18c27e62bea5fa
/apex/apex-info-file.xml is labeled as apex_info_file. It is
created/written by apexd once by apexd, and can be read by zygote and
system_server. The content of the file is essentially the same as the
return value of getAllPackages() call to apexd.
Bug: 154823184
Test: m
Merged-In: Ic6af79ddebf465b389d9dcb5fd569d3a786423b2
(cherry picked from commit f1de4c02cc)
Change-Id: Ic6af79ddebf465b389d9dcb5fd569d3a786423b2
See discussion in aosp/1233645. There was a concern about this
filesystem automounting when enabled, so this change adds sepolicy to
preemptively lock it down.
I'm not confident it actually automounts. If it does, it'll land in
/sys/kernel/security, which is also protected with the sysfs policy.
Test: Builds
Bug: 148102533
Change-Id: I78a246a5c18953f2471f84367ab383afb2742908
The credstore service is a system service which backs the
android.security.identity.* Framework APIs. It essentially calls into
the Identity Credential HAL while providing persistent storage for
credentials.
Bug: 111446262
Test: atest android.security.identity.cts
Test: VtsHalIdentityTargetTest
Test: android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test
Change-Id: I5cd9a6ae810e764326355c0842e88c490f214c60
Helps with support of recovery and rollback boot reason history, by
also using /metadata/bootstat/persist.sys.boot.reason to file the
reboot reason. For now, label this file metadata_bootstat_file.
Test: manual
Bug: 129007837
Change-Id: Id1d21c404067414847bef14a0c43f70cafe1a3e2
This adds the type and permissions for dumping and appending prereboot
information.
Bug: 145203410
Test: Didn't see denials while dumping and appending prereboot info.
Change-Id: Ic08408b9bebc3648a7668ed8475f96a5302635fa
Setting files and dirs under /data/incremental as apk_data_file, so that
they will have the same permissions as the ones under /data/app.
Current layout of the dirs:
1. /data/incremental/[random]/mount -> holds data files (such as base.apk) and
control files (such as .cmd). Its subdirectory is first bind-mounted to
/data/incremental/tmp/[random], eventually bind-mounted to
/data/app/~~[randomA]/[packageName]-[randomB].
2. /data/incremental/[random]/backing_mount -> hold incfs backing image.
3. /data/incremental/tmp/[random] -> holds temporary mountpoints (bind-mount targets)
during app installation.
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ia5016db2fa2c7bad1e6611d59625731795eb9efc
/mnt/pass_through was introduced to allow the FUSE daemon unrestricted
access to the lower filesystem (or sdcardfs).
At zygote fork time, the FUSE daemon will have /mnt/pass_through/0
bind mounted to /storage instead of /mnt/user/0. To keep /sdcard
(symlink to /storage/self/primary) paths working, we create a
'self' directory with an additional 'primary' symlink to
/mnt/pass_through/0/emulated/0 which is a FUSE mount point.
The following components need varying sepolicy privileges:
Vold: Creates the self/primary symlink and mounts the lower filesystem
on /mnt/pass_through/0/emulated. So needs create_dir and mount access
+ create_file access for the symlink
zygote: In case zygote starts an app before vold sets up the paths.
This is unlikely but can happen if the FUSE daemon (a zygote forked app)
is started before system_server completes vold mounts.
Same sepolicy requirements as vold
installd: Needs to clear/destroy app data using lower filesystem
mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to walk
/mnt/pass_through
priv_app (FUSE daemon): Needs to server content from the lower
filesystem mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to
walk /mnt/pass_through
Bug: 135341433
Test: adb shell ls /mnt/pass_through/0/self/primary
Change-Id: I16e35b9007c2143282600c56adbc9468a1b7f240
The steps involved in setting up profiling and stack unwinding are
described in detail at go/perfetto-perf-android.
To summarize the interesting case: the daemon uses cpu-wide
perf_event_open, with userspace stack and register sampling on. For each
sample, it identifies whether the process is profileable, and obtains
the FDs for /proc/[pid]/{maps,mem} using a dedicated RT signal (with the
bionic signal handler handing over the FDs over a dedicated socket). It
then uses libunwindstack to unwind & symbolize the stacks, sending the
results to the central tracing daemon (traced).
This patch covers the app profiling use-cases. Splitting out the
"profile most things on debug builds" into a separate patch for easier
review.
Most of the exceptions in domain.te & coredomain.te come from the
"vendor_file_type" allow-rule. We want a subset of that (effectively all
libraries/executables), but I believe that in practice it's hard to use
just the specific subtypes, and we're better off allowing access to all
vendor_file_type files.
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I4aa482cfb3f9fb2fabf02e1dff92e2b5ce121a47
System_server will listen on incoming packets from zygotes.
Bug: 136036078
Test: atest CtsAppExitTestCases:ActivityManagerAppExitInfoTest
Change-Id: I42feaa317615b90c5277cd82191e677548888a71
Adding two labels: "incfs" for the incremental filesystem and
"incremental_root_file" for file paths /data/incremental/*.
Doc: go/incremental-selinux
Test: manual
Change-Id: I7d45ed1677e3422119b2861dfc7b541945fcb7a2
In order for system_server to report ION allocations in dumpsys meminfo
report it needs access to ION sysfs nodes.
Bug: 138148041
Test: dumpsys meminfo
Change-Id: I8b1efebe8f4b06a3975e96ddd6a8cbcacdb52fb2
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Zygote/Installd now can do the following operations in app data directory:
- Mount on it
- Create directories in it
- Mount directory for each app data, and get/set attributes
Bug: 143937733
Test: No denials at boot
Test: No denials seen when creating mounts
Change-Id: I6e852a5f5182f1abcb3136a3b23ccea69c3328db
This adds a new apex_rollback_data_file type for the snapshots (backups)
of APEX data directories that can be restored in the event of a rollback.
Permission is given for apexd to create files and dirs in those directories
and for vold_prepare_subdirs to create the directories.
See go/apex-data-directories for details.
Bug: 141148175
Test: Built and flashed, checked directory was created with the correct
type.
Change-Id: I94b448dfc096e5702d3e33ace6f9df69f58340fd
This adds a new apex_module_data_file type for the APEX data directories
under /data/misc/apexdata and /data/misc_[de|ce]/<u>/apexdata.
Permission is given for vold to identify which APEXes are present and
create the corresponding directories under apexdata in the ce/de user
directories.
See go/apex-data-directories.
Bug: 141148175
Test: Built & flashed, checked directories were created.
Change-Id: I95591e5fe85fc34f7ed21e2f4a75900ec2cfacfa
Currently linker config locates under /dev, but this makes some problem
in case of using two system partitions using chroot. To match system
image and configuration, linker config better stays under /linkerconfig
Bug: 144966380
Test: m -j passed && tested from cuttlefish
Change-Id: Iea67663442888c410f29f8dd0c44fe49e3fcef94
Android is moving away from debugfs. Information from /d/wakeup_sources
and /d/suspend_stats is now also exposed in sysfs under
/sys/class/wakeup/* and /sys/power/suspend_stats/* respectively:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/31/1349https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/6/1275
Allow SystemSuspend to read those sysfs nodes.
One caveat is that /sys/class/wakeup/wakeupN can be a symlink to a
device-specific location. In this case, device sepolicy should label
that the files appropriately. This is similar to how device policy
applies "sysfs_net" and "sysfs_batteryinfo" labels.
Bug: 144095608
Bug: 129087298
Test: boot cuttlefish; system_suspend is able to read
/sys/power/suspend_stats/* and /sys/class/wakeup/*
Change-Id: I350c88a271c0f422d0557aeb5e05e1537dc97bc9
Vendors can publish services with servicemanager only on non-Treble
builds. vendor_service_contexts is not meant to be read by
servicemanager.
5bccbfefe4/public/servicemanager.te (22)
Bug: 141333155
Test: create /vendor/etc/selinux/vendor_service_contexts and make sure it is
correctly labeled.
Change-Id: Ib68c50e0cdb2c39f0857a10289bfa26fa11b1b3c
Give /data itself a different label to its contents, to ensure that
only init creates files and directories there.
This change originally landed as aosp/1106014 and was reverted in
aosp/1116238 to fix b/140402208. aosp/1116298 fixes the underlying
problem, and with that we can re-land this change.
Bug: 139190159
Bug: 140402208
Test: aosp boots, logs look good
Change-Id: I1a366c577a0fff307ca366a6844231bcf8afe3bf
Give /data itself a different label to its contents, to ensure that
only init creates files and directories there.
Bug: 139190159
Test: aosp boots, logs look good
Change-Id: I3ee654a928bdab3f5d435ab6ac24040d9bdd9abe
In b/73062966, we add new AID ranges for each partition that doesn't
yet have them (system, system_ext, odm, product). We also add group
and passwd files to these partitions to be able to map these AIDs into
human readable user and group names, and vice versa.
All processes should be able to read all users and groups. We divide
the ranges into non-overlapping regions for each partition and we
namespace the names with the partition name as a prefix.
Allow domain r_file_perms to
/(system|product|system_ext)/etc/(group|passwd).
Vendor and odm passwd and group files already have this access, since
/(vendor|odm)/etc/* is already domain readable.
Example contents:
blueline:/ $ cat /system/etc/passwd
system_tom::6050:6050::/:/bin/sh
blueline:/ $ cat /product/etc/passwd
product_tom::7013:7013::/:/bin/sh
Bug: 73062966
Test: tree-hugger selinux denial during boot test
Change-Id: Ib4dc31778e95e952174e1365497feaf93dca7156
/metadata/ota will store critical bits necessary to reify
system and vendor partition state during an OTA. It will be accessed
primarily by first-stage init, recovery/fastbootd, and update_engine.
Bug: 136678799
Test: manual test
Change-Id: Ib78cb96ac60ca11bb27d2b2fe011482e64ba0cf8
/system/apex/com.android.runtime is labeled as runtime_apex_dir
and init is allowed to mount on it.
When TARGET_FLATTEN_APEX is true (= ro.apex.updatable is unset or set to
false), apexd is not used to activate the built-in flattened APEXes.
Init simply bind-mounts /system/apex to /apex.
However, there is a special case here. The runtime APEX is installed as
either /system/apex/com.android.runtime.debug or
/system/apex/com.android.runtime.release, whereas it should be activated
on /apex/com.android.runtime - without the .debug or .release suffix.
To handle that case, the build system creates an empty directory
/system/apex/com.android.runtime and the .debug or .release directory
is bind-mounted to the empty directory by init at runtime.
Bug: 132413565
Test: marlin is bootable
Merged-In: I3fde5ff831429723fecd1fa5c10e44f636a63f09
Change-Id: I3fde5ff831429723fecd1fa5c10e44f636a63f09
(cherry picked from commit 99902a175b)
lmkd needs to read /proc/lowmemorykiller to send statslog events in response to
applications being killed.
Bug: 130017100
Change-Id: I929d5a372e1b2f63b7b5ed421f1898ebddaec01c
apexd needs to read /vendor/apex dir and files in it.
Bug: 131190070
Bug: 123378252
Test: 1. Add apex to /vendor/apex
-> see if boot succeeds with new policy
2. Add flattened apex to /vendor/apex
-> see if only root files are labelled as vendor_apex_file
Change-Id: I37795ab6d659ac82639ba5e34d628fe1b5cdb350
"This symlink was suppose to have been removed in the Gingerbread
time frame, but lives on."
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/d2f0a2c%5E!/
Apps targeting R+ must NOT use that symlink.
For older apps we allow core init.rc to create
/mnt/sdcard -> /storage/self/primary symlink.
Bug: 129497117
Test: boot device, /mnt/sdcard still around.
Change-Id: I6ecd1928c0f598792d9badbf6616e3acc0450b0d
The bootstrap bionic (/system/lib/bootstrap/*) are only to the early
processes that are executed before the bionic libraries become available
via the runtime APEX. Allowing them to other processes is not needed and
sometimes causes a problem like b/123183824.
Bug: 123183824
Test: device boots to the UI
Test: atest CtsJniTestCases:android.jni.cts.JniStaticTest#test_linker_namespaces
Change-Id: Id7bba2e8ed1c9faf6aa85dbbdd89add04826b160
We no longer have /system/etc/security/apex/* as the public keys are all
bundled in APEXes. Removing the selinux label and policies for it.
Bug: 936942
Test: device is bootable
Change-Id: I6b6144a8d15910d1ba8584a0778244ed398dc615
This CL add new label for files created by fsverity.
Bug: 112038861
Test: ls -Z /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures.
Change-Id: I8e49ad9a43282bc608449eb0db4ea78617c4ee9a
If kernel is built with CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE optimization,
libjemalloc5 will attempt to read
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled and hit an SELinux denial.
Various denials similiar to the following are seen on cuttlefish:
avc: denied { open } for comm="surfaceflinger"
path="/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled" dev="sysfs" ino=776
scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
permissive=1
Bug: 28053261
Test: boot cuttlefish without above denials.
Change-Id: Ic33f12d31aacc42d662a8c5c297fbb5f84d4deea
