This is unused currently & there are no concrete plans to use it
in the future.
Bug: 130080335
Test: Device boots up & connects to networks.
Test: Will send for regression tests
Change-Id: I785389bc2c934c8792c8f631362d6aa0298007af
Merged-In: I785389bc2c934c8792c8f631362d6aa0298007af
(cherry picked from commit 56dfc06397)
Cleaning up exported*_system_prop and moving surfaceflinger properties
to new property contexts.
Bug: 152468529
Bug: 154885206
Test: boot cf_x86 and crosshatch
Change-Id: I7f8a684e9cbabce2f55a5292d7b2283ac0716cd9
Assigning a new context boot_status_prop for following two properties:
- sys.boot_completed
- dev.bootcomplete
Bug: 154885206
Test: boot cf_x86 and crosshatch, see no denials
Change-Id: Ieadabf90a9a1b54b52a1283bd648c11c95d558dd
Merged-In: Ieadabf90a9a1b54b52a1283bd648c11c95d558dd
(cherry picked from commit 2973c96055)
This is to clean up bad name "exported_dalvik_prop"
Bug: 154465224
Test: sepolicy_tests
Test: treble_sepolicy_tests 26.0 ~ 29.0
Change-Id: Ie5e738b5985c1db1bca7a857971d8490a7980b5b
Helps with support of recovery and rollback boot reason history, by
also using /metadata/bootstat/persist.sys.boot.reason to file the
reboot reason. For now, label this file metadata_bootstat_file.
Test: manual
Bug: 129007837
Change-Id: Id1d21c404067414847bef14a0c43f70cafe1a3e2
Define two property_context.
1. vendor_socket_hook_prop - for ro.vendor.redirect_socket_calls. The
property set once in vendor_init context. It's evaluated at process
start time and is cannot change at runtime on a given device. The set
permission is restricted to vendor_init. The read permission is
unrestricted.
2. socket_hook_prop - for net.redirect_socket_calls.hooked. The
property can be changed by System Server at runtime. It's evaluated when
shimmed socket functions is called. The set permission is restricted to
System Server. The read permission is unrestricted.
Bug: Bug: 141611769
Test: System Server can set net.redirect_socket_calls.hooked
libnetd_client can read both properties
libnetd_client can't set both properties
Change-Id: Ic42269539923e6930cc0ee3df8ba032797212395
This reverts commit f536a60407.
Reason for revert: Resubmit the CL with the fix in vendor_init.te
Bug: 144534640
Test: lunch sdk-userdebug; m sepolicy_tests
Change-Id: I47c589c071324d8f031a0f7ebdfa8188869681e9
Define a new property_context vndk_prop for ro.product.vndk.version.
It is set by init process but public to all modules.
Bug: 144534640
Test: check if ro.product.vndk.version is set correctly.
Change-Id: If739d4e25de93d9ed2ee2520408e07a8c87d46fe
Used when mapping RTM_GETLINK messages to this new permission.
Users of netlink_route_sockets that do not use the net_domain()
macro will need to grant this permission as needed. Compatibility
with older vendor images is preserved by granting all vendor domains
access to this new permission in *.compat.cil files.
Bug: 141455849
Test: build (this change is a no-op without kernel changes)
Change-Id: I18f1c9fc958120a26b7b3bea004920d848ffb26e
The commit 7baf725ea6 broke OMX on O/O-MR1(/P?) vendors.
Previous to this commit, all OMX codecs had to use "mediacodec" type,
after this commit, omx codecs just had to get hal_omx_server attribute.
This commit left to the vendor the charge of adding "hal_omx_server"
attribute to mediacodec.
However this can't work on non-Q vendors.
On P vendor, versioned_plat_pub contains the appdomain <=> mediacodec
allows, so OMX isn't technically broken on those devices.
But to ensure it won't break in the future, mark 28's mediacodec as
hal_omx_server as well
This fixes broken OMX decoding on O/O-MR1 vendors, failing with the
following denial:
avc: denied { call } for comm=4E444B204D65646961436F6465635F scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:mediacodec:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0
Bug: 141186440
Change-Id: I018f8d9aabc77e7ea86ca14734b1ab2edfdf8ed1
apexd stops itself when it finds that it is running on a device with
flattened APEXes (i.e. ro.apex.updatable = false).
Bug: 133907211
Test: launch sdk_phone_x86_64
adb logcat -d | grep apexd | wc -l
returns 3
Change-Id: I7fa161b069aa34adb028194b55f367fe740a0cfc
/system/apex/com.android.runtime is labeled as runtime_apex_dir
and init is allowed to mount on it.
When TARGET_FLATTEN_APEX is true (= ro.apex.updatable is unset or set to
false), apexd is not used to activate the built-in flattened APEXes.
Init simply bind-mounts /system/apex to /apex.
However, there is a special case here. The runtime APEX is installed as
either /system/apex/com.android.runtime.debug or
/system/apex/com.android.runtime.release, whereas it should be activated
on /apex/com.android.runtime - without the .debug or .release suffix.
To handle that case, the build system creates an empty directory
/system/apex/com.android.runtime and the .debug or .release directory
is bind-mounted to the empty directory by init at runtime.
Bug: 132413565
Test: marlin is bootable
Merged-In: I3fde5ff831429723fecd1fa5c10e44f636a63f09
Change-Id: I3fde5ff831429723fecd1fa5c10e44f636a63f09
(cherry picked from commit 99902a175b)
apexd needs to read /vendor/apex dir and files in it.
Bug: 131190070
Bug: 123378252
Test: 1. Add apex to /vendor/apex
-> see if boot succeeds with new policy
2. Add flattened apex to /vendor/apex
-> see if only root files are labelled as vendor_apex_file
Change-Id: I37795ab6d659ac82639ba5e34d628fe1b5cdb350
The bootstrap bionic (/system/lib/bootstrap/*) are only to the early
processes that are executed before the bionic libraries become available
via the runtime APEX. Allowing them to other processes is not needed and
sometimes causes a problem like b/123183824.
Bug: 123183824
Test: device boots to the UI
Test: atest CtsJniTestCases:android.jni.cts.JniStaticTest#test_linker_namespaces
Change-Id: Id7bba2e8ed1c9faf6aa85dbbdd89add04826b160
We no longer have /system/etc/security/apex/* as the public keys are all
bundled in APEXes. Removing the selinux label and policies for it.
Bug: 936942
Test: device is bootable
Change-Id: I6b6144a8d15910d1ba8584a0778244ed398dc615
Since ipmemorystore service has been moved to network stack from
system service, also should revert the relevant sepolicy which is
corresponding to the previous configuration.
Bug: 128392280
Test: atest FrameworksNetTests NetworkStackTests
Change-Id: I1ae09696e620b246f817db71e7b71c32aae9be05
With the CLs in the same topic, it's being built as a dynamically linked
executable. And this applies to normal boot (including charger mode) and
recovery mode both.
/system/bin/charger under normal boot will be labeled as charger_exec,
which has the attribute of system_file_type.
The file in recovery image will still be labeled as rootfs. So we keep
the domain_trans rule for rootfs file, but allowing for recovery mode
only.
Bug: 73660730
Test: Boot into charger mode on taimen. Check that charger UI works.
Test: Boot into recovery mode. Check that charger process works.
Change-Id: I062d81c346578cdfce1cc2dce18c829387a1fdbc
Remove unnecessary rules which will be added from 28.0.cil automatically
by the build process.
Bug: 111308141
Test: builds
Change-Id: I02064785cac1ed6d8b4e462604a1b8db10c1a25a
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Lmkd needs read access to /proc/pressure/memory, proc/pressure/cpu
and proc/pressure/io nodes to read current psi levels.
Lmkd needs write access to /proc/pressure/memory to set psi monitor
triggers.
Bug: 111308141
Test: modified lmkd to use PSI and tested using lmkd_unit_test
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Merged-In: I9efd60c7fbb89cc08938fa5119b13d794813b52b
Change-Id: I9efd60c7fbb89cc08938fa5119b13d794813b52b
This is an area that apexd can use to store session metadata, which
won't be rolled back with filesystem checkpointing.
Bug: 126740531
Test: builds
Change-Id: I5abbc500dc1b92aa46830829be76e7a4381eef91
System suspend service is not a HAL, so avoid using HAL-specific macros
and attributes.
Use system_suspend_server attribute for ISystemSuspend.hal permissions.
Use system_suspend type directly for internal .aidl interface
permissions.
Bug: 126259100
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: blueline boots; wakelocks can still be acquired; device suspends
if left alone.
Change-Id: Ie811e7da46023705c93ff4d76d15709a56706714
The application zygote is a new sort of zygote process that is a
child of the regular zygote. Each application zygote is tied to the
application for which it's launched. Once it's started, it will
pre-load some of the code for that specific application, much like
the regular zygote does for framework code.
Once the application zygote is up and running, it can spawn
isolated service processes that run in the isolated_app domain. These
services can then benefit from already having the relevant
application code and data pre-loaded.
The policy is largely the same as the webview_zygote domain,
however there are a few crucial points where the policy is different.
1) The app_zygote runs under the UID of the application that spawned
it.
2) During app_zygote launch, it will call a callback that is
controlled by the application, that allows the application to
pre-load code and data that it thinks is relevant.
Especially point 2 is imporant: it means that untrusted code can run
in the app_zygote context. This context is severely limited, and the
main concern is around the setgid/setuid capabilities. Those conerns
are mitigated by installing a seccomp filter that only allows
setgid/setuid to be called in a safe range.
Bug: 111434506
Test: app_zygote can start and fork children without denials.
Change-Id: I1cc49ee0042d41e5ac6eb81d8f8a10ba448d4832
For experiment flag testing, we add a flag netd and have
SEPolicy updates.
Test: add sepolicy, m -j, check GetServerConfigurableFlag function in netd
Bug:122050512
Change-Id: I21c844c277afc358085d80447f16e4c0d4eba5b3
runas_app domain is used by lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to debug/profile
debuggable apps. But it misses permissions to ptrace app processes and
read /proc/<app_pid> directory.
Bug: none
Test: build and boot marlin.
Test: run lldb and simpleperf on apps with target sdk version 24-29.
Change-Id: I9e6f940ec81a8285eae8db3b77fb1251a25dedd0
Test: basic workflow between apexd and PackageManager tested with
changes being developed.
Bug: 118865310
Change-Id: I1ae866f33e9b22493585e108c4fd45400493c7ac
The policies allow the system server to register a network_stack_service
used to communicate with the network stack process.
Test: atest FrameworksNetTests
Bug: b/112869080
Change-Id: Ib9b7d9150fe4afcce03c8b3dbb36b81c67e39366
The networking stack app hosts services that used to be in the system
server (IpClient, NetworkMonitor for now), but in a different process to
be packaged as a mainline module.
Test: booted, verified networking stack working when in app
Change-Id: I300a556f51b35c17378af961cea1ec937444e597
To configure read-ahead on loop devices, eg.
/sys/devices/virtual/block/loop0/queue/read_ahead_kb
Bug: 120776455
Test: configuring read-ahead on loop devices works from apexd
Change-Id: Ib25372358e8ca62fa634daf286e4b64e635fac58
