... such as Cuttlefish (Cloud Android virtual device) which has a
DRM virtio-gpu based gralloc and (sometimes) DRM virtio-gpu based
rendering (when forwarding rendering commands to the host machine
with Mesa3D in the guest and virglrenderer on the host).
After this change is submitted, changes such as aosp/1997572 can
be submitted to removed sepolicy that is currently duplicated
across device/google/cuttlefish and device/linaro/dragonboard as
well.
Adds a sysfs_gpu type (existing replicated sysfs_gpu definitions
across several devices are removed in the attached topic). The
uses of `sysfs_gpu:file` comes from Mesa using libdrm's
`drmGetDevices2()` which calls into `drmParsePciDeviceInfo()` to
get vendor id, device id, version etc.
Bug: b/161819018
Test: launch_cvd
Test: launch_cvd --gpu_mode=gfxstream
Change-Id: I4f7d4b0fb90bfeef72f94396ff0c5fe44d53510c
Merged-In: I4f7d4b0fb90bfeef72f94396ff0c5fe44d53510c
... such as Cuttlefish (Cloud Android virtual device) which has a
DRM virtio-gpu based gralloc and (sometimes) DRM virtio-gpu based
rendering (when forwarding rendering commands to the host machine
with Mesa3D in the guest and virglrenderer on the host).
After this change is submitted, changes such as aosp/1997572 can
be submitted to removed sepolicy that is currently duplicated
across device/google/cuttlefish and device/linaro/dragonboard as
well.
Adds a sysfs_gpu type (existing replicated sysfs_gpu definitions
across several devices are removed in the attached topic). The
uses of `sysfs_gpu:file` comes from Mesa using libdrm's
`drmGetDevices2()` which calls into `drmParsePciDeviceInfo()` to
get vendor id, device id, version etc.
Ignore-AOSP-First: must be submitted in internal as a topic first to
avoid having duplicate definitions of sysfs_gpu
in projects that are only available in internal
Bug: b/161819018
Test: launch_cvd
Test: launch_cvd --gpu_mode=gfxstream
Change-Id: I4f7d4b0fb90bfeef72f94396ff0c5fe44d53510c
Merged-In: I4f7d4b0fb90bfeef72f94396ff0c5fe44d53510c
This is intended for wm properties related to wmshell/sysui.
Using this context allows sysui to manipulate these properties
in debug builds.
Bug: 219067621
Test: manual
Change-Id: I5808bf92dbba37e9e6da5559f8e0a5fdac016bf3
Test: atest SupplementalProcessTest
Bug: 215105355
Ignore-AOSP-First: Cherry picking internally first to rename. Will be cherry-picked to AOSP right after.
Change-Id: I1b6d1a778cb658bdfd930b684e4ba0640031b226
Merged-In: I1b6d1a778cb658bdfd930b684e4ba0640031b226
(cherry picked from commit 8ea8587abb)
Allow rules in public/*.te can only reference types defined in
public/*.te files. This can be quite cumbersome in cases a rule needs to
be updated to reference a type that is only defined in private/*.te.
This change moves all the allow rules from public/app.te to
private/app.te to make it possible to reference private types in the
allow rules.
Bug: 211761016
Test: m
Test: presubmit
Change-Id: I0c4a3f1ef568bbfdfb2176869fcd92ee648617fa
Merged-In: I0c4a3f1ef568bbfdfb2176869fcd92ee648617fa
Allow rules in public/*.te can only reference types defined in
public/*.te files. This can be quite cumbersome in cases a rule needs to
be updated to reference a type that is only defined in private/*.te.
This change moves all the allow rules from public/app.te to
private/app.te to make it possible to reference private types in the
allow rules.
Ignore-AOSP-First: resolving merge conflict
Bug: 211761016
Test: m
Test: presubmit
Change-Id: I0c4a3f1ef568bbfdfb2176869fcd92ee648617fa
Almost 1:1 of the sepolicy for ephemeral apps
Test: make
Bug: 203670791
Ignore-AOSP-First: Feature is developed in internal branch
Change-Id: Ib085c49f29dab47268e479fe5266490a66adaa87
Checkin apps use /data/misc_ce/<id>/checkin to backup the checkin
metadata. So users won't lose the checkin tokens when they clear
the app's storage.
One example is when GMScore is used for checkin, users may clear
GMScore data via "settings". If the device accidentally loses the
token without backup, it won't be able to checkin again until
factory reset.
The contents in checkin dir will be cleaned up when a user is removed
from the device. We also plan to add Gmscore test to ensure the dir
is cleaned up at checkin time, thus prevent other Gmscore modules
from using this storage by mistake.
Bug: 197636740
Test: boot device, check selinux label, check gmscore writes to the new dir
Change-Id: If3ff5e0fb75b4d49ce80d91b0086b58db002e4fb
Remove some allow rules for odsign, since it no longer directly
modifies CompOs files. Instead allow it to run compos_verify_key in
its own domain.
Grant compos_verify_key what it needs to access the CompOs files and
start up the VM.
Currently we directly connect to the CompOs VM; that will change once
some in-flight CLs have landed.
As part of this I moved the virtualizationservice_use macro to
te_macros so I can use it here. I also expanded it to include
additional grants needed by any VM client that were previously done
for individual domains (and then deleted those rules as now
redundant).
I also removed the grant of VM access to all apps; instead we allow it
for untrusted apps, on userdebug or eng builds only. (Temporarily at
least.)
Bug: 193603140
Test: Manual - odsign successfully runs the VM at boot when needed.
Change-Id: I62f9ad8c7ea2fb9ef2d468331e26822d08e3c828
The test for the services has been running with selinux disabled. To
turn selinux on, required rules are allowed.
Below is the summary of the added rules.
* crosvm can read the composite disk files and other files (APKs,
APEXes) that serve as backing store of the composite disks.
* virtualizationservice has access to several binder services
- permission_service: to check Android permission
- apexd: to get apex files list (this will be removed eventually)
* Both have read access to shell_data_file (/data/local/tmp/...) for
testing purpose. This is not allowed for the user build.
* virtualizationservice has access to the pseudo terminal opened by adbd
so that it can write output to the terminal when the 'vm' tool is
invoked in shell.
Bug: 168588769
Test: /apex/com.android.virt/bin/vm run-app --log /dev/null
/data/local/tmp/virt/MicrodroidDemoApp.apk
/data/local/tmp/virt/MicrodroidDemoApp.apk.idsig
/data/local/tmp/virt/instance.img
assets/vm_config.json
without disabling selinux.
Change-Id: I54ca7c255ef301232c6e8e828517bd92c1fd8a04
ART is becoming a module and we need to be able to add new properties
without modifying the non updatable part of the platform:
- convert ART properties to use prefix in the namespace of
[ro].dalvik.vm.
- enable appdomain and coredomain to read device_config properties
that configure ART
(cherry picked from commit 0b2ca6c22c)
Test: boot
Bug: 181748174
Merged-In: Id23ff78474dba947301e1b6243a112b0f5b4a832
Change-Id: Id23ff78474dba947301e1b6243a112b0f5b4a832
ART is becoming a module and we need to be able to add new properties
without modifying the non updatable part of the platform:
- convert ART properties to use prefix in the namespace of
[ro].dalvik.vm.
- enable appdomain and coredomain to read device_config properties
that configure ART
Test: boot
Bug: 181748174
Change-Id: Id23ff78474dba947301e1b6243a112b0f5b4a832
Allow the MediaProvider app to write the system property
fuse.passthrough.enabled in case FUSE passthrough is enabled.
The need for this additional system property is due to the ScopedStorage
CTS tests that are assuming FUSE passtrhough is always on for devices
supporting it, but there may be some cases (e.g., GSI mixed builds)
where this is not possible true and the feature is disabled at runtime,
thus causing the tests to fail.
This additional system property is only set when FUSE passthrough is
actually being used by the system.
Bug: 186635810
Test: CtsScopedStorageDeviceOnlyTest
Signed-off-by: Alessio Balsini <balsini@google.com>
Change-Id: I623042d67399253a9167188c3748d93eb0f2d41f
Some jars, such com.android.location.provider.jar, are both on the
system_server classpath and loaded as libraries. If the .oat files are
in the ART apexdata cache (due to being system_server classpath), they
need to be execute permission to be usable as AOT compiled libraries.
Bug: 184881321
Test: install an updated ART apex, open apps, see no more denials
Change-Id: I89b74dfa047699c568575d99a29c5e74abdef076
untrusted apps were already granted this policy and we now extend it
to all apps. This allows FileManager apps with the
MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permisssion to access USB OTG volumes mounted
on /mnt/media_rw/<vol>.
This permission access in the framework is implemented by granting
those apps the external_storage gid. And at the same time USB volumes
will be mounted on /mnt/media_rw/<vol> with the external_storage gid.
There is no concern of interferring with FUSE on USB volumes because
they are not FUSE mounted.
For sdcards (non-USB) volumes mounted on /mnt/media_rw/<vol>, those
volumes are mounted with the media_rw gid, so even though they are
FUSE mounted on /storage/<vol>, arbitrary apps cannot access the
/mnt/media_rw path since only the FUSE daemon is granted the media_rw
gid.
Test: Manual
Bug: 182732333
Change-Id: I70a3eb1f60f32d051f44253b0db2c7b852d79ba1
This should be ok since apps are already allowed to read the contained
files; the dir is iterated by tests to ensure that all files are signed
correctly.
Bug: 165630556
Test: new test passes
Change-Id: Ib6c298f2b267839a802c17288230a8151a1eec86
This reverts commit 809eb75553.
Reason for revert: should allow shell to do it instead
Change-Id: Ie07b86d1308cb41885957d2214ed7ce190f5ae18
Test: pass
Bug: 179427873
The updated font files will be stored to /data/fonts/files and
all application will read it for drawing text.
Thus, /data/fonts/files needs to be readable by apps and only writable
by system_server (and init).
Bug: 173517579
Test: atest CtsGraphicsTestCases
Test: Manually done
Change-Id: Ia76b109704f6214eb3f1798e8d21260343eda231
odrefresh is the process responsible for checking and creating ART
compilation artifacts that live in the ART APEX data
directory (/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art).
There are two types of change here:
1) enabling odrefresh to run dex2oat and write updated boot class path
and system server AOT artifacts into the ART APEX data directory.
2) enabling the zygote and assorted diagnostic tools to use the
updated AOT artifacts.
odrefresh uses two file contexts: apex_art_data_file and
apex_art_staging_data_file. When odrefresh invokes dex2oat, the
generated files have the apex_art_staging_data_file label (which allows
writing). odrefresh then moves these files from the staging area to
their installation area and gives them the apex_art_data_file label.
Bug: 160683548
Test: adb root && adb shell /apex/com.android.art/bin/odrefresh
Change-Id: I9fa290e0c9c1b7b82be4dacb9f2f8cb8c11e4895
These are read by some apps, but don't have any corresponding property
contexts. This adds a new context as we're going to remove default_prop
access.
Bug: 173360450
Test: no sepolicy denials
Change-Id: I9be28d8e641eb6380d080150bee785a3cc304ef4
adbd and apps (SystemUI and CTS test apps) need to read it.
BUG: 162205386
Test: Connect to device which sets service.adb.tcp.port in vendor
partition through TCP adb.
Change-Id: Ia37dd0dd3239381feb2a4484179a0c7847166b29
This is to remove exported3_default_prop. Contexts of these properties
are changed.
- ro.boot.wificountrycode
This becomes wifi_config_prop
- ro.opengles.version
This becomes graphics_config_prop. Also it's read by various domains, so
graphics_config_prop is now readable from coredomain.
- persist.config.calibration_fac
This becomes camera_calibration_prop. It's only readable by appdomain.
Bug: 155844385
Test: no denials on Pixel devices
Test: connect wifi
Change-Id: If2b6c10fa124e29d1612a8f94ae18b223849e2a9
This removes bad context names "exported*_prop". Property contexts of
following properties are changed. All properties are settable only by
vendor-init.
- ro.config.per_app_memcg
This becomes lmkd_config_prop.
- ro.zygote
This becomes dalvik_config_prop.
- ro.oem_unlock_supported
This becomes oem_unlock_prop. It's readable by system_app which includes
Settings apps.
- ro.storage_manager.enabled
This becomes storagemanagr_config_prop. It's readable by coredomain.
Various domains in coredomain seem to read it.
- sendbug.preferred.domain
This bcomes sendbug_config_prop. It's readable by appdomain.
There are still 3 more exported3_default_prop, which are going to be
tracked individually.
Bug: 155844385
Test: selinux denial check on Pixel devices
Change-Id: I340c903ca7bda98a92d0f157c65f6833ed00df05
The rule "get_prop(coredomain, vts_status_prop)" is duplicated by
mistake. It's already in coredomain.te, and it should be deleted from
app.te
Bug: N/A
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I816c8da74940fc6ccdd50fe377aa54eae36237b4
vts_config_prop and vts_status_prop are added to remove exported*_prop.
ro.vts.coverage becomes vts_config_prop, and vts.native_server.on
becomes vts_status_prop.
Bug: 155844385
Test: Run some vts and then getprop, e.g. atest \
VtsHalAudioEffectV4_0TargetTest && adb shell getprop
Test: ro.vts.coverage is read without denials
Change-Id: Ic3532ef0ae7083db8d619d80e2b73249f87981ce
A device must indicate whether GPU profiling is supported or not through
setting these two properties properly. CTS needs to read these two
properties in order to run corresponding compliance tests. Hence need to
update sepolicy for these two properties.
Bug: b/157832445
Test: Test on Pixel 4
Change-Id: I6f400ecbbd5e78b645bb620fa24747e9367c2ff3
Merged-In: I6f400ecbbd5e78b645bb620fa24747e9367c2ff3
compatible_property_only is meaningless to new types introduced after
Android P because the macro is for types which should have different
accessibilities depending on the device's launching API level.
Bug: N/A
Test: system/sepolicy/tools/build_policies.sh
Change-Id: If6b1cf5e4203c74ee65f170bd18c3a354dca2fd4
This property allows us to disable sdcardfs if it is present. The old
property ended up getting repurposed, so a new one was needed.
Mediaprovider will also need to access this to determine what actions it
needs to take.
Test: builds
Bug: 155222498
Change-Id: I66ac106613cbb374f54659601e4ba3f61eaecd2f
There is no change in behavior. These denials were already
being blocked.
Bug: 79617173
Test: build
Change-Id: Iffd1e5ba42854615eeea9490fe9150678ac98796
Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
not the cause of the failure, but just a symptom that
storage isn't ready. Many apps handle the failure appropriately.
These denials are not helpful, are not the cause of a problem,
spam the logs, and cause presubmit flakes. Suppress them.
Bug: 145267097
Test: build
Change-Id: If87b9683e5694fced96a81747b1baf85ef6b2124
This is needed to get Java heap graphs.
Test: flash aosp; profile system_server with setenforce 1
Bug: 136210868
Change-Id: I87dffdf28d09e6ce5f706782422510c615521ab3
Since ipmemorystore service has been moved to network stack from
system service, also should revert the relevant sepolicy which is
corresponding to the previous configuration.
Bug: 128392280
Test: atest FrameworksNetTests NetworkStackTests
Change-Id: I1ae09696e620b246f817db71e7b71c32aae9be05
Move all app tmpfs types to appdomain_tmpfs. These are still protected
by mls categories and DAC. TODO clean up other app tmpfs types in a
separate change.
Treble-ize tmpfs passing between graphics composer HAL and
surfaceflinger.
Bug: 122854450
Test: boot Blueline with memfd enabled.
Change-Id: Ib98aaba062f10972af6ae80fb85b7a0f60a32eee
The testharness service will manage Test Harness Mode and provide a
command-line interface for users to enable Test Harness Mode; however it
does not directly provide a public API.
Bug: 80137798
Test: make
Test: flash crosshatch
Change-Id: Ie396e40fcea8914b4dd2247f2314e029b66ad84e
When an app uses renderscript to compile a Script instance,
renderscript compiles and links the script using /system/bin/bcc and
/system/bin/ld.mc, then places the resulting shared library into the
application's code_cache directory. The application then dlopen()s the
resulting shared library.
Currently, this executable code is writable to the application. This
violates the W^X property (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX), which
requires any executable code be immutable.
This change introduces a new label "rs_data_file". Files created by
/system/bin/bcc and /system/bin/ld.mc in the application's home
directory assume this label. This allows us to differentiate in
security policy between app created files, and files created by
renderscript on behalf of the application.
Apps are allowed to delete these files, but cannot create or write these
files. This is enforced through a neverallow compile time assertion.
Several exceptions are added to Treble neverallow assertions to support
this functionality. However, because renderscript was previously invoked
from an application context, this is not a Treble separation regression.
This change is needed to support blocking dlopen() for non-renderscript
/data/data files, which will be submitted in a followup change.
Bug: 112357170
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases
Change-Id: Ie38bbd94d26db8a418c2a049c24500a5463698a3
Move rules / neverallow assertions from public to private policy. This
change, by itself, is a no-op, but will make future patches easier to
read. The only downside of this change is that it will make git blame
less effective.
Motivation: When rules are placed into the public directory, they cannot
reference a private type. A future change will modify these rules to
reference a private type.
Test: compiles
Bug: 112357170
Change-Id: I56003409b3a23370ddab31ec01d69ff45c80d7e5
This is used to address a CTS testcase failure. This CTS
testcase need to access the content of Contact, some data
from ContactProvider is transfered through ashmem.
Currently ashmem is backed by the tmpfs filesystem, ContactProvider
in android run as a priv_app, so the file context of the ashmem
created by ContactProvider is priv_app_tmpfs. CTS runs as an
untrusted_app, need to be granted the read permission to the
priv_app_tmpfs files.
Bug: 117961216
[Android Version]:
android_p_mr0_r0
[Kernel Version]:
4.19.0-rc8
[CTS Version]:
cts-9.0_r1
[Failed Testcase]:
com.android.cts.devicepolicy.ManagedProfileTest#testManagedContactsPolicies
[Error Log]:
11-11 11:15:50.479 12611 12611 W AndroidTestSuit: type=1400 audit(0.0:811):
avc: denied { read } for path=2F6465762F6173686D656D202864656C6574656429
dev="tmpfs" ino=174636 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c113,c256,c522,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:priv_app_tmpfs:s0:c522,c768 tclass=file permissive=0
[Test Result With This Patch]:
PASS
Change-Id: I45efacabe64af36912a53df60ac059889fde1629
Kernel commit 8a2af06415ef0fc922162503dd18da0d9be7771f (ashmem: switch
to ->read_iter) switched ashmem from using __vfs_read to vfs_iter_read
to read the backing shmem file. Prior to this, reading from an ashmem
fd that was passed between processes didn't hit any permission checks;
now SELinux checks that the receiver can read from the creator's file
context.
Some apps receive buffers through ashmem from system_server, e.g., the
settings app reads battery stats from system_server through ashmem when
an app details page is opened. Restore this ability by giving apps read
access to system_server_tmpfs. system_server is still responsible for
creating and passing across the ashmem buffers, so this doesn't give
apps the ability to read anything system_server isn't willing to give
them.
Bug: 112987536
Bug: 111381531
Test: atest android.appsecurity.cts.PermissionsHostTest on kernel 4.14
Change-Id: Ice5e25f55bc409e91ad7e8c7ea8b28ae213191a3
Because applications should be able to set the receive
timeout on UDP encapsulation sockets, we need to allow
setsockopt(). getsockopt() is an obvious allowance as
well.
Bug: 68689438
Test: compilation
Merged-In: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
Change-Id: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
This gives the privilege to system apps, platform apps,
ephemeral apps, and privileged apps to receive a
UDP socket from the system server. This is being added
for supporting UDP Encapsulation sockets for IPsec, which
must be provided by the system.
This is an analogous change to a previous change that
permitted these sockets for untrusted_apps:
0f75a62e2c
Bug: 70389346
Test: IpSecManagerTest, System app verified with SL4A
Change-Id: Iec07e97012e0eab92a95fae9818f80f183325c31
Vendor-specific app domains depend on the rules in app.te so they
must reside in public policy.
Bug: 70517907
Test: build
Change-Id: If45557a5732a06f78c752779a8182e053beb25a2
Merged-In: If45557a5732a06f78c752779a8182e053beb25a2
(cherry picked from commit 1f4cab8bd4)
Do not let apps read uid_concurrent_active_time and
uid_concurrent_policy_time.
b/68399339
Test: Check that they can't be read from the shell
without root permissions and system_server was able
to read them
Change-Id: I6f09ef608607cb9f4084ba403a1e7254b8c49a06
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
Android uses hidepid=2 to restrict visibility to other /proc entries on
the system. This helps preserve user, application, and system
confidentiality by preventing unauthorized access to application metadata,
and addresses attacks such as
http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~zhiyunq/pub/sec14_android_activity_inference.pdf
Ensure the SELinux (weaker) equivalent is being enforced by adding
neverallow compile time assertions.
TODO: The "shell" user runs as both an Android application, as well as
spawned via adb shell. This was a mistake. We should separate out the
"shell" Android app into it's own SELinux domain. For now, exclude the
shell from this assertion. (The shell Android app is covered by
hidepid=2, so there's no leaking of data, but still, it's over
privileged today and should be cleaned up.
Bug: 23310674
Test: policy compiles. Compile time assertion only.
Change-Id: I0e1a6506b2719aabf7eb8127f046c4ada947ba90
This adds parellel rules to the ones added for media_rw_data_file
to allow apps to access vfat under sdcardfs. This should be reverted
if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext it used for access to
the lower filesystem
Change-Id: Idb123206ed2fac3ead88b0c1ed0b66952597ac65
Bug: 62584229
Test: Run android.appsecurity.cts.ExternalStorageHostTest with
an external card formated as vfat
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
This adds parellel rules to the ones added for media_rw_data_file
to allow apps to access vfat under sdcardfs. This should be reverted
if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext it used for access to
the lower filesystem
Change-Id: Idb123206ed2fac3ead88b0c1ed0b66952597ac65
Bug: 62584229
Test: Run android.appsecurity.cts.ExternalStorageHostTest with
an external card formated as vfat
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
tombstoned allows dumpstate to install "intercepts" to java trace
requests for a given process. When an "intercept" is installed, all
trace output is redirected to a pipe provided by dumpstate instead
of the default location (usually in /data/anr or /data/tombstone).
Note that these processes are already granted "write" and "getattr"
on dumpstate:fifo_file in order to communicate with dumpstate; this
change adds "append" to the existing set of permissions.
Bug: 32064548
Test: manual
Change-Id: Iccbd78c59071252fef318589f3e55ece51a3c64c
Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.
Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.
Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual
(cherry picked from commit a8832dabc7f3b7b2381760d2b95f81abf78db709)
(cherry picked from commit 11bfcc1e96)
Change-Id: Icc60d227331c8eee70a9389ff1e7e78772f37e6f
Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.
Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.
Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual
Merged-In: I70a3e6e230268d12b454e849fa88418082269c4f
Change-Id: Ib4b73fc130f4993c44d96c8d68f61b6d9bb2c7d5
Currently, some jni libs in /vendor/lib are allowed to be executed
in java process by labelling them as same_process_hal_file. This is
wrong because those jni libs are not in fact same process HALs.
After b/37481404, those jni libs for vendor apks are embedded inside the
apk just like downloaded apks.
In order to make this possible, appdomain is allowed to execute
vendor_app_file. Note that allowing this is not a Treble violation because
vendor_app_file is Java and JNI code only. Native libraries in
/vendor/lib are still prevented from being loaded in apps except for
those are labeled as same_process_hal_file AND are loaded via the
'sphal' namespace.
Bug: 37481404
Test: Phone application does not crash.
Change-Id: Ifaece2f05d0b20e28c4b1c0847f5ea0bb28ade02
Specify per-service rules for PDX transport. Now being able to
grant permissions to individual services provided by processes,
not all services of a process.
Also tighter control over which permissions are required for
client and server for individual components of IPC (endpoints,
channels, etc).
Bug: 37646189
Change-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea
Merged-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea
Sensord move in ag/2106763 should be accompanied by corresponding
sepolicy move of sensord-related files/declarations.
Bug: 36996994
Test: Sailfish build shows no related permission errors
Change-Id: Ibe41b363f7ca2752b5d3e0961298985cf784663d
Specify per-service rules for PDX transport. Now being able to
grant permissions to individual services provided by processes,
not all services of a process.
Also tighter control over which permissions are required for
client and server for individual components of IPC (endpoints,
channels, etc).
Bug: 37646189
Change-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea
Remove SELinux access from domain_deprecated. Access to SELinux APIs can
be granted on a per-domain basis.
Remove appdomain access to SELinux APIs. SELinux APIs are not public and
are not intended for application use. In particular, some exploits poll
on /sys/fs/selinux/enforce to determine if the attack was successful,
and we want to ensure that the behavior isn't allowed. This access was
only granted in the past for CTS purposes, but all the relevant CTS
tests have been moved to the shell domain.
Bug: 27756382
Bug: 28760354
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems. No collected denials.
Change-Id: Ide68311bd0542671c8ebf9df0326e512a1cf325b
The API does not expose the FD directly. But they are
used by libaaudio.so linked with the app.
Needed for low latency audio.
Bug: 37167970
Test: NativeOboe touch to tone latency app
Change-Id: I92372eff44d856e9aff399dc9c64fd18524fdc44
Signed-off-by: Phil Burk <philburk@google.com>
This adds fine-grained policy about who can register and find which
HwBinder services in hwservicemanager.
Test: Play movie in Netflix and Google Play Movies
Test: Play video in YouTube app and YouTube web page
Test: In Google Camera app, take photo (HDR+ and conventional),
record video (slow motion and normal), and check that photos
look fine and videos play back with sound.
Test: Cast screen to a Google Cast device
Test: Get location fix in Google Maps
Test: Make and receive a phone call, check that sound works both ways
and that disconnecting the call frome either end works fine.
Test: Run RsHelloCompute RenderScript demo app
Test: Run fast subset of media CTS tests:
make and install CtsMediaTestCases.apk
adb shell am instrument -e size small \
-w 'android.media.cts/android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner'
Test: Play music using Google Play music
Test: Adjust screen brightness via the slider in Quick Settings
Test: adb bugreport
Test: Enroll in fingerprint screen unlock, unlock screen using
fingerprint
Test: Apply OTA update:
Make some visible change, e.g., rename Settings app.
make otatools && \
make dist
Ensure device has network connectivity
ota_call.py -s <serial here> --file out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Confirm the change is now live on the device
Bug: 34454312
(cherry picked from commit 632bc494f1)
Merged-In: Iecf74000e6c68f01299667486f3c767912c076d3
Change-Id: I7a9a487beaf6f30c52ce08e04d415624da49dd31
This commit marks surfaceflinger and app domain (except isolated_app)
as clients of Configstore HAL. This cleans up the policy and will make
it easier to restrict access to HwBinder services later.
Test: Play YouTube clip in YouTube app and YouTube web page in Chrome
Test: Take an HDR+ photo, a normal photo, a video, and slow motion
video in Google Camera app. Check that photos show up fine and
that videos play back with sound.
Test: Play movie using Google Play Movies
Test: Google Maps app displays the Android's correct location
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: I0f468a4289132f4eaacfb1d13ce4e61604c2a371
This commit marks system_server and app domains (except isolated_app)
as clients of Graphics Allocator HAL. This makes the policy cleaner
and prepares ground for restricting access to HwBinder services.
Test: Play video in YouTube app and in Google Chrome YouTube web page
Test: Using Google Camera app, take an HDR+ photo, a conventional
photo, record a video with sound and a slow motion video with
sound, then check that photos look good and videos play back
fine, including sound.
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: Iea04d38fa5520432f06af94570fa6ce16ed7979a
The new binder_call() lines had to be added
because this change removes mediacodec from
binderservicedomain (on full-treble), hence
domains that could previously reach mediacodec
with binder_call(domain, binderservicedomain)
now need explicit calls instead.
Test: Youtube, Netflix, Maps, Chrome, Music
Change-Id: I3325ce20d9304bc07659fd435554cbcbacbc9829
Since hal_graphics_composer_default is now no longer
a member of binderservicedomain, these domains would
no longer be able to use filedescriptors from it.
Bug: 36569525
Bug: 35706331
Test: marlin boots, YouTube, Maps, Camera, video
Change-Id: I4c110cf7530983470ae079e4fbc8cf11aa0fab7f
Relabeling /vendor and /system/vendor to vendor_file removed
previously granted permissions. Restore these for non-treble devices.
Addresses:
avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for pid=2944 comm="dumpstate"
path="/system/vendor/bin/wpa_cli" dev="mmcblk0p10" ino=1929
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
tclass=file
And potentially some other bugs that have yet to surface.
Bug: 37105075
Test: build Fugu
Change-Id: I8e7bd9c33819bf8206f7c110cbce72366afbcef8
Renderscript drivers are loaded from /vendor/lib64 by following the
/system/vendor symlink. This change fixes a couple of things.
- Allows all domains access to follow the symlink
- Restores app domain permissions for /vendor for non-treble devices
- Allow app domains to peek into /vendor/lib64, but NOT grant 'execute'
permissions for everything. Since RS drivers can be loaded into any
process, their vendor implementation and dependencies have been
marked as 'same process HALs' already.
Bug: 37169158
Test: Tested on sailfish (Treble) & Angler (non-treble)
./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases \
--skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
--abi arm64-v8a
Result: Tests Passed: 743 Tests Failed: 0
Change-Id: I36f5523381428629126fc196f615063fc7a50b8e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
We should give appdomain the access to the /vendor/framework directory
since the jar in the directory is not dexopt-ed.AFAIK, jars which are
not in the bootclasspath are not dexopt-ed by default.
Bug: b/37129319
Test: built and confirmed that embms.apk not crashed
Change-Id: Ic2b1eef472f2fba53e26403dde8ad9ede8105a03
The change makes 'vendor_overlay_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like idmap, system_server, zygote and appdomain.
The overlay files contains RROs (runtime resource overlays)
Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video
Change-Id: I3596ca89ad51d0e7d78c75121f22ea71209ee332
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The change makes 'vendor_app_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like dex2oat, idmap, installd, system_server and appdomain.
Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video
Change-Id: Ib8757fedbf2e19c8381c8cd0f8f2693b2345534b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
This change associates all domains which are clients of Allocator HAL
with hal_allocator_client and the, required for all HAL client
domains, halclientdomain.
This enables this commit to remove the now unnecessary hwallocator_use
macro because its binder_call(..., hal_allocator_server) is covered by
binder_call(hal_allocator_client, hal_allocator_server) added in this
commit.
Unfortunately apps, except isolated app, are clients of Allocator HAL
as well. This makes it hard to use the hal_client_domain(...,
hal_allocator) macro because it translates into "typeattribute" which
currently does not support being provided with a set of types, such as
{ appdomain -isolated_app }. As a workaround, hopefully until
typeattribute is improved, this commit expresses the necessary
association operation in CIL. private/technical_debt.cil introduced by
this commit is appended into the platform policy CIL file, thus
ensuring that the hack has effect on the final monolithic policy.
P. S. This change also removes Allocator HAL access from isolated_app.
Isolated app shouldn't have access to this HAL anyway.
Test: Google Play Music plays back radios
Test: Google Camera records video with sound and that video is then
successfully played back with sound
Test: YouTube app plays back clips with sound
Test: YouTube in Chrome plays back clips with sound
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Id00bba6fde83e7cf04fb58bc1c353c2f66333f92
Test: no relevant denials on marlin while booting
Test: no relevant denials on angler while booting
Bug: 36278706
Change-Id: Ieba79e1c8fca4f74c63bc63e6dd0bdcf59204ca2
Prevent app domains (processes spawned by zygote) from acquiring
locks on files in /system. In particular, /system/etc/xtables.lock
must never be lockable by applications, as it will block future
iptables commands from running.
Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ifd8dc7b117cf4a622b30fd4fffbcab1b76c4421b
