Ideally, public should only contain APIs (types / attributes) for
vendor. The other statements like allow/neverallow/typeattributes are
regarded as implementation detail for platform and should be in private.
Bug: 232023812
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: diff <(git diff --staged | grep "^-" | cut -b2- | sort) \
<(git diff --staged | grep "^+" | cut -b2- | sort)
Test: remove comments on plat_sepolicy.cil, replace base_typeattr_*
to base_typeattr and then compare old and new plat_sepolicy.cil
Change-Id: I5e7d2da4465ab0216de6bacdf03077d37f6ffe12
Path to vendor overlays should be accessible to those processes with
access to vendor_overlay_file. This is okay when overlays are under
/vendor/overlay because vendor_file:dir is accessible from all domains.
However, when a vendor overlay file is served from a vendor apex, then
the mount point of the apex should be allowed explicitly for 'getattr'
and 'search'.
Bug: 285075529
Test: presubmit tests
Change-Id: I393abc76ab7169b65fdee5aefd6da5ed1c6b8586
Creating a per-user encrypted directory such as /data/system_ce/0 and
the subdirectories in it too early has been a recurring bug. Typically,
individual services in system_server are to blame; system_server has
permission to create these directories, and it's easy to write
"mkdirs()" instead of "mkdir()". Such bugs are very bad, as they
prevent these directories from being encrypted, as encryption policies
can only be set on empty directories. Due to recent changes, a factory
reset is now forced in such cases, which helps detect these bugs;
however, it would be much better to prevent them in the first place.
This CL locks down the ability to create these directories to just vold
and init, or to just vold when possible. This is done by assigning new
types to the directories that contain these directories, and then only
allowing the needed domains to write to these parent directories. This
is similar to what https://r.android.com/1117297 did for /data itself.
Three new types are used instead of just one, since these directories
had three different types already (system_data_file, media_rw_data_file,
vendor_data_file), and this allows the policy to be a bit more precise.
A significant limitation is that /data/user/0 is currently being created
by init during early boot. Therefore, this CL doesn't help much for
/data/user/0, though it helps a lot for the other directories. As the
next step, I'll try to eliminate the /data/user/0 quirk. Anyway, this
CL is needed regardless of whether we're able to do that.
Test: Booted cuttlefish. Ran 'sm partition disk:253,32 private', then
created and deleted a user. Used 'ls -lZ' to check the relevant
SELinux labels on both internal and adoptable storage. Also did
similar tests on raven, with the addition of going through the
setup wizard and using an app that creates media files. No
relevant SELinux denials seen during any of this.
Bug: 156305599
Change-Id: I1fbdd180f56dd2fe4703763936f5850cef8ab0ba
This is in addition to allowing setting of extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on files and dirs and to enable project ID inheritance through FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
Bug: b/215154615
Test: atest installd/StorageHostTest
Test: atest installd/installd_service_test.cpp
Change-Id: I769ae7ed110175dbb5d511a4345c57057d71ae64
Bug: 179094324
Bug: 156537504
Test: confirm that installd killing those processes are not brininging
selinux violation
Change-Id: Icac3f5acc3d4d398bbe1431bb02140f3fe9cdc45
Any FUSE filesystem will receive the 'fuse' type when mounted. It is
possible to change this behaviour by specifying the "context=" or
"fscontext=" option in mount().
Because 'fuse' has historically been used only for the emulated storage,
it also received the 'sdcard_type' attribute. Replace the 'sdcard_type'
attribute from 'fuse' with the new 'fusefs_type'. This attribute can be
attached on derived types (such as app_fusefs).
This change:
- Remove the neverallow restriction on this new type. This means any
custom FUSE implementation can be mounted/unmounted (if the correct
allow rule is added). See domain.te.
- Change the attribute of 'fuse' from 'sdcard_type' to 'fusefs_type'.
See file.te.
- Modify all references to 'sdcard_type' to explicitly include 'fuse'
for compatibility reason.
Bug: 177481425
Bug: 190804537
Test: Build and boot aosp_cf_x86_64_phone-userdebug
Change-Id: Id4e410a049f72647accd4c3cf43eaa55e94c318f
We should add sepolicy for installd to get permission to check for external_storage.sdcardfs.enabled before deciding that the system is using sdcardfs.
Test: Run on device not using sdcardfs, but with sdcardfs present in kernel
Bug: 160727529
Bug: 181819712
Change-Id: I79df67789ab003762337ad4e89e46892990d0e60
Bug: 168907513
Test: verified the correct working of the v2 uid/pid hierarchy in normal
and recovery modes
This reverts commit aa8bb3a29b.
Change-Id: Ib344d500ea49b86e862e223ab58a16601eebef47
a54bed6907
Bug: 151660495
Test: verified proper boot in regular mode and proper working of adb in
recovery
Change-Id: Id70d27a6162af6ede94661005d80a2a780057089
user_profile_data_file is mlstrustedobject. And it needs to be,
because we want untrusted apps to be able to write to their profile
files, but they do not have levels.
But now we want to apply levels in the parent directories that have
the same label, and we want them to work so they need to not be
MLS-exempt. To resolve that we introduce a new label,
user_profile_root_file, which is applied to those directories (but no
files). We grant mostly the same access to the new label as
directories with the existing label.
Apart from appdomain, almost every domain which accesses
user_profile_data_file, and now user_profile_root_file, is already
mlstrustedsubject and so can't be affected by this change. The
exception is postinstall_dexopt which we now make mlstrustedobject.
Bug: 141677108
Bug: 175311045
Test: Manual: flash with wipe
Test: Manual: flash on top of older version
Test: Manual: install & uninstall apps
Test: Manual: create & remove user
Test: Presubmits.
Change-Id: I4e0def3d513b129d6c292f7edb076db341b4a2b3
the cgroups v2 uid/gid hierarchy will replace cgroup for all sepolicy
rules. For this reason, old rules have to be duplicated to cgroup_v2,
plus some rules must be added to allow the ownership change for cgroup
files created by init and zygote.
Test: booted device, verified correct access from init, system_server
and zygote to the uid/pid cgroup files
Change-Id: I80c2a069b0fb409b442e1160148ddc48e31d6809
This gives us an easy way for the policy to refer to all existing or
future types used for app private data files in type= assignments in
seapp_contexts.
Apply the label to all the existing types, then refactor rules to use
the new attribute.
This is intended as a pure refactoring, except that:
- Some neverallow rules are extended to cover types they previous
omitted;
- We allow iorap_inode2filename limited access to shell_data_file and
nfc_data_file;
- We allow zygote limited access to system_app_data_file.
This mostly reverts the revert in commit
b01e1d97bf, restoring commit
27e0c740f1. Changes to check_seapp to
enforce use of app_data_file_type is omitted, to be included in a
following CL.
Test: Presubmits
Bug: 171795911
Change-Id: I02b31e7b3d5634c94763387284b5a154fe5b71b4
This gives us an easy way for the policy to refer to all existing or
future types used for app private data files in type= assignments in
seapp_contexts.
Apply the label to all the existing types, then refactor rules to use
the new attribute.
This is intended as a pure refactoring, except that:
- Some neverallow rules are extended to cover types they previous
omitted;
- We allow iorap_inode2filename limited access to shell_data_file and
nfc_data_file;
- We allow zygote limited access to system_app_data_file.
Also extend check_seapp to check that all types specified in
seapp_contexts files have the attribute, to ensure that the neverallow
rules apply to them. As a small bonus, also verify that domain and
type values are actually types not attributes.
Test: Presubmits
Test: Manual: specify an invalid type, build breaks.
Bug: 171795911
Change-Id: Iab6018af449dab3b407824e635dc62e3d81e07c9
/mnt/pass_through was introduced to allow the FUSE daemon unrestricted
access to the lower filesystem (or sdcardfs).
At zygote fork time, the FUSE daemon will have /mnt/pass_through/0
bind mounted to /storage instead of /mnt/user/0. To keep /sdcard
(symlink to /storage/self/primary) paths working, we create a
'self' directory with an additional 'primary' symlink to
/mnt/pass_through/0/emulated/0 which is a FUSE mount point.
The following components need varying sepolicy privileges:
Vold: Creates the self/primary symlink and mounts the lower filesystem
on /mnt/pass_through/0/emulated. So needs create_dir and mount access
+ create_file access for the symlink
zygote: In case zygote starts an app before vold sets up the paths.
This is unlikely but can happen if the FUSE daemon (a zygote forked app)
is started before system_server completes vold mounts.
Same sepolicy requirements as vold
installd: Needs to clear/destroy app data using lower filesystem
mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to walk
/mnt/pass_through
priv_app (FUSE daemon): Needs to server content from the lower
filesystem mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to
walk /mnt/pass_through
Bug: 135341433
Test: adb shell ls /mnt/pass_through/0/self/primary
Change-Id: I16e35b9007c2143282600c56adbc9468a1b7f240
In order for services registered with LazyServiceRegistrar to dynamically stop, servicemanager needs to be able to call into client processes (to notify them and trigger shutdown).
Bug: 143108344
Test: aidl_lazy_test
Change-Id: I402d0bcc5e668bf022162c7ce7393d5b77256479
Zygote/Installd now can do the following operations in app data directory:
- Mount on it
- Create directories in it
- Mount directory for each app data, and get/set attributes
Bug: 143937733
Test: No denials at boot
Test: No denials seen when creating mounts
Change-Id: I6e852a5f5182f1abcb3136a3b23ccea69c3328db
installd has been deleting files on the primary (emulated) storage
device for awhile now, but it was lacking the ability to delete files
on secondary (physical) storage devices.
Even though we're always going through an sdcardfs layer, the
kernel checks our access against the label of the real underlying
files.
Instead of tediously listing each possible storage label, using
"sdcard_type" is more descriptive and future-proof as new
filesystems are added.
avc: denied { read open } for path="/mnt/media_rw/1B82-12F6/Android/data/com.android.cts.writeexternalstorageapp" dev="loop9p1" ino=1224 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { write search } for name="cache" dev="loop9p1" ino=1225 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { remove_name } for name="probe" dev="loop9p1" ino=1232 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
avc: denied { unlink } for name="probe" dev="loop9p1" ino=1232 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
avc: denied { rmdir } for name="cache" dev="loop9p1" ino=1225 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vfat:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
Bug: 113277754
Test: atest android.appsecurity.cts.StorageHostTest
Test: atest android.appsecurity.cts.ExternalStorageHostTest
Test: atest --test-mapping frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/pm/
Change-Id: Id79d8f31627c0bfb490b4280c3b0120d0ef699bf
So it can dexopt these JARs.
Bug: 119800099
Test: DeviceBootTest.DeviceBootTest#SELinuxUncheckedDenialBootTest
Change-Id: I40b25319381654c607e17d6fc61e1a1c6fb0c1f1
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.
Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
The original fs-verity implementation requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN and thus
the actual setup is proxied through installd. Instead, upstream
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl checks write permission to inode, and thus
can happen in system_server.
Also, replace the old measure ioctl with FS_IOC_SET_VERITY_MEASUREMENT.
Note that although the number is name, they work differently.
Test: set ro.apk_verity.mode=2, in-progress CTS passed without denial
Bug: 112037636
Change-Id: I3e8d14321df8904dfed68b83aae8b3dd99c211ac
system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.
Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order
of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of
dac_override and dac_read_search checks. Domains that have dac_override
will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also
have that permission. Since dac_override is a strict superset of
dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have
dac_override to get rid of the denials.
Bug: 114280985
Bug: crbug.com/877588
Test: Booted on a device running 4.14.
Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
cgroupfs doesn't allow files to be created, so this can't be needed.
Also remove redundant neverallow and dontaudit rules. These are now
more broadly handled by domain.te.
Bug: 74182216
Test: Denials remain silenced.
Change-Id: If7eb0e59f567695d987272a2fd36dbc251516e9f
(cherry picked from commit 8e8c109350)
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.
Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
permissions.
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
installd needs to check whether idmap is outdated or not compared to
vendor overlay file.
Test: building succeeded and tested on sailfish.
Bug: 37179531
Change-Id: I934c1ae39e3f806bca1e3d68cf8190addeebb499
The change makes 'vendor_app_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like dex2oat, idmap, installd, system_server and appdomain.
Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video
Change-Id: Ib8757fedbf2e19c8381c8cd0f8f2693b2345534b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
seapp_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'seapp_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospSeappContexts
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
video
Change-Id: I19b3e50c6a7c292713d3e56ef0448acf6e4270f7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts
Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
