ADF is a modern replacement for fbdev.
ADF's device nodes (/dev/adf[X]), interface nodes
(/dev/adf-interface[X].[Y]), and overlay engine nodes
(/dev/adf-overlay-engine[X].[Y]) are collectively used in similar
contexts as fbdev nodes. Vendor HW composers (via SurfaceFlinger) and
healthd will need to send R/W ioctls to these nodes to prepare and
update the display.
Ordinary apps should not talk to ADF directly.
Change-Id: Ic0a76b1e82c0cc1e8f240f219928af1783e79343
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
When SurfaceFlinger -- or any BufferQueue consumer -- releases a buffer, the
BufferQueue calls back into the producer side in case the producer cares.
This results in a notification from surfaceflinger to bootanim.
This callback started in d1c103655533321b5c74fbefff656838a8196153.
Addresses the following denial:
6.164348 type=1400 audit(1397612702.010:5): avc: denied { call } for pid=128 comm="surfaceflinger" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:bootanim:s0 tclass=binder
Change-Id: I6f2d62a3ed81fde45150d2ae3ff05822bfda33fe
The ctl_default_prop label is a bit too generic for some
of the priveleged domains when describing access rights.
Instead, be explicit about which services are being started
and stopped by introducing new ctl property keys.
Change-Id: I1d0c6f6b3e8bd63da30bd6c7b084da44f063246a
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
Resolves denials such as:
avc: denied { open } for pid=3772 comm="Binder_4" name="cmdline" dev="proc" ino=26103 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=file
This seems harmless, although I am unclear as to why/where it occurs.
Likely just for logging/debugging.
Change-Id: I7be38deabb117668b069ebdf086a9ace88dd8dd1
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir>
files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and
untrusted apps. But we had to allow read/write to support passing of
open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems
that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well,
only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket. So there is no
real benefit to keeping it as a separate type.
Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until
restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility.
Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.
Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.
For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.
Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.
This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.
Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.
Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.
This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.
Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.
Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
When playing protected content on manta, surfaceflinger would crash.
STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
1. Launch Play Movies & TV
2. Play any movie and observe
OBSERVED RESULTS:
Device reboot while playing movies
EXPECTED RESULTS:
No device reboot
Even though this only reproduces on manta, this seems appropriate
for a general policy.
Addresses the following denials:
<5>[ 36.066819] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" name="tlcd_sock" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=627097 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file
<5>[ 36.066985] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:10): avc: denied { connectto } for pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" path="/data/app/tlcd_sock" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
<5>[ 41.379708] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:15): avc: denied { connectto } for pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
<5>[ 41.380051] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:16): avc: denied { read write } for pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[ 41.380209] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:17): avc: denied { open } for pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[ 41.380779] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:18): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path="/dev/mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
Change-Id: I20286ec2a6cf0d190a84ad74e88e94468bab9fdb
Bug: 12434847
There are continued complaints about not being able to generate
bug reports and surfaceflinger crashes. Move surfaceflinger
out of enforcing until I can resolve this.
Here are some denials I'm seeing. I'm not sure what binder service is
running in the shell domain... Need to do more digging.
nnk@nnk:~/Downloads$ grep "avc: " screenshot_runtime_restart.txt | grep surfaceflinger
<5>[ 5.182699] type=1400 audit(1389111729.860:9): avc: denied { search } for pid=186 comm="surfaceflinger" name="tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=627090 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 744.988702] type=1400 audit(1389112469.578:188): avc: denied { call } for pid=596 comm="Binder_3" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:shell:s0 tclass=binder
This reverts commit a11c56e124.
Bug: 12416329
Change-Id: I7b72608c760c4087f73047ad751a5bd069fa2ec7
When a bugreport is triggered using the device keys,
it generates a screenshot and places it into
/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports. SELinux is denying
those writes.
Addresses the following denials:
<5> type=1400 audit(1389047451.385:23): avc: denied { call } for pid=267 comm="Binder_1" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tclass=binder
<5> type=1400 audit(1389046083.780:37): avc: denied { write } for pid=4191 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-06-14-07-35.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=81874 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
Bug: 12416329
Change-Id: I318145591cda500094d98103d30b784df48a67be
Leave the domain permissive initially until it gets more testing.
Change-Id: I9d88d76d1ffdc79a2eff4545d37a9e615482df50
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init
In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.
When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:
1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.
Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.
Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
The binder_transfer_binder hook was changed in the kernel, obsoleting
the receive permission and changing the target of the transfer permission.
Update the binder-related policy to match the revised permission checking.
Change-Id: I1ed0dadfde2efa93296e967eb44ca1314cf28586
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
New property_contexts file for property selabel backend.
New property.te file with property type declarations.
New property_service security class and set permission.
Allow rules for setting properties.
